RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색

인기 검색어

    다국어 입력

    http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

    변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

    예시)
    • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
    • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
    닫기
    KCI등재

    주택담보대출 부도요인 분석을 통한 LTV 및 DTI 등 거시건전성 규제의 효과에 관한 연구 = An Assessment of the Effect of Macro-Prudential Regulations in Korea Based on Mortgage Default Analysis

    한글로보기

    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A101457127

    • 0

      상세조회
    • 0

      다운로드
    서지정보 열기
    • 내보내기
    • 내책장담기
    • 공유하기
      • URL 복사
    • 오류접수
    인용문이 복사되었습니다.

    부가정보

    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Using individual data of 165,463 mortgage loans which Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) provided directly for securitization from June 2010 to December 2012, we studied whether macro-prudential tools such as loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios also serve to achieve micro-prudential purposes. The relative importance and implications of these macro-prudential tools were reviewed carefully by analyzing the following four questions. First, we analyzed whether low LTV and DTI ratios effectively reduce default risk at an individual mortgage level. Our empirical results show that both LTV and DTI ratios affect the default rate of individual mortgage loans positively with statistical significance, but their relative explanatory power remains low at the 1.3 to 7.5-percent level. On the contrary, the credit rating of borrowers was found to be the most powerful variable providing more than two-thirds of the explanatory power of the model. Secondly, we examined whether it is appropriate on a micro-prudential basis to directly ban mortgage loans whose LTV or DTI ratios are in excess of regulatory limits. We found that the LTV ratio tends to positively affect the default rate on an increasing basis, implying that the LTV ratio limit at a certain level seems justified for micro-prudential purposes as well. However, the DTI ratio was found to affect the default rate positively but on a decreasing basis, implying that further study is required to answer whether the DTI ratio limit can effectively achieve micro-prudential purposes. Thirdly, we looked at whether it is appropriate to apply the uniform limits on LTV and DTI ratios indiscriminately to borrowers with high and low credit ratings, respectively. We found that the LTV ratio tends to have a greater explanatory power for borrowers with high credit rating. On the other hand, the DTI ratio was found to have greater explanatory power for borrowers with a low credit rating, implying that the current uniform application of LTV and DTI ratio limits calls for fine-tuning. Fourthly, we assessed whether the current policy initiative to improve the product features of mortgage loans is effective. As anticipated, we found that the transition from interest-only bullet loans to amortizing loans and from variable-rate loans to fixed-rate loans tends to lower the default rate. These findings provide several policy implications. First, considering that the credit rating is more influential variable than LTV and DTI ratios, the uniform and direct application of LTV and DTI limits needs fine-tuning. It may be worth considering the implementation of indirect (soft constraint) regulatory tools such as the U.K.’s loan-to-income (LTI) ratio, which limits the share of oversized loans, rather than oversized loans themselves. It would allow banks to better utilize their own capability to assess and screen borrowers with a low default risk. Secondly, the assessment of the DTI ratio as a tool to mitigate the default risk needs to be conducted with caution. Its relatively low explanatory power from the default model seems to be attributable to banks’ lending practices that assess the income of borrowers either too conservatively or inaccurately and/or the borrowers’ strategic reporting of income. Thirdly, as the possibility of a “strategic default,” especially among borrowers with a high credit rating, cannot be ruled out in Korea, the introduction of non-recourse mortgage loans needs to be approached with caution, suggesting that the availability of non-recourse mortgages be limited to borrowers with a low credit rating.
    번역하기

    Using individual data of 165,463 mortgage loans which Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) provided directly for securitization from June 2010 to December 2012, we studied whether macro-prudential tools such as loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-inco...

