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    KCI등재 SSCI SCOPUS

    Game Changer: North Korea under the Obama-Lee Partnership and Beyond

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104866019

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Existing theories of coercive diplomacy logically pinpoint missing elements in the negotiating process and resulting outcomes concerning North Korean issues. They do not, however, explain why we have failed to obtain the elements crucial for influencing North Korean leaders’ perceptions.
    This paper claims that a lack of will to actually retaliate against North Korea is responsible for the successive failures to deter North Korea’s repeated limited-aim attacks, not a lack of capability. The author argues that credible intimidation lies at the core of “Proactive Deterrence.” Case studies in this paper also show that inconsistency in policy toward North Korea should be considered an important factor in the failure to coerce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
    Factors of domestic politics and ideological confrontation in South Korean society are also analyzed as part of several popular but flawed arguments concerning inter-Korean relations. In addition,the author assesses the current status and forecasts the future of the North Korean regime, a key factor in the inter-Korean relationship,the ROK-U.S. alliance, and future U.S. Northeast Asia strategy.
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    Existing theories of coercive diplomacy logically pinpoint missing elements in the negotiating process and resulting outcomes concerning North Korean issues. They do not, however, explain why we have failed to obtain the elements crucial for influenci...

    Existing theories of coercive diplomacy logically pinpoint missing elements in the negotiating process and resulting outcomes concerning North Korean issues. They do not, however, explain why we have failed to obtain the elements crucial for influencing North Korean leaders’ perceptions.
    This paper claims that a lack of will to actually retaliate against North Korea is responsible for the successive failures to deter North Korea’s repeated limited-aim attacks, not a lack of capability. The author argues that credible intimidation lies at the core of “Proactive Deterrence.” Case studies in this paper also show that inconsistency in policy toward North Korea should be considered an important factor in the failure to coerce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
    Factors of domestic politics and ideological confrontation in South Korean society are also analyzed as part of several popular but flawed arguments concerning inter-Korean relations. In addition,the author assesses the current status and forecasts the future of the North Korean regime, a key factor in the inter-Korean relationship,the ROK-U.S. alliance, and future U.S. Northeast Asia strategy.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 김재엽, "한국의 재래식 억제전략 발전 방안" 신아시아연구소 18 (18): 115-144, 2011

    2 정재욱, "북한의 군사도발과 ‘적극적 억지전략’의 구현 방향" 한국국제정치학회 52 (52): 137-159, 2012

    3 ROK Ministry of Unification, "Unification White Paper" The Ministry of Unification 2012

    4 Manyin, Mark E., "U.S.-South Korea Relations" CRS/The Library of Congress 2011

    5 Bolkcom, Christopher, "U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study" CRS 2006

    6 Han, Cheol-Yong, "Truth is One: Ontic Truth of the Second Yeonpyeong Battle" Palbokwon 2010

    7 George, Alexander L., "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy" Westview Press 1994

    8 Huth, Paul, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism" 87 (87): 1993

    9 Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, "Statement Criticizing the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) that is against the North Korean Human Rights Act"

    10 King, Robert R., "Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues"

    1 김재엽, "한국의 재래식 억제전략 발전 방안" 신아시아연구소 18 (18): 115-144, 2011

    2 정재욱, "북한의 군사도발과 ‘적극적 억지전략’의 구현 방향" 한국국제정치학회 52 (52): 137-159, 2012

    3 ROK Ministry of Unification, "Unification White Paper" The Ministry of Unification 2012

    4 Manyin, Mark E., "U.S.-South Korea Relations" CRS/The Library of Congress 2011

    5 Bolkcom, Christopher, "U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study" CRS 2006

    6 Han, Cheol-Yong, "Truth is One: Ontic Truth of the Second Yeonpyeong Battle" Palbokwon 2010

    7 George, Alexander L., "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy" Westview Press 1994

    8 Huth, Paul, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism" 87 (87): 1993

    9 Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, "Statement Criticizing the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) that is against the North Korean Human Rights Act"

    10 King, Robert R., "Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues"

    11 Kim, Tae-Hyo, "Small Power’s Leverage against the Great Power: The North Korean Crisis" 3 (3): 1996

    12 U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report" 2006

    13 Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, "Press Conference: Defector Survey on the Distribution of Overseas Food Aid" Seoul Press Center

    14 Choi, Jin-Wook, "People’s Perception Change on North Korea, Evaluation of the North Korea Policy" Korea Institute for National Unification 2010

    15 Sanger, David E., "Obama’s Nuclear Strategy Intended as a Message"

    16 Sanger, David E., "Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms"

    17 U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report" 2002

    18 U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report" 2010

    19 Powell, Robert, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility" Cambridge University Press 1990

    20 Powell, Robert, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense" 27 (27): 2003

    21 Korean Central News Agency, "North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) Report" 2012

    22 Lee, Myung-bak, "Meeting with His Excellency Lee Myung-bak, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations"

    23 Zakaria, Fareed, "Inside Obama’s World: The President Talks to Time about the Changing Nature of American Power"

    24 Jeh, Sung-Ho, "Humanitarian Aid to North Korea: The Present State of “South-South Conflict” and Its Implication for the North Korean Human Rights Issue" 18 (18): 2011

    25 Moore, Gregory J., "How North Korea Threatens China’s Interests: Understanding Chinese ‘Duplicity’ on the North Korean Nuclear Issue" 8 (8): 2008

    26 Moon, Jae-In, "Hardline North Korea Policy Caused the Yeonpyeong Incident" Hankyoreh Shinmun

    27 Office of the President, "Global Korea: the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea"

    28 Rhee, Sang-Woo, "From Defense to Deterrence: The Core of Defense Reform Plan 307" Center for Strategic and International Studies 2011

    29 Rhodes, Edward, "Conventional Deterrence" 19 (19): 2000

    30 Mearsheimer, John J., "Conventional Deterrence" Cornell University Press 1983

    31 Lee, Myung-bak, "Collection of Speeches by President Lee Myung-bak (Volume 3), The 65th Liberation Day Speech"

    32 이동률, "China’s Policy and Influence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue" 한국국방연구원 22 (22): 163-181, 2010

    33 Jae-Jung Suh, "Assessing the Military Balance in Korea" 극동문제연구소 28 (28): 63-88, 2004

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    2020-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (해외등재 학술지 평가) KCI등재
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    2016 0.24 0.18 0.22
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