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      • 東北아시아에서의 島嶼紛爭에 關한 硏究 : 獨島 領有權 紛爭을 中心으로

        曺圭雲 韓國海洋大學校 2002 국내석사

        RANK : 249695

        United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea had been concluded in 1982 through a long session, and by many times of argument, and entered into force in November, 1994. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that 157 States put an agreement under their signature, 138 nations ratified up to now February, 2002 was arranged as The Magna Carta of the sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has an object to settle dispute between subjects of International law, or to settle dispute that has already occurred between subjects of International law in an amicable way. In the northeastern Asia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea did not achieved it's object, but produced "a quite contrary result". Because United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea regulates the exclusive right of the coastal State positively, and the coastal States are anxious to expand the bounds of the sea that they can govern like land. This phenomenon is detected obviously at the dispute of islands. In the northeastern Asia, Korea, Japan, China(Taiwan), and Russia are pitted against each other for its interest on the other side of the sea. They recognize the importance of the sea, so it leaves some room to dispute. In the northeastern Asia, there are 3 disputes of islands. Russia and Japan are pitted against each other about the islands of the southern Kuril Islands, and the confrontation of small island adjacent Taiwan is going on. Firstly, dispute about "Northern Territories(Japan designated)" between Russia and Japan. Secondly, dispute about "Senkaku Islands(Japan designated)" between China, or Taiwan, and Japan. The third, the last, one is the dispute about "Tokdo" that the antagonism is going on. When I study about dispute about "Tokdo", first of all, I arrange two aspects of dispute about "Tokdo". The Northen Territories is occupied by Russia, but there is stronger will of Japan about the Northern Territories than will of Japan about other disputing region, so there is substantial negotiation using economic support as intermediation at the northern territory. In 1991, since The Soviet Union broke down, both Russia and Japan cleared hostile relation, and built companion relation under the end of the Cold War, furthermore they made diplomatic effort to settle dispute about territory. Specially, with collapse of The Soviet Union, New force of Reformation in Russia that got faced with total crisis established a principle that they return four islands of Kuril Islands by stages on condition of economic support in a big way. Also, Japan that concluded that they could recover the northern territory, because the Yeltsin adminstration needed economic support of Japan after the end of the Cold War, so Japan concentrated on negotiation about the northern territory on condition of economic support. As a result, both Russia and Japan reached conclusion with adopting the joint declaration There are some importances that China can't concede Senkaku Islands. Firstly, in the southern sea of China, any concession can't be expected, because the southern sea of China is related other dispute of island, secondly, existence of petroleum is clarified at the coast, therefore China is expected that it shows the effectiveness of armaments to consolidate the effectiveness against this waters, or that it tries substantial exploration to make foundation of possession. Against this, Japan is evading positively the phenomena that lead the result that can magnify or deepen character of dispute to maintain substantial control. Senkaku Islands are certainly belongs to Japan, therefore what is useless to debate about Senkaku Islands are Japan's standpoint. Japan's will looks passive against "Tokdo" as compared to Japan's will about the northern territory and standpoint of Senkaku Islands, but it is very positive as compared to position of Korea. As compared to the government of Korea that insists "no dispute" about "Takesima(Japan designated)"-like Japan that insists "no dispute" about dispute about Senkaku Islands-, the government of Japan stresses that there is a dispute by formal announcement of the government of Japan with presenting wrongfulness about the occupation of "Tokdo" of Korea. Japan is the nation that adopts expansive policy of the sea, with establishing exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, or straight baseline for its interest from the island that doesn't satisfy essential condition for island. With considering these factors, against dispute about island, Japan is expected that it doesn't concentrate on triumph on one place, but it aims at overall triumph. There is no guarantee not to apply the method of Japan that lead advantageous situation of Japan by progress of negotiation through economic intermediation, or by manipulation of public opinion of circumference for "Tokdo", therefore Korea has to prepare certain foundation about assertion of dominium of "Tokdo", with dismissing disregarding, and avoiding position about phenomenon.

      • 해난구조계약상 한국형 해양환경손해특별보상약관(KSCOPIC) 제정에 관한 연구

        김대래 한국해양대학교 2018 국내박사

        RANK : 249695

        해난구조가 필요한 해난사고 발생 시 세계적으로 정형화된 표준 계약서인 LOF (Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement) 해난구조 계약서가 1892년에 제정ˑ공포된 이후에 널리 사용되고 있다. 1960년과 1970년대에 해운업이 급격히 발전하면서 대형 유조선이 등장 하였고, 유조선박의 사고 시에 극심한 해양오염사고를 초래하여 환경의 오염방지, 경감에도 관심을 기울이게 되었다. 그 취지에서 1892년에 최초로 제정·공표된 이후에 1972년까지 몇 차례 소폭으로 개정을 이루어 오던 표준계약서인 LOF 해난구조계약서는 거대한 오염사고를 경험하면서 환경손해방지·경감을 위하여 전통적인 불성공 무보수(No Cure No Pay)의 기본원칙에 문제가 제기되었다. 이 문제의 조치로 유류가 적재된 유조선에 만 안전망(Safety Net)을 적용하였다. 이후 안전망(Safety Net)을 전 선박으로 확대적용하기 위하여 1989년 해난구조에 관한 국제협약 (이하 1989년 국제구조협약 이라고 한다)의 제14조가 채택되었다. 그러나 1989년 국제구조협약 제14조에 의한 특별보상을 시행함에 있어 불편함과 Nagasaki Spirit와 같은 판결에 대한 우려가 있었다. 그러한 문제점과 법적인 분쟁의 가능성을 감소시키고 특별보상액의 산정을 단순화하기 위하여 선주상호보험(P&] Clubs)과 국제구조연맹(ISU) 회원을 주축으로 1989년 국제구조협약 제14조 특별보상을 선택적으로 대신 할 SCOPIC약관이 탄생하게 되었다. 또한, SCOPIC약관에는 약관의 효용 극대화와 구조현장의 시시각각 진행사항을 확인 및 검토하고 구조업자를 도와 성공적인 구조가 될 수 있도록 하는 임무를 지닌 SCR제도가 포함되어 있었고, 이를 지속적으로 활용하고 있다. 우리나라의 주요 주변국인 중국과 일본의 해난구조 산업의 현황과 자체적인 SCOPIC약관과 SCR제도의 도입·입법 관련하여 검토한 결과 중국은 SCOPIC약관보다는 중국여건에 적합한 SCR제도를 도입에 대한 회의를 2016년에 이미 실시하였고, 일본은 이미 2005년부터 기존의 JSE해난구조계약서 (The Documentary Committee of The Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc.)에 자체적인 SCOPIC약관과 같은 성격의 특별보수약관(Special Remuneration Clause)과 SCR제도를 제정하여 사용하고 있다. 우리나라는 상대적으로 해난사고가 많이 발생하지 않기 때문에, 구조적으로 해난구조의 수요가 상대적으로 적다. 우리나라는 수중작업 및 선박운항관련인력이 대부분이고, 조선기사 등 전문기술인력은 상대적으로 종사율이 상당히 낮다. 무엇보다도 현행 상법은 1989년 국제구조협약 제14조의 특별보상 제도를 수용하여 환경손해 방지·경감에 대한 특별보상에 대하여 규정하였다. 그러나 1989년국제구조협약 제14조의 특별보상을 실행함에 따른 문제점에 대한 해결방안이 SCOPIC약관과 약관에 포함된 SCR제도의 시도조차 없고, 이를 적용할 LOF해난구조계약서와 같은 정형화된 자체적인 해난구조계약서 조차도 없다. 다종다양한 선박으로 부터의 유류오염사고 등으로 인하여 상당한 해양오염과 환경손해에 따른 피해가 발생되는 것을 이미 경험한 바 있다. 이러한 환경오염방지·경감과 성공적인 해난구조를 위하여 우리나라의 여건에 실질적으로 적합하고 필요한 자체적인 한국형 SCOPIC약관의 제정과 입법화가 절실히 필요하다. The LOF(Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement) salvage contract, a formalized global contract suitable for the nature of maritime salvage in the event of a marine accident requiring salvage operation, has been widely used since it was enacted and promulgated in 1892. In the 1960s and 1970s, the rapid growth of the shipping industry led to the emergence of large oil tankers, which caused severe marine pollution accidents in the event of such vessels' accident, thereby it was becoming to pay attention to the prevention and minimizing of environmental pollution/damage. The LOF contract that was first enacted and promulgated in 1892. The standard form of agreement that has been revised several times until 1972. As result of the massive pollution accidents, there was some issue on the principle of LOF contract (No Cure No Pay). Thereafter, as a solution to such a problem, a safety net was applied only to oil tankers loaded with oil. In order to extend this safety net to all vessels, it was eventually adopted as Article 14(Special Compensation) of the International Convention on Salvage 1989. However, there were inconvenience and particular concerns on the judgment of the ‘Nagasaki Spirit’in practicing the Article 14(Special Compensation) of the International Convention on Salvage 1989, so that P&I Clubs and ISU Members were required to minimize the likelihood of such legal disputes and to simplify matters of special compensation. As a result, the selective SCOPIC Agreement in order to replace the Article 14 (Special Compensation) of the International Convention on Salvage 1989 was born. The SCR system which has to maximize the utility of SCOPIC and confirming and reviewing the progress of the salvage operation at site, and assisting Salvage Master in order to make a successful salvage operation, was also included in the SCOPIC. As a result of reviewing status of the salvage industry in the neighbored country China and Japan as well as their own SCOPIC and SCR system, China had a trial to introduce its own SCR system rather than SCOPIC, and Japan has introduced and enacted its own SCOPIC (Special Remuneration Clause) and SCR system already in the own JSE contract. Since there was no considerable numbers of the maritime accidents happening in Korean waters, the demand for Salvage market has been relatively small. Also there are not so many professional salvage engineers or naval architectures, but mainly divers and merchant ship operators only. Most of all, the current Korean Commercial Law has only adopted the special compensation of Article 14 of the International Convention on Salvage 1989, stipulating special compensation for environmental damage prevention. However, there has been no even a trial for establishing own SCOPIC clause and SCR system, which are essential for solving the difficulty and inconvenience in respect of practicing the rule of the special compensation. What is the more worse is that there is no contract of the same type as the LOF contract to be incorporated with the SCOPIC clause. We have already experienced considerable marine pollutions and environmental damage resulting from the various maritime casualty. In order to prevent and/or minimize environmental pollution and to achieve the successful salvage operation, it is essentially necessary to establish and legislate own SCOPIC clause for Korea salvage market and circumstances.

