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기업리스크 제어와 거래비용 감소 및 최고경영자 동기부여의 효과적인 수단으로서의 보상체계
이정호 ( Jung Ho Lee ),하정출 ( Jeong Chul Ha ) 한국보험학회 2002 보험학회지 Vol.63 No.-
The basic intuition of principal-agent model suggests that compensation package is structured to trade off CEO compensation with firm performance. In general, agency theory focuses on strategic control, driven by cost minimization and risk reduction considerations, whereas human capital theory concentrates on strategic motivations driven by competitive advantages. This study examines the relationship between chief executive officer(CEO) compensation and firm performance in USA from the perspectives of agency theory and human capital theory. Overall, the present study demonstrates that compensation package as an incentive scheme tends to provide an effective means of controlling firm risk, reducing transaction costs and motivating the CEO to enhance firm performance. Properly structured CEO compensation, aligning CEO interests with those of shareholders, increases firm performance as it serves to reduce firm risk. In addition, an optimal level of leverage can be viewed as indicating growth opportunities, whereas an excessive level of leverage can be viewed as indicative of firm risk. One of the major findings of the study is that the CEO`s human capital accumulation of experience in the position, reflecting their firm-specific knowledge and expertise that include the ability to handle firm risk, contributes to firm risk minimization and CEO compensation.