공유재 이론의 적용 대상 확대 = Wider Application of Theory of the Commons

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The study of Public Administration is an application science that employs economic theory and models for the analysis of public finance. It usually adopts a theory of public goods. However, public goods are only a part of goods supplied by government. Most goods in the public sector are the commons (defined as rival goods without excludability) or the mixed goods. Theory of the commons has long been established, and the most famous is the theory of Tragedy of the Commons developed by Hardin. However, use has been limited to special areas such as fishery, forestry, and environmental quality. Most goods in the public sector are the commons, though the theories of the commons are applied to very limited goods. This study explores the ways to apply the theory of the commons widely to goods in public sectors such as budgets, performance, and other financial or human resources. The key for the wider use of the theory is the development of a feedback loop which connects private interest to public interests. It requires creativity and wisdom to develop such an incentive loop.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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