회계투명성의 국가 간 비교 및 자본비용과의 상관관계에 대한 실증연구

심호식(Shim Ho shik),이우종(Lee Woo Jong),이재경(Yi Jae kyung),한승엽(Han Seung Youb) 한국공인회계사회 2016 회계·세무와 감사 연구 Vol.58 No.2

우리나라는 1997년 외환위기 이후 회계투명성 제고를 위해 다양한 노력을 경주해왔음에도 국제경영개발원이나 세계경제포럼 등 국제평가기구에 의한 회계투명성 순위는 여전히 (최)하위권에 머물고 있다. 그러나 이러한 결과는 응답자의 주관적 인식(perception)이 반영된 설문답변에 전적으로 기초한 것으로 객관적 평가라 할 수 없다. 이에 본 연구는 학술적으로 통용되는 다양한 계량분석모형을 통해 회계투명성에 대한 실증분석을 시도했다. 실증분석 결과 우리나라의 회계투명성은 「① 재량적 발생액 규모 기준으로 중위권(56개국중 22위) , ② 재량적 발생액 변동성 기준으로 상위권(55개국중 8위) , ③ 이익반응계수 기준으로 중상위권(51개국중 19위) 을 기록했으며, ④ 전염효과도 부재」하여 국제평가기구가 발표한 국가 회계투명성 순위처럼 (최)하위권은 아닌 것으로 나타났다. 이는 그간 도입·시행된 각종 선진 회계시스템으로 인해 평균적인 회계투명성이 개선된 결과로 판단된다. 한편, 미국과 우리나라를 대상으로 회계품질(투명성)과 자본비용 간의 상관관계를 분석한 결과 미국은 높은 회계품질이 자본조달 비용을 경제적으로 유의미한 수준으로 낮추는 데 기여하는 반면, 우리나라는 그러한 관계가 관측되지 않아 기업이 자발적으로 고품질의 회계정보를 생산하기 위한 사회·경제적 효익이 사실상 부재한 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과는 향후 회계정책의 패러다임이 투명한 회계정보의 생산(기업 역할)만을 강조해온 기존의 공급자적 관점 에서 기업의 능동적인 고품질 회계정보 생산을 적극적으로 유도(시장 역할)하는 수요자적 관점 으로 전환될 필요가 있음을 시사한다. Despite all the efforts from practitioners, regulators, and accounting scholars in Korea, accounting transparency in Korea has been ranked at the lowest according to the previous management surveys by International Institute for Management Development (IMD) and World Economic Forum (WEF). In this paper, we question about the validity of those surveys because they might reflect merely biased perception of respondents on accounting practices in Korea. To address this question, we employ empirical proxies for accounting transparency and analyze a large set of archival data on financial statements of firms from 56 countries surrounding IMD survey respondents. We find that Korea does not appear to be in the most opaque group based on several empirical proxies for earnings quality. Specifically, Korea is ranked 1) at the 22nd in terms of the level discretionary accruals among 56 data-available countries, 2) at the 8th in terms of discretionary accruals volatility (standard deviation) among 55 data-available countries, and 3) at the 19th in terms of earnings-returns relations among 51 data-available countries. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that investors rely on information of industry peers in earnings valuation, indicating that the lack of firm-specific private information is not severe in the Korean stock market. In sum, we do not find evidence supporting that accounting transparency in Korea deserves the lowest ranking around the world. Rather, the empirical proxies for earnings quality consistently prove that the de facto quality of accounting transparency in Korea is above the median of the sample countries, consistent with what academicians and practitioners have argued for the last few years. However, further analyses reveal that costs of raising debt (or equity) are not related to the transparency constructs we used above for Korean firms, implying the lack of benefits of improving accounting transparency in Korea. By contrast, the transparency constructs show a strongly negative association with costs of debt (or equity) for U.S. firms, indicating that more transparent firms are well compensated by lower financing costs in the U.S. financial market. We thus suspect that the lack of benefits for accounting transparency in Korea (i.e., statistically no association between earnings quality and external financing costs) would partially provoke the unfavorable responses to survey questions about accounting practices in Korea. If a financial market does not appropriately appreciate the quality of earnings across firms and thus fails to reflect it in capital resource allocation, managers would consider all the regulatory inputs to improve accounting transparency as unnecessary cost sources that are not properly accompanied by corresponding benefits. A related concern is that such negative perception would drive out transparent firms from the market in the long run (a.k.a., adverse selection problem). Caveats are in order. To empirically address our research question, we cannot help making some assumptions which unavoidably sacrifice academic rigor. First, we compare earnings quality constructs from a single estimation model (i.e., a pooled regression) across countries. By doing so, we assume that the single model fits well to every economy, which is unlikely. Therefore, our earlier inferences would not hold valid to the extent that the fitness of the models significantly varies across countries. Second, we do not intend to explain why accounting transparency differs across countries. Prior studies document a set of country-level characteristics that explain cross-sectional variations of earnings quality across countries. However, including all of those country-level differences would not serve this paper because we are not interested in why earnings quality differs across countries but whether earnings quality differs (and whether Korea actually belongs to the lowest group).

毒蛇咬傷에 關한 外科的 治療

沈虎植(Ho Shik Shim),張龍雄(Yong Ung Chang),羅珪淵(Kyu Youn Lah),金世煥(Sae Whan Kim) 대한외과학회 1972 Annals of Surgical Treatment and Research Vol.14 No.1

先天性 食道閉鎖 및 氣管食道瘻의 外科的 治療

沈虎植(Ho Shik Shim),金世煥(Sae Whan Kim) 대한외과학회 1973 Annals of Surgical Treatment and Research Vol.15 No.2

지분율 괴리도와 공시 정보의 빈도 사이의 관계

심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ),이문영 ( Moon Y. Lee ),최종학 ( Jong Hag Choi ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계학연구 Vol.35 No.4

본 연구는 지배주주의 의결권과 배당권의 차이인 지분율 괴리도로 측정한 기업의 지배구조 수준과 공정공시제도를 통해 공시되는 정보의 빈도 사이의 관련성을 조사하였다. 지분율 괴리도가 커지게 되면 지배주주가 소액주주의 권리를 침해하여 자신의 사적 이익을 추구할 가능성이 높아지게 된다. 따라서 기업은 이러한 사실을 외부 이해관계자들로부터 숨기기 위하여 정보를 덜 공개할 수 있다. 그러나 그 반대로 이런 기업들이 더 정보를 많이 공개할 수도 있다는 소수의 견해도 존재한다. 그 결과 지분율 괴리도