Following a series of annual disasters which had caused a level of human and material damage previously unmatched and had left the victims distraught, the Japanese colonial power decided to carry out disaster relief in order to restore facilities and ...
Following a series of annual disasters which had caused a level of human and material damage previously unmatched and had left the victims distraught, the Japanese colonial power decided to carry out disaster relief in order to restore facilities and stabilize control over the state. In the 1910s(1910~18), the colonial power established a victim rescue system based on the `imperial gift` principle which aimed to emphasize the `benefits` granted by the Japanese emperor, and disaster relief was implemented accordingly. In the 1920s(1919~33), a temporary organization was formed to establish disaster relief policy, and the budget for disaster relief was greatly increased. From the mid-1930s(1934~45), discussions on prevention measures began in earnest, and disaster expenditure was increased again. As can be observed from the measures taken in 1939, characteristics pertaining to a war mobilization effort, such as the interlinking of the political moving of victims with wartime rationing, also became more prominent around that time. The first characteristic of the new disaster relief policy was the minimization of direct rescue. This appeared to be motivated by a discriminatory discourse targeting the alleged `laziness of the Chosun people`. The rationalizing logic of the colonial power and its desire for reformation and control of the Korean people―in particular, its intention to promote a `work mindset` through concepts such as self-rehabilitation ―were at work. The colonial ruler also aimed to kill two birds with one stone by simultaneously pursuing the cause of victim rescue through disaster relief and employing the victims towards industrial development, effectively combining colonial industrial development with disaster relief. Here the stakes of private capitalists who participated in public works and land development were clearly connected. The various disaster relief projects carried out by the colonial powers became more defined and systemized over time, but the violence of imperialism remained evident throughout. The Japanese government in Korea perceived the victims through the prism of a discourse centered around the `laziness of the Chosun people`, capitalists exploited disaster relief as an opportunity for accumulating wealth, and there was little consideration given to the actual damage suffered by the victims in the context of a `minimal rescue` policy. Yet as the population increases in a colony or as the social structure becomes more complex, the time and cost required to recover from a disaster augments. As modernization was achieved and investment in facilities increased, more resources had to be invested in damage restoration. Situations where the risk and scope of damage grows larger due to the facilities for disaster prevention are an unavoidable paradox of modern civilization in the cycle of `development` and `growth`.