科學으로서의 批評 : 그 妥當性과 問題點 : With Northrop Frye's critical principle as the central figure Northrop Frye의 批評原理를 中心으로 = Criticism As Science : Its Validity and Problems

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The appearance of New Criticism has brought about the new controversy whether criticism is science or art. In other words, modern critics have classified the function of criticism or its activity into "description" and "value-judgement," and have asserted opposing opinions about this problem.
Frye asserts that criticism is science which is the structure of objective knowledge. In short, his critical attitude can be summarized as follow: if criticism is a structure of knowledge, and if knowledge and value are separate, then value cannot be a part of criticism. Finally, he takes the separatism between description and value-judgement.
His critical attitude, however, does not accomodate all the basic and important problems of criticism because his principle is very simple and schematic. Krieger and Hirsch dispute Frye's separatism. Krieger insists on anti-separatism, citing Kant's priority of cognition. Hirsch also asserts the necessity of value-judgement, using Kant's aesthetic Eigenschaft. Especially, Hirsch admits the objectivity of value-judgement, referring to Kant's aesthetic universality. In a sense, it seems that he tries to harmonize with the extreme opposite attitudes - Frye's separatiam and Krieger's anti-separatism.
If we admit Frye's separatism, firstly we must accept the great cultural sacrifices which abandon artistic quality of literature completely, man's unique aesthetic respones to literature, and its subject value. From this point of view, Frye's assumption-criticism is the structure of knowledge seems to commit "petitio principii. " Secondly, Frye's extreme inductive thought gives rise to the idea that criticism is the attempt of organizing our knowledge of only our past culture. We, however, cannot ignore the importance of deductive philosophy which helps to perceive the present and future culture in the history of human knowledge.
However, Frye's critical attitude has some problems which were above mentioned, we cannot deny the significance of his separatism in the history of criticism. When we admit G. Hough's view of the aim of criticism a complete criticism is to "understand literary work rightly on its own plane, and that we may know the better from the worse," Frye's "criticism as science" becomes the first order of work in critical activity.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 問題의 提起
• Ⅱ. Frye의 批評原理 槪觀 및 그 妥當性
• 1. 批評의 自律性
• 2. 科學으로서의 批評
• 3. 記述과 價値判斷의 分離
• Ⅲ. Frye의 批評原理에 대한 問題點
• 1. 文學의 自律性에 대한 問題點
• 2. 價値判斷에 대한 論爭
• Ⅳ. 마무리