행정내부규율사항론(行政內部規律事項論)

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.34 No.2

`Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration` has not had so much spotlight in Administrative Law. There have been no so deep study on it. The traditional study on Special Power Relations has not been discussed under the premise of the conception, `Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration`. It has been treated only as a kind of conception of results. Thus it has not taken a leading role in Administrative Law and has had little recognitions. But We should deduce the conception of items `Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration` from the view point of the whole legal order and by utilizing the conception of `Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration` we should take the conception. Thus we should study the concerned parts of Administration Law and make use of the theory on it to access administrative law. The way of recognizing it in functional way helps us solve the unsolved problems easily. The `Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration` is the core of administration. The study of `Inner-Autonomous Items in Administration` helps us find out the substance of Administration and by that analyse it more functionally. It is another way of access to the Administrative Law.

도시생태현황(Biotope등급)에 대한 公法的 檢討

李相千(Lee, Sang-Cheon) 한국비교공법학회 2016 공법학연구 Vol.17 No.2

國家賠償法 제2조 제1항의 立法論上 問題點

이상천(Lee Sang-Cheon) 행정법이론실무학회 2010 행정법연구 Vol.- No.26

According to the present State Compensation Act Article 2(1), the definition of 'private persons entrusted with public duties' falls within the 'public officials'. Thus the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' take no civil responsibilities against both the government's and the victims' side as far as without purpose or gross negligence by the above Act Article 2(3). But the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' which has independence on organization and operation should take the civil responsibilities for their prvious deeds. Just the principle of liability with fault should be adapted for their deeds. If not so, it means the violation of equity, and it leads to the government's financial overload, and the reduction of carefulness to prevent accidents. For the above reasons, the principle of liability with fault should be adapted widely even in the area of 'private persons entrusted with public duties'. Firstly, the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' in the above 2(1) means the ones which has independence of low degree below average in relevance with the government. The ones which has independence of high degree doesn't go into it on the above 2(1). The ones which has independence of comparatively high degree from the government should be ruled by the principle of joint-malfeasance liabilities if possible. And in the cases as against the highly independed ones the principle of joint-malfeasance liabilities should be applied as far as it goes. Even though in the above cases the clauses of 'State Compensation Act' should be applied, it could be interpreted that the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' should answer for what they had done regardless of gross negligence or not. Secondly, for the intention of legistlation according to the legal view which the court and academic circles went after, the expression of 'private persons entrusted with public duties' is inadequate. The expression of 'the private persons who could be measured as entered into administrative organs, in concrete cases, entrusted with public duties' would have been better for that meaning. Thirdly, However if the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' had no assets to pay for their liabilities to the errors, the victims couldn't be saved. Thus it is recommended that the legal steps making up the shortage of their paying abilities should be taken. In contracting of trusting public services, the way of liabilities apportionment should be fixed and it is recommended that the above private persons should take out a policy on the liability for what they did. The matter of gross negligence or not is not the one of scale of the compensation sum. The size of compensation sum doesn't go with the degree of negligence. Even though the 'private persons entrusted with public duties' committed a slight error, the size of government's compensation sum could be gross. The expression that the private persons should be free from liabilities regardless of the degree of negligence would overload the State and local government's finance. Finally, 'State Compensation Act Article 2(1)' should be revised.

국내 벤처기업의 업령(業齡)에 따른 성과 결정요인

이상천(Sang Cheon Lee),고봉상(Bong Sang Go),용세중(Se Jung yong) 대한산업공학회 2004 대한산업공학회 추계학술대회논문집 Vol.2004 No.11

