On Mass Killings Generally and Consolidative Mass Killings Specifically.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation has two main parts. The first attempts to sort the many different kinds of mass killings we have observed. It traces their differences, similarities, and relationships to one another and other forms of political violence. This yields several different broad types of mass killing – coercive, repressive, developmental, expansionary, reconfigurative, and consolidative – each with different kinds of organizations competing for different kinds of political aims with different uses and patterns of mass killing.The second develops a theory of consolidative mass killing. This implies a short-term explanation for why actors competed and why their competition resulted in consolidative mass killings as well as a longer-term theory for where these actors and their conflicts came from. The short-term theory explains conflict through the nationalized, particular economic structure and explains mass killing through the organization structures of the competitors. The longer-term theory explains the evolution of these actors and their conflicts through a co-evolution of the economics, politics, and organizations.In the short-term, I argue insular elite politico-military-economic networks and mass-based political organizations found themselves competing for control of the state and economy. Because of the nature of the economy, all sides had few options for wealth and security beyond controlling the state. Because of the nature of their organizations, neither side could coopt or compel the other without drastic action. When mass-based political organizations’ attempts to overthrow these networks failed, these networks used one of their few available tools – mass killing – to consolidate their power.In the longer-term, I argue these actors and their conflicts evolved from a particular politico-economic context. Specifically, networks within the military ousted existing colonial or colonially sponsored powers. On the economic side, they inherited a relatively poor, largely agricultural economy with a few profitable exports. On the political side, they lacked strong organizational infrastructure or even informal network ties to a socially and regionally divided polity. To solve these challenges, these military networks pursued several political and economic policies simultaneously. Specifically, theysought to create national identities, rituals and practices, and sometimes one-party organizations. if this was unavailable, they sought to coopt existing political organizations in their state-building attempts.seized control of profitable export sectors, sought foreign investment, and pursued land reforms. all of this corresponded to their state-building projects: collecting resources for re-investment or patronage, weakening rivals, and attracting new supporters.On the one hand, these policies achieved many of their aims. Their economies often became larger, more efficient, and developed. These networks increased their own wealth and power as well as their organizational reach. On the other hand, they failed to solve some underlying problems and created some new ones. Economically, these countries remained relatively poor, highly agricultural, and highly dependent on select exports. It also became increasingly linked – as different regions’ investments, profits, and taxes became tied to the nationalized economy and its decision-makers. Further, locally, flows of people and resources remained largely the same which prevented any transformation of local politics and identities.Politically, this created an insular politico-military-economic network with strong organizational ties throughout the territory. However, it also generated resistance to this increasing power. Often, this involved counter-maneuvers by counter-elites – mutinies, separatist movements, coup attempts – none of which succeeded but all of which drove purges and exacerbated the already insular and military nature of these networks. More problematic, however, were mass-based resistance movements which flourished as economic crises increased popular discontent, decreased regimes’ patronage power, and increased their dependency on external patrons.To resist these movements, which increasingly contested local control (sometimes violently) and national viability (through elections, mass demonstrations, infiltration of the state and military), these networks invested in youth groups to mobilize support as well establish or defend local control. Where possible, counter-movements responded in kind. This created the context for the short-term competition which eventually yielded consolidative mass killing.