9/11 테러, 이라크 전쟁과 정보실패 = 9/11 Terror, Iraq War and Intelligence Failure

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The failure to prevent the September 11 attacks or find Iraqi WMD have put intelligence at center of last year's presidential campaign in the United States. The above cases are considered as two of the most damaging intelligence failures in recent American history. In this respect, this paper examines the meaning and types of intelligence failure and analyzes the real causes of it through comparing the events of September 11 with the case of Iraqi WMD.
An intelligence failure is defined as a misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests. It is considered as an important national security issue to inflict severe damages to the survival and prosperity of a nation, as seen from the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War.
It can be classified into 'the failure of intelligence organization' and 'non-intelligence failure,' reflecting the real causes of the failure. Through comparing the events of September 11 with the case of Iraqi WMD. I concluded that the events of September 11 was surely an intelligence failure, but the intelligence on Iraq should be considered rather as a political failure than as 'a failure of intelligence organization.' The problem lay not with intelligence professionals, but with the Bush administration. They wanted a war, so they demanded reports supporting their case, while dismissing contrary evidence.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 글은 정보실패의 개념, 유형, 그리고 그 의미를 규명하는데 목적을 두고 쓰여졌다. 이러한 목적을 위해 정보실패의 사례와 이론에 대한 기존 연구들을 검토해보고 이를 바탕으로 정보실패의 유형과 원인에 관한 인과관계를 이론적 분석틀로써 정립해 보았으며, 이를 부시 행정부 동안 발행한 2개의 사례들에 경험적으로 적용해보았다.
정보실패는 정책결정권자로 하여금 왜곡된 정책결정을 유도함으로써 국가의 생존과 번영에 치명적인 손실을 야기할 수 있는 심각한 문제로 인식된다. 정보실패는 크게 정보기관의 실책에서 비롯된 정보적 실패와 정보의 정치화, 정책결정권자의 오판 등 정보기관 외에 다른 외적 요소들에서 비롯된 ‘정보외적 실패’(non-intelligence failure)로 구분될 수 있겠다. 물론 정보실패의 상당 부분은 정보기관의 실책에서 비롯된다. 그런데, 외견상 정보실패로 보이지만 실상을 깊이 따져보면 정보기관의 잘못이라기보다는 ‘정보외적 요소들’(non- intelligence elements) 때문에 실패하게 되는 경우도 많다. 9.11 테러 사건은 분명히 정보기관의 실책에서 비롯된 ‘정보적 실패’로 규정될 수 있겠지만, 이라크 대량살상무기에 관한 정보판단의 왜곡은 정보공동체의 실책 이상으로 부시 대통령과 핵심 관료들이 정치적 목적을 위해 정보를 조작했을 가능성이 큰 것으로 평가되었다. 그러므로 정보실패의 많은 부분은 정책적인 대응이 미흡했거나 정보를 자신의 정치적 목적에 이용한 정책결정권자에게 있다고 보아야 할 것이다.

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