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본 연구는 한 북한이탈청년이 후기 청소년기에서부터 청년에 이르기까지 대한민국에서 정착한 청년의 삶에 관한 생애사 연구이다. 현재 사회 초년생으로 성인이 되기까지 북한이탈청년으로의 생애 경험을 연대기적으로 관찰하여 자신의 삶의 의미를 이루는 주체성의 형성과 이를 둘러 싼 환경적 맥락을 살펴보고자 한다. 2021년 9월 기준으로 대한민국에 입국한 북한이탈주민 총 33,400명 중, 20-40세대가 64.5%를 이룬다. 북한이탈주민 중 여성과 청소년에 관한 연구대상이 주를 이루는 반면, 대상자 전체의 가장 높은 비율을 차지하는 미래의 사회에 중추적 역할을 하는 청년에 대한 연구는 상대적으로 미흡한 편이다. 북한이탈청년은 사회 통합의 주체로 사회 구성원 내의 동등성을 취한다는 차원에서 이들의 주체성 연구는 보다 다양해져야 한다. 본 연구는 북한이탈청년의 정체성 형성 과정을 통해 자신의 실존에 관하여 성찰하는 한 개인과 이를 둘러싼 환경과의 관계를 확인함으로 북한이탈청년의 개별적 특수성이 전체 사회와 함께 조화를 이루는 과정과 그 가능성에 대해 모색해보고자 한다. 본 연구는 생애사 질적 연구방법을 통해 이루어졌으며, 생태학적 관점의 브론펜브레너(Brofenbrenner)의 생태학적 체계이론을 분석도구로 정하였다. 먼저, 연구 참여자는 총 4번의 주체성이 재구성 되어 왔으며 이 사건을 연대적으로 구획할 수 있다. 각 단계는 ‘선택의 부재’, ‘‘차이’가 주는 충격과 극복’, ‘선택 기준의 전이’, ‘타인의 존재에 관한 새로운 의미 발견’으로 구성되며, 각 경로에서 경험의 축적과 사고의 전이가 발생하는 것을 확인할 수 있다. 또한, 그의 시간 체계에서 이루어가는 삶의 의미에 영향을 미치는 환경 요소를 4개의 환경체계로 구분해볼 수 있었다. 개인적 특성의 발현 과정에 영향을 미친 학습 공간의 구성체, 사회적 지지체계, 학습 기회의 장 그리고 정착 지원제도라는 4가지 체계로 구분해 볼 수 있었으며 환경 체계간의 상호작용을 통해 북한이탈청년의 성장에 영향을 미치는 요인을 확인할 수 있었다. 본 연구는 북한이탈청년이 ‘청년이 되어 감’의 의미를 주체성의 형성과정을 통해 밝혔으며, 문제 요인에 따른 횡적인 연구보다는 한 청년의 삶을 종적으로 바라보는 것으로 그 의미를 지닌다. 북한이탈청년 스스로 자신의 실존을 탐색해가며 지속적으로 변화를 시도함으로 ‘자아’와 ‘타자’의 위치가 전복되어 가는 순환 과정을 겪음을 보여준다. 이를 통해 북한이탈주민에 관한 연구와 정착실태를 근본적으로 전환하는 해석의 틀을 제시해준다는 점에서 연구의 의의를 이루며, 앞으로 북한이탈청년에 관한 종단 연구가 확대되길 기대하는 바이다. This study aims to understand how a North Korean defector experiences who is settled in South Korea from late adolescence to youth and how his subjectivity has constructed as time went by. It figures out the process of meaning of one's life by chronologically observing the life experiences from the beginning of settlement to adulthood which relates to the environmental context surrounding him. As of September 2021, 64.5% youth of the total 33,400 North Korean defectors who have entered the Republic of Korea. While research subjects on women and adolescents are dominant among North Korean defectors, studies on young people, who account for the highest proportion of all and play a pivotal role as future members of society, are relatively insufficient. This study aims to explore the process and possibility of harmonizing the individual specificities of North Korean defectors with the entire society by confirming the relationship between an individual who reflects on their existence and the environment surrounding them. The following are the main research questions. First, How is a youth of North Korean defector establishing his subjectivity? Second, what are the factors influencing his subjectivity construction? As one qualitative research, life history conducts this study. Brofenbrenner's ecological system theory from an ecological point of view was designated as an analysis tool. First, there are four stages establishing participant's subjectivity according to chronologically. Each stage consists of 'absence of choice', 'overcoming a shock from 'difference', 'transition of choice criteria', and 'discovery of new meanings about others'. This shows that experience accumulation and thought transition occur in each path. In addition, it could be analyzed into four environmental systems that influence the meaning of life in his time system. It could be divided into four systems: the members of learning space, the social support system, the learning opportunity field, and the settlement support system that influenced the expression process of personal characteristics, and the growth of North Korean defectors through interaction. This study revealed the meaning of "being a young man" through the process of constructing one’s subjectivity, and has its meaning as a longitudinal and comprehensive view of a young man's life rather than a simple problem recognition. It shows that the North Korean defector undergoes a cycle in which the positions of "self" and "others" are overturned by continuously attempting to change by exploring their existence. Through this, it is meaningful in that it presents a framework for research on North Korean defectors and interpretation that fundamentally changes the settlement status. That longitudinal studies on North Korean defectors will be expanded in the future is expecting.
