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      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Constructivism in Security Studies on Pacific Asia : Assessing Its Strengths and Weaknesses

        Peou, Sorpong Center for International Studies, Inha University 2002 Pacific Focus Vol.17 No.2

        In the last decade or so, security scholars have paid attention to non­material factors in trying to make sense of the varied behavior of states in Pacific Asia. Although they do not totally reject material rationalism, constructivists have found in inadequate or misleading and sought to prove that ideational factors help shed better light an state’s security policies. Constructivism on security in Pacific Asia has at least three variant: Cultural realists build their theories on the concept of strategic culture, emphasizing the role of central decision­makers; social interactionists stress the importance of socialization; historical culturalists pay considerable attention to cultural change in domestic political attitudes. This paper asks whether constructivism, one of today’s most influential competing paradigms, has supplanted or suppemented realist perspectives on national security. As the latest challenger in security studies, constructivism has become a general approach in security studies, but still needs to prove it self further before it can claim to be superior to realism. This paper also suggests what its proponents should do to improve their social theories and further shows that constructivism should be treated essentially as a theory of difference, which implies that sates are most likely to behave in ways that conform to balance­of­threat logic.

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      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Japan's Nuclear Option : Its Possibilities and Limitations

        Park, Hahnkyu Center for International Studies, Inha University 2002 Pacific Focus Vol.17 No.2

        This study seeks to illuminate the possibility of Japan’s nuclear option in the changing context of both domestic and international politics in the Post­Cold War era. Currently, it may be very difficult for Japan to choose a nuclear option considering the domestic political context. The majority of the Japanese people still possess a strong anti­nuclear sentiment because of the experience of nuclear bombing that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Those who advocate Japan’s nuclear armament have also not become a major political force in Japanese politics. Japan has also established several legal and institutional mechanisms that prohibit Japan from becoming a nuclear power. However, international crises that could severely damage Japan’s national security and vital interests, would bring about major changes in Japan’s domestic political context that has so far successfully con­strained Japan’s move toward nuclear armament. These international crises may include mounting nuclear and military threats from neigh­boring countries, failure of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and weakening or breakdown of the U.S.­Japan security alliance. Under these international crises, the Japanese people could feel a sense of severe insecurity and they might agree to the nuclear option for the sake of national security. It seems that, although Japan will not take a direct course to go nuclear in the near future due to the domestic political constrains, it will continue to keep a nuclear option, which makes it possible for Japan to possess nuclear weapons when domestic and international circumstances dictate to do so.

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      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        The New GATT Round and the Developing World

        Naya, Seiji,Togashi, Janis Center for International Studies, Inha University 1988 Pacific Focus Vol.3 No.2

        The Uruguay Round is regarded by many to be the most important round in the history of GATT Not only have new issues of trade in services and protection of intellectual property. rights been placed on the agenda, but liberalization of trade of agricultural and other specific commodities that have been exempted from full GATT dis- cipline have also been included in the new round of multilateral negotiations. Much of the pressures on the international trading environment emerged from recent large trade and balance-of-Payments imbalances of many countries. Bvt, while the serious problems besetting the world economy may be helped by an improved trade policy regime, the solution depends primarily on domestic action in the United States, the EEC, and Japan. In the United States, wtlat is needed is a reduction in the government budget deficit and in the gap between domestic saving and investment. At the same time, West Germany and Japan must stimulate their domestic economies and irlcrease import demand to fill the gap that will be left by the slowdown in growth of U.S. demand for goods. In addition, microeconomic action aimed at easing the structural adjustment in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors must be taken by both developed and developing countries. For example, appli- cation of safeguard measures in individual countries must be made temporary and should facilitate greater productivity or the phasing out of non-competitive industries rather than preserve inefficient produc- tion. In the more advanced developing countries, opening of domestic markets to foreign competition and easing protection in specific indus- tries is necessary. That is, these nations are being urged to graduate from special and differential treatment. In the developed world, pro- tection is also maintained in several industries, particularly in agri- culture, textile and clothing, and steel. The United States has proposed a far-reaching plan to eliminate most bar'riers to agricultural trade to show its serious intent to attain substantial liberalization in the negotiations, But liberalization of agricultural trade is particulary difficult given the EEC's staunch support of the Common Agricultural Policy. One of the primary goals of the United States in this new round is the development of new rules that will strengthen GATT as an institu- tion and as a framework under which international trade takes place. However, other countries have expressed concern about expecting too much from the Uruguay Round. The combination of the inclusion of major new issues, the greater number of members in GATT who must agree, and the substantial adjustments associated with any serious liberalization efforts raises a serious threat of overloading GATT. A more modest objective that combines some rules changes with tradi- tional item-by-item trade liberalization may be a more realistic alter- ilatlve. Despite the numerous problems and issues faced in the current round of multilateral negotiations, there appears to be, at least in the initial stages of talks, a willingness to negotiate a reasonable solution. The general concern about growing protectionist sentiment and a return to the trading system of the 1930s-and the ensuing prolonged stagnation in world trade-reflects the fact that all countries have a large stake in maintaining a liberal international trading system.

