협조적 행위를 둘러싼 경제적 논리와 구조적 논리 = On the Cooperative Behavior: Economic Logic vs. Structural Logic

국문 초록 (Abstract)

  본 논문은 인간 사회에서 이타적 협조행위의 진화를 둘러싸고 진행된 기존의 논의를 경제적 논리와 구조적 논리로 구분하고, 각 논리에 따라 이타적 협조행위의 존재/진화가 어떻게 설명되는가를 검토한다. 경제적 논리는 이타적 협조전략에 부여되는 보수가 비협조전략에 부여되는 보수보다 커질 수 있는 물질적 보수구조에 주목하고, 이 보수구조 하에서 협조전략을 개체의 이기적 동기로부터 설명한다. 반면 구조적 논리는 개체의 이기적 동기로부터 설명될 수 없는 진정한 이타적 성향의 진화를 설명하고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 경제적 논리의 한계를 검토한 후, 그 대안으로서 구조적 논리를 제시할 것이다. 그리고 이타적 협조 행위의 진화에 유리한 조건을 창출시킬수 있는 구조적 요인들이 어떤 것이 있는가를 규명해보고자 한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

  This paper investigates the conditions for the evolution of altruistic cooperation in human societies. I categorize various hypotheses on this issue into economic logic and structural logic. Economic logic focuses on the conditions that change the material payoff structure so that cooperative strategies could be a best response for individuals. On the other hand, structural logic suggests that cooperative strategies are dominated in terms of material payoff at the individual level, but can evolve under specific interaction structures. Unlike economic logic, this logic focuses on real altruistic behaviors which cannot be explained by any material or selfish motivation. In this paper, I critically review some hypotheses based on economic logic and suggest structural logic as an alternative. I identify the structural conditions that could create favorable conditions for the evolution of altruistic cooperation.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 한국어 초록
  Ⅰ. 도입
  Ⅱ. 협조적 행위의 진화를 둘러싼 경제적 논리들
  Ⅲ. 협조적 행위에 대한 경제적 논리의 한계
  Ⅳ. 사회구조적 논리
  Ⅴ. 결론
  참고문헌
  ABSTRACT
  

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