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The Anatomy of Cultural Power : Elements and Implications for Global Politics
Paek, Tae Youl Center for International Studies, Inha University 2004 Pacific Focus Vol.19 No.1
Until recently, the study of international politics was confined mostly to economic, military, and diplomatic aspects. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, however, culture has been on the rise in the discipline. A new approach has come to appreciate the affect of culture on the nature and structure of power. It is the aim of this paper to identify and discuss the components of cultural power and their contributions to a nation’s power from an international point of view. The thesis of this paper is that cultural power is different in character from economic power, military might, and diplomatic choice are factors, but are more symbolic and perceptible. At the same time, cultural power is also as influential as other aspects of power and can be a source of diffusion, absorption, and domination.
Japan's Nuclear Option : Its Possibilities and Limitations
Park, Hahnkyu Center for International Studies, Inha University 2002 Pacific Focus Vol.17 No.2
This study seeks to illuminate the possibility of Japan’s nuclear option in the changing context of both domestic and international politics in the PostCold War era. Currently, it may be very difficult for Japan to choose a nuclear option considering the domestic political context. The majority of the Japanese people still possess a strong antinuclear sentiment because of the experience of nuclear bombing that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Those who advocate Japan’s nuclear armament have also not become a major political force in Japanese politics. Japan has also established several legal and institutional mechanisms that prohibit Japan from becoming a nuclear power. However, international crises that could severely damage Japan’s national security and vital interests, would bring about major changes in Japan’s domestic political context that has so far successfully constrained Japan’s move toward nuclear armament. These international crises may include mounting nuclear and military threats from neighboring countries, failure of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and weakening or breakdown of the U.S.Japan security alliance. Under these international crises, the Japanese people could feel a sense of severe insecurity and they might agree to the nuclear option for the sake of national security. It seems that, although Japan will not take a direct course to go nuclear in the near future due to the domestic political constrains, it will continue to keep a nuclear option, which makes it possible for Japan to possess nuclear weapons when domestic and international circumstances dictate to do so.
An, Yong Heun Center for International Studies, Inha University 2003 Pacific Focus Vol.18 No.1
The purpose of this paper is to explain the change in the Korean government's bargaining approach from a soft-line to a hard-line approach. This paper introduced a two-level explanation to find an explanatory variable. The two-level explanation concentrates on the ratification process connecting domestic to international politics. This explanation holds that strong domestic pressure farces a negotiator to employ a hard-line stance, whereas weak domestic pressure makes possible a concessive soft-line approach. The two-level theorists suggest conditions that create strong domestic pressure. Those are the features of bargaining issues and the existence of an electoral system that strengthens some domestic constituents' power by over-representing them. The homogenous bargaining issue and domestic constituents' over-represented electoral power produce strong domestic pressure. Hence a negotiator is inclined to take a hard-line stance, when the feature of a bargaining issue is homogenous and a domestic group whose interest is closely related to the bargaining issue is over-represented by the electoral system. This paper argues that these conditions are not sufficient. Under an electoral law permitting mobilized voting, these variables do not yield strong domestic pressure during the ratification process. It is because politicians, who participate in the ratification process, are able to get votes by means of mobilization, and they, therefore, are less responsive to domestic constituents' demands so as to get their votes. We found this to be the situation in the case of the Korean government's adoption of a soft-line stance. In 1993, a new electoral law was proposed to hinder politicians from mobilizing votes with money. The new law led to changes in politicians' behavior. Politicians had no choice but to appeal to their constituents with a policy consistent with their constituents' interests and demands in order to get their votes. Politicians' changed behavior enabled such variables as the feature of a bargaining issue and a domestic constituent's electoral power to produce strong domestic constraints, as the two-level game theorists argue. As a result, the Korean government changed its bargaining approach from a sort-line to a hard-line one after the reform of the electoral law. To show the effect of the change in the electoral law on a negotiator's adoption of a bargaining approach, this paper considers such variables as the nature of a bargaining issue and an electoral system that over-represents some domestic constituents. The selection of Korean trade negotiation cases allows this paper to put those variables under scrutiny. The cases also enable us to consider the international variable such as the United States' international pressure. There were no variations in those variables in Korean cases. This work has useful implications for cases in which a country undergoing the transition to democracy negotiates with other countries. Democratization creates new democratic laws and institutions. New laws and institutions in countries like Korea may push politicians into responding more to their domestic supporters' demands than before. As a result, they may create a situation in which "mestic politics and international relations become entangled."
Won, Eun-Sang Center for International Studies, Inha University 1989 Pacific Focus Vol.4 No.2
As it moves toward the beginning of the 1990s, South Korea is now making a break through in its political life, moving from a so-called military-dominated authoritarian system to a popular mass democracy. Both the political and economic reforms have been so rapid, however, that there is some potential for internal instability during the 1990s-an internal threat which the North may be eager to encourage and exploit.