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Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy resources as a foreign policy tool
Randall Newnham 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2011 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.2 No.2
This paper will explore the growth of Russia’s energy leverage in recent years, a source of power which Russia has used both to reward its friends and punish its enemies. It will briefly trace the origins of this power in the integrated energy networks of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact. It will then examine recent cases of the use of ‘oil power.’ Both positive and negative linkage will be considered. Some states-such as Armenia, Belarus and the Ukraine under President Kuchma-have been favored with heavily subsidized energy. Others-such as Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic States and the Ukraine under President Yushchenko-have been targeted by supply disruptions and punitive price increases. Russia’s new ‘petro-power’ is of great importance today, and not just for its immediate neighbors: like other ‘petro-states,’ Russia is likely to gain ever more power as oil and gas become scarcer in the future.
Pipeline politics: Russian energy sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections
Randall E.Newnham 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2013 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.4 No.2
In early 2010, the ‘Orange Revolution’ in the Ukraine came to an end. The pro-Western President, Viktor Yushchenko, was replaced by the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych. This paper argues that Russian energy sanctions helped pave the way for Yanukovych's election. The Kremlin undermined the Ukrainian economy by exploiting the country's dependence on Russian oil and gas, imposing harsh price increases and financial terms and even cutting off supplies in 2006 and 2009. In the end, I argue, these measures fit the ‘classic model’ of economic sanctions: impose pain until the population turns against its government and removes it. Uniquely, however, this paper links sanctions to the long-standing literature on elections in the U.S. and other democracies which shows how economic decline influences voting behavior. A certain level of sanctions may cause a predictable change in election outcomes in the targeted state. This opens, I believe, an important new potential avenue in research on sanctions.
Georgia on my mind? Russian sanctions and the end of the ‘Rose Revolution’
Randall E.Newnham 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2015 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.6 No.2
In recent years Russia has launched a concerted effort to undermine pro-Western regimes in the former Soviet area by using economic sanctions. Most studies of this economic offensive have focused on Russia's obvious use of natural gas as a political weapon. This paper adds to that literature by showing how the Kremlin in fact uses many kinds of sanctions simultaneously. The case of Georgia illustrates this clearly. To undermine President Saakashvili Moscow used not only energy sanctions, but also trade and financial sanctions, as well as restrictions on Georgian migrant workers. As this case shows, democratic regimes may be particularly vulnerable to such economic sanctions, since even a relatively small economic decline can cause an incumbent to lose an election. The Russian effort in Georgia seems to have succeeded, as Saakashvili's party was driven from office in the 2012 and 2013 elections by Georgian Dream, a new coalition founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune in Russia. However, Ivanishvili has now found that he, too, faces Russian economic pressure.