부관(附款) 통제(統制)로서의 진정일부취소소송 활용에 관한 소고

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2013 홍익법학 Vol.14 No.1

Administrative act is not so elastic through its strict standardization. Administrative agency should choose one to do or not to do, and there is no way but the two. This situation is not so useful and efficient to both sides, administrative agency and its counterpart. Supplementary clause on administrative act can tenuate its strictness and helps administrative act escape from too excessive standardization. But we should be alerted to the abuse of supplementary clause by administrative agency`s side. Thus the legal control of supplementary clause on administrative act is recommended. Following to our case law, only burden among supplementary clauses is regarded as an independent ``declaration of will`` seperated from its main administrative act and could be suited and sentenced alone, but the others not. Afterwards, as society develops forwards the more supplementary clauses will get their independence from main administrative act and be treated as an administrative act. Before 1991, all the supplementary clauses had been considered that they should be treated legally always with their main administrative act, but since 1991, burden could have been treated independently from its main dministrative act. And the same flow would go on. The above flow has been spreading theoretically by the name of ``lawsuit of impure partial cancellation`` against the view of case law. But it is doubtful whether the above form of lawsuit could be possible or not by the present legal system. In ways of interpreting law to control supplementary clause, we could take the three. One is to grant ``partial cancellation`` by the possibility of seperation from its main administrative act, another is to grant ``partial cancellation`` through the recognition of its independent presence, the other would be to grant ``partial cancellation`` by giving ``character of disposal``. In legistlative way, the legistlation of lawsuit for performance of obligation would be the most useful and efficient. In short, it is the most useful and efficient to grant every supplementary clause ``character of disposal`` to control it, which enables us to make use of ``lawsuit of pure partial cancellation``. Also it means that all supplementary clauses could be treated as an independent ``declaration of will`` and be regarded as an perfect object elligible for legal sue. If so, ``lawsuit of pure partial cancellation`` to all supplementary clauses could be possible. After that, the remaining point would be the problems of validity of supplementary clause in relation with the main administrative act in side of substantial law, which could be treated in main dispute in the name of ``possibility of independent cancellation``. However, it is strongly recommended that lawsuit for performance of obligation should be legistlated to do that.

법인처벌론(法人處罰論)으로서의 조직고의론(組織故意論)

이상천 ( Sang Cheon Lee ) 법조협회 2015 法曹 Vol.64 No.4

In any case, the action of a natural person who is a member of a corporate should be analyzed legally in the sense that it is one of the corporation``s activities. The constitutional court says that the corporate’ liability in relation with the meaning of joint penal provisions is not on the premise of its natural person’ crime. Thus the legal character of corporate liability is not a kind of vicarious liability but its own. If so, the theory of enterprise punishment within the framework of traditional theory of criminal law should be shown necessarily in consideration of the corporate’s own character. In the area of environmental administration, it is not a proper way of protecting environment from enterprise activities to place a greater emphasis on punishing natural person than on the corporate itself. A business organization has its own way of thought, and it exists apart from that of a natural person, a member of the corporate. There has been the theory of collective knowledge and the theory of organization model to control business activities by imposing criminal penalty on the corporate itself in United States of America. Besides, there has been the theory of business organization liability in Japan. The above theories say all the same thing that the corporate itself should and could bear the criminal liability. A nature person has little significance in influencing business activities and should be subject to the corporate’s command which is under the sovereignty of Jaebul, the group of enterprises. The focus should be on punishing the corporate itself in the area of environmental administration in which only the corporate itself reveals itself in the sense that its nature person has little significance in business activities. Actually as possible as can be, it is needed to develop the theory actively that the criminal punishment should be imposed on the corporate itself than on the natural person. And the theory should not hurt the principle of self liability in concern with imposing criminal punishment on the corporate itself. Under the establishment of the definition of organization knowledge we could regard it as a subjective illigal factor which should be needed for composing crime in case of a natural person. In conclusion, ‘organization knowledge’ should be composed as a tool of protecting our natural environment efficiently from the corporate’s enterprise activities.

