한국 금융시장의 개방과 법률적 과제 및 검토 -한미 FTA의 금융시장개방 시사점-

김병태 국제거래법학회 2007 國際去來法硏究 Vol.16 No.1

A look back on the history of the financial sector reforms in Korea shows that the Government’s financial reforms since the early 1990s have focused primarily on financial deregulation and financial market liberalization. Like other previous financial reforms such as the ‘Five-Year Financial Reform Plan of 1993’ and the ‘Financial Market Open Schedule under the Guidelines of the OECD of 1996,’ the recent financial sector reforms and liberalization of Korea have been similar in some parts or further progressive in large parts compared to past financial reforms. In line with Korea’s financial market liberalization, its financial policy and reforms have to be compatible with guidelines laid out by the WTO and the OECD. Recently, they are embodied more often by Korea’s FTA(Free Tree Agreement) negotiations and agreements. One of them is the FTA between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America drafted as of May 25, 2007. This article deals with a brief review of Korea’s financial market opening or liberalization on the whole and legal problems connected with Korean financial market laying stress especially on the latest negotiation of the FTA between Korea and the U.S.A. which becomes the latest important means in financial market opening under the WTO structure. Since negotiations about financial market between Korea and the U.S.A by the FTA is not limited to issues or problems only between two countries, they can become important pine nuts that can examine Korea’s general financial policy and liberalization policy. In turn, it is noted that this article grasps problems with the up-to-date tendency about Korea’s generalized policy of financial market liberalization and examines their related legal problems on the basis of the discussion contents through the FTA between Korea and the U.S.A.