      • 확장된 한국방공식별구역의 실효적 지배 강화를 위한 대응전략에 관한 연구

        장영배 한국해양대학교 대학원 2018 국내석사

        RANK : 249695

        미국이 1950년 최초로 방공식별구역(ADIZ)을 설정한 이래 현재까지 약 28여 개국 에서 방공식별구역을 운영하고 있지만, 해당구역에서 국가 간 국제적인 분쟁이 발생된 사례는 없었다. 이는 관련 국가간 묵시적 합의에 의해 중첩되는 구역이 존재하지 않았을 뿐만 아니라, 국제법상 명확한 근거에 의해 설정된 구역이 아니기 때문이다. 그러나 공중에서의 구역은 해상에서와 동일하게 육지의 국경선과 같이 명확하게 그어진 선이 존재하지 않는 공간으로서 천연자원과 어족자원을 둘러싼 해양경계획정에 관한 분쟁이 일부국가 간 발생하고 있다는 점에서 공중에서도 방공식별구역을 둘러싼 국가 간의 분쟁이나 의도하지 않은 군사적 충돌이 발생할 가능성이 내재되어 있는 실정이다. 이러한 상황에서 중국이 지난 2013년 11월 23일 동중국해에 일방적으로 방공식별구역(ADIZ)을 선포함으로써, 동북아지역에서 해상뿐만 아니라 공중 에서도 관련 국가간의 분쟁이 격화될 가능성이 높아지고 있다. 중국의 방공 식별구역 선포는 중국의 급부상한 경제력과 이를 바탕으로 한 군사력이 강력 해지면서 가능해 졌다. 이러한 중국의 ADIZ 선포는 일본과의 센카쿠 열도(중국명 : 댜오위다오, 대만명 : 댜오위타이) 영유권 분쟁에서 전략적으로 유리한 위치를 차지하고, 동북아지역에서 높아진 중국의 위상을 과시함으로써 영향력을 확대 하기 위한 의도로 분석된다. 특히 중국의 일방적인 방공식별구역 선포에 따라 우리 정부도 기존 한국방공식별구역 (KADIZ)에서 제외된 홍도와 마라도 남단과 이어도 상공을 KADIZ 범위에 포함 하여 확대 선포하는 등 적극적으로 대응한 바 있다. 그리고 중국이 선포한 방공 식별구역 내에는 우리와 중국과 관할권 문제로 분쟁발생 가능성이 내재되어 있는 이어도와 일본과 중국이 영유권 문제로 분쟁중인 센카꾸 열도가 포함되어 있어 한ㆍ중ㆍ일 3국간의 갈등이 예상된다. 또한 기존의 일본방공식별구역(JADIZ) 과 함께 한ㆍ중ㆍ일 3국의 방공식별구역이 중첩되면서 외교적 갈등뿐만 아니라 해당 지역에서의 군사적 충돌 가능성도 점차 높아지게 되었다. 또한 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)은 세계 유일의 분단국가이자 북한과 적대적 으로 대치하고 있는 우리의 안보 현실에서 매우 중요한 요소라 할 수 있다. 그리고 그 동안 방공식별구역(ADIZ) 운용을 통해 일본, 중국, 러시아 등 주변 국가와 불필요한 충돌을 방지하는 역할도 수행하고 있다. 이러한 측면을 고려 할 때 확장된 한국방공식별구역에 대해 보다 실효적인 지배를 강화하고 선제적 으로 우리의 관할권을 유지하고 강화해 나가야 한다. 그러나 현행작전을 우선시하는 軍에서 한국방공식별구역을 운용하다 보니 국내법상으로도 2009년도에 이르러 법적인 근거가 마련되는 등 다소 소극적인 대응으로 일관해 왔다. 그리고 국제법상으로 근거가 없어 이와 관련된 연구기관 이나 전문가 등도 매우 부족한 실정이다. 또한 한국방공식별구역은 1951년 美 공군에 의해 설정되어 현재까지 우리 軍에 의해 관리되어 왔기 때문에 軍 내부적 으로만 방공식별구역 운용에 관한 절차가 규정화되어 있을 뿐 관련 제도의 발전과 다각적인 측면에서의 접근이 제한될 수밖에 없었다. 이러한 한계를 극복하고 확장된 한국방공식별구역에 대한 실효적인 지배 강화와 더불어 안정적 운영을 위한 대응전략을 연구할 필요성이 대두되었다. 본 연구의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 문헌조사와 전문가 의견을 수렴하는 방법을 택 하였고, 참고자료는 국ㆍ내외 논문과 주요 연구기관의 간행물, 언론보도, 국내ㆍ외 학술지, 인터넷 검색자료 등 접근이 가능한 자료를 다양하게 활용하여 방공식별구역(ADIZ)에 대한 개념과 방공식별구역의 국제법적 지위와 주변국 의 방공식별구역 운영 현황 등 일반현황을 살펴보고, 중국의 방공식별구역 선포 배경과 법적 근거ㆍ문제점 등을 알아본데 이어, 이에 대한 우리 정부와 주변국 대응, 확장된 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)의 문제점 등 분석을 통해 향후 확장된 KADIZ의 실효적 지배를 강화하기 위한 대응전략을 연구하였는데, 대응전략으로 효율적인 KADIZ 관리를 위한 대응방안, KADIZ의 국내법적 문제 개선방안과 향후 과제, 우리의 해양권익과 연계한 KADIZ 확장방안 등을 제시하였다. 본 연구논문의 핵심인 확장된 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)의 실효적 지배 강화 와 안정적 운영을 위한 대응전략은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 확장된 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)을 효율적으로 관리할 수 있는 대응방안을 강구해야 한다. 방공식별구역은 항공기의 특성을 고려하여 영공을 효과적 으로 방어하기 위한 일종의 완충구역이며, 영공방위를 위한 실질적인 사전 필수 공간이다. 그러한 측면에서 중국의 일방적인 방공식별구역(ADIZ) 획정에 대해 우리 정부가 보여준 조치는 여러제약을 안고 지내왔던 한국방공식별구역의 오랜 숙원까지 한꺼번에 해결하는 성과가 있었다고 할 수 있다. 하지만 한국과 중국, 일본이 중첩된 방공식별구역을 공유하게 된 것은 우발적인 군사적 충돌 등 동북아지역의 안정과 평화에 상당한 위협요소로 작용하게 될 것이다. 따라서 확장된 한국방공식별구역의 실효성 강화를 위한 외교안보측면의 전략 구비가 선행되어야 하고, 이와 더불어 확장된 KADIZ를 기준으로 중국과 일본의 방공식별구역 경계를 재조정하도록 지혜를 모아야 하며, 이에 앞서 중첩된 방공식별구역 내에서 군사적 충돌을 막고 안전한 비행을 보장할 수 있는 조속한 협의가 이루어져야 할 것이다. 또한 인천 비행정보구역(FIR)內 KADIZ 확장구역에 대한 관할권을 강화할 수 있는 방안을 강구해야 한다. 인천 FIR內 KADIZ 관할권 강화 방안으로 A-593 항로에 대한 관제권 회복과 제주 남단 한국방공식별구역 확장구역에 훈련공역을 설정하는 방안 등이 추천된다. 아울러 중국이 서해상에 새로운 방공식별구역을 획정하더라도 우리의 방공식별구역 서쪽경계선이 절대 손상되지 않도록 군사 외교적으로 총력을 기울여야 하겠다. 또한 확장된 한국 방공식별구역을 장악하고, 우리의 권리를 정당하게 주장할 수 있도록 현재의 방공작전수행체계를 면밀히 점검하여 미비한 부분은 빠른 시간 내에 보강해야 한다. 둘째, 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)을 둘러싼 국내의 관련법령상의 미비한 요소 를 수정ㆍ보완하고 국제사회에서 방공식별구역(ADIZ) 관련 국제법 형성 논의를 적극 주도해야 한다. 한국방공식별구역을 둘러싼 관련 법령은 무엇이 문제이고 어떠한 것을 보완해야 하는지 등의 KADIZ 관련 국내법령 정비는 계속 이루어져야 하며 과연 한국방공식별구역은 어떻게 운용되고 이를 위반할 시 어떤 조치가 취하여 진다는 내용을 일반법령에 공포되어 있어야 한다. 그런 의미에서 항공법 과 군용항공법규 간 정비나 적용범위에 대한 조정도 필요하다고 본다. 셋째, 장기적으로 대한민국의 해양주권과 관할권이 미치는 해양관할권역과 연계되면서 우리의 군사력 운용범위도 포함된 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)으로 추가 확장해야 한다. 대한민국의 해양주권과 관할권이 미치는 해양관할권역은 영해, 접속수역, 배타적경제수역(EEZ), 대륙붕 등 해상영역을 포함하고 있어 軍의 군사력 운용범위와 그 경계는 유사하다. 그러나 일본ㆍ중국의 방공식별구역(ADIZ)이 각국의 배타적경제수역 또는 대륙붕 경계와 일치하는 것과 달리 현재 우리 해ㆍ공군 항공전력의 主 작전경계선인 한국방공식별구역은 우리의 해양관할 권역의 상공에 대한 경계를 포함하고 있지 않다. 따라서 평시 한국방공식별 구역 외곽의 해양관할권역에서 해ㆍ공군 항공전력의 지속적인 해양권익보호 작전이 제한되고, 유사시 잠재적인 위협에 의한 해양 분쟁 또는 갈등시 공중전력의 신속하고 효율적인 작전대응이 보장되지 않아 국제적 안보환경에서 불리한 여건에 처하고 있는 실정이다. 즉, 주변국과의 해양 갈등ㆍ분쟁시 자국의 해양 권익보장을 위해서는 해상ㆍ공중전력의 활동 영역을 수평적으로는 자국의 해양 권익이 미치는 해역을 작전영역으로 획정하고 수직적으로는 그 상공까지 작전공역을 확보하여 유리한 국제적 안보환경과 여건 조성을 보장 해야 하다. 따라서 대한민국의 해양권익을 유지하고 보장하기 위해서는 해양주권과 관할권의 영향이 미치는 全 해양관할권 상공과 해ㆍ공군 항공전력의 군사력 운용영역을 한국 방공식별구역 범위와 일치되도록 KADIZ를 확장할 필요가 있다. 따라서 본 연구결과는 최근 급변하는 동북아지역 정세 속에서 확장된 한국 방공식별구역(KADIZ)에 대한 실효적인 지배 강화와 이어도 주변해역 관할권 보호를 위한 국가 차원의 전략과 정책 수립에 일조할 것으로 판단된다. 그러나 대다수 자료가 군사자료로 인한 보안문제로 접근 및 취급이 제한되어 연구결과 에 수록하기가 힘들었으며 군사비문이 아닌 군사자료나 국내ㆍ외 연구 논문, 간행물, 언론보도 등 시사성 있는 최신자료를 최대한 활용하였으나, 심층 깊은 문제 도출에 한계점을 가지고 있다. 또한 최근 1~2년간 발표된 관련 연구 논문이 부족하다 보니 자료 최신화가 다소 부족하였고 확장된 한국방공식별 구역의 실효적 지배 강화를 위한 대응전략이라는 큰 틀에서 연구하다 보니 세부적이고 구체적인 연구가 이루어지지 못한 부분도 있다. 따라서 향후 연구는 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)에 대한 법적근거 마련을 위한 연구와 더불어 본 연구 에서 제시한 우리의 해양권익과 연계한 KADIZ 확장(안)의 유효화 방안과 우리 軍의 전장권역의 경계 등을 고려한 동북아지역의 해상작전공역에 대한 주변국 과의 공역관리협조방안 연구도 필요하다. 결론적으로 확장된 한국방공식별구역(KADIZ)에 대하여 실효적 관할권을 유지 하고 강화하기 위해서는 국가 차원에서 대응해야 하며, 이는 곧 대한민국의 해양관할권 활동 보장과 영공을 수호하는 것임을 명심해야 한다. 특히 우리나라 의 안보현실은 그 어느 시기보다 국가적인 역량의 결집이 요구되고 있으며, 이를 통해서만 대한민국의 위상이 한층 높아질 것이라 판단된다. Air Defense Identification Zone(ADIZ) has been operated in about 28 countries since the United States established it in 1950. To date international conflicts over ADIZ have yet been found between the nations. This is because the zone does not encroach upon the mutual consent by the interested countries and the legitimacy has not been defined by the International Laws. However, the possibilities of accidental and unintended military conflicts in the air exist as shown in the maritime conflicts between some countries over territorial demarcation lines, which define zones for natural resources and fisheries, This indicate its ambiguous nature of delineation both in the air and the sea, unlike in the land. Meanwhile, People's Republic of China(PRC) unilaterally declared its own ADIZ in November 23, 2013, increasing the possibility of severe conflicts both in the air and the sea of Northeast Asia. The abrupt declaration was made possible because of its rapidly growing economy and subsequent development of the People's Liberation Army(PLA). China's recent behavior is due to its objectives to seize the initiatives in territorial dispute over Senkaku Islands(Diaoyu in Chinese, Diaowitai in Taiwanese) and to display its escalated status quo in Northeast Asia, while seeking hegemony in the region. In the wake of Chinese unilateral declaration, the Republic of Korea duly responded by including Hongdo and Marado area into the ADIZ, which was excluded in the previous plan. However, a new plan is expected to cause further trilateral conflicts between South Korea, China and Japan as the plan covers not only Ieodo Island, where South Korea and China claim territorial rights, but also the Senkaku Islands where Japan and China have disputes In addition to Japan Air Defense Identification Zone (JADIZ), it is expected to result in more collisions in military as well as diplomacy among the three nations as the zones becomes overlapping one