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Kazakhstan’s Quest for Status: A Secondary State’s Strategy to Shape Its International Image
O'Neill Daniel C.,Primiano Christopher B. 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2024 Journal of Eurasian Studies Vol.15 No.1
Since becoming an independent country in 1991, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a strong desire for international status and recognition by, for example, hosting numerous international events, such as chairing the OSCE and hosting EXPO 2017; creating the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia; and, most notably, presenting the abandonment of its nuclear weapons as a model for other states to emulate. Surprisingly, Kazakhstan has received scant attention by scholars regarding its desire for status, especially considering how the government has framed its decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons in terms of advancing international peace at the expense of its own security self-interest. Kazakhstan’s status-seeking raises two questions. First, how can a mid-level power strategically frame its foreign and domestic policies in order to improve its global status? And second, how can it improve its international status when domestic priorities (such as economic development and political stability) lead to policies that meet disapproval abroad? In this article, we answer these questions by examining issue areas (security, democratization, and the environment) that contain variation in our dependent variable, Kazakhstan’s quest for status. In doing so, we reveal patterns of how a secondary or mid-level state lacking substantial material capabilities can, through its words and actions, construct an image that may enhance its international status. We also show variation by issue area in the reception of these efforts by developed and developing countries. Lastly, we reveal in what issue areas Kazakhstan’s desire for status internationally is constrained by the government’s desire to maintain power domestically.
김용균,Daniel C. O'Neill 이화여자대학교 이화사회과학원 2019 사회과학연구논총 Vol.35 No.1
While international and domestic economic factors influence a government’s willingness and ability both to accrue and to pay off sovereign debt, political institutions also play an important role. We present an analysis of the effects of political institutions on foreign-debt buildup and reduction in developing countries. Our findings show that the degree of centralization of power, whether through presidential systems, unified governments, or the lack of a federal or otherwise decentralized system, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, governments in such systems are more likely to indulge in debt expanding spending sprees, particularly left leaning governments, during election years, in more democratic states. On the other hand, governments with more centralized power are better able to cut spending and reduce debt, particularly those operating within more authoritarian political institutions. Overall, our findings imply that centralized power in the hands of a national executive in a highly democratic setting is more likely to lead to rapid foreign debt buildup, yet executives in such settings are often unable to take the drastic measures needed to reduce debt in times of imminent crisis. In short, political institutions impact both debt buildup and debt reduction.