한·중 FTA: 지역주의 맥락에서

주장환 ( Jang Hwan Joo ) 아시아.유럽미래학회 2010 유라시아연구 Vol.7 No.1

본 연구는 다른 국가, 특히 중국과 일본과 같이 한국 역시 개별 국가 및 지역과의 FTA를 추진할 때 지역주의 측면에서 진행되어야 한다는 점을 중국의 사례를 통해 주장하고자 한다. 즉 중국의 한o중 FTA에 임하는 인식과 목적이 무엇인지를 규명하고 이를 통해 그들의 전략에 대한 분석을 통해 한국의 대응전략에 대한 현실적 함의와 시사점을 모색하고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구에서는 먼저 중국의 한o중 FTA에 대한 인식을 살펴본다. 이 부분에서는 중국의 대한반도 전략이라는 차원에서 접근한다. 다음으로 구체적인 중국의 한o중 FTA에 대한 목적을 그리고 이러한 목적을 달성하기 위한 추진 전략을 분석한다. 결론에서는 이와 같은 중국 측의 접근 및 사고에 대해 한국은 어떤 관점을 가지고 대응해야 하는지에 대한 의견을 제시한다. 연구 결과, 중국은 FTA를 ``조화 외교``라는 새로운 노선을 구현하기 위한 구체적인 전술로써 적극적으로 활용하고 있다. 따라서 자원 확보나 경제적 효과의 측면보다 동아시아 지역주의 형성과정에서의 주도권 확보 등의 차원에서 매우 적극적으로 한국과의 FTA를 체결하려 한다는 것을 알 수 있다. 그것도 낮은 수준의 조기 협상 타결을 목표로 상당히 적극적인 자세로 나올 것으로 예상된다. 그렇다면, 한국은 이에 대해 어떤 태도와 입장을 가져야 할 것인가? 이 질문에 답하기 위해서는 아래와 같은 차원에서의 준비 및 대응방안 마련이 요구된다. 먼저, 한국 역시 외교 안보적 차원에서 중국과의 FTA 체결이 향후 한국의 미래에 끼칠 영향에 대해 논의 및 결정해야 할 것이다. 주되게는 향후 동북아 및 동아시아 질서 재편과정에서 한국은 어떤 위치를 차지할 것인가, 한국의 북한 문제를 포함한 대 동아시아 혹은 동북아 전략은 어떻게 펼칠 것인가 등에 대한 분명한 전략적 판단을 내려야 할 것이다. 구체적으로 보면, 현재 병존하고 있는 동아시아 지역주의에 대한 여러 국가들의 방안 즉 미국을 중심으로 하는 ``아시아-태평양 주의``, 아세안이 추진하고 있는 ``아세안 주의``, 일본 그리고 중국의 방식 중 어느 길을 선택할 것인지 혹은 독자적인 방식을 마련할 것인지에 관한 심도 깊은 논의와 전략적 판단이 필요하다는 것이다. 다음으로, 외교 안보적인 측면 외에 경제적인 측면에서 한·중 경제관계의 특수성을 감안한 FTA 추진 논리 개발이 필요하다. 특히 고려해야할 한·중 경제관계의 특수성은 2003년부터 최대 수출 대상국 그리고 2004년부터 첫 번째 교역 대상국으로 표현되는 한국 경제의 중국에의 높은 의존도, 대중 수출의약 80%에 달하는 중간재 비중, 대중국 투자 상위국, 농수산업의 유사성 등으로 요약할 수 있다. 따라서 이러한 각 특수성에 맞는 대응 논리 및 전략을 세워야 할 것이다. 마지막으로, 어떤 형태의 FTA를 추진할 것인가에 대한 분석과 판단이 요구된다. 현재까지의 상황은 다음과 같다. 중국은 본문에서도 밝혔듯이, 협상의 범위가 좁고, 관세 양허 수준이 낮은 유형을 선호할 가능성이 높다. 그러나 한국의 입장에서는 관세수준 보다는 협상의 범위에 농수산 및 제조 상품분야 뿐만 아니라 서비스, 투자를 포함한 기타 이슈를 포함하는 포괄적인 협상이 국익에 더 유리하다. 특히 이와 관련해서 최근 타결된 중·뉴질랜드 FTA 협상에서 중국 측이 서비스를 포함한 포괄적 FTA에 합의 했으나, 실제 내용에서는 협정 발효 후 3년이 경과한 시점에서 개방 일정을 개정하거나 취소하기로 한점 등에서도 볼 있듯이 일정한 진전은 있되 실제 내용에서는 여전히 부실하다고 평가할 수 있다. 그러나 지역주의의 측면에서 이러한 대응 전략이 과연 현실적인지는 매우 신중한 고민이 필요하다. 따라서 이부분에 대한 보다 적극적인 검토와 논의가 필요하다. 또 기타 국가 및 지역과의 중국의 FTA 협상 과정에 대한 평가를 통해, 특히 아세안과의 협상 과정에서 보여준 중국 측의 ``파격적인 양보`` 행위를 고려했을 때, 한국이 요구할 양보는 무엇인지에 대해서도 실무적으로 고민해야 할 필요가 있을 것이다. This article argues that Korea``s FTA has to be gone on like China and Japan from a context of regionalism, through the case of China. The aim of this research is explore the material implications to Korea through getting at root of the recognition and purpose of China and predicting her strategy. For this, first, this article examine the recognition of China about Korea-Sino FTA. More specifically, I examine the China``s Strategy about Korea peninsula in this part. Second, this article analyzes the purpose and strategy of China that is designed for achieving those. Third, I present some suggestions about Korea for countermeasures on China``s these approach and thinking. As a result, China positively uses FTA to realize the new foreign doctrine, ``harmonious diplomacy(Hexie Waijiao)``, as a concrete tactic. So, China attaches more greater importance to diplomatic-security effect, to secure initiative of formation-process of east-asia regionalism etc. And China positively and quickly try to contract FTA with Korea. In addition, China is expected more positively setting for early contracting FTA with Korea. If so, what do Korea do? To answer this question, some preparations and countermeasure are needed as below perspectives. First, Korea has to discuss and decide the future effect after contracting FTA with China from a diplomatic-security dimension More concretely, Korea has to form a careful judgement about these problems, what position will do gain Korea in the process of reorganization of east-north asia and east-asia order in the future? Which way will do select Korea among ‘Asian-pacific way``, ‘ASEAN way``, ‘Japan way``, ‘Chinese way`` and an independent way. Second, Korea has to develop the promotion logic about economic dimension besides diplomatic-security dimension considering a particularity of Korea-Sino economic relationship. Especially, more attention is given to these situations, China has been Korea``s the largest export destination since 2003 and the largest trade partner since 2004, producer goods is more than 80% in Korea-Sino trade, similarity of agriculture and fisheries industries etc. So, Korea has to set the strategy according to these particularities. Lastly, Korea has to needed analysis and judgement about type of FTA with China. As to analysis, China prefer FTA with narrow-negotiation boundary and low- tariffconcession level to the others. But, this article argues that it is a more advantageous FTA for Korea that is included service and investment issues in addition to agriculture and fisheries and manufacturing industry. Korea also is prepare to think the solution when China give Korea to ``Early Harvest Programme`` that China has given to ASEAN in the negotiation-process of FTA.