another. Furthermore, KADIZ is a very critical element in our national security environment, especially since we are the only divided nation in the world and stand against North Korea. Moreover, the operation of the ADIZ prevents unnecessary conflicts with neighboring countries such as Japan, China and Russia. Considering these aspects, we need to reinforce an effective control over the expanded KADIZ and proactively maintain and strengthen the jurisdiction over troubled territory. However, the response by the Republic of Korea to ongoing challenges surrounding KADIZ has been considered passive as shown in 2009 when finished its touches in the legal system for KADIZ, which indicated the armed forces' tendencies to prioritize current operations over others. In addition, it not only lacks legal basis in International laws but also has few related research institutions and experts to develop the system. Also, since the KADIZ was established by the U.S. Air Force in 1951 and has been operated by our armed forces so far, as stipulated in the operation procedure, the scope of reinforcement and the means of development of the system have been greatly limited. Therefore, the need to discuss the way to overcome its limitations and to find an effective way to control KADIZ has been on the rise. To achieve the objectives of this research, we have reviewed the academic papers and listened to advice of the experts. In addition, multiple resources have also been referenced such as research papers both from home and abroad, periodicals from major research institute, media coverage, academic magazines and online search data to identify the concept and the current status of the ADIZ of neighboring countries. Moreover, the paper also aims to study the legal background and the strategies behind Chinese unilateral declaration of the zone, identifying the surrounding countries' response and its status quo in terms of the International laws. The research entails an analysis of the expanded KADIZ, which results in the three proposals : a plan for the efficient management of the KADIZ, a plan to tackle the obstacales in terms of domestic laws, and an expansion plan for the KADIZ to increase national maritime interest. the response strategy for effective control enhancement of the expanded KADIZ as a the focus of this thesis are as listed below : First, we need to build up a new master plan for an efficient management of the expanded KADIZ. the ADIZ is a buffer zone to effectively defend the air space of the nation based on aircraft operational features, which is the essential to national defense. In this regard, the response exerted by South Korean government against Chinese unilateral decision is deemed as an attent to loosen the long prevalent constraints. However, the overlapping of ADIZ among three nations including the Republic of Korea, China and Japan presages accidental military clashes, posing a grave threat to the peace of Northeast Asia. Therefore, zone readjustment through diplomatic efforts should be made to reinforce its extended validity and an agreement should be followed immediately in order to prevent contingent situations and gaurantee safe aircraft operations. In addition, we ought to seek a way to strengthen jurisdiction over expanded KADIZ within the Incheon FIR. The restoration of air control right of A-593 air route and setting up a training area off the Southern part of Jeju Island are recommended. Furthermore, diplomatic and military efforts should be concentrated to secure the west demarcation line of ADIZ in case of another abrupt decision made by the Chinese government. Second, deficient components on national decree surrounding KADIZ need to be revised and complemented. We need to take initiative on leading discussion on enacting international law regarding the ADIZ in international society. Arrangement on national decree regarding KADIZ, such as what are problems about decree regarding our ADIZ and what needs to be complemented, need to be carried out successively. Also, how ADIZ is operated and what kind of measures are taken when it is violated need to be declared in a general law. In that sense, arrangement between aviation law and military as well as conciliation on coverage is needed. Third, in the long­term, KADIZ need to be extended to include military operation capability and the maritime jurisdiction area where maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction reach. Maritime jurisdiction area, where maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction reach, includes maritime area such as maritime territory, contact sea area, Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) and continental shelf. Similar to how JADIZ and China Aerial Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ) do not correspond with each country's exclusive economic zone or continental shelf boundaries, the operation area of Korea's current naval and aerial aviation force, KADIZ does not include aerial territory of maritime jurisdiction area. Therefore, sustained operation for maritime interest protection of naval and aerial aviation force in the maritime jurisdiction area. Also, immediate and efficient operation response of the aviation force in case of maritime conflict by a potential threat is not secured, thus leaving Korea vulnerable in the international security environment. In other words, should maritime conflict/dispute with surrounding countries occur, horizontally, naval and aerial aviation force's areas of activity must be demarcated as operation areas to secure maritime interest. vertically, its area of operation in the air must also be secured to ensure advantageous international security environment and condition. Therefore, to secure South Korea's maritime interest, the military operation area of maritime jurisdiction area's aerial parameter and naval and aerial aviations force, as affected by maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction, should correspond with KADIZ. Therefore, the result of this research is likely to contribute to establishing nationwide strategy and policy to defend jurisdiction over water around Ieodo Island and strengthen effective control over KADIZ which has been expanded by the recent rapid change of circumstances in northeast Asia. However, since most of the data is restricted due to security of military materials, it was difficult to include them in the results. Although this research used as much nonconfidential military material and recent data such as essays, publications, news reports as possible, it has limitation in term of in­depth conclusion. Also, due to lack of recently published research papers, there has not been enough updated data. Conducting broad research of countermeasures for effective control over expanded KADIZ has prevented this research from being thorough and detailed. Therefore, future research must establish legal grounds about KADIZ and validate a plan of maritime interest linked with expansion of KADIZ Furthermore, there is also a need for research on cooperative measures for the control of international waters with neighboring countries, taking into account South Korea's boundaries of battleground.