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        The Anatomy of Cultural Power : Elements and Implications for Global Politics

        Paek, Tae Youl Center for International Studies, Inha University 2004 Pacific Focus Vol.19 No.1

        Until recently, the study of international politics was confined mostly to economic, military, and diplomatic aspects. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, however, culture has been on the rise in the discipline. A new approach has come to appreciate the affect of culture on the nature and structure of power. It is the aim of this paper to identify and discuss the components of cultural power and their contributions to a nation’s power from an international point of view. The thesis of this paper is that cultural power is different in character from economic power, military might, and diplomatic choice are factors, but are more symbolic and perceptible. At the same time, cultural power is also as influential as other aspects of power and can be a source of diffusion, absorption, and domination.

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        The U.S.Policy and Strategy toward DPRK : Comparison and Evalution of the Clinton and Bush Administrations

        Lee, Hun Kyung Center for International Studies, Inha University 2002 Pacific Focus Vol.17 No.2

        This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administration’s policies and strategies toward North Korea. The Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea’s change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self­imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration’s engagement policy did not lead to North Korea’s change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea’s unclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea’s response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK. This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administration’s policies and strategies toward North Korea. The Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea’s change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self­imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration’s engagement policy did not lead to North Korea’s change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea’s unclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea’s response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK.

      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Politicians, Electoral Law & International Bargaining Approaches : A Case Study of Korea-U.S. Agricultural Trade Negotiation

        An, Yong Heun Center for International Studies, Inha University 2003 Pacific Focus Vol.18 No.1

        The purpose of this paper is to explain the change in the Korean government's bargaining approach from a soft-line to a hard-line approach. This paper introduced a two-level explanation to find an explanatory variable. The two-level explanation concentrates on the ratification process connecting domestic to international politics. This explanation holds that strong domestic pressure farces a negotiator to employ a hard-line stance, whereas weak domestic pressure makes possible a concessive soft-line approach. The two-level theorists suggest conditions that create strong domestic pressure. Those are the features of bargaining issues and the existence of an electoral system that strengthens some domestic constituents' power by over-representing them. The homogenous bargaining issue and domestic constituents' over-represented electoral power produce strong domestic pressure. Hence a negotiator is inclined to take a hard-line stance, when the feature of a bargaining issue is homogenous and a domestic group whose interest is closely related to the bargaining issue is over-represented by the electoral system. This paper argues that these conditions are not sufficient. Under an electoral law permitting mobilized voting, these variables do not yield strong domestic pressure during the ratification process. It is because politicians, who participate in the ratification process, are able to get votes by means of mobilization, and they, therefore, are less responsive to domestic constituents' demands so as to get their votes. We found this to be the situation in the case of the Korean government's adoption of a soft-line stance. In 1993, a new electoral law was proposed to hinder politicians from mobilizing votes with money. The new law led to changes in politicians' behavior. Politicians had no choice but to appeal to their constituents with a policy consistent with their constituents' interests and demands in order to get their votes. Politicians' changed behavior enabled such variables as the feature of a bargaining issue and a domestic constituent's electoral power to produce strong domestic constraints, as the two-level game theorists argue. As a result, the Korean government changed its bargaining approach from a sort-line to a hard-line one after the reform of the electoral law. To show the effect of the change in the electoral law on a negotiator's adoption of a bargaining approach, this paper considers such variables as the nature of a bargaining issue and an electoral system that over-represents some domestic constituents. The selection of Korean trade negotiation cases allows this paper to put those variables under scrutiny. The cases also enable us to consider the international variable such as the United States' international pressure. There were no variations in those variables in Korean cases. This work has useful implications for cases in which a country undergoing the transition to democracy negotiates with other countries. Democratization creates new democratic laws and institutions. New laws and institutions in countries like Korea may push politicians into responding more to their domestic supporters' demands than before. As a result, they may create a situation in which "mestic politics and international relations become entangled."

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