The Prospects for Economic Reform in North Korea after Kim Jong-il and the China Factor

Troy Stangarone,Nicholas Hamisevicz 통일연구원 2011 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.20 No.2

In recent years, it has become clear that China is the most important external partner for North Korea. Total trade with China represented 32.7 percent of North Korea’s trade in 2003, and in four short years grew to 67.1 percent, excluding inter-Korean trade. China during its economic growth has tried to encourage North Korea to undertake a similar path of economic reform. Nearly every time Kim Jong-il has visited China, Chinese government leaders have made statements demonstrating China’s support for North Korea’s economic reform. Moreover, Chinese officials often try to highlight their economic successes to Kim Jong-il when he visits China. Often, Kim Jong-il made statements suggesting North Korea would reform, especially through Special Economic Zones, following these trips. Yet real economic reform and success has yet to be seen in North Korea. Interestingly, as North Korea’s relationship with China has grown closer in recent years, North Korea has also taken steps to build relationships with other partners. Kim Jong-il visited Russia in 2011 to discuss economic projects. But among Pyongyang’s top trading partners, Russia only breaks into the top ten on the import side as North Korea’s fifth largest import partner in 2010. Overall, North Korea has more trade with Egypt and Brazil than Russia, and almost as much with Mexico. North Korea also did around $50 million in trade with Germany, from whom it imported machinery to make wine and press fruit, while exporting apparel. Ultimately, only North Korea can determine the direction of its economic development. Provocations against South Korea have hurt inter-Korean trade, limiting this option of economic interaction. North Korea still restrains itself from fully engaging in Chinese-style reforms though the passing of Kim Jong-il may open opportunities for greater economic change. Moreover, despite its outreach to other countries like Russia, Egypt, and Brazil, North Korea still needs more trade and financial engagement with other countries to fully develop in the dynamic global economy. In recent years, it has become clear that China is the most important external partner for North Korea. Total trade with China represented 32.7 percent of North Korea’s trade in 2003, and in four short years grew to 67.1 percent, excluding inter-Korean trade. China during its economic growth has tried to encourage North Korea to undertake a similar path of economic reform. Nearly every time Kim Jong-il has visited China, Chinese government leaders have made statements demonstrating China’s support for North Korea’s economic reform. Moreover, Chinese officials often try to highlight their economic successes to Kim Jong-il when he visits China. Often, Kim Jong-il made statements suggesting North Korea would reform, especially through Special Economic Zones, following these trips. Yet real economic reform and success has yet to be seen in North Korea. Interestingly, as North Korea’s relationship with China has grown closer in recent years, North Korea has also taken steps to build relationships with other partners. Kim Jong-il visited Russia in 2011 to discuss economic projects. But among Pyongyang’s top trading partners, Russia only breaks into the top ten on the import side as North Korea’s fifth largest import partner in 2010. Overall, North Korea has more trade with Egypt and Brazil than Russia, and almost as much with Mexico. North Korea also did around $50 million in trade with Germany, from whom it imported machinery to make wine and press fruit, while exporting apparel. Ultimately, only North Korea can determine the direction of its economic development. Provocations against South Korea have hurt inter-Korean trade, limiting this option of economic interaction. North Korea still restrains itself from fully engaging in Chinese-style reforms though the passing of Kim Jong-il may open opportunities for greater economic change. Moreover, despite its outreach to other countries like Russia, Egypt, and Brazil, North Korea still needs more trade and financial engagement with other countries to fully develop in the dynamic global economy.

