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    UN 안보리 결의안 제2270호의 대북제재가 북한경제에 미치는 영향 분석

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A101891190

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Responding to recent military provocations of North Korea, UN Security Council passes Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, which includes provisions more stronger than those of existing resolutions in terms of depth and width. The empirical analysis on the economic effect of Resolution 2270 is important, for it provides the meaningful reference to evaluate the change of North Korea’s stance in the near future and set up policy alternatives toward such a change. North Korea’s import of capital goods, equipment parts, fuel and raw materials seems to play the role of another input in the production process. Then it is reasonable to think the extended production function in North Korea, that includes North Korea’s import as another factor of production besides labor and capital elements. The extended production function model is used in this paper to empirically analyze the economic effect of the new resolution. Specifically this study investigates the effect on North Korea’s real GDP when the provision to prohibit North Korea’s export of coal, iron and iron ore causes the decrease in export revenue to be used for the payment of North Korea’s import.
    North Korea’s annual data ranging from 1980 to 2014 is used for the empirical analysis. Findings are as follows: first, when North Korea’s export of coal, iron and iron ore is prohibited, export revenue is decreased by about 150 million dollars, and the consequent decrease in North Korea’s import may result in about 7.6% drop in North Korea’s real GDP. Secondly, the decrease of cash income through the shut down of the Gaeseoung industrial complex is about 120 million dollars. Consequently it may cause about 0.6 drop in North Korea’s real GDP. Thirdly, even though the provision to prohibit the exportation of workers from North Korea is not included in the new resolution, it is likely that such a provision may be additionally included in the resolution if North Korea continues to commit military provocations. It is reported that North Korea may get about 300~500 million dollars annually from the exportation of workers. Then the prohibition of the exportation of North Korean workers may reduce North Korea’s real GDP by about 1.5~2.5%.
    All empirical findings about the economic effect of sanctions are just about the short run effect. Eventually the reduction in North Korea’s overall production through the decrease in North Korea’s import may affect the capacity of reproduction in the North Korean economy. In the long run, it damages the functioning of the North Korean economy seriously. It is expected that North Korea may respond to economic sanctions of the new resolution through the mobilization of domestic resources. Considering the current situation of the North Korean economy, without the institutionalization of North Korea’s market such as institutional guarantees of user rights or proprietary rights on production assets, it could not succeed in the efficient mobilization of domestic resources enough to overcome the economic downturn caused by Resolution 2270. In this respect, economic sanctions on Resolution 2270 may affect the economic transformation of the North Korean economy.
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    Responding to recent military provocations of North Korea, UN Security Council passes Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, which includes provisions more stronger than those of existing resolutions in terms of depth and width. The empirical analysis on t...

    Responding to recent military provocations of North Korea, UN Security Council passes Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016, which includes provisions more stronger than those of existing resolutions in terms of depth and width. The empirical analysis on the economic effect of Resolution 2270 is important, for it provides the meaningful reference to evaluate the change of North Korea’s stance in the near future and set up policy alternatives toward such a change. North Korea’s import of capital goods, equipment parts, fuel and raw materials seems to play the role of another input in the production process. Then it is reasonable to think the extended production function in North Korea, that includes North Korea’s import as another factor of production besides labor and capital elements. The extended production function model is used in this paper to empirically analyze the economic effect of the new resolution. Specifically this study investigates the effect on North Korea’s real GDP when the provision to prohibit North Korea’s export of coal, iron and iron ore causes the decrease in export revenue to be used for the payment of North Korea’s import.
    North Korea’s annual data ranging from 1980 to 2014 is used for the empirical analysis. Findings are as follows: first, when North Korea’s export of coal, iron and iron ore is prohibited, export revenue is decreased by about 150 million dollars, and the consequent decrease in North Korea’s import may result in about 7.6% drop in North Korea’s real GDP. Secondly, the decrease of cash income through the shut down of the Gaeseoung industrial complex is about 120 million dollars. Consequently it may cause about 0.6 drop in North Korea’s real GDP. Thirdly, even though the provision to prohibit the exportation of workers from North Korea is not included in the new resolution, it is likely that such a provision may be additionally included in the resolution if North Korea continues to commit military provocations. It is reported that North Korea may get about 300~500 million dollars annually from the exportation of workers. Then the prohibition of the exportation of North Korean workers may reduce North Korea’s real GDP by about 1.5~2.5%.
    All empirical findings about the economic effect of sanctions are just about the short run effect. Eventually the reduction in North Korea’s overall production through the decrease in North Korea’s import may affect the capacity of reproduction in the North Korean economy. In the long run, it damages the functioning of the North Korean economy seriously. It is expected that North Korea may respond to economic sanctions of the new resolution through the mobilization of domestic resources. Considering the current situation of the North Korean economy, without the institutionalization of North Korea’s market such as institutional guarantees of user rights or proprietary rights on production assets, it could not succeed in the efficient mobilization of domestic resources enough to overcome the economic downturn caused by Resolution 2270. In this respect, economic sanctions on Resolution 2270 may affect the economic transformation of the North Korean economy.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 이석, "효율적 대북제제: 데이터 분석과 함의" 통일연구원 2016