Young people exist in any society, they are something like driving engine to move the society. Kim Jong Un is emphasizing ‘young people’ throughout politics, economy and society using the words of ‘youth-focused’ and ‘young people’s strong country’. North Korea’s young people are currently sharing the experiences which are different from the regime of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il. They have gone through the unique life time experiences such as North Korea famine, market place and currency reform, they have many features different from the older generation. The opening and reform of the system, and the activation of international exchange has exposed the young people of North Korea to the western civilization. It is the very important issue how North Korea will interact with them, use their competency. North Korean regime has utilized young people by organizing and mobilizing them to their project, to the national goal achievement through their ideological education, training business so far. And the system to utilize young people has differed depending on the internal and external environment and the strategic goal that North Korea faced. It can be classified by which they focused on among ideology(: red) and professionalism (: expert). Kim Il Sung regime focused on the system establishment, national defense and socialist economic construction. At that time, the establishment of the single structure, Kim Il Sung’s seizure of power were the most important. Furthermore, the infrastructure to train the next generation was not sufficient. So they recognized the importance of science technology area but the ideology arming of youth was preferentially focused. Kim Jong Il regime should concentrate the system protection as a countermeasure against the system threat, and international and domestic risk. The collapse of Soviet Union, Eastern European socialism, Korea-Russia and Korea-China diplomatic ties were the factors to threat the system of North Korea. Furthermore, the severe economical crisis of domestic area was acted as a factor to threat their regime. Therefore Kim Jong Il regime had no choice but to execute the market friendly policy. But the relaxed ideology caused from such a policy and environmental change brought about the closed policy once again. “Songun Politics(Military-first Politics)” policy raised by Kim Jong Il regime is the solution to such a problem, they encourage people to follow its example by combining soldiers and young people. Kim Jong Un regime has focused both of ideology and professionalism of youth. The North Korea regime is currently succeeding Juche Idea and “Songun Politics” ideology as the ideology to be Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism of all the society. Especially they emphasize young people to be the leading role of construction of civilized socialism. Also they hope that young people, ‘the hero of future’ will be practitioner typed technology talents while reforming the educational area and advocating the construction of knowledge economic powerhouse. Kim Jong Un regime provides a kind of venue of opportunity to young people. And they reveal their will to provide the foundation so that young people can accept the policy of party. North Korea named itself as a bastion of socialism. It means they are one and only socialism country in the world. The strong country in ideology, military through Juche idea and nuclear power strengthening is the essential factor to successfully lead the propaganda to defense socialism and the construction of strong country. Kim Jong Un regime will continuously seek the plans which can utilize the competency of youth to maintain their system now and forever. It means that the people’s life enhancement and the construction of civilized socialism can secure the justification of regime through a certain level of economical achievement. Also it means the rationality of socialism insisted by North Korea.
북한 청년에 대한 기대역할 변화 양상 연구 : 김정일과 김정은 집권 시기 반동사상문화 현상을 중점으로
최근 북한의 청년들은 북한 당국에서 요구하는 역할에 조금씩 의문을 갖기 시작하였다. 과거 기성세대들이 받았던 배급체계가 무너지고 장마당이 활성화 되면서 더 이상 북한 당국에 의존 경험이 없는 청년들이 늘어나고 있기 때문이다. 이러한 현상은 북한 청년들이 외부문화에 호기심을 가지면서 한류와 같은 문화의 영향을 받아 새로운 문화 형성으로 이어지고 있다. 이에 대응하여 북한 당국은 청년의 외부문화 접촉을 중대한 일탈로 규정하고 2020년 12월 4일 최고인민회의 상임위원회 제14기 제12차 전원회의에서 ‘반동사상문화배격법’을 제정하여 통제를 더욱 강화하는 정책을 취하고 있다. 이러한 북한의 사회적 변화를 주목하여 이 연구에서는 김정일과 김정은 집권 시기별로 북한 청년세대에게 기대하는 역할의 변화 양상을 분석하여 북한 청년들의 관심이 어떻게 이동하고 있는지 살펴본다. 특히 반동사상문화 유입에 따른 북한 당국 대응이 김정일과 김정은 시기에 어떻게 달라졌으며 이러한 외부문화 통제 강화가 북한 청년들의 기대역할에 어떤 영향을 미치고 있는지에 집중한다. 이에 북한 청년에 대한 이해를 높여 향후 북한사회에 대한 전망을 도출하고, 이를 토대로 남북 통합 과정을 위한 시사점을 제안하는 것을 본 연구의 목적으로 한다. 본 논문은 위 연구질문에 답하기 위해 로동신문 분석과 탈북민 면담을 진행하였다. 2002년부터 2021년까지 20년간의 로동신문 내 청년을 언급한 2대 사론설을 분석범위로 설정하여, 기사의 내용 중 청년에 대한 메시지를 중점으로 키워드를 도출하는 “키워드 분석”과 R통계를 활용하여 기사에 사용된 텍스트를 분석하는 “텍스트 마이닝 분석”을 사용했다. 로동신문의 양적분석을 보완하고자 북한에서 한류문화나 외부 콘텐츠에 대한 시청 경험이 직접적 혹은 간접적으로 가지고 있는 북한이탈주민(탈북민)을 대상으로 면담을 진행했다. 연구결과, 북한 청년에 대한 기대역할 변화 양상과 반동사상문화 현상의 세 가지의 특징을 확인할 수 있었다. 첫째, 북한 청년들에 대한 기대역할과 관련하여 김정은 시기에는 김정일 시기보다 군인으로서의 역할이 축소되고, 청년동맹 조직생활과 애국심이 강조되며 노동력을 제공하는 역할로서의 청년이 부각되었다. 