학술논문 : 특집논문: 한국과 중국 관계개선을 위한 지향점? ; 한,중 수교 20년과 양국의 군사관계 -평가와 전망을 중심으로-

기세찬 ( Se Chan Ki ) 한국군사학회 2011 군사논단 Vol.65 No.-

This study attempts to estimate the relations between Korea-China after the Korea-China amity and suggests the way of developments between Korea-China military relations. The relations between Korea-China has been growing throughout all the branches of politics, economics, cultures, and militaries over twenty years. But after 2008, the international situation around Korea-China became even worse due to the global financial crisis, deterioration of North Korea-U.S. relations, and impasse of South Korea-North Korea. As we have seen from the attack against the ROK corvette Cheonan and the shelling Yeonpyeong Island, the two countries failed to keep close contact to deal with those incidents and to sustain strong ties that had shaped since the beginning of the amity based on the growth of trades. Therefore, Korea-China relationship needs to develop not rhetoric but content. Although Both Korea and China have exposed differences over some problems, it is important to build two countries will be advanced to be more practical and cooperative relationship for the benefit of the two countries. To achieve this, the two countries have to have proper plans, preparations, and upgrade military relations beyond economics. We could say Korea-China military relations is a mutual exchange relationship. To develop the Korea-China relations at the practical level, we need to consider overall the relations between U.S.-China and North Korea-China that directly affect the Korea-China relations. We can`t establish the higher level relations, unless China adjusts China-North Korea alliance or the U.S. understands the development of Korea-China relations.

Korea-Sudan Relations During The May Regime

Kim, Jung-Doo 한국아프리카학회 2002 한국아프리카학회지 Vol.16 No.-

This paper focuses on the history of Korea-Sudan relations during the years 1969-1985, particulary the May regime mainly in political and economic terms. Both Korea and Sudan had been colonized. Korea was liberated in 1945 from Japan. On the other hand, Sudan went through a similar historical experiences with some differences it was liberated from British colonial rule in 1956. Sudan knew well Korea through the Korean war. South Korea sent goodwill missions Sudan since independence in 1945 for the purpose of normalization of relations. South Korea established diplomatic relations with Sudan in 1977, but North Korea had already established diplomatic ties with Sudan in 1969. Nimeiri's policy was directed toward the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. However, Nimeiri government made a complete u-turn from pro-Soviet stance to pro-Western one by 1976. On the other hand, In South Korea on June 23, 1973, the Park government issued a special Presidential declaration stating that it would open its doors to all countries that differ from it in ideology and political system. Korea made various efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Sudan through exchange of visits, mediation of influential figure, etc. As a result, Korea established consular and diplomatic relations respectively. The competition between was intense in Sudan for Sudan's support for their position in the non-aligned movement and in the international arena. Sudan supported sometimes South Korean position since 1976. Korea and Sudan concluded trade promotion agreement in December 1976 and cultural agreement in November 1977. The trade volume of two countries has been increased. Korea stressed diplomacy of visit and invitation with Sudan. Exchanges of visits of government officials Seoul in March 1983. President Chun Doo-Hwan and President Nimeiri agreed to extend bilateral cooperation in various field. they agreed to set up a joint ministerial ommission and a vocational training center with grant-type aid which cost more than 4.5 million. Nimeiri's visit to Seoul made bilateral relations reach a peak. During the May regime, South Korea's grant aid was $453,000 such as cultivator, water-pumps, etc. and its loan was $20 million for construction of guest house. the Daewoo Group invested directly capital in Sudan $7 million ITMD(tire maker) $33.02 million to SKCCC(construction), $20 million to BNB(bank). The total was $60.02 million. On the other hand, North Korea's grant aids were $750,000 for construction of the youth and Children Palace and $2 million for construction of four model towns, together with $2 million loans. Though the period is short, South Korea-Sudan cooperation has rapidly developed especially in economic fields. Thus the two countries became a good cooperative partner based on reciprocity and equity.