‘더반 합의’ 하에서의 탄소배출권거래제도의 構想에 관한 經濟法論的 小考

李相千(Lee, Sang-Cheon) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2012 東亞法學 Vol.- No.54

‘더반 합의’를 비롯한 국제정세는 탄소배출권을 중핵으로 하는 교토체제에서 벗어나려는 것으로 보인다. 오히려 탄소관세가 중심이 되고 탄소관세를 피하기 위해 탄소배출권은 나름대로 보조기능을 수행할 정도일 것이다. 아마도 탄소배출권은 국제적 유통성이 중시될 것이 아니고 자국의 탄소규제에 봉사하는 정도의 개념으로 자리잡을 것 같다. 탄소배출권거래제도의 구상과 관련하여, 우선 법본질론적 입장에서 탄소배출권을 보면 원초적으로 공법적 규제를 많이 받을 수밖에 없는 개념이라 할 것이고, 따라서 유통성의 강화로 그 거래에 비중을 둘 것이 아니라 당초의 예정된 기능대로 ‘탄소배출을 할 수 있는 권리’ 라는 본연의 개념에 충실한 방향으로 입론되어야 할 것이다. 둘째, 탄소배출권의 기능상 산업경제에 직접적 연관파급효과를 미치게 될 것이고 산업의 신경이라 할 전력의 수급에도 직접적 영향을 미친다 할 것이므로 전력수급의 중요성에 비추어도 그 현업기관에 탄소배출권의 거래를 담당하게 함이 타당할 것이다. 셋째, 자본시장법상 탄소배출권 그 자체는 금융상품이 될 수가 없는 것이다. 입법례상 탄소배출권 자체를 금융투자상품으로서 금융규제의 대상으로 하고 있는 경우는 거의 보이지 않는 것은 환경보호라는 목적적 개념인 탄소배출권거래제가 투기대상으로 되는 것을 방지하기 위한 것이기 때문일 것이다. 우리의 경우도 현행 자본시장법상으로는 탄소배출권 자체를 금융투자상품이라 할 수는 없는 일이고, 이러한 결론은 탄소배출권거래제도를 입론함에 있어서 당연히 고려되어야 할 것이다. 한국거래소는 탄소배출권거래를 억지로 금융상품으로 만들지 않는 한 거래할 수 있는 기관도 아니다. 이상의 이유로 무리하게 현행법에도 없는 다른 입법을 해 가면서까지 한국거래소로 하여금 탄소배출권의 거래를 담당하게 할 것은 아니라 할 것이다. 오히려 탄소배출권의 현실적 기능을 직시하면 산업의 신경이라는 전력수급조절을 맡아온 전력거래소가 탄소배출권의 거래를 담당하고, 그 실무적 경험등을 토대로 지속가능한 산업경제의 조절작용을 해 나가게 하는 것이 타당할 것이다. The ‘Carbon Emission Credit Trading System’ is no more omnipotent under The “Durban Declaration on Climate Change”. The international situation is slowly coming out of ‘Kyoto-mechanism’ It’s time for carbon tax to be centered, and The ‘Carbon Emission Credit Trading System’ will carry just the subfunction to avoid carbon custom. Perhaps the international fluidity of Carbon Emission Credit in Carbon Emission Credit Trading System will be not so important, but be likely to remain as a subsidy. Concerned with the construction of Carbon Emission Credit Trading System, Firstly, in view of legal essentiality, Carbon Emission Credit should be established more under the influence of ‘public law’ rather than under that of private law. Secondly, In view of the function of ‘Carbon Emission Credit’, it would get to the industrial economy, and turmoil the system of balance of elctricity. Thirdly, the Carbon Emission Credit itself could be no more a financial commodity, Thus there is no reason for KPX to make treat it. In consideration of the real function of Carbon Emission Credit, the KPX should take th duty of trading Carbon Emission Credit. It would be natural for KPX to take the duty of trading Carbon Emission Credit, and it leads to harmonious supply and demand of electricity and peace in industrial.