둘째, 반동사상문화 현상에 대한 특징이 김정일 시기에는 반제계급의식에 강조점을 더 두었다면, 김정은 시기에는 문화적 확산 측면에 대한 경계심을 더 높게 드러내는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 김정일 시기에는 반동사상문화가 경제적 일탈의 범주에서 다뤄졌지만, 김정은 시기에는 ‘반동사상문화배격법’과 같은 새로운 법을 제정하고 정치적 위협에 준하는 대응 정책을 도입하는 등 통제 수위가 상향되는 양상을 보이고 있었다. 셋째, 반동사상문화에 대한 위협의식은 김정은이 청년들에게 조직을 중요시 여기고 애국심이 투철한 사회주의 본연의 청년 역할을 강화시키는데 촉매제의 역할을 하였으며, 그동안 이동의 자유가 없던 북한 청년들 사이에 공통된 관심사를 불러일으켜서 ‘세대단위’의 청년문화를 공유하게끔 하였다. 또한 반동사상문화가 단순한 문화적 유희의 차원에서 경제적 생계수단으로 발전되는 양상을 보이면서 앞으로도 계속 확장이 될 가능성을 가지고 있음을 확인하였다. 본 연구결과를 토대로 향후 북한 사회 변화에 대한 전망에 대해 논의하며, 추후 남북의 문화적 통합을 위한 시사점을 도출하였다. 본 연구는 북한 청년에 대한 기대역할에 대해 김정일과 김정은 시기로 나누어 다각적인 비교 분석을 하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 특히 비교적 최근에 등장한 ‘반동사상문화배격법’에 대해 주목하여 북한 사회의 최신 동향을 드러내었으며, 반동사상문화에 영향을 받은 북한 청년들의 역할과 문화적 특성을 분석하여 이전과 달라진 북한 청년들의 문화를 조명하였다는 점에서 의미가 있다. In recent years, North Korean young people have begun to have growing doubts about their roles as required by the North Korean authorities. This is because the number of young people who no longer depend on the North Korean government is increasing as the distribution system that the older generations had depended on is collapsing and the market has been activated. This phenomenon has led to the formation of a new culture as young people become more curious about outside culture influences such as the Hallyu(Korean wave). In response, the North Korean authorities have defined “contact with outside culture by young people” as a serious deviation, and enacted the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law on December 4, 2020, at the 14th 12th plenary session of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly to further tighten control over the North Korean people. Against this backdrop, this study examines how the expected roles and interests of the North Korean youth have changed during the reigns of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. In particular, this research focuses on how the North Korean authorities' response to the influx of reactionary ideology and culture has changed during the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un eras, and how their responses have affected the expected roles of the North Korean youth. Therefore, this study aims to improve understanding of North Korean youth, to explore future prospects for North Korean society, and to suggest implications for the inter-Korean integration process. This research employs analysis of the Rodong Shinmun and interviews with North Korean defectors as research methods. For the Rodong Shinmun analysis, this study analyzes leading articles and political commentary from 2002 to 2021, and conducts keyword analysis and text mining analysis using R statistics. To complement the Rodong Shinmun analysis, interviews were carried out with North Korean defectors who had direct or indirect experience with Hallyu culture in North Korea. The results of this study found three major characteristics of the phenomenon of reactionary ideology and culture, along with changes in the expected roles of the North Korean youth. Firstly, as compared to the Kim Jong-il period, the expected military role for North Korean youth has declined during the reign of Kim Jong-un, with youth league organization participation, patriotism, and contributing to the labor force being more greatly emphasized. Secondly, regarding the phenomenon of reactionary ideological culture, this study shows that while a greater emphasis was placed on anti-imperialist class consciousness during Kim Jong-il's period, this emphasis has shifted during the Kim Jong-un period to a higher level of caution about the spread of external cultural influences. Furthermore, in the Kim Jong-il era, reactionary ideological culture was treated as a category of economic deviance, but in the Kim Jong-un era, the level of governmental efforts to maintain control over reactionary ideological culture have increased as evidenced by the introduction of new laws such as the ‘Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law’. Thirdly, the sense of threat provided by the phenomenon of reactionary ideology and culture has served as a catalyst for the Kim Jong-un regime to strongly emphasize to North Korean youth the importance of the group and of the role of young people in socialism, which is thoroughly patriotic by nature. The shared phenomenon of reactionary ideology and culture among North Korean youth has created ‘youth culture’ in North Korea, which is a new phenomenon given that North Korean youths have not had freedom of movement. In addition, this study shows that reactionary ideological culture has the potential to continue to expand in the future, given that it produces not only simple cultural entertainment but also an economic means of livelihood. Based on these results, this research discusses the future prospects for North Korean society, and suggest implications for cultural integration between North and South Korea. This study is meaningful in that it examines changes in the expected roles of North Korean youth focusing on the comparison of the reigns of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, and also reveals the latest trends in North Korean society and features of North Korean youth cultures with particular attention to the ‘Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law’.