韩日“新型伙伴关系”评估与展望

강용범,고재휘 한국동북아학회 2007 한국동북아논총 Vol.12 No.4

With the cold war over, Japan has done an about-face in their foreign policy toward Korean government. To make Koreans forget about the past historical matters, Japan pursued an active foreign policy. In addition, former Korean president Taewoo Roh and Youngsam Kim showed positive attitudes to build up favorable inter state relationship with Japan. However, since 1990 Japanese government started turning to the right. To make matters worse, Korea met economical difficulties due to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Right at this time, the Kim Daejoong administration made the turning point of the relations between two countries. “ Recovery of destroyed relationship with Japan” became one of the central issues in foreign policy. Korea and Japan established the mutual cooperation on political, economical, cultural and security matters. Above all, opening of the cultural market closed to Japan initiated the “New age” between two countries. Unfortunately Japanese history textbook controversies in 2001 completely ruined this relationship between Korea and Japan. Although 2002 Korea-Japan co-hosted Worldcup sort of helped rebuilding the relationship, both countries realized they can never be free from the past historical matters. Roh Moohyun administration which claims to stand for “The government everybody can participate” have put great effort to fix up the situation between Korea and Japan. Roh Moohyun administration fixed it a rule to have the yearly summit conference, arranged the official meetings to conclude FTA(Free Trade Agreement) and declared the year 2005 as the Korea-Japan Year of the Friendship President Roh professed not to mention the past historical matters as governmental issue during his presidential tenure. While it runs into a lot of flak from the public considering it as humiliating diplomacy. Due to the enacting regulations of “Dakesima Day”by the Sinema County Parliament, Japan 2005, the territorial dispute recurred between Korea and Japan, and it led it to the cancellation of they early summit conference and the relations between Korea and Japan had to face the worst phase ever. In conclusion, historical matters and territorial dispute were supposed to be the biggest obstacles between Korea and Japan. But the relations between Korea and Japan seems to be more mature than the one between China and Japan. Because Korea and Japan have maintained diversified cooperation relations. 냉전이 종식된 후 일본의 대한반도정책은 커다란 변화를 가져왔다. 특히 일본은 한국과의 과거를 청산하고 적극적인 태도로 임했으며, 노태우, 김영삼 정부도 새로운 한․일관계의 정립을 위해 노력했다. 90년대 이후 일본정치의 우경화와 1997년 아시아금융위기로 인하여 한국경제는 위기를 맞게 되었다. 이러한 때에 김대중 정권은‘황폐해진 한․일관계’를 회복하는 것을 핵심과제로 삼고, 정치, 경제, 외교, 안보, 문화면에서 협력관계를 구축하였다. 일본문화에 대한 금지령을 해소하고 문화시장을 개방함으로 양국관계의‘새로운 시대’를 열었으나, 2001년 일어난‘역사교과서 풍파’로 인해 원점으로 돌아갔다. 2002년 한․일 월드컵을 계기로 복원되긴 했으나 역사문제는 여전히 넘을 수 없는 장벽이라는 것을 상기시켰다. 노무현 참여정부는 정상간 상호방문, 자유무역협정 체결로 2005년을‘한․일 우호년’으로 정하고 임기 내에 역사문제를 정부 차원에서 거론하지 않겠다고 공언 함으로대일 관계 구축에 강한 의지를 보였지만‘굴욕적인 대일외교’라는 비난을 면치 못했다. 2005년 일본 시마네현 의회가 법안을 채택하여‘다께시마의 날’을 확정함으로 한․일간의 영토분쟁이 야기되고, 정상 간의 정례방문이 무산되는 등 한․일 관계는 회복되지 못했다. 결론적으로 한․일 관계는 역사문제와 영토분쟁이 장애물이긴 하나 다각적인 협력관계를 유지함으로 중․일 관계 보다는 원활하고 성숙된 관계라 볼 수 있겠다.

