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      실제 이익조정이 장기 경영성과에 미치는 영향 = The Effect of Real Earnings Management on Long Term Performance

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

      Since Roychowdhury (2006) developed estimation models for real earnings management, such as abnormal cash flow from operation (ACFO), abnormal production cost (APC), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADE), several researches have been conducted using his estimation models. Although his models have contributed to studies on real earnings management in terms of helping researchers overcome the limitations of previous studies that were only able to capture individual operating activities, these models are still vulnerable to measurement error problems. It is argued that managers tend to relax their credit policy to boost sales and they reduce research and development (R&D) expenses to improve accounting numbers. However, similar to discretionary accruals, managers` activities considered to be real earnings management may deliver their private information (Subramanyam 1996). A manager who is aware that a customer whose operating performance will improve in a later period does not restrain the employee from selling products on credit. In addition, a manager who enhances the efficiency of their R&D process can achieve the same level with a smaller budget. Namely, Roychowdhury`s (2006) metrics may have positive as well as negative meaning. The former is related to private information, whereas the latter is associated with managers` opportunistic earnings management. If Roychowdhury`s (2006) metrics as to real earnings management embrace managers` private information instead of earnings management, it will be related to even an higher operating performance in succeeding period. This study investigates whether Roychowdhury`s (2006) measurement is negatively associated with a firm`s performance. Negative relationship can serve as the evidence that the measurement captures opportunistic earnings management on average. The followings are the empirical results of the study. First, real earnings management has a negative effect on long-term operating performance and stock performance. In other words, current real earnings management impairs not only the very next period`s but also the later period`s performances. We also find that stock price reflects this negative impact of real earnings management on long-term performance. Furthermore, this negative impact is more serious in long-term periods than in short-term periods, consistent with Graham et al. (2005). Unlike accruals-based earnings management, real earnings management distorts managers` operating decisions damaging actual performance. Although discretionary accruals are reversed in next period without a longer effect, the negative impact of real earnings management accelerates with the lapse of time. Second, upward (downward) earnings management has a negative (positive) impact on long-term operating performance. We analyze the differential impact with the direction of real earnings management. We define the earnings management brackets that are suspected to have different earnings management incentives: upward, downward, and unclear. While long-term operating performance decreases with upward real earnings management bracket, it increases with downward real earnings management bracket. Stock price declines only with upward earnings management bracket, showing that investors are more sensitive to bad news. Third, we find that investors can obtain abnormal profit with hedge portfolio based on real earnings management. It implies that firms with larger real earnings management are overvalued because real earnings management brings about mispricing in stock market. This study has some contributions. First, we try to mitigate measurement error problem in Roychowdhury`s (2006) model. In addition to his estimation models, we add the return on asset (ROA) variable to control a firm`s performance like performance-matched discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al. 2005). Although Roychowdhury (2006) included net income as a control variable in the regressions, we cannot control operating performance with his model. It is because the proxy for the real earnings management is independent variable in our analysis. Thus, we eliminate the correlation between real earnings management and firm performance in the estimation stage to minimize the measurement error. Second, we examine the gradual long-term impact of real earnings management on firm`s operating performance with the modified real earnings management model. Our finding suggests that his model contains not managers` private information but opportunistic earnings management on average. Third, we find that upward and downward real earnings management have differential impacts on the long term performance. While upward real earnings management aggravates future performance, it gets better with downward real earnings management. Our detailed analysis furthers the result of earlier studies.
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      Since Roychowdhury (2006) developed estimation models for real earnings management, such as abnormal cash flow from operation (ACFO), abnormal production cost (APC), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADE), several researches have been conducted usi...