남북한 출신 청년이 만드는 접촉지대의 문화번역과 협력적 생애사 : A 독서모임을 중심으로
Hidaka, Sawako 연세대학교 대학원 2019 국내석사
The aim of this thesis is to identify different shapes of power dynamics and identities that are constructed, exchanged and modified within a contact zone between young South Koreans and young North Koreans. Conducting a fieldwork on a book club organized by these young people called “Book Club A,” it finds that the gathering is a place of daily and micro-cultural activities where the cultural medium of books allows its members to share views. The club serves as a physical space of contact for the two groups of young Koreans and also deepens, psychologically and cognitively, their understanding of each other. The number of North Koreans who have defected to South Korea exceeded 30,000 in 2017. Ever since, South Korea has searched for ways to better support South Koreans and North Koreans to "coexist". A series of developments in the two Koreas’ 2018 international relations, including the inter-Korean summit and the North Korea–United States Summit, has heightened much of the South Korean society’s interest in its Northern counterpart. Some in the South have advocated that North Korean defectors should be integrated into South Korea referring to their shared ethnicity. Indeed, South Korea has been an active party of the inter-Korean relations in a macroscopic sense, and yet it has overlooked the fact that there emerged another form of inter-Korean relations at a microscopic level – that between South Koreans and North Korean defectors. This thesis attempts to translate the varying terms through which the young people of two Koreas build their relationships in a cultural space of a book club, and to inquire into the ensuing changes in how they identify themselves in the course of such development. It employs participatory observation and in-depth interviews to reveal what conventions are mutually understood by the members and what their respective locations imply. It may be safe to assume that young South Koreans are the majority while the young North Korean defectors are minority in the South Korean society. And it is an uncontested fact that power relations between them already exists in many areas. Book Club A becomes a space inconsistent with the outside world. Books lay the foundation for conversations led by shared interests while the formality and rituals set by the club endorse equitable social membership. Here in this quotidian and microscopic space, all members, those native to South Korea and those who defected from the North alike, encounter and practice mutual recognition that cannot be experienced beyond its doors. Also, the discussion about books is based on their life experience, which heals them related to the historical division of Korean peninsula and forms mental bond between them. This process can be analyzed through the concept, Collaborative Life History as well as the example of German reunification and separated Korean people. Book Club A is different from public institutions in that it does not provide financial supports to the young North Korean defectors in the South Korean society. Its impact, after all, lies in offering the young North Koreans with the experience of social recognition and interaction that are as crucial to a settlement in the Korean society as is any public support. The presence of this space has a great social significance; it signals to the young generation of the Korean society, whose ethnic diversity exhibits continuous growth in the face of globalization, to explore the possibility of interaction and communication with the minorities of their society. 본 연구는 남북한 출신 청년들이 A 독서모임이라는 문화적 접촉지대에서 역동적인 권력 관계와 정체성을 만들어내고 그것을 서로 교환하며 변화시키는 모습을 분석(번역)하는 연구이다. 연구현장인A 독서모임은 책이라는 문화적 장치를 통해 의견을 나누는 일상적이고 미시적인 문화활동의 장소이다. 본 연구에서는 A 독서모임을 단순히 한국과 북한 출신 청년이라는 두 집단이 물리적으로 접촉하는 공간으로만 보는 것이 아니라 그들이 서로에 대한 이해를 심화시켜나가는 심리적, 인지적 공간으로서의 문화적 접촉지대로 본다. 한국에서는 북한이탈주민 3만 명 세대라고 불리던 2017년쯤부터 본격적으로 북한이탈주민과 한국 사람이 ‘상생’하기 위한 방향성이 계속해서 모색되어 왔다. 특히 2018년에 들어 남북정상회담과 북미정상회담이 연이어 개최되는 등 국제관계가 요동치는 가운데 한국 사회에서는 북한에 대한 관심이 한층 더 높아지고 있다. 한편 한국 사회에서는 민족성을 언급하면서‘한국 사람’인 북한이탈주민을 ‘우리’안에 편입시켜야 하는 존재로 보는 시선이 존재한다. 또한 국제관계라는 거시적인 관점에서 볼 때 한국은 남북관계의 주체라고 하지만 국내라는 미시적인 관점에서 볼 때 한국 사람과 북한이탈주민 간의 작은 남북관계에 대해서는 별로 관심을 보이지 않는다. 본 연구에서는 A 독서모임이라는 문화적 공간에서 남북한 출신 청년들이 다양한 방식으로 관계를 맺어가는 모습과 그들의 변화하는 정체성을 참여 관찰과 심층 면접을 통해 분석(번역)하고 일상적인 현장에서의 남북한 출신 청년의 상호이해와 그들의 위치가 시사하는 의미를 밝혔다. 한국 사회에서 한국 출신 청년은 다수를 차지하며 북한이탈주민인 북한 출신 청년은 소수자인 것은 사실이다. 이들 간에는 여러 분야에 걸쳐 권력 관계가 이미 존재한다. 그러나 A 독서모임에서는 책이라는 문화적 매개체를 통해 그들 간의 대화를 가능케 한다. 또한 동등한 사회적 동료로서 이야기를 나눌 수 있도록 만들어진 의례를 토대로 남북한 출신 청년은 일상적이고 미시적인 공간에서 외부 사회에서는 경험하지 못하는 상호인정의 관계를 실천하고 있다. 또한A 독서모임에서 이루어지는 토론과 논의는 개개인의 인생경험을 공유함으로써 역사적인 분단, 민족의 이산 등의 경험으로 인한 고통과 고독감이 치유되고 구성원 간에서의 공동체성이 생기는 효과를 낳는다. 이러한 과정은 독일통일과 한민족 이산의 사례와 같이 협력적 생애사라는 개념으로 해석할 수 있다. A 독서모임은 공공기관의 지원정책과는 달리, 북한 출신 청년을 경제적으로 지원하지는 못하지만, 한국 사회에 정착하는 데에 있어 경제적 지원 못지않게 중요한 사회적 인정의 감각과 소통의 경험을 제공해준다. 이것은 앞으로도 지구화로 인해 다문화사회가 진행될 한국 사회를 만들어가는 주체인 청년에게 소수자와의 교류와 소통의 가능성을 깨닫게 해준다는 사회적 의미를 지니고 있다.