農地保全負擔金 부과에 관한 小考 : 행정심판재결례에 대한 반론을 중심으로

李相千(Lee Sang-Cheon) 한국비교공법학회 2012 공법학연구 Vol.13 No.1

결국 지목변경된 '대지'를 매수한 제3의 매득자에게 농지보전부담금을 부과할 수 있느냐의 문제가 행정심판으로 문제가 되고 있다. 그러나, 아무래도 깊은 법리적 검토는 거치지 못한채 기각되고 있는 실정이다. 첫째, 농지보전부담금 부과의 근거규정인 농지법 제38조등은 문의적 해석으로도 지목변경 이전의 능지전용과정에서 농지보전부담금이 부과되는 과정을 규율하는 규정인 것이지 이미 지목변경된 '대지'에 관한 농지보전부담금의 부과까지를 규율하는 규정이라고는 볼 수 없다. 둘째, 측량·수로조사 및 지적에 관한 법률 제81조, 동법 시행령 제67조, 동법 시행규칙 제84조 등에 의해 지목변경은 신청에 의한 행정의 행위로 농지전용등으로 인한 최종 정리단계의 절차인 것이므로 농지보전부담금은 지목변경 이전에 거치는 것이어서 이미 지목변경된 '대지'에 농지보전부담금이 부과된다는 입범례나 해석론은 허용되지 않는다 할 것이다. 셋째, 농지보전부담금의 부과취지가 농지전용으로 인한 농지상실을 보전한다는 농지조성비적 성격과 농촌경제를 도모한다는 부담금의 성격을 병유한다고 할 것인데 그 성격으로 보아 그 부과는 한 번으로 족한 것이지 이중삼중으로 부과하겠다는 취지로는 해석되어지기 곤란한 면이 있어 이미 지목변경절차에서 부과되었거나 부과될 수 있었던 농지보전부담금을 지목변경된 결과의 '대지'를 매수한 제3의 전득자에게 부과시킨다는 것은 온전히 '대지'로 알고 매득한 그 제3 매득자의 재산권적 지위를 부당하게 침해하는 입범례라고 밖에는 할 수 없는 것이다. 넷째, 농지법 제2조의 '농지'의 개념상 공부상의 지목을 불문하고 이용현황을 기준으로 파악한다고 하고 있으나, 그 의미는 농지전용절차 내지 농지조성비·농지전용부담금 내지 농지보전부담금이 부과되는 입법례가 생기기 전의 토지에 대하여 적용될 소지가 있는 것이지 이미 지목변경과정에서 농지보전부담금이 부과되었거나 부과될 소지가 있었던 토지에 대하여 지목변경된 결과의 '대지'를 전득한 제3자에게 농지보전부담금이 부과될 수 있다는 의미는 아닌 것이다. 다섯째, 공법적 규정이 사법적 지위를 불안하게 할 입법재량도 있을 수는 있으나 어디까지나 그러한 公·私法상의 괴리는 헌법이 말하는 비례의 원칙 범위내이어야 할 것인데, 지목변경절차 일반에 비추어 이미 '대지'로 지목변경된 토지를 매득한 제3자에게 농지보전부담금을 부과한다는 것은 부당한 공익만을 내세우는 것으로 입법재량의 남용이라 할 것이다. 그러나 농지보전부담금의 근거규정인 농지법 제38조등에 대한 문의적 해석으로 합헌적 해석이 가능한 이상 동조등이 위헌이라고 판단해 버릴 것은 아니므로 지목변경된 '대지'를 매수한 제3의 전득자는 농지보전부담금을 부과받을 법적 지위에 있지 않다고 해석할 것이다. 이상의 근거에도 불구하고 법원의 판례는 생성되지 않으면서 행정심판에서 지목변경된 '대지'를 매수한 전득자도 농지보전부담금을 부과받을 법적 지위에 있음을 전제로 한 재결례가 반복될 수 있다는 것은 생각해 볼 문제이다. 그 적극적 당사자가 법원에의 항고소송을 제기하지 않고 불복을 중단함은 '권리 위에 잠자는 자' 라고 할 수도 있을 것이나, 불복소송을 포기하는 이유가 거듭된 행정심판재결례에 비추어 승소가능성이 없다고 오신한 결과라면 오히려 위 당사자를 위해 이러한 학리적 논구로 그 법적 지위를 명확히 해 줄 필요가 있다고 할 것이다. There are some cases of dicision at administrative appeals about charging farmland preservation charges on the third party who purchased a 'building site' on public documents. The legal status of the above third party still remains suspended about the problem of being charged of farmland preservation charges. And some cases simillar to the above cases would be likely to be repeated over and over. According to the dicision at administrative appeals the administrative appeals are not accepted. Thus the farmland preservation charges should be levied on the third party. But we can not see the results of studying the legal status of the above third party. Firstly, Farmland Act Article 38 on levying farmland preservation charges is adapted to controlling the procedure of farmland diversion before land category change, but not to doing that before land category change. Secondly, according to the related provisions of Farmland Act and its annexed codes, for example act on land survey, water way survey and cadastral records Article 81, the diversion of farmland is carried out before land category change, Thus farmland preservation charges couldn't be levied on the owner of 'building site' which had already gone through land category change. Thirdly, in view of the character of farmland preservation charges which contains both of the two which are that of making farmland and that of charging special purposes for agricultural villages, farmland preservation charges should be levied once per a farmland, but not in a double or in a triple way. Thus the farmland preservation charges should not levied on third party who purchased the building site' believing that it is just a 'building site' as it is on publice records. Fourthly, according to the Farmland Act Article 2 the 'Farmland Act' is decided not by the public records, but by the situation as it is used. It means that farmland preservation charges could not be levied on the building site which went through land category change under the legal systemic situation of farmland preservation charges. But it could be adapted to the building site not under the legal systemic situation of farmland preservation charges. Fifthly, the difference between the contents of public law and those of private law should not be so wide. The difference should be within constitutional limit. In consideration of general procedure of land category change, farmland preservation charges should not levied on the third party who purchased the building site which already had undergone land category change. Under the circumstances of no court decision about the above case, the dicision at administrative appeals which is not correct would be repeated. But it is not proper, The repeated academic study on the above case would be necessary and helpful to solve this stationary situation.

