감정에 관한 또 하나의 퍼즐 = Another Puzzle Of Emotion

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

What I call 'Cognitivism' in this paper is a theory of emotion, according to one version of it (which I call 'Strong Cognitivism') emotion is nothing but a judgement or belief, and according to another version ('Weak Cognitivism') emotion is essentially dependent upon cognitive factors. Cognitivism is superior to other available theories of emotion for various reasons. First of all, it could individuate various modes of emotions. Secondly, it could explain the rational aspect of emotion. Thirdly, it could explain the normative aspect of emotion. Especially, I propose 'Cognition Dependence Thesis' for emotion to stand out its rationality as follows:
[Cognition Dependence Thesis] That a person has emotion E under the situation S depends upon the fact that s/he has a belief B (or does not have a belief B').
Following this thesis someone's having (or being in) a specific mode of emotion is rationally explained by her having (or not having) a specific belief. Also, I propose, we could individuate various modes of emotion by finding the very specific belief as expressed in the thesis.
Despite its pluasibility, however, Cognitivism has not been free from objections. I consider two. According to the first one, Cognitivism is wrong because we, in fact, experience some emotions for which we never find rational grounds. I claim, however, that this objection only shows that we sometimes have no clue for the grounds of our emotions. The second objection is an older and more serious one, which involves the infamous 'puzzle of fiction'. A long list of literature on this issue indicates that this has been puzzling many philosophers, and suggests that there might be no solution to this puzzle. I do not intend to offer another solution but only suggest a promising one.
Even if this puzzle is successfully solved, I claim, there would be another task for Cognitivists. For full-fledged rationality of emotion we should expect emotion to play an active role in yielding new beliefs or, even better, knowledge, which is put as follows:
[Causal Role Thesis] For some emotion E, if a person has E under the situation S, it is causally responsible for her having a non-trivial belief B.
I propose Cognition Dependence Thesis and Casual Role Thesis complete Cognitivism in the full sense. However, I claim that Cognitivism meets another puzzle -- we cannot have both theses. For, whenever we find a 'new' belief that is yielded by emotion, it is in fact an old one which rationally explains the very emotion.