While most of outside commentators have expressed concern about the near future of North Korea mainly because of its unabated political-economic difficulties since the 1990s, the North Korea itself not only has clamored for 'the strong and powerful nation' but also has made display of 'its survival'. Where do such a 'self-confidence' of North Korea come from? In order to give an appropriate answer, one may try to analyze various structural facet of North Korea. Among other things, this dissertation sheds the special light on the youth who is the backbone of the society. The aims of this study is as follows. First of all, it examines the organization and role of the Youth League in North Korea. Through the systematic research of the formation and transformation of the Youth League's organization and role, this study will contribute to elevate one step further the understanding level of the Youth League which remains 'preliminary' in the existing research materials. Secondly, this paper investigates the stability of the North Korean regime by investigating the activities of the Youth League. Comparing the role of youth between North Korea in 1990s which is confronting the crisis of the regime and East Europe during the system transition, this paper makes clear how the Youth League plays a pivotal role of stabilizing the North Korean regime. Thirdly, this study provides a reference for analysis in order to anticipate the transition of political power after the Kim Jung Il era by reconsidering how the Youth League had transformed during the process of power transfer from Kim Il Sung to his son, Kim Jung il. The Youth League is supposed to organize the youth of age 14-30, counting its number about 5million. Including the members of the Juvenile Corps, the youth forms one third of the whole population, which occupies an important position in quantity. It's scale as a political organization is only next to the Party. It is one of mass organizations that is destined to organize and mobilize the large extent of masses under the Party and the Leader. The Youth League is conspicuous among other mass organizations in a sense that it has the role as the reserves for the future members and leaders of the Party. That is, the Youth League performs its function as the reserves and the transmission belt for the Party. It was in the Third Congress of 1948 that the Youth League was formally recognized as a transmission belt for the first time by deciding to device the contents and methods of ideological education programme. The Fifth Congress held in 1964 consolidated further the position of the Youth League as the transmission belt by emphasizing the education of revolutionary tradition, loyalty for the Party, Marx-Leninism and class conscience. With the 1971 Sixth Congress as the decisive momentum, the Youth League took the full-fledged responsibility of formating and expanding the ideology of justifying the power succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il. The leadership of North Korea was well aware of the role of the youth in a transitional period and kept strict watch on 'erratic and unhealthy thoughts and deed' of the youth. The gradual intrusion of capitalism into the society mainly because of economic difficulties has forced the North Korean leadership to reemphasize the importance of 'continuous revolution' and 'achievement of great Juche revolution' in order to sustain the existing system. Also the Youth League has established its position as the reserves for the Party since the Fourth Congress of the Party. As mentioned above, it is one of the largest mass organizations including 5million youth ranging the youth of age 14-30. Aside from huge membership, the youth is important element for the maintenance of a certain regime because the young people are susceptible to change which may lead them either towards loyal to or estrange from the existing system. Recruiting the members and cadres of the Party from the Youth League, the North Korea seems to succeed in