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Trends Underpinning Tourism to 2015 : An Analysis of Key Drivers for Change
Larry Dwyer 한국관광학회 2003 International Journal of Tourism Sciences Vol.3 No.2
Since tourism is essentially integrated with other sectors in the economy, tourism trends cannot be considered in isolation from key drivers that will shape the world of the future. Key drivers can be grouped under 4 headings: the Global Economy and Globalisation; Natural Resources and Environment; Science and Technology; Demographics. Each driver or trend will have varying inputs in different regions and countries. The paper discusses the way in which these drivers will affect the tourism industry, both international and domestic, to the year 2015. Important change agents on both the supply side and the demand side of tourism are identified and discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the resulting challenges to tourism education.
( Larry V. Pearce ),( Jihyae Ann ),( Peter M. Blumberg ),( Jeewoo Lee ) 한국응용약물학회 2019 Biomolecules & Therapeutics(구 응용약물학회지) Vol.27 No.5
The capsaicin receptor TRPV1 (transient receptor potential vanilloid 1) has been an object of intense interest for pharmacological development on account of its critical role in nociception. In the course of structure activity analysis, it has become apparent that TRPV1 ligands may vary dramatically in the rates at which they interact with TRPV1, presumably reflecting differences in their abilities to penetrate into the cell. Using a fast penetrating agonist together with an excess of a slower penetrating antagonist, we find that we can induce an agonist response of limited duration and, moreover, the duration of the agonist response remains largely independent of the absolute dose of agonist, as long as the ratio of antagonist to agonist is held constant. This general approach for limiting agonist duration under conditions in which absolute agonist dose is variable should have more general applicability.
North Korea and Terrorism: The Yokota Megumi Factor
( Larry A Niksch ) 한국국방연구원 2002 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.14 No.1
This article describes the emergence in 1997 of the issue of Japanese who are suspected of having been kidnapped by North Korea, when a North Korean defector provided information on Yokota Megumi, who disappeared at the age of 13. It then lays out the manner in which this issue grew into a dominant factor in Japan-North Korean relations over the next five years. The heart of the article`s analysis deals with the factors that brought the kidnapping issue into US and South Korean policies toward North Korea, especially the limitations it progressively placed on the policies of Seoul and Washington and the Perry initiative. The Clinton administration`s decision to place the issue on Secretary Albright`s agenda in Pyongyang sent a message to Pyongyang that terrorism issues would have to be settled with Japan in order to receive any meaningful financial compensation in any agreement with the United States on missiles. It also sent a message to both Seoul and Pyongyang that the United States would not risk damage to its alliance with Japan by removing North Korea from the terrorism list without certainty that removal would bring big, substantial benefits to US policy. Moreover, it interrupted Seoul`s plans to secure Japanese money to help fulfill its promise of large-scale infrastructure aid to North Korea, which i turn blocked aid from the international financial institutions.
China’s Policies toward North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs
Larry Niksch 통일연구원 2015 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.24 No.2
China’s policies toward North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been a significant problem for the United States, South Korea, and Japan since the onset of six-party talks in 2003. China’s diplomatic strategy and tactics in six-party talks seldom supported U.S. negotiating positions. China officially supported denuclearization of North Korea; but its negotiating strategy was to influence the talks, especially the Bush administration, into accepting more limited objectives that would allow North Korea to retain secret components of a nuclear weapons program. China opened criticism of North Korea when Pyongyang began to test nuclear warheads, thus unveiling secrets of its program, and long-range missiles. However, China rejected placing overt pressure on North Korea. It acted only in limited ways to enforce United Nations sanctions against North Korea. It allowed North Korea access to Chinese territory and institutions that Pyongyang used to advance its nuclear and missile programs. China has been motivated by core objectives of supporting political stability in North Korea and preserving North Korea as a buffer against South Korea and the United States. China is also motivated by its policy of building relations with Iran, a key partner of North Korea in developing nuclear warheads and long-range missiles. These long-standing Chinese goals and strategies suggest that China will pursue similar strategies and tactics in dealing with future scenarios, such as a continuing of North Korean nuclear and missile testing, a de facto moratorium by North Korea on testing but no negotiations, and a resumption of six-party negotiations