      • 韓國海洋汚染 防除政策의 改善方案에 관한 연구

        鄭昇勳 한국해양대학교 2002 국내석사

        RANK : 249679

        As we know, the ocean plays a lot of important roles for human-beings to survive. We have long believed that the ocean cannot be polluted because it has the capability of self-purification, but unfortunately it has begun to polluted due to pollution arising from various pollutants, especially oil which is relevant to shipping in the sea. After the Sea Prince oil spill accident in 1995, the korean government has taken a measure to establish an emergency response system and equip clean-up capacity against large spill, major contents of which are as followers :First, Korea Marine pollution Response Corporation has been established as a non-government organization of recovery of spilled oil in order to improve private response capabilities.Second, clean-up equipments, such as large clean-up vessels and oil fences for the open sea operation has been expanded.Third, a national contingency plan on the large spill accidents has been established compliance with the provisions of Article 6 of the OPRC 1990.However, there exist some problems in the national response system, such as cleary roles definition between government and private agencies; proper amendment of the Marine Pollution Prevention Act to incorporate major contents of the OPRC 1990; and training and exercises of clean-up personnel.With the above problems in mind, this paper reviews the current issues on the national oil pollution response system and recommends policy-making to tackle to those problems.

      • 한국해양오염방제조합 방제실행능력의 극대화 방안 연구

        김성란 한국해양대학교 대학원 2006 국내석사

        RANK : 249679

        In Korean waters maritime typhoon or storms often form. Unexpected big marine accident is usually affected by natural factors such as typhoon, waves, wind and mist. The whole marine traffic amount is concentrated in the sea area around the harbor boundary and narrow waterway. The harbors on the southern and western seashore are surrounded by many islands, so the access route is complex. Besides the coastline is much indented. Especially the sea area joining Korean waters is geographically crowded with marine traffic between Korea/Japan, Korea/China, Korea/Russia. It also forms various fishing ground in the inshore so that the rate of maritime accident is very high. The total cases of pollution accident occurred in Korean coast are 3,911 for the past 10 years (‘95~’04). The yearly mean 390 cases have been occurring. It shows somewhat decreasing tendency at the peak of 2000. But the ship accident occupies more than 90% of all. The major control cases of domestic marine pollution accident are 3 except the Sea Prince. The accident of the Sea Prince was occurred in July 28, 1995 as unloading 260,000㎘ of crude oil at the Honam Jeongyoo harbor. Undergone the typhoon "FAYE", the part of stokehold was run against the island. The fire broke out inside, the ship was drifting; finally it ran on the sunken rock of the southern end of Sorido, Nammyon, Yeocheongun. The outflow of 5,035㎘ of crude oil polluted throughout the southern coast. Since the establishment of Korea Marine Pollution Response Corp., the case of the medium-mega pollution accident is the year mean 45 among 300~400 marine pollution cases a year. It means once a week control measure was carried out. In September, 2003, the marine accident caused by the storm "Memi" resulted in the maritime pollution by 4 ships (cargo ship and oil tanker) at the same time. The whole relevant member in the neighboring district was called out to recover the damage. And in December of the same year, the oil tanker Jeongyangho's left 4th tank was broken by the collision with other oil tanker at the port of Yeosoo Nakpo. The outflow of about 623 tons of bunker-C oil polluted throughout the coast including neighboring seashores. The rapid set-up of oil boom stopped the spreading of oil. As time went by, the viscosity of the outflown oil was going down affected by the temperature of water. So the oil collector was not available then, an excavator and other equipment were utilized to collect oil. It was the only domestic case of control operation occurred in winter.The estimation of domestic control ability is on the basis of capability in which the control ship and oil collector are able to collect one third of the maximum flow volume, 60,000tons, during marine accident of 200,000tons loadage's oil tanker. The rest is a treatment by oil disposer, oil absorbent and to collect sticking oil to coast. The estimation of control ability is relatively important against the mechanical collection and chemical control method preferentially. In the national control strategy and domestic marine environment, the control disposer is considered to be just an optional measure because of the 2nd pollution. Therefore we aim at the mechanical collection like USA and Japan, we utilize the mechanical efficiency (the efficiency of oil collector) by 20%.As introducing the notion of the maximum outflow volume, the maximizing measure of control execution capability, classifying the 12 branches' disposition of the current KMPRC into the following 4 scenarios, I have analyzed the optimum disposition and maximization.Scenario 1 has analyzed the disposition volume of oil collectors kept in each region, as evaluating its control execution capability. On the assumption that KMPRC takes charge 35% of the national control capability, I analyzed the volume of the current holding oil collectors according to its control execution capability. The case of pollution accident which could be settled by equipment and manpower contained in the branch ship is corresponding to the 1st step, it could be controlled by the maximum control execution capability of the relevant branch.In the 2nd step, the neighboring branch's control equipment is drawn to settle the pollution accident which could be handled by branch-kept equipment but needed the support of control manpower, or the accident which couldn't be controlled by branch-kept equipment. The treatment level of the 1st step is the value which the treated volume of KMPRC divided by the control execution capability in the 1st step of the relevant branch among the maximum outflow volume. If the value is below 1, it means the relevant branch can exclusively implement the control measure in the 1st step, if it is above 1, it explains the status needed to draw the support of neighboring branch beyond the 2nd step.Scenario 2 adjusts the control capability of 6 branches which are ineffectively disposed in the current control execution capability into the proper level 1 of the 1st step treatment level. Then as distributing the extra control capability into the 6 branches which are able to treat the 1st step above 1, the treatment level of the 1st step could be adjusted effectively. As the treatment level of the 1st step maintaining the branch which is satisfying the treatment of KMPRC among the maximum outflow volume, keeping the rate of insufficiency of 4 branches low, of which treated volume among the maximum outflow is beyond the 1st step treatment level. It shows the efficient redisposition of all disposition volume is required.Scenario 3 shows that if the relevant branch could exclusively settle 100% of the treated volume of KMPRC among the maximum outflow volume of the relevant branch, by regulating the 1st step treatment level of all branches to 1, the additional requirement is 24,347 tons of control execution capability. Scenario 4 shows that at the time of accident, by mobilizing the neighboring branch, to adjust the 2nd step treatment level to below 1 to be able to satisfy the treatment volume of KMPRC among the maximum outflow volume, the measure in which adjusting the 1st step treatment level to below 1, before adjusting the 2nd step one, is considered more advantageous than adjusting the 2nd step one to below 1 directly not considering the 1st step one. In this case the additional requirement is 15,890 tons of capability.

      • 동아시아의 해양안보 위협에 따른 한국 해군의 대비방안에 관한 연구

        신강석 한국해양대학교 대학원 2016 국내박사

        RANK : 249679