    2 "한국은행"

    3 "통계청"

    4 장동구, "잠재GDP 추정과 생산갭의 인플레이션 지표로서의 유용성 검토" 3 (3): 1-37, 1997

    5 최요철, "우리나라 수출과 성장간의 관계분석" 8 (8): 43-75, 2002

    6 이상만, "북한의 경제성장 결정 요인 분석:북한과 중국의 성장함수식 비교" 평화문제연구소 21 (21): 137-161, 2009

    7 임호열, "북한무역의 변동요인과 북한경제에 미치는 영향" 대외경제정책연구원 2015

    8 이영훈, "북한무역 및 남북교역이 북한경제성장에 미치는 효과 분석" 한국은행 2004

    9 한국개발연구원, "북한경제지표집"

    10 이영훈, "북·중무역의 현황과 북한경제에 미치는 영향" 한국은행 2006

    1 이석, "효율적 대북제제: 데이터 분석과 함의" 통일연구원 2016

    2 "한국은행"

    3 "통계청"

    4 장동구, "잠재GDP 추정과 생산갭의 인플레이션 지표로서의 유용성 검토" 3 (3): 1-37, 1997

    5 최요철, "우리나라 수출과 성장간의 관계분석" 8 (8): 43-75, 2002

    6 이상만, "북한의 경제성장 결정 요인 분석:북한과 중국의 성장함수식 비교" 평화문제연구소 21 (21): 137-161, 2009

    7 임호열, "북한무역의 변동요인과 북한경제에 미치는 영향" 대외경제정책연구원 2015

    8 이영훈, "북한무역 및 남북교역이 북한경제성장에 미치는 효과 분석" 한국은행 2004

    9 한국개발연구원, "북한경제지표집"

    10 이영훈, "북·중무역의 현황과 북한경제에 미치는 영향" 한국은행 2006

    11 한국경제신문, "미국 ‘북한 근로자 해외송출’ 금지...돈줄 더 죈다"

    12 신용도, "대북 무역제재가 북한경제에 미치는 효과 분석" 한국테러학회 7 (7): 49-71, 2014

    13 이승현, "국제사회의 대북제재: 현황과 과제" 국회입법조사처 2013

    14 통일부, "개성공단 전면 중단 관련 정부 성명"

    15 통일부, "개성공단 임금 WMD 유입 관련 정부 입장"

    16 "US Department of the Treasure"

    17 "Resolution 825"

    18 "Resolution 2270"

    19 "Resolution 2094"

    20 "Resolution 2087"

    21 "Resolution 1874"

    22 "Resolution 1718"

    23 "Resolution 1695"

    24 "Executive Order 13722"

    25 남인욱, "2015년 북한경제동향 관련 통계자료" 18 (18): 57-84, 2016

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    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2023 평가 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
    2020-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (재인증) KCI등재
    2019-12-01 등재 등재후보로 하락 (계속평가) KCI등재후보
    2016-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (계속평가) KCI등재
    2015-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재후보
    2013-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 유지 (기타) KCI등재후보
    2011-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
    2008-04-10 학회명변경 영문명 : Korean Terror Association -> The Korean Association for Terrorism Studies
    2008-04-08 학회명변경 한글명 : 한국테러연구학회 -> 한국테러학회
    영문명 : Korean Terror Studies Association -> Korean Terror Association
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    학술지 인용정보

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    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.32 0.32 0.43
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    0.46 0.5 0.533 0.07
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