      Since Roychowdhury (2006) developed estimation models for real earnings management, such as abnormal cash flow from operation (ACFO), abnormal production cost (APC), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADE), several researches have been conducted using his estimation models. Although his models have contributed to studies on real earnings management in terms of helping researchers overcome the limitations of previous studies that were only able to capture individual operating activities, these models are still vulnerable to measurement error problems. It is argued that managers tend to relax their credit policy to boost sales and they reduce research and development (R&D) expenses to improve accounting numbers. However, similar to discretionary accruals, managers` activities considered to be real earnings management may deliver their private information (Subramanyam 1996). A manager who is aware that a customer whose operating performance will improve in a later period does not restrain the employee from selling products on credit. In addition, a manager who enhances the efficiency of their R&D process can achieve the same level with a smaller budget. Namely, Roychowdhury`s (2006) metrics may have positive as well as negative meaning. The former is related to private information, whereas the latter is associated with managers` opportunistic earnings management. If Roychowdhury`s (2006) metrics as to real earnings management embrace managers` private information instead of earnings management, it will be related to even an higher operating performance in succeeding period. This study investigates whether Roychowdhury`s (2006) measurement is negatively associated with a firm`s performance. Negative relationship can serve as the evidence that the measurement captures opportunistic earnings management on average. The followings are the empirical results of the study. First, real earnings management has a negative effect on long-term operating performance and stock performance. In other words, current real earnings management impairs not only the very next period`s but also the later period`s performances. We also find that stock price reflects this negative impact of real earnings management on long-term performance. Furthermore, this negative impact is more serious in long-term periods than in short-term periods, consistent with Graham et al. (2005). Unlike accruals-based earnings management, real earnings management distorts managers` operating decisions damaging actual performance. Although discretionary accruals are reversed in next period without a longer effect, the negative impact of real earnings management accelerates with the lapse of time. Second, upward (downward) earnings management has a negative (positive) impact on long-term operating performance. We analyze the differential impact with the direction of real earnings management. We define the earnings management brackets that are suspected to have different earnings management incentives: upward, downward, and unclear. While long-term operating performance decreases with upward real earnings management bracket, it increases with downward real earnings management bracket. Stock price declines only with upward earnings management bracket, showing that investors are more sensitive to bad news. Third, we find that investors can obtain abnormal profit with hedge portfolio based on real earnings management. It implies that firms with larger real earnings management are overvalued because real earnings management brings about mispricing in stock market. This study has some contributions. First, we try to mitigate measurement error problem in Roychowdhury`s (2006) model. In addition to his estimation models, we add the return on asset (ROA) variable to control a firm`s performance like performance-matched discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al. 2005). Although Roychowdhury (2006) included net income as a control variable in the regressions, we cannot control operating performance with his model. It is because the proxy for the real earnings management is independent variable in our analysis. Thus, we eliminate the correlation between real earnings management and firm performance in the estimation stage to minimize the measurement error. Second, we examine the gradual long-term impact of real earnings management on firm`s operating performance with the modified real earnings management model. Our finding suggests that his model contains not managers` private information but opportunistic earnings management on average. Third, we find that upward and downward real earnings management have differential impacts on the long term performance. While upward real earnings management aggravates future performance, it gets better with downward real earnings management. Our detailed analysis furthers the result of earlier studies.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 송인만, "적자보고를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계학회 13 (13): 29-52, 2004

      2 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

      3 고종권, "재무보고이익-세무보고이익의 차이와 이익, 현금흐름 및 발생액의 지속성과 자본시장의 반응" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 127-162, 2006

      4 나종길, "유동발생의 예측오차와 감사인 유형에 따른 재량적 발생의 정보성 차이" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 117-142, 2004

      5 김권중, "신규 상장기업의 이익조정동기" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 87-116, 2004

      6 문상혁, "기업지배구조의 특성과 유동발생의 예측오차" 한국산업경영학회 21 (21): 217-257, 2006

      7 박종일, "기업지배구조와 이익조정: 최대주주 지분율을 중심으로" 한국회계학회 28 (28): 135-172, 2003

      8 손성규, "경영자-감사인간의 의견불일치와 감사인교체" 한국공인회계사회 48 (48): 205-229, 2008

      9 Gunny,K, "What are the consequences of real earnings management?" University of California 2005

      10 Bartov,E, "The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation" 68 : 840-855, 1993

      1 송인만, "적자보고를 회피하기 위한 이익조정" 한국회계학회 13 (13): 29-52, 2004

      2 김지홍, "적자 회피 및 이익 평준화를 위한 실제 이익조정 활동" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 31-63, 2008

      3 고종권, "재무보고이익-세무보고이익의 차이와 이익, 현금흐름 및 발생액의 지속성과 자본시장의 반응" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 127-162, 2006

      4 나종길, "유동발생의 예측오차와 감사인 유형에 따른 재량적 발생의 정보성 차이" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 117-142, 2004

      5 김권중, "신규 상장기업의 이익조정동기" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 87-116, 2004

      6 문상혁, "기업지배구조의 특성과 유동발생의 예측오차" 한국산업경영학회 21 (21): 217-257, 2006

      7 박종일, "기업지배구조와 이익조정: 최대주주 지분율을 중심으로" 한국회계학회 28 (28): 135-172, 2003

      8 손성규, "경영자-감사인간의 의견불일치와 감사인교체" 한국공인회계사회 48 (48): 205-229, 2008

      9 Gunny,K, "What are the consequences of real earnings management?" University of California 2005

      10 Bartov,E, "The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation" 68 : 840-855, 1993

      11 Dechow, P. M, "The relation between earnings and cash flows" 25 : 133-168, 1998

      12 Frankel, R, "The relation between auditors’ fees for nonaudit services and earnings management" 77 : 71-105, 2002

      13 Dechow, P. M, "The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors" 77 : 35-59, 2002

      14 Subramanyam,K.R., "The pricing of discretionary accruals" 22 : 249-281, 1996

      15 Xie,H, "The mispricing of abnormal accruals" 76 : 357-373, 2001

      16 Bushee,B, "The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior" 73 : 305-333, 1998

      17 Park, J. S, "The effect of the cost born by the auditor after the issuance of the audit opinion on the audit opinion" 25 (25): 57-77, 2000