한일수교와 일본표상 -1960년대 전반기의 한국영화와 영화검열-

오영숙 ( Young Sook Oh ) 한양대학교 현대영화연구소 2010 현대영화연구 Vol.6 No.2

This paper seeks to closely examine the characteristics and contexts of the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and Korean Cinema in the first half of the 1960s by focusing on the truth behind censorship and cinematic phenomenon during a specific era before and after the establishment of amity between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan amity was meant not only to develop Korea-Japan relations but an issue of legitimizing the Park Jung-Hee regime and as a critical plan intimately correlated to establishing the nation`s future. The Park Jung-Hee regime actively pursued a Korea-Japan summit for the purpose of economic development and concluded a Korea-Japan framework agreement in 1965, establishing amity and normalizing diplomatic relations. However, the majority of citizens found the government`s consistent humiliating and modest posture throughout the process of establishing this agreement problematic and began to express intense infuriation. The opposition struggle of the Korea-Japan agreement culminated with a student protest on June 3, 1964 and went on to expand further than mere anti-Japanese sentiment to rage at the Park Jung-Hee administration`s betrayal of nationalism and democracy, an administration who had previously committed publicly to uphold `national democracy`. Meanwhile, there was the rise of Japanese culture in Korean society which began in the early 1960s. In the 1950s, the Rhee Seung-man administration cried out for a `clean sweep of Japanese ways` and suspended all exchanges between Korea and Japan. However, subsequent to the April revolution and the seizure of power by the Democratic Party, humanitarian exchange along with cultural exchanges between Korean and Japan were generously permitted. As a result of print materials, music, and movies, the domain of popular culture and the so-called `Japanese rage` began to stir. Looking ahead at the point of signing the Korea-Japan agreement, the discussion enters a more serious level than that of Japanese films, Korean films and their exchanges. The movie industry began to accelerate the production and distribution of Japanese cultural goods. The Korean movie industry conveyed three different postures regarding Japan around the same time. 1) Adhering to the equation of `Japanese ways = box office hit`, various methods were utilized to attract Japan unto the screen 2) Adapting to the opposing atmosphere of the Korea-Japan agreement and appealing to the anti-Japanese sentiment of citizens by advocating nationalism. 3) Providing imaginary reconciliation via the narrative and spectacle of attaches between Korean and Japanese(romance, family relationship) in which beautiful and good Japanese woman sacrifice herself for Korean lover or persons. Although these three tendencies seem to be contrary to each other, these cinema was addressing the dual identity of Korean people as colonial subject. They reflect public need to solve the problem imaginarily by socially symbolic act such as cinema and cultural exchange. These cultural efforts were made vigorously to seek new relationship with Japan but reached a deadlock by the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and cinema censorship. In the first half of 1960s, cinema censorship and policies of cinemas in regard to Korea-Japan relations were oppressive but more or less unprincipled, temporary or easily fluctuating. Ultimately, one government`s cultural policies acted as the leading cause to the promotion of malformations of Korea-Japan relations. Fixation on anti-communism became linked to the fear of cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan, the inconsistencies of the censorship policy extinguished the trust cultural artists had in the government and in tandem, disheartened the volition of Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Furthermore, the anti-Japanese sentiment maintained by citizens was utilized as a foreign alibi to prop up the Park Jung-Hee regime`s inability to hold a liberal posture towards the Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Such cultural policies of the Park Jung-Hee regime ultimately became the cause of discord between economic, political, and cultural levels of the Korea-Japan relations during the Cold War period, which more or less languished in a state of disproportionate deformity.