making use of the youth for its benefit. Though in a lesser degree after the mid-199s than before, the young people in North Korea are still enthusiastic in learning 'one and only ideology' and practicing the policy and line of the Party through the 'life and learning programme' of the Youth League. Entrusted by the Party the Youth League guides the activities of the Chosen Juvenile Corps with the aim of inspiring the latter with the mind of adaptability and loyalty to the Party. Among other classes or organizations the Youth League is paramount to play a role as a 'vanguard' of protecting the regime and materializing the directives from Kim Jung Il. As the crisis of the regime intensified since 1990s the North Korean leadership began to proliferating the discourse of 'importance of the youth', made the youth day and added Kim Il Sung before the title of the Youth League. With the economic and financial difficulties deepening, the Youth League also was mobilized in those fields. Sine the foundation of the 'Speed Battle Youth Shock Guard' in 1975 the mobilization of the youth has been routinized and radicalized. Except economic duty, the 'Speed Battle Youth Shock Guard' has played active role in educating the youth who is not eligible for the army. By comparing and analyzing the situation of the transitional era of Kim Il Sung-Kim Jung Il with the recent changes on the youth part, one may predict the possibility of the incoming succession of Kim Jung Il. In the process of the previous succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il there were three conspicuous moves of the Youth League: the formation and expansion of 'great revolutionary achievement' discourse, replacement of cadres with young and newly elements, campaign for the 'Three Revolutionary Teams' and resurgence of the Youth Department of the Party. By 2006 one can detect that the very similar phenomenon as before is upsurging. From this one can predict the impending of the power succession of Kim Jung Il. Accompanying the new emphasis on information, scientific technology and pragmatism, the third generation of revolution belonging to the 30s and 40s in age is emerging. If the First Secretary of the Youth League, Kim Kyung Ho in his 50s is replaced by a young newcomer and a necessity of reshuffle of its major cadres is raised, there is no problem of interpreting them as a 'significant' clue of indicating the imminent power transition in North Korea. Because we already know that there was a precedent during the transition period of Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il. The close examination of the precess of power transfer from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il discloses the fact that the Youth Department of the Party was reemerged - this Department was nullified since the Second Congress of the Party in 1948 - in order to empower the youth and to support the power succession. Now the Youth Department keep the low profile so that some observers doubt its existence itself. Waiting the resurgence of the Youth Department of the Party one can explain it as an indication of power change in North Korea. It is necessary to gave attention to the leadership of the campaign for the 'Three Revolutionary Teams' which launched its resurgence from 2003. These 'Teams' were the royal guards for pro-Kim Jung Il. There is a probability that Kim Jung Il might reorganize this movement to transfer its lordship to his successor in some point. His successor might use its leaders as his power base of a new regime as well as the foundation of mobilizing the masses for supporting his regime. Nowadays the North Korea government is standing on a crucial moment to deal with 'crisis' or 'challenge' representing 'the Songun era' and the generation shift. In order to cope with urgent problems, it is unevitable for North Korea to hold firm grip on the youth who is liable to change. Therefore, we can not deny the possibility that North Korea continues to give priority on the youth-centered policy by giving them the role as the vanguard of the regime and master of 'the strong and powerful nation'. The next supreme leader after Kim Jung Il seems to arise from the next Kim Jung Il generation as long as there will be no crucial 'emergence'. One can concludes that the Youth League will be used as the political and organizational core of the post-Kim Jung Il's leadership. As we have seen, the Youth League has accomplished its role as the transmission belt and reserves for the power in North Korea.
