중국철학 : 유가사상에 있어서 초월성과 내재성의 문제 -모종삼과 홀-에임즈의 담론과 관련하여- = Transcendence and Immanence in Confucianism: In Relation to Mon Tsung-san and Hall-Ames` Discourse

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

From a viewpoint of moral philosophy, fundamental difference between Mou Tsung-san`s transcendence claim and Hall and Ames` immanence claim lies in that Mou thinks that early Confucianism has something similar to transcendent law-giver or principle that justifies li(禮) and gives moral values to li, while Hall-Ames thinks that there is no such a thing. Hall-Ames` lack of transcendence claim seems not to be persuasive in the ethical point of view. It is because shu is a formal moral principle which justifies li. and shu is equivalent to Kant `s categorical imperative in its implication. So, Shu is a transcendent moral principle which satisfies with Hall-Ames` condition of transcendence. Tien(天) in Confucianism is a transcendent entity in the sense that it is an ideal entity which makes moral judgment in accordance with such a transcendent moral principle. Therefore, modern Confucians` assertion of `transcendent but immanent` is persuasive, because early Confucianism believes that sprouts of Tien`s moral capacities are immanent in men. Finally, aspects of transcendence and that of immanence all exist in early Confucian moral thinking. Both aspects are in complementary relationship. So, lack of transcendent aspect is not desirable. The combination of both aspects is required for complete moral thinking.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 호스퍼스 존, "인간행위의 탐구" 자작아카데미, 서울 1999

2 허버트, "공자의 철학" 1993

3 "蔡仁厚 輯錄, 人文講習錄" 學生書局, 臺灣 1996

4 "當代儒學之自我轉化" 1994

5 "孟子의 四端과 二階段公利主義" 39집 : 1999

6 "孔孟의 恕의 도덕판단 방법론에 관한 小考" 8집 : 1997

7 "儒家와 칸트의 도덕판단 방법론 비교연구" 77집 : 2003

8 "‘一以貫之’章 解釋의 檢討" 13집 :

9 "Thinking Through Confucius State University of New York" 1987

10 Heiner, "State University of New York" 1993

11 "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals" 1948