공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 제9조 제1항 제1호의 법체계적 정합성

이상천(Lee Sang Cheon) 인하대학교 법학연구소 2010 法學硏究 Vol.13 No.2

이미 공공기관의 정보공개에 관한 법률 제4조 제1항에서 ‘타법령에서 정보의 공개ㆍ비공개를 규정한 경우에서의 그 적용할 규범’에 관해 규정하고 있음에도 동법 제9조 제1항 제1호에서 다시 ‘타법령에서 비공개를 정한 경우 공개하지 않을 수 있다’ 라는 취지로 규정하고 있음은 이해하기 어렵다. 이미 타법령에 비공개로 되어 있다면, 새삼 다시 공개ㆍ비공개를 규정할 필요도 이유도 없기 때문이다. 또 당연히 법령상 비공개로 되어 있을 경우도 비공개할 수 있는 재량적 사유의 다른 항목과 같이 규정하여 명실공히 비공개대상을 모두 묶어 표현하고자 하였으면, 위 제1호의 경우는 동법 제9조 제2호 내지 제8호의 경우와는 다른 표현을 썼어야 하는 것이다. 위 재량적 표현을 두고 타법령상 비공개대상정보를 정보공개의 원칙에 대한 예외로서 비공개할 수 있음을 규정한 취지를 정보공개청구권과의 법률상 의무의 충돌을 해결하기 위한 것이라는 논리를 펴나, 엄격히 말하면 그것은 그 타법령의 적용한계론상의 해석론일 뿐이다. 곧 위 제9조 제1항 제1호를 입법한 것 자체가 불필요한 것이고, 법규 명령상의 비공개정보를 의무적 비공개로 하지 않고 ‘공개하지 아니할 수 있다’ 라는 재량적 표현으로 연접(連接)하여 버린 것은 참으로 이해할 수 없다. 또 정보의 비공개대상을 정할 수 있는 법규의 형식을 총리령ㆍ부령은 제외하면서 그보다 하위규범인 조례를 넣고 있는 것은 규범력의 단계적 구조를 크게 흔들어 놓는 결과를 초래하고 있다. 이 밖에도 위 제9조 제1항 제1호가 위임명령 중 대통령령만 정보의 비공개를 정할 수 있는 법규형식으로 정하고 총리령ㆍ부령은 제외한 것은 합리적이지 않고 규범의 단계적 구조를 흔들어 놓는 혼란만 부추긴다. 이상과 같이 적어도 위 제9조 제1항 제1호의 존재는 법체계적 정합성을 크게 저해하는 불필요한 규정이므로 삭제되어야 마땅한 규정이다. 입법상 가장 기초적인 논리가 결여될 때 국민적 감시만이 효율적인 개선책인지 모른다. If once some information is fixed to be disclosed in an Act or Decree, it doesn’t have to be regulated again in a new norm like Act or Decree. Perhaps the Article 9-(1)-① of Official Information Disclosure Act was legislated in the purpose of expressing all disclosed informations in one article as the Article 9-(1). The above Article 9-(1)-① should be deleted because it is needed no more in legislation. The same Act has the Article 4-(1) which is legislated for the case of the other Act of Decree regulating closing some information concerned. Thus the presence of the above Article 9-(1)-① occurrs only the possibility of interpreting its meaning in several ways. It is not only of no use, but occurring crowdedness in interpreting the Article. If they insisted that all the disclosed information should have been expressed in only one article as the Article 9-(1)-①, The ① of the Article 9(1) should have been expressed otherwise, unlike the others from ② to ⑧. In case of the Article 9-(1)-①, it should be expressed like that ‘follow to the other Act of Decree’ or ‘should not be disclosed’. The expression which is fit in the others from ② to ⑧ is adapted to the Article 9-(1)-①, which is too rude in legistlation. The kinds of administrative mandate legistlation which can fix the objects of information disclosure contains the Municipal Ordinances which is lower than ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry in legal enforcement power, but excludes doesn’t ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry. The legistlation swings the stepped structure of legal norms. And the Article 9-(1)-① designates Presidential decrees but ordinances of the Prime MinisterㆍExecutive Ministry as the kinds of legal norms which can treat the objects of information disclosure, which is unreasonable and occurrs the crowdness swinging the stepped structure of legal norms. The unreasonability could have been pointed with only a little care, and it is the very fundamental matter in legistlation. It is regretful that such mistake happened in making ‘Official Information Disclosure Act’ which is very important in this information society. This is just a farce. Aftwards the logics should not be disregarded in legistlation.