    Using individual data of 165,463 mortgage loans which Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) provided directly for securitization from June 2010 to December 2012, we studied whether macro-prudential tools such as loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios also serve to achieve micro-prudential purposes. The relative importance and implications of these macro-prudential tools were reviewed carefully by analyzing the following four questions. First, we analyzed whether low LTV and DTI ratios effectively reduce default risk at an individual mortgage level. Our empirical results show that both LTV and DTI ratios affect the default rate of individual mortgage loans positively with statistical significance, but their relative explanatory power remains low at the 1.3 to 7.5-percent level. On the contrary, the credit rating of borrowers was found to be the most powerful variable providing more than two-thirds of the explanatory power of the model. Secondly, we examined whether it is appropriate on a micro-prudential basis to directly ban mortgage loans whose LTV or DTI ratios are in excess of regulatory limits. We found that the LTV ratio tends to positively affect the default rate on an increasing basis, implying that the LTV ratio limit at a certain level seems justified for micro-prudential purposes as well. However, the DTI ratio was found to affect the default rate positively but on a decreasing basis, implying that further study is required to answer whether the DTI ratio limit can effectively achieve micro-prudential purposes. Thirdly, we looked at whether it is appropriate to apply the uniform limits on LTV and DTI ratios indiscriminately to borrowers with high and low credit ratings, respectively. We found that the LTV ratio tends to have a greater explanatory power for borrowers with high credit rating. On the other hand, the DTI ratio was found to have greater explanatory power for borrowers with a low credit rating, implying that the current uniform application of LTV and DTI ratio limits calls for fine-tuning. Fourthly, we assessed whether the current policy initiative to improve the product features of mortgage loans is effective. As anticipated, we found that the transition from interest-only bullet loans to amortizing loans and from variable-rate loans to fixed-rate loans tends to lower the default rate. These findings provide several policy implications. First, considering that the credit rating is more influential variable than LTV and DTI ratios, the uniform and direct application of LTV and DTI limits needs fine-tuning. It may be worth considering the implementation of indirect (soft constraint) regulatory tools such as the U.K.’s loan-to-income (LTI) ratio, which limits the share of oversized loans, rather than oversized loans themselves. It would allow banks to better utilize their own capability to assess and screen borrowers with a low default risk. Secondly, the assessment of the DTI ratio as a tool to mitigate the default risk needs to be conducted with caution. Its relatively low explanatory power from the default model seems to be attributable to banks’ lending practices that assess the income of borrowers either too conservatively or inaccurately and/or the borrowers’ strategic reporting of income. Thirdly, as the possibility of a “strategic default,” especially among borrowers with a high credit rating, cannot be ruled out in Korea, the introduction of non-recourse mortgage loans needs to be approached with caution, suggesting that the availability of non-recourse mortgages be limited to borrowers with a low credit rating.

    더보기

    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 방두완, "한국 모기지시장의 채무불이행 및 조기상환 분석" 한국금융학회 24 (24): 87-118, 2010

    2 김영식, "주택담보대출의 부실 가능성은?" 서울대학교금융경제연구원 1-31, 2011

    3 최성호, "주택담보대출 연체율의 분포적 특성을 고려한 미시 스트레스 테스트 - 이항분위회귀 모형을 이용하여 -" 한국주택학회 22 (22): 23-43, 2014

    4 박연우, "주택가격과 은행대출의 상관관계에 관한 연구" 한국금융학회 26 (26): 107-141, 2012

    5 이동걸, "우리나라 가계부채의 연체결정요인 및 취약성 연구" 한국금융학회 28 (28): 137-178, 2014

    6 신승우, "보금자리론의 채무불이행 및 조기상환 위험에 관한 실증적 연구" 한국주택학회 16 (16): 5-26, 2008

    7 성태윤, "글로벌 금융위기 이후 영미 금융 감독체제의 변화" 한국경제의 분석패널 18 (18): 1-53, 2012

    8 방두완, "국내 주택담보대출 LGD의 기본특성과 결정요인 분석: 아파트시장을 중심으로" 한국은행 18 (18): 51-83, 2012

    9 함준호, "개인CB 자료를 이용한 우리나라 가계의 부채상환위험 분석" 한국개발연구원 32 (32): 1-34, 2010

    10 Daglish, T, "What Motivates a Subprime Borrower to Default?" 33 : 681-693, 2009

    1 방두완, "한국 모기지시장의 채무불이행 및 조기상환 분석" 한국금융학회 24 (24): 87-118, 2010

    2 김영식, "주택담보대출의 부실 가능성은?" 서울대학교금융경제연구원 1-31, 2011

    3 최성호, "주택담보대출 연체율의 분포적 특성을 고려한 미시 스트레스 테스트 - 이항분위회귀 모형을 이용하여 -" 한국주택학회 22 (22): 23-43, 2014

    4 박연우, "주택가격과 은행대출의 상관관계에 관한 연구" 한국금융학회 26 (26): 107-141, 2012

    5 이동걸, "우리나라 가계부채의 연체결정요인 및 취약성 연구" 한국금융학회 28 (28): 137-178, 2014

    6 신승우, "보금자리론의 채무불이행 및 조기상환 위험에 관한 실증적 연구" 한국주택학회 16 (16): 5-26, 2008

    7 성태윤, "글로벌 금융위기 이후 영미 금융 감독체제의 변화" 한국경제의 분석패널 18 (18): 1-53, 2012

    8 방두완, "국내 주택담보대출 LGD의 기본특성과 결정요인 분석: 아파트시장을 중심으로" 한국은행 18 (18): 51-83, 2012

    9 함준호, "개인CB 자료를 이용한 우리나라 가계의 부채상환위험 분석" 한국개발연구원 32 (32): 1-34, 2010

    10 Daglish, T, "What Motivates a Subprime Borrower to Default?" 33 : 681-693, 2009

    11 Gerardi, K, "Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default" Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanata 2013