        With the ocean being mankind’s last store of resources, it is also becoming the site of sharp conflict and competition, and the seas of East Asia are no exception. Disputes over islands, namely the Spratly and Paracel Islands, are intensifying in the South China Sea between China and Southeast Asian nations. In the East China Sea there are severe disputes between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and resource development. In Northeast Asia, there are disputes over the sovereignty of Dokdo and jurisdiction of the waters off Ieodo. Moreover, there are rampant piracy, terrorism at sea that is highly likely to happen, natural disasters, sea pollution, and illegal fishing in parts of the region, demonstrating the vulnerability of East Asian waters to transnational threats. In addition, competition for maritime hegemony among states in the region is intense. In particular, the People’s Liberation Army Navy(and the“PLAN”) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force(and the“JMSDF”) are strengthening their maritime power projection capabilities which could apply political pressure on neighboring countries. China is accelerating naval power build-up in order to secure maritime hegemony in East Asia with its anti-access/area denial(A2/AD) formulated to oppose U.S. presence in the region. Currently, it is estimated that the PLAN can exert sea control out to the first island Chain, but its maritime operation capability will be expanded to the second island chain by around 2020 with the acquisition of two to three carrier battle groups. Japan is discarding its former exclusively defense concept and developing a dynamic defense concept which advances the range and degree of its defense activities. Recently, Japan legislated new security laws expanding the operating area of the JMSDF abroad. The JMSDF, the second largest naval force in the Asia-Pacific region after the U.S. 7th Fleet, is demonstrating its cutting edge naval power by building the newest advanced ships including large, light carrier-class vessels. The extra-regional hegemon the United States is deploying 60 percent of its naval capabilities to East Asia as it proceeding to its rebalancing strategy in accordance with its Asia-Pacific-focused policy. In addition, North Korea is engaging in maritime provocations, varying their degree from severe such as with the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island to temporary crossings over the Northern Limit Line. In particular, it is developing asymmetric capabilities such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and undertaking far-reaching provocations such as missile launches and nuclear tests. Going forward, it is predicted that North Korea will commit provocations at sea at any time in order to achieve its political objectives. In this way, while East Asia’s maritime disputes and non-military threats are“soft” issues, they tend to be easily turned into“hard”issues due to historical problems, national sentiments, and political and military sensitivity; and these hard or soft issues are appearing with mixed qualities. That is, these are complex threats in which military and non-military factors are intertwined, and as these threats are likely to grow in mutual linkage with one another, it is inevitable that they exert tremendous influence on national security. Despite this security situation, because South Korea is focused on responding to the present threat of North Korea’s military, it has payed poor attention to the more fundamental task of protecting the national strategic interests. This is due to poor recognition of the fact that maritime security threats in East Asia have a profound influence on the nation’s existence and interests because South Korea is de-facto maritime nation with practically no means to move out via land though it is geographically classified as a peninsula. In recognition of this problem, this paper was written to explore the overall plan that South Korea must follow, including the national-level strategy for responding to East Asian maritime security threats, the maritime strategy and force development that the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy must pursue, development of the Navy’s role, and maritime security cooperation. For this research, the following problems are raised. First, what is the nature of East Asia’s maritime disputes and non-military maritime security threats? Second, how is the maritime strategy of each regional power changing and developing? Third, how is North Korea’s naval power developing and what is its level of provocation? This research revealed the following results. First, our national security and maritime strategies require a paradigm shift because maritime security is not subordinate to national security but is almost equal. For this, the national security strategy should be developed by reassessing security threats and challenges in order to put emphasis on maritime security threat and develop our understanding of threats to maritime territoriality and sea lines of communication as threats to our vital interests. According to this perspective, I have proposed a“balanced maritime defensive strategy” as the ROK Navy’s maritime strategy. This is tailored through choices and focus and employs maritime control, maritime containment, and maritime cooperation strategies to respond to the diverse maritime threats in East Asia. Second, to deal with the various maritime threats at the same time, the required ROK Navy forces must be urgently acquired. The appropriate level of naval power must as a priority be gained in order to have the forces be able to respond to crises related to Dokdo and Ieodo and to the maritime strategies of neighboring great powers while at the same time respond effectively against the North Korean threat. Regarding the development of South Korea’s naval capabilities, there is a need to build social consensus based on the lessons of history on naval 21세기의 해양은 인류에게 남은 마지막 자원의 보고로서 국가간의 이익이 첨예하게 대립하는 각축장이 되고 있으며 동아시아 해양도 예외가 아니다. 즉, 남중국 해역에서는 남사군도와 서사군도를 둘러싼 중국과 동남아 국가들 간의 도서영유권 분쟁이 격화되고 있다. 동중국 해역에서는 센카쿠 열도 및 자원개발 문제로 일·중간의 심각한 분쟁이 있다. 동북아에서도 한·일간의 독도 영유권 문제와 한·중간에는 이어도 주변해역의 관할권 이견이 존재하고 있다. 또한 일부 해역에서는 해적행위가 빈번히 발생하고 해상테러의 가능성이 높게 예견되고 있으며 대규모 자연재해, 해양오염, 불법어로 등도 발생하고 있어 동아시아의 해양은 초국가적 위협에도 취약한 상태에 있다. 아울러 주변국들의 해양패권 다툼이 치열하게 전개되고 있다. 특히 중국과 일본 해군은 주변국에 정치적 압력을 가할 수 있는 해양투사 전력을 강화하고 있다. 즉, 중국은 A2/AD 전략을 바탕으로 미국에 대항하여 동아시아의 해양패권을 장악하기 위해 강한 해군력 건설에 박차를 가하고 있다. 현재 중국 해군의 해양작전 능력은 제1도련권 이내일 것으로 추정되고 있으나, 2020년경에는 2~3개 항모전투단 확보와 함께 제2도련권으로 확장될 것으로 전망된다. 일본은 과거 1,000해리 전수방위라는 수세적 개념에서 벗어나 그 범위와 강도를 역동적으로 전진시키는 동적방위 개념을 발전시키고 있다. 최근에는 신안보법을 제정하여 해상자위대의 활동 영역을 해외로 확대시키고 있다. 해상자위대는 경항모급의 대형함정을 비롯하여 최신예 함정을 건조하는 등 아·태 지역에서 미 7함대에 버금가는 규모로서 최첨단 해군력을 과시하고 있다. 역외 패권국인 미국은 아・태 지역 중시 정책기조에 따라 재 균형 전략을 추진하면서 미 해군력의 60%를 동아시아에 배치를 추진하고 있다. 더구나 북한은 천안함 폭침, 연평도 포격과 같은 고강도 수준의 도발에서부터 일시적인 북방한계선 월선에 이르기까지 위협의 수위를 조종하여 끊임없이 해상도발을 야기하고 있다. 특히 잠수함 발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 등 비대칭 전력을 확보하고 미사일 발사와 핵 실험 등의 파급력이 큰 도발을 기습적으로 감행하고 있다. 앞으로도 북한은 한반도 안보정세를 고려하여 언제든지 정치적 목적 달성을 위해 해상에서 도발을 감행할 것으로 예상된다. 이와 같이 동아시아의 해양분쟁 및 비군사적 해양안보 위협은‘연성적(軟性的)’성격의 이슈이면서도, 역사문제와 국민적 감정, 정치·군사적 민감성 때문에 쉽게‘경성적(硬性的)’으로 변질되는 현상을 보이고 있으며,‘경성적’혹은‘연성적’이슈가 혼재되어 나타나고 있다. 즉 군사적·비군사적 요소가 직·간접적으로 긴밀하게 연계되어 있는 복합적 위협이고 이들 위협이 상호 연계되어 확대될 가능성이 매우 크므로 국가안보에 지대한 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다. 이러한 안보적 상황에도 불구하고 한국은 북한의 군사적 위협이라는 현존 위협 대응에 초점을 맞추고 있어서 보다 근원적인 국가 전략적 이익 보호에 소홀한 측면이 있다. 이는 한국이 지형적으로 반도 국가이지만 지정학적으로는 육상진출이 거의 불가능하여 해양국가나 다름이 없음에도 불구하고, 동아시아의 해양에서 발생하는 안보위협이 국가 존립과 이익에 심대한 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 인식이 부족하기 때문이다. 이러한 문제인식에 따라 본 논문은 동아시아의 해양안보 위협에 대응할 수 있는 국가차원의 전략과 한국 해군이 추구해야 할 해양전략 및 전력발전, 그리고 해군의 역할 발전, 해양안보 협력 등 종합적인 대비방안을 모색하기 위해 작성하였다. 연구를 위해 다음과 같이 3가지 문제를 제기하였다. 첫째, 동아시아의 해양분쟁 및 비군사적 해양안보 위협의 실체는 무엇이며, 그것이 한국의 해양안보에 미치는 영향은 어떠한가? 둘째, 역내 주요국들의 해양전략은 어떻게 변화하고 있고 해군력은 어떠한 형태로 발전하고 있는가? 셋째, 우리나라의 안보와 직결된 북한의 해군력은 어떻게 발전하고 있으며 도발의 수위는 어떠한가? 연구를 통해 얻은 결과로는 첫째, 오늘날 해양안보는 국가안보의 하위개념이 아니라, 거의 대등한 수준이므로 우리의 국가안보 전략과 해양전략의 패러다임 전환이 필요하다는 것이다. 이를 위해 국가안보 전략은 안보위협과 도전요소를 재평가하여 해양안보에 대한 위협을 중시하고 무엇보다 해양영유권과 해상교통로에 대한 위협을 우리의 사활적 이익으로 간주할 수 있도록 발전시켜야 한다. 이러한 관점에 따라 연구자는 한국 해군의 해양전략으로‘균형적 해양방위전략’을 제시하였다. 이 전략은 동아시아의 다양한 해양안보 위협에 대응하여 선택과 집중을 통해 해양통제, 해양견제, 해양협력 전략을 구사하는 맞춤형 전략이다. 둘째, 동아시아의 다양한 해양안보 위협에 동시에 대처할 수 있도록 한국 해군의 소요 전력은 요구 능력을 기반으로 시급히 확보되어야 한다. 주변 강대국들의 해양전략과 해군력 발전 그리고 독도 및 이어도 문제로 인한 위기 발생시 이에 대응할 수 있