A youth class and organization in DPRK is quite something of social position. DPRK have a understanding of a stronghold the Young Communist League of Korea(YCLK) with Party, Military. DPRK take a serious view of youth league which set forth it's schema so that 'YCLK=guidance of the revolutionary fulfillment, The Korean Worker's Party = successors of the revolutionary fulfillment, the Korean People's Army= guardian of the revolutionary fulfillment'. Kim Il-Sung gives a definition a korean youth movement that 'young communist movement of Korea is social-political agitation that succeed brightly to it which do much for accomplish a historical achievement of labor class which ring of revolutionary movement for the national liberation, class liberation, human liberation. Kim Il-Sung established oneself a type of a korean youth movement because he leads to the anti-Japanese armed struggle in his youth. Since the restoration of independence to a Japanese, he founded on YCLK that was extensively go with working youngster a each field of society that was based on 'the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal people democratic revolution' while a socialist state construction. Most of the youngster participated in Korea War at firsthand. And a youngster be assigned to the base also take an active part in 'the front line support corps'. With the end of the war 1953, a youngster which working power of good quality came into force positive a popular mobilization movement that put 'restoration of youth', 'construction shock troop of youth' to practical use. The four convention of The Korean Worker's Party in 1961 made a declaration that was completed on socialism conversion. According to have finished with 'the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal period' and are now on its way to a socialist state, youth organization was became different a mission and attribute. The advent of Kim Jung-Il was forced on a learning unique idea system that go on revolution of 'the succeed Kim Il-Sung' to the youth. Kim Il-Sung presents a 'shock troop of youth' movement to force an ideological education and production activities. DPRK advocates that "''shock troop of youth' movement is to be depended upon a fighting unit of the endeavor front that was remarkable gave impetus to socialistic economy's building and is a worthy school of communism education.' After 1990's especially being undergo a system crisis of NK, a phenomenon was represented a youth policy to forced and transformed. A phenomenon of The Kim Jung-Il period represents to a youth policy to forced and transformed, to be the title is changed to YCLK after Kim Il-Sung's death and to be 'sokdojeon shock troop of youth' completed 'the young hero motorway'(in 90's representative construction work) on 'arduous march' period. In conclusion, 'policy of youth consideration' in DPRK found itself a youth department's ideology to reserve as the second reserve troop which preserve a socialism system. It stress the need that to absolutely perform youngster oneself's role which regard a successors of revolution, a vanguard for a construction of socialism 'great powerful nation'. Also DPRK makes the youngster stand before ranks 'policy of youth consideration' which a plan for the excitements of moral that to mobilize a youngster for the socialism economy's construction.
북한 이주 청년들의 진로 모색 과정을 통해 본 생애 전략
This paper examines the means and the limitations North Korean youth migrants face as they strive to construct their own strategy in finding careers in South Korea. Since late 1990s', North Koreans have been leaving their own country. This is due to globalization, economic changes in North Korea, development of migration industry and the desire of individuals and families wishing to improve their lives from poverty. Some of the migrants who left North Korea use their kinship network and live relatively stable lives in China. However, for those who have no kinship network, they had to endure poverty due to limited support. Those who leave North Korea become illegal migrants due to the political relationship between North Korea and China. The migrants residing in China hide their identities, live by cheap labor, and sometimes choose marriage as a means of living. If their lives are endangered by such harsh environment, they choose to migrate to South Korea to have a better social and economic status. From mid to late 1990s, the number of North Koreans migrating to South Korea has increased and as of 2007, it has reached to 10,000. The resettlement support system that South Korean government offers includes endowment of nationality, residence and resettlement fund. The influx of North Korean migrants had expected a warm welcome from their brother country, South