      18 Healy,P.M, "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions" 7 : 85-107, 1985

      19 Graham, J. R, "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting" 40 : 3-73, 2005

      20 Basu,S, "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings" 24 : 3-37, 1997

      21 Szczesny, A, "Substitution, availability and preferences in earnings management: Empirical evidence from China" 2 (2): 129-160, 2008

      22 DeFond, M. L, "Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings" 23 : 115-139, 1997

      23 Bens, D., "Real investment implications of employee stock option exercises" 40 : 359-393, 2002

      24 Cohen, D. A., "Real and accrual based earnings management in the pre- and post-sarbanes-oxley periods" 83 : 757-787, 2008

      25 Zhang,W, "Real activity manipulations to meet analysts’ cash flow forecasts" University of Texas 2008

      26 Kothari, S. P, "Performance matched discretionary accrual measures" 39 : 163-197, 2005

      27 Kothari, S, "Information in prices about future earnings: Implications for earnings response coefficients" 15 : 143-172, 1992

      28 Scott,W, "Financial accounting theory" Prentice hall 2003

      29 Dechow, P. M, "Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation" 14 : 51-89, 1991

      30 Zang,A.Y, "Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation" Duke University 2007

      31 Chan, K., "Earnings quality and stock returns" 79 : 1041-1082, 2006

      32 Oh, H. T, "Earnings persistence and mispricing of accrual components" 9 (9): 65-86, 2004

      33 Phillips, J. D, "Earnings management: New evidence based on deferred tax expense" 78 : 491-521, 2003

      34 DuCharme, L. L, "Earnings management: IPO valuation and subsequent performance" 16 : 369-396, 2001

      35 Black, E. L, "Earnings management using asset sales: An international study of countries allowing noncurrent asset revaluation" 25 : 1287-1319, 1998

      36 Burgstahler, D, "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses" 24 : 99-126, 1997

      37 Roychowdhury, S, "Earnings management through real activities manipulation" 42 : 335-370, 2006

      38 Jones,J, "Earnings management during import relief investigations" 29 : 193-228, 1991

      39 Lin, S., "Earnings management and guidance for meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts" California State University 2006

      40 Mizik, N, "Earnings inflation through accruals and real activity manipulation: Its prevalence at the time of an SEO and the financial market consequences" Columbia university. 2007

      41 Barton,J, "Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management decisions?" 76 (76): 1-26, 2001

      42 Frank, M. M, "Do managers use the valuation allowance account to manage earnings around certain earnings targets?" 28 : 43-65, 2006

      43 Lee, H. Y., "Differential type of earnings management based on ownership structure" Yonsei University. 2008

      44 Dechow, P. M., "Detecting earnings management" 70 : 193-225, 1995

      45 Larcker, D, "Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance" 82 : 963-1008, 2007

      46 Fama, E. F, "Common risk factors in the returns of stock and bonds" 33 : 3-56, 1993

      47 Schipper,K, "Commentary on earnings management" 3 : 91-102, 1989

      48 Chung, H, "Client importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals" 78 (78): 931-955, 2003

      49 Dechow, P. M, "Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC" 34 : 1-20, 1996

      50 Park, S. S, "CEO turnover and earnings management through real activities manipulation" Sogang University 2008

      51 Peasnell, K. V, "Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?" 32 : 1341-1346, 2005

      52 Gaver, J., "Additional evidence on the association between income management and earnings based bonus plans" 19 : 3-29, 1995

      53 Cohen, D. A, "Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings" New York University. 2008

      54 Richardson, S. A, "Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices" 39 : 437-485, 2005

      55 Shin, G. K, "A study on the impact of the educational and training expenses on the firm performance" 21 : 173-185, 2003

      56 Choi, S. K, "A positive study on the choice of accounting method for research and development costs" 23 (23): 137-155,

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      2020 평가 계속평가 신청대상 (등재유지)
      2015-01-01 등재 우수등재학술지 선정 (계속평가)
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      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 1.96 1.96 2.48
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      2.65 2.74 5.829 0.22
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