    12 Borio, C, "Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?" BIS 2003

    13 Hofmann, B, "The Determinants of Private Sector Credit in Industrialized Countries:Do Property Prices Matter?" BIS 2001

    14 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Revisions to the Standardised Approach for Credit Risk (Consultative Document)"

    15 Foote, C, "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers" NBER 2009

    16 Floros, I. V, "Qualified Residential Mortgages and Default Risk"

    17 Park, S. W, "Price Run-up in Housing Markets, Access to Bank Lending and House Prices in Korea" 40 : 332-367, 2010

    18 Deng, Y, "Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity, and the Exercise of Mortgage Options" 68 : 275-307, 2000

    19 Deng, Y, "Mortgage Prepayment and Default Behavior with Embedded Forward Contract Risks in China’s Housing Market" 38 : 214-240, 2009

    20 Guiso, L, "Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Mortgages" NBER 2009

    21 IMF, "Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them?: Lesson from Country Experiences" 2011

    22 Tucker, P, "Macroprudential Policy at the Bank of England" Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q3

    23 Qi, M, "Loss given default of high loan-to-value residential mortgages" 33 : 788-799, 2009

    24 Park, Y. W, "Loss Given Default of Residential Mortgages in a Low LTV Regime: Role of Foreclosure Auction Process and Housing Market Cycles" 39 : 192-210, 2014

    25 Borio, C, "Implementing the Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation and Supervision" 13 : 2009

    26 Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England, "Implementing the Financial Policy Committee’s Recommendation on Loan to Income Ratios in Mortgage Lending"

    27 Foster, C, "FHA Terminations: A Prelude to Rational Mortgage Pricing" 13 : 273-291, 1985

    28 송상윤, "DTI와 주택담보대출의 연체전이율간의 관계 - 분위회귀모형과 회귀절단설계를 이용하여 -" 한국주택학회 22 (22): 05-27, 2014

    29 허석균, "DTI, LTV 및 대출상환 조건이 주택담보대출의 연체율에 미치는 영향" 한국규제학회 21 (21): 39-77, 2012

    30 Amromin, G, "Comparing Patterns of Default Among Prime and Subprime Mortgage" Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 33 : 18-37, 2009

    31 Agarwal, S, "Collateral Pledge, Sunk-Cost Fallacy and Mortgage Default" Journal of Financial Intermediation

    32 Benoit, D. F, "Binary Quantile Regression: A Bayesian Approach Based on The Asymmetric Laplace Distribution" 27 : 1174-1188, 2012

    33 Hofmann, B, "Bank Lending and Property Prices: Some International Evidence" The Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research 2003

    34 Gerlach, S, "Bank Lending and Property Price in Hong Kong" 29 : 461-481, 2005

    35 Claessens, S, "An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools" IMF 2014

    36 Foster, C, "An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default" 3 : 351-372, 1984

    37 Deng, Y, "An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China" 31 : 117-136, 2005

    38 Kim, Y. S, "A Study on Mortgage Loan Borrowing Behavior of Korean Households: A Micro Perspective"

    39 Medema L, "A Practical Approach to Validating a PD Model" 33 : 701-708, 2009

    더보기

    동일학술지(권/호) 다른 논문

    동일학술지 더보기

    더보기

    분석정보

    View

    상세정보조회

    0

    Usage

    원문다운로드

    0

    대출신청

    0

    복사신청

    0

    EDDS신청

    0

    동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

    더보기

    주제

    연도별 연구동향

    연도별 활용동향

    연관논문

    연구자 네트워크맵

    공동연구자 (7)

    유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

    인용정보 인용지수 설명보기

    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2026 평가 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
    2020-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
    2017-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재
    2013-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2010-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2009-01-01 등재 학술지 통합 (기타)
    2008-03-28 학술지명변경 한글명 : 금융학회지 -> 금융연구
    외국어명 : Korean Journal of Money & Finance -> Journal of Money & Finance
    KCI등재
    2008-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2005-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
    2004-01-01 등재 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
    2003-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
    더보기

    학술지 인용정보

    학술지 인용정보
    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.57 0.57 0.64
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    0.61 0.62 1.431 0.06
    더보기

    이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

    나만을 위한 추천자료

    해외이동버튼