일조갈등의 豫防的 解消를 위한 立法論的 硏究

李相千(Lee Sang-Cheon) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2009 東亞法學 Vol.- No.45

The control of sunshine in building code is carried out through the conception of space i.e. height and distance, but the distribution of sunshine in the field of civil law is carried out by the hours of lasting sunshine. The sunshine conflicts are caused by the differences between the two means to guarantee sunshine. The sunshine interests have the characters of ‘game of zero sum’. Thus the essential function of the criteria of permitting building in concern with sunshine is the reasonable distribution of sunshine interests. From the above differences, the function of sunshine distribution through the existing building code is being carried out in a restricted degree. As in case of Japan, there are a little differences in the criteria of guaranteeing sunshine between civil law and administrative law. The standard law of building performance of Japan has the article that it should be decided by the hours of lasting shadow whether the right to enjoy sunshine infringed or not, but the case law by civil court has made decisions about shunshine infringement chiefly by the hours of lasting sunshine. Therefore, there are little severe conflicts surrounding sunshine in Japan, but in Korea there are so much severe cases of sunshine conflicts as the cases of injuction of building prohibition. Firstly, the presence of the differences between the two legal criteria dealing with sunshine in the above two legal fields is not consistent with our national legal feeling. we don't think it reasonable that the lawful building observing the criteria of permitting building is illegal in private law. Secondly, the existing building code is breaking the legal theory of ‘prohibition of inclusive mandate legistlation’, and the lower administrative legistlation doesn't go with the upper one. Thirdly, the negligence of the presence of the above differences come to the ‘nonperformance of necessary legistlation’ in theory of constitutional law. The differences should be removed at once. It is impossible and unreasonable that the criteria of sunshine in civil law be adjusted to the criteria of permitting building in building code. The criteria of permitting building should be revised according to the criteria of reasonable distribution of sunshine of case law in civil law. By that, in consideration of the revision, the civil court wouldn't accept any injunction of prohibiting building against the building under construction keeping the criteria of permitting building as long as under no special circumstances. If so, the sunshine conflicts would be much decreased, the new legistlation would be consistent with our national legal feeling, elevate the national spirits of observing law, and be helpful to the social peace.