한ㆍ중 경제관계와 `일대일로(一帶一路)` 대응방향

곽복선 ( Kwag Bok Sun ) 현대중국학회 2016 現代中國硏究 Vol.18 No.3

이 글은 한·중 경제관계와 중국의 일대일로 전략에 대한 한국의 대응 방향을 분석한다. 중국정부가 2013년부터 추진해오고 있는 일대일로 전략에 대해 국내외 자료들은 주로 미·중의 세력 재균형, 사회간접자본 건설, 자원, 물류, 유라시아 이니셔티브와 연계 등 시각에서 다루고 있다. 본 논문에서는 시각을 달리하여 한국과 중국, 한국과 일대일로 국가들과의 무역, 투자 현황을 비교분석하고, 이를 통해 한국의 입장에서 일대일로전략에 대한 대응방향을 찾아보았다. 분석결과 한국의 입장에서 일대일로 국가들은 중국과 같은 정도의 중요성을 가지고 있으므로, 이들 국가들에 대한 진출은 중국이 주도하는 일대일로의 프레임 안에서의 신규 진출과 프레임 밖에서 기존의 진출을 확대하는 것이 모두 시도되어야 할 것이다. 한국의 진출이 부진하거나 중국의 주도권이 강한 지역에서는 중국과의 협력기반을 통해 진출해야하며, 동남아시아와 같이 기존의 경제협력 관계가 많은 지역은 기본적으로 한국의 독자적 진출가능 영역을 심화 확대하는 방향을 모색해야 한다. 중국과의 협력진출이 필요한 지역에서는 중국을 통해 현지 정부, 기업과 협력 프레임을 만드는 방향을 모색해야 하며, 가능한 경우 무역과 투자 자유화의 수준을 높이는 FTA같은 협력 프레임을 구축하는 방향으로 가야한다. 일대일로와 관련 중국 자체에 대한 한국의 대응방향은 유라시아 이니셔티브와 일대일로의 연결을 현실화하는 것은 물론, 서부지역과 푸젠성(福建省) 등 중국 내부의 일대일로 건설 중점지역에서의 중국과의 경제협력을 실제화 하는 것이 모색되어야 한다. 또한, 중국과는 이미 이루어져있는 한·중 FTA라는 경제교류 자유화 프레임을 강화하는 방향에 초점이 주어져야 하며, 이러한 협력기반 위에 일대일로 국가들에서 양국 경제협력이 이루어져야 한다. This paper attempts to analyze Korea-China economic relations and counter measures for Korea on China`s One Belt & One Road strategy. On One Belt & One Road strategy which is being pushed forward by China since 2013, many domestic and foreign papers mainly handle it from a viewpoint of power rebalancing between USA and China, SOC projects, energy resources development, logistic channels, Eurasia initiative etc. This paper studied comparatively on situations of trade volumes and FDI both of Korea-China and Korea-One Belt & One Road countries and tried to find out counter measures for Korea different from existing angles on One Belt & One Road strategy. As a result of analysis, it is known that One Belt & One Road countries have a same importance as China from Korea`s viewpoint. So, Korea should try to expand market developments in these countries within frame of One Belt & One Road led by China`s initiative and at the same time try to strengthen already existing footholds in those countries outside from that frame. Therefore, it is suggested as follows. In those countries where Korea has a weak basis or China has a great influence, Korea should enter those countries through cooperative relations with China and in those countries where Korea has established a good basis of economic cooperations as like ASEAN countries, Korea should expand and deepen her own domains regardless of China. In those regions where demand cooperative entering with China, Korea should construct cooperation frame with those countries` governments and companies through cooperative basis with China. and try to establish cooperative frames to promote level of liberalization on trade and investment as like FTA with them. Within China territory, Korea should try to connect Eurasia initiative and One Belt & One Road project and substantialize economic cooperations with China in core regions for One Belt & One Road project as like China`s western provinces and Fujian province. In addition to those cooperations, Korea should try to strengthen Korea-China FTA as a basic frame for economic exchange liberalization and on such basis, make an effort to create economic cooperations with China in One Belt & One Road countries.