      • 외국 해양대학 항해학과 교과과정의 개발에 관한 연구 : 케냐해양대학의경우

        홍준기 한국해양대학교 일반대학원 2016 국내석사

        RANK : 249679

        This study deals with the development of curriculum for navigation science department of Kenya maritime college, which is planned to be established in near future. To achieve the goal of study, various investigations are performed as follows. Firstly, in chapter 2 the present state of Kenya in relation to education and maritime industry and JKUAT university and it’s curriculum are investigated. In chapter 3, IMO requirements of maritime education for navigation officers and IMO model courses are investigated, respectively. In chapter 4, curriculums of navigation science department for foreign major maritime universities such as USMMA and CMA in USA, PMMA and MAAP in Philippine, KMOU in Korea, DMU in China and VIMARU and HCMUT in Vietnam are investigated. Finally, in chapter 5 the curriculum of Kenya maritime college and the teaching syllabuses of maritime major subjects are proposed. The proposed curriculum in this study is based on 5 year education program which is composed of 10 semesters with 2 semesters every year including 1 year onboard training. Total credit hours to be completed are 200. The subjects in curriculum are composed of basic subjects, maritime subjects, major subjects and onboard training subject with the weight ratio of 25:40:15:20. The onboard training subject is a single subject which takes 40 credit hours with Pass/Fail score. The basic subjects are chosen primarily from JKUAT curriculum, because it is to get the teaching helps from JKUAT professors. The proposed teaching syllabuses of maritime subjects are developed based on IMO model courses and those are minimum teaching contents to be taught. The more detailed syllabuses and teaching aids can be seek in relevant IMO model courses. The deficient parts in this study is that the investigation to the curriculum of foreign major maritime universities is performed insufficiently due to the lack of relevant syllabuses and the investigation to the curriculum of european maritime universities can not be performed due to no relevant curriculums.