Korea. However, North Korean migrants face prejudice in South Korea and experience difficulties in gaining economic and symbolic capital. Previous researches studying North Korean migrants failed to see their experiences from the subjective view of expectation and strategy in life. In addition, the studies had only focused on the characteristics of political relationship between North and South Korea, resulting in overlooking the matter of migration in the macro-context. This research approaches North Korean migration from a conception of 'forced migration'. As Castles(2003) suggested, the concept of forced migration renders us to see structural impact on migration. This paper focuses on the strategies of North Korean youth migrants in pursuing their lives through immigration. In this process, social context of each society interact with the migrant individuals. North Korean migrants in their 20’s and 30’s make up majority of North Korean migrants. It is also believed that youth tend to have wider life expectations and a greater chance at gaining various types of resources than people in other age groups. However, social network, inconsistency and inefficiency of governmental support, and exclusion by the society, limit the opportunities of the North Korean youths in acquiring their needs. In order to investigate these matters thoroughly, I conducted in-depth interviews with 11 North Korean youth migrants for six months since June 2007. Firstly, this paper begins with the political and economic approach of the North Korean youth migrants' initial processes in migration. Then it looks at the consistencies and consequences of social network in the process of migration. Secondly, the paper focuses on the strategies of the North Korean youth migrants in choosing university, work, marriage and re-immigration in interaction with social context of South Korea. Finally, it is discovered that they form alternative identity by negotiating between the two separate identities as South Korean and as North Korean. Surely, for the North Korean youth migrants this is not an easy process. As marginal migrants, they experience obstacles in piling up meaningful resources and making life plans. But they struggle and sometimes negotiate the realities with their status as a 'refugee'. This paper emphasizes to see the North Korean youth migrant as the social agents. Also it tries to explore the experiences migrant youths make in their career developments without representing them as victims of political relationship between the two countries, poverty and stigmatization. From the investigations, this research strives to describe the North Korean youth migrants as active subjects who perform various strategies in their life and career paths. 본 연구는 북한을 이탈하여 남한으로 이주한 청년들이 진로를 모색하는 과정에서 드러내는 생애 전략과 그 의미를 해석하려는 연구이다. 북한을 이탈하는 사람들이 증가하게 된 것은 글로벌리제이션, 이주산업의 발달, 경제적 곤궁 속에서 더 나은 삶을 희구하는 개인 및 가족의 전략에 의한 것이다. 북한을 떠나 중국 등지로 이동한 이주민들은 친척 연결망을 활용하여 비교적 안정적인 생활을 하기도 하고, 미약한 자원을 가진 채 빈곤한 생활을 감내해야 하기도 한다. 주변화된 방식으로 이주한 북한 이주민들은 중국과 북한 간의 정치적 관계로 인하여 불법 이주민이 된다. 중국에서 북한 이주민들은 신분을 감추며 노동을 하고 생계 수단으로서 결혼을 택하기도 한다. 이 과정에서 신분 탄로의 위험에 처하여 생활을 이어갈 수 없거나, 남한 사회에 대한 정보를 접하고 더 나은 사회 ? 경제적 지위를 획득하고자 남한 이주를 선택하게 된다. 북한이탈주민의 남한 입국은 1990년대 후반부터 꾸준히 증가하여 2007년 현재 1만명에 다다랐다. 남한 정부가 추진하고 있는 북한이탈주민 정착지원제도는 국적 부여, 주택과 정착금 지원을 포함한다. 북한 이주민을 남한으로 유입하는 것은 합법적 신분 부여 및 경제적 지원을 포함하는 정착지원제도와, 같은 언어를 쓰는 ‘동일 민족 국가’에 대한 문화적 기대이다. 그러나 이러한 기대와 달리 남한에서 북한이탈주민은 낙인화, 주변화된 사회적 위치를 인식하게 되고 경제 ? 문화 ? 사회 자본을 획득하는데 어려움을 겪는다. 북한이탈주민을 다루는 기존 연구들은 이들의 이주 경험을 연속적으로 인식하며 삶의 기대와 전략을 가진 행위자로 보는 시각이 부족했다. 또한 분단으로 인한 남북한 관계의 정치적 특수성만을 부각시켜 이주가 이루어지는 거시적 맥락을 간과하는 경향이 있었다. 따라서 본 연구는 북한이탈주민을 특수한 정치적 상황 아래 발생하는 ‘탈북 난민’으로 규정하지 않는다. 이들의 이주는 글로벌리제이션의 구조적 영향 하에 주변적 위치에서 이주하는 성격을 나타낸다고 보아 좀 더 폭넓은 의미를 가진 ‘강제적 이주(forced migration)’의 개념으로 접근하였다. 또한 북한이탈주민을 빈곤과 사회적 통제 속에서 억압받으며 이동하는 사람들로 피해자화하지 않기 위해 이들이 각 이주 단계에서 수행하는 생애 전략을 부각시키고자 하였다. 국경을 너머 이주 사회 각각의 맥락들과 상호작용하며 생애 전략을 구사하는 측면이 청년층에서 가장 잘 보여질 것이라 가정하였으므로 본 연구의 연구 대상을 2,30대 북한 이주 청년집단으로 하였다. 2,30대 청년 집단은 남한으로 입국하는 북한이탈주민 중 입국 비율이 가장 높은 집단이기도 하다. 북한 이주 청년들은 대학 진학, 취업 기회에 있어 중장년층에 비해 유리한 적응 조건을 가지고 있다. 또한 청년은 삶을 계획하고 기회를 확장하려는 욕망이 높은 집단적 특성을 지니고 있기도 하다. 그러나 사회적 연결망 및 문화 자본의 미약함과 정부 지원의 단기성과 비체계성, 사회적 배제 등으로 인하여 청년들이 자원을 획득하는 과정은 한계에 부딪치기도 한다. 이러한 과정을 구체적으로 드러내기 위해 연구자는 2007년 6월부터 약 6개월간 진로를 모색하는 과정에 있는 북한 이주 청년 11명을 심층 면접하였다. 본 논문은 다음과 같은 내용을 포함한다. 먼저 북한 이주 청년들이 이주하는 배경과 계기를 다루고 이주가 계속해서 연결되는 측면을 사회적 연결망을 중심으로 살펴보고자 하였다. 또한 북한 이주 청년들이 대학진학, 노동, 결혼, 재이주의 진로를 선택하는 과정에서 남한 사회 맥락들과 상호작용하며 생애 전략을 구사하는 측면을 부각시키고자 하였다. 진로 모색의 과정에서 청년들은 남한 혹은 북한의 국민으로 포섭되지 않고 맥락에 따라 적절히 협상하며 정체성을 형성하고 있음이 드러난다. 이러한 분석을 통하여 본 논문은 북한 이주 청년들이 주변화된 위치에서 수혜를 받는 피해자가 아닌, 자원 획득을 위하여 다양한 방식으로 생애 전략을 구사하는 행위자로서의 측면을 보여주고자 하였다. 또한 남한 사회가 청년들을 ‘탈북’한 사람으로 단일하게 재현하는 것에 대항하여 역동적인 정체성을 형성하고 있음을 드러내고자 하였다.