경제안보시대의 한일 무역 동향에 관한 고찰

송정현 한국일본근대학회 2023 일본근대학연구 Vol.- No.82

The G2 friction ignited by the U.S. tariff imposition on China in 2016 gradually intensified, causing the reorganization of the existing global supply chain, and the concept of economic security using economic means to secure its own security is drawing keen attention. Accordingly, this study conducted three analysis of trade trends by item: 1)Korea-Japan trade trends after 2000, 2)trade trends before and after the Korea-Japan trade dispute in 2019, and 3)trade trends by item. The results of this study are as follows. First of all, in the case of Korea-Japan trade trends since 2000, the trade volume between Korea and Japan more than doubled compared to 2000, and the trade deficit more than doubled compared to 2000 as exports and imports increased at the same time. 2)In the case of trade trends before and after the 2019 Korea-Japan trade dispute, it can be seen that Korea's exports to Japan increased and imports to Japan decreased after the Korea-Japan trade dispute. However, considering that logistics movement between countries was limited due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, the above results are unlikely to be a clear basis for the negative impact of the Korea-Japan trade dispute on Korea-Japan trade.3)In terms of trade trends by item, the top 10 items of import and export in 2000, 2012, and 2022 were similar. In particular, the top three items of import and the top two items of export were major trade items between Korea and Japan. The significance of this study is as follows. First of all, it analyzes the post-war trade structure trends of Korea-Japan semiconductor export regulations that occurred in 2019. With the importance of economic security increasing, it is very important to understand the impact of the implementation of trade regulation policies of a specific country on trade between the implementing country and the target country. The second point is an analysis of trade trends by item between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan trade has benefited both countries through interdependence. However, the global trade landscape has changed, especially in the era of economic security, and since each trade item will have different ripple effects on the country's military security and economic sectors, it is expected to be used as a basic analysis survey in establishing trade policies and foreign policies.

Enemy, Homager or Equal Partner?: Evolving Korea-China Relations

김흥규 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2012 Journal of International and Area Studies Vol.19 No.2

Since the formal establishment of South Korea (hereafter, Korea)-the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China) relations in 1992, the bilateral relationship has recorded tremendous success in terms of trade volume, cooperation on the North Korean nuclear crisis, and the magnitude of exchanges in various areas. However, it is also true that the bilateral relations still remain far from satisfaction in terms of depth and degree of communication, crisis management, and a shared vision. Given Korean’s psychological alertness and apprehension formed over a long history of contacts with China, differences in political system, mutual misperceptions, and degree of understanding, these problems cast serious challenges for future relations between the two countries. In the future, Korea-China relations could be sour and bumpy if the Korean government relies excessively on security-oriented approaches, centering on its alliance with the U.S. Korea needs to exercise a “creative middle power-pragmatic diplomacy” in dealing with China. The objective is to establish a positive-sum game in the Korea-China strategic cooperative partnership, extending consultation and cooperation beyond security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Both the Korea-U.S. alliance and the Korea-China strategic cooperative partnership should be the foundation of Korea’s diplomatic assets, under which Korea would try to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. The substance of Korea-China relations will be determined by the policies of each government to consolidate the “cooperative strategic partnership.” Sound communication, political will, and strategic management matter. The future relationship of Korea with China is at the crossroad among the ranges of being enemy, homager, or equal partner. Korea obviously favors the establishment of an equal partnership with China, based upon the common principles of mutual respect, cooperation, and co-prosperity.