      • 한국형 해양보급기지(offshore supply base)의 개념적 모형과 구축전략에 관한 연구

        김용호 한국해양대학교 2017 국내박사

        RANK : 249679

        현재 우리나라의 해양산업은 전반적으로 큰 위기를 맞고 있다. 전통적인 해양산업인 해운과 조선의 침체에다가 저유가 기조로 인한 해양플랜트 산업의 타격은 글로벌 강자의 위치에 있던 국내 기업들의 퇴출로 이어지고 있고, 그 여파로 국내 항만들은 물동량 증가세 둔화로 터미널들의 기능 재배치를 고려하고 있으나 새로운 수요 창출에 어려움을 겪고 있다. 해양보급기지(OSB)를 단순히 해상플랫폼 또는 Offshore Oil & Gas 산업을 지원하는 물류기지로만 정의한다면 인접한 해양 유전이 없는 국내에 구축하는 것이 타당성을 갖지 못할 것이다. 이 연구에서는 우선 OSB가 Offshore Oil & Gas 생산기지를 지원하는 기능들을 크게 두 가지로 나누어 살펴 본 바, 그 하나는 소모성 자재와 생필품 등 해상플랫폼 운용을 위한 보급기능이고, 다른 하나는 설치와 유지보수 등을 위한 기술지원 기능이다. 그리고, Offshore Oil & Gas 산업의 추세로 보아 향후 OSB의 기술지원 기능이 강화될 것으로 예상되고, 기술지원 기능에 중점을 두고 민간기업이 운영하는 OSB인 싱가포르 Loyang OSB의 성공사례를 살펴 보았다. 한편, 해양건설업은 Offshore Oil & Gas의 설치·유지보수 작업을 포함하여 기타 해저케이블과 해상풍력 등 해양 구조물과 관련된 모든 작업을 수행하는데, 시장 규모가 조선과 해양플랜트 제작산업을 합친 것 보다 더 크다. 글로벌 해양건설시장에서 국내 기업의 점유율은 1%도 되지 않으며, 향후 성장 전망 등에 비추어 보아도 해양건설업은 한국 경제의 새로운 활력소가 될 수 있는 산업이다. 그래서, 본 연구에서는 OSB의 지원대상 범위를 해양건설업으로 규정하고 살펴 보았는데, 이 영역은 Offshore Oil & Gas에 대한 기존 OSB들의 기술지원 기능은 물론, 국내 해양건설업체들의 주력 사업 분야를 포함하며, 해양 유전과의 지리적 근접성 요소가 적기도 하다. 기존의 OSB에서도 기술지원 기능의 직접적인 수요자는 해양건설업체이므로, 해양건설업 전반을 지원하는 OSB가 국내에 구축된다면, 국내 해양건설업 성장에 도움이 되고 항만으로서는 새로운 수요를 창출하는 효과를 거두게 될 것이며, 장기적으로 기존 해외 OSB들과 같은 경쟁력을 갖게 될 것이다. 국내에 구축하는 한국형 OSB의 모형을 도출하기 위해 본 연구에서는 OSB의 기능들을 해양건설업체 입장에서 재분류 하였는데, 그것은 업체의 생산요소인 선박, 장비, 자재, 인력을 기준으로 한 것이다. 이 분류기준으로 기존 OSB들이 구비한 기능들을 살펴 보고 국내의 기존 해양건설업체가 운용 중인 선박기지의 기능들과 비교 검토한 결과, 해양건설업체들이 필요로 하는 기능들을 추출해냈다. 그리고, 국내 OSB 구축에 있어서 설정한 두 가지 전제는 모든 기능들을 한꺼번에 갖추지 않고 수요자가 희망하는 기능들부터 순차적으로 갖춘다는 것과, 새로이 항만을 구축하지 않고 기존 항만의 터미널 기능 재배치를 활용한다는 것이다. 한편, 국내 OSB 구축의 가장 큰 걸림돌은 수요 부족으로 인한 운영 차질이므로 한국형OSB의 모형에는 초기 수요자가 될 국내 해양건설업체들이 실제 희망하는 입지와 서비스들을 파악하여 반영해야 할 것이다. 그래서 본 연구에서는 국내 업체 소속으로 현재 해양건설업 현장에 있는 실무 전문가들을 대상으로 국내 OSB의 입지와 기능 우선순위에 대하여 설문조사를 수행했다. OSB의 입지 선호도 조사를 위해서는 일정한 기준으로 선정한 4개 항만, 즉, 부산, 울산, 마산, 포항을 대상으로 응답자들이 선호하는 이유들마다 순위를 매기게 했다. OSB가 갖출 기능들의 우선순위 조사를 위해서는 4가지 대항목 각각에 대해서 우선순위와 상관 없이 필수적으로 갖추어야 할 기능들을 제외한 3가지씩의 세부항목들로 모두 12가지의 기능들을 대상으로 하여, 대항목들 간의 우선순위와 각 대항목 내의 세부항목들 간의 우선순위를 쌍대비교를 통해 응답하게 했다. 입지에 관한 응답의 분석은, 각 항만별 순위 빈도수를 평점으로 환산하고 5가지의 선호이유들을 동일한 가중치를 두어 합산하여 총점으로 항만들의 순위를 매기는 방식을 수행했다. 기능 우선순위에 관한 분석은, AHP 분석 방법을 활용하여 대항목들 간의 순위와 각 대항목 내의 세부항목들 간의 순위, 그리고 12개 세부항목 전체에 대한 우선순위를 도출했다. 또, 응답자의 여건이 응답에 어떤 영향을 미치는지 파악하기 위해 소속 회사의 규모에 따라 두 부류로 나누어 분석하였고, 해외 OSB 방문경험 여부에 따라서도 나누어 분석하였다. 설문 분석 결과, 국내에 OSB를 구축한다면 그 입지는 부산지역이 가장 선호되는 것으로 파악되었다. 해양건설업체들이 부산을 선호하는 이유는 기존 업무활동의 연속성, 협력업체들과의 근접성, 인력 공급을 위한 도시적 환경, 육상교통의 편리성, 그리고 기존 항만으로서의 평판 등 모든 기준에서 부산이 우위에 있기 때문이었다. OSB가 가장 먼저 갖추어야 할 기능은 자재와 관련된 기능으로서, 원스톱 통관체제를 갖추고 업체들의 자재 공동구매 등의 원가절감 효과를 기대할 수 있는 기능을 갖추는 것으로 파악되었다. 그 다음 기능 우선순위는 장비의 렌탈을 위한 장비업체의 대리점이나 렌탈업체를 유치하는 것과 자재를 업체에 운송하는 육상운송에 대한 서비스 순이었다. 업체 규모에 따라 기능 우선순위가 다른 것으로 파악되었는데, 규모가 큰 업체가 희망하는 서비스의 우선순위는 선박 – 장비 – 자재 – 인력 순이고, 규모가 작은 업체는 반대로 인력 – 자재 – 장비 – 선박 순으로 양측이 정반대의 입장을 보였다. 업체의 규모에 따라 우선순위가 반대로 나타나는 현상은 초기 OSB의 수요 확보에 가장 큰 애로점으로 작용할 것으로 예상되어, 해결방안이 필요하다고 판단되었다. 해외 OSB 방문경험 여부는 응답의 성향에 영향을 미치지 않았다. 이는 기존 OSB의 기능과 형태에 상관 없이 국내 OSB는 국내 해양건설업체들의 수요를 갖추는 것이 우선되어야 함을 의미한다고 할 수 있겠다.

      • 北極海 環境變化로 인한 韓國의 海洋安保政策 硏究

        강희승 韓國海洋大學校 大學院 2015 국내박사

        RANK : 249679

        The Arctic marine environment is changing from moment to moment. The factors which affect the Arctic environment are changes in weather, oceanic conditions and the Arctic's own geographical features. Furthermore, widened human access to navigation within the Arctic Ocean has drastically increased the number of ships and aircraft in the area, and this is expected to lead to a new era of exploration; it is said that the discovery of new shipping routes in the Arctic is of the same worth as the discoveries of Columbus. On the other hand, some say that the changes caused by human activities will not only provide benefits, but also the possibility of unexpected disasters and calamities. There is no doubt that international cooperation is integral to the performance of policies relating to the Arctic area, which have been successfully developed for the last 10 years. Therefore, this study will look into the following factors: ● Pending issues for drastic changes in the Arctic and solutions to these ● Settlement of territorial disputes between Arctic coastal states ● Advantages and disadvantages of the discovery of new maritime routes ● Role of the Arctic Council and its future tasks The Republic of Korea acquired a formal position as an observer at the 8th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council held in Kiruna, Sweden in 2013. The Republic of Korea is considered to be poor in resources but it is, however, one of the most favoured nations in "trade". The potential of the Arctic, which may be examined following the discovery of new shipping routes has intrigued The Republic of Korea to turn its gaze on the trade situation within the Arctic area. Accordingly, the government of Republic of Korea has attracted cooperation within its own ministries in order to push forward its Arctic policies and to incarnate challenging issues while doing so. Spelled out in the following paragraphs are the details of Arctic potential due to the discovery of the new maritime routes. Firstly, costs for international shipping are expected to downtrend sharply as the new shipping routes decrease shipping distances covered e.g. freight charge for international shipping are expected to be decreased by 25 per cent. Furthermore, the Arctic, owing to its inclement weather and environmental conditions, has until now never been an easy place to explore. The situation is different at the present time, allowing the tremendous supply of natural resources which rests under the ice of the Arctic to become more accessible; a quarter of the undiscovered petroleum and other natural resources such as nickel, copper, iron ore are to be found within the rock strata of the Arctic. Such potentials of the region will fulfil a role as a new growth engine for The Republic of Korea. In addition to the bullet points above, this report will also investigate Korea's maritime security policy and strategies for the changes in the Arctic, and consider the resolution of these by diagnosing the situations of other coastal states. Other suggestions of this report regard diverse aspects of Arctic changes illustrated above, including effective ways of providing airspace management, ratification of new Arctic treaties, the operation of naval power of countries in the Arctic Council. These will be followed by the identification of the probable role of the Korean Navy in the Arctic and national policies dealing with Arctic issues. Having said this, solutions to the four main topics of this report are outlined by four different terms: ● International cooperation on Arctic management ● Governmental proposals of Arctic strategic development (in the case of The Republic of Korea) ● Identifying and promoting the role of an observer state in the Arctic Council ● Advance Arctic strategies in collaboration with other coastal states : the USA, Canada, Russia, etc. To begin with the first term, there are a number of issues that need to be treated internationally. For example, territorial disputes including the continental shelf and the demarcation of territorial waters should be handled peacefully under terms of UNCLOS, which will deter any drastic action from countries involved in such disputes. Terminating conflicts between such countries is eventually aimed at enhancing maritime security in the Arctic. Other elements of oceanic security issues comprise ensuring the safety of navigation in the Arctic area and exploitation of mineral resources, which are the results derived from the new shipping routes. Concerning this discovery of new shipping lanes, it is strongly suggested that international military cooperative systems be launched with the support of the UN. In addition, free navigation has to be assured to every rightful country as it is strictly stated in the UNCLOS. Some countries, unsurprisingly, try to obtain exclusive possession of shipping routes and this cannot be overlooked. Every country related to the Arctic, regardless of distance, should legislate domestic laws on Arctic activities taking the peace of humanity into account. In addition, maritime observation systems capable of transmitting real-time maritime conditions, should be developed for those navigating in the region. The government of Republic of Korea recommended to take the following action regarding Arctic issues. Firstly, government-led Scientific research and international cooperation activities should be enhanced. The government has recently re-established the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and shown their intention to focus on the Arctic. The hot potato, however, is that their current level of scientific research and frequency of participation in international Arctic activities still remains low. There exist countless threats throughout the Arctic region and it is imperative that Korean naval power be strengthened in case of salvage and other rescue operations. Methods may include building icebreakers and the foundation of a military base in the Arctic. Establishing a consultative body for maritime policies would also help Korea play a role as an observer. Apart from the governmental dimension, supporting nongovernmental organisations should also be considered as this would assist in constructing a national information exchange infrastructure. Furthermore, Korean officials promulgated a plan for processing integrated Arctic policies in 2013. For example, Korea is ambitious for transforming Busan into a 'hub' for shipping in North-east Asia. Details of this project include collaborating with Russia. In terms of the Arctic Council, coastal states expect observer states to participate positively in their activities with financial resources and the sharing of scientific knowledge. The Republic of Korea should set a business model for the Arctic so as to precede competing countries. The Korean peninsula is directly affected by the Siberian air mass and, therefore, the precise prediction of climate changes in the Arctic is necessary. Lastly, the development of human resources is one of the most urgent tasks as Korea's contribution to Arctic activities will mainly relate to exporting its competitive manpower resources. As discussed above, The Republic of Korea managed to obtain observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013 and experts argue that succeeding in the following policies would help Korea make its position secure. In the first place, observer countries including Korea should scrutinize progress when working groups of the Arctic Council aim to achieve common interests of humanity. If so, observer countries should actively participate in the activities of the groups so that Arctic can be protected both environmentally and economically. To give an example of such activities, observer countries can become involved when members of the Arctic Council make deliberations on new treaties or agreements affecting the Arctic. Secondly, Korea should seek SLOC security as well as raise the quality of the Korean Navy's sea rescue capability, which may be achieved if there is collaboration with other states. The next policy is the improvement of governance between states and understanding of the characteristics of the Arctic region. As the Ocean does not belong specifically to certain people or organizations, thus, it is necessary for us all to work together to protect it. Denuclearization in the area could be the first thing to process. The last policy is to make the full use of the extension of mutual exchange between EU countries and North Asian countries. Although North Korea's policy of seclusion prevents Northern Asia from achieving faster growth, this connection between two different continents is expected to raise Korea's economic potential. Discussed from this point onward is the last topic: collaboration with other countries related to the Arctic either directly or indirectly. To start with countries whose concern towards the Arctic is more intense than other countries, due to their geographical attributes, Russia is regarded to be the top-rated country for investment from the position of Korea since the two countries are adjacent to each other, and President Putin of Russia is now pushing forward a business in energy development throughout Eastern Siberia and the Far East. For instance, Russia currently concentrates on development of oceanic resources; crude oil, natural gas, mineral resources, fishery resources and so on, and they have also entered into a business in construction and management of new shipping routes. Probable areas where Russia and Korea can process a joint investment may include a newly-launched system of transporting crude oil from West Siberia using the ESPO oil pipeline, which a long-term project of cooperative resource exploitation in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The same can apply to a port construction business, a mapping project for sea beds in the Barents Sea, Loften and Vesteralen areas, the establishment of Kirkenes airport and port, cooperation in research into an integrated surveillance system for Arctic navigation, expansion of infrastructure and conclusion of MOU with eminent universities. Canada is known to be a country whose political interest in the Arctic is very high and is a place with rich mineral resources. They have recently started the Mackinzie Gas Project whose objective is to construct a 1,200km length natural gas pipeline. If successfully processed, 1.2 billion cubic feet of gas will be distributed through the pipeline and the official start of sales is expected to be in 2018 when every legal and financial problem has been solved. Cooperation between Korea and Canada is necessary for the following policies. Firstly, it is expected that Korea will be able to help Russia build VTS and communications management information systems in the Arctic, which are to be prepared for the new shipping routes. Additionally, the necessity for collaboration in port and resource development industries, development of high-tech vessels fit for polar expeditions, environmental protection and supporting indigenous people cannot be overlooked. Alaska is renowned for rich resources buried in it; 10% of world coal reserves and a vast range of mineral and fishery resources from the Siberian Ocean take up to half of the total American fishery resources. Korea should refer to American's advanced knowledge of the Arctic and the reliability of their naval power, for example, in participation in the Arctic training program conducted from 2011 which would enhance the capability of the Korean Navy. Norway, located adjacent to the Arctic, implemented the High North policy since 2006 and contributed to Arctic management to a large extent. Korea would benefit from consultation with the Norwegian Barents 202 Education Program, which comprises Arctic knowledge of vast scope. In addition to Norway, Greenland, due to its geographical nature, is believed to hold 48 billion barrels of petroleum and natural gas with a number of other natural resources. Greenland is said to have competitive knowledge in digital mapping and geographic intelligence. Possible collaborative strategy between Korea and Greenland would establish an Arctic information intelligence centre, which would enhance Korea's understanding of Arctic and Greenland's business capability. In contrast to the countries discussed so far, illustrated below are non-Arctic countries (in terms of geography). To begin with China, seems to have a similar position to that of Korea, but is ready for the upcoming new shipping routes and their results, such as resource exploitation. Both countries may work together regarding these opportunities, while they will also be in competition. Japan, Korea's neighbouring country, is alleged to be the most prepared country for an imminent golden age of the Arctic. Their North Ocean program; ANSROP-2 and geographical information system; JANSROP-GIS are the most competitive ones compared to other countries' and the Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan established JAMSTEC; Japan Agency Marine-Earth Science and Technology to supervise and analyse the Arctic Ocean in real time. Korean research organizations should strengthen relationships with such Japanese scientific organizations in order not to be left behind. Non-Arctic EU countries include the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, France, Poland, Italy, Belgium and others. Their common interest in these matters are concerned with the Arctic environment and energy preservation policies. Being a member country of 유엔해양법협약, they count themselves responsible for conformation to oceanic laws, international airspace and environmental changes. Therefore, it is not too much to say that there is room for Korea and those countries to cooperate in a number of areas such as guarantee of the right to fish in international oceans, the conservation of biological resources, the safety of navigation in international shipping routes, and the legislation of international law for Arctic activities, and other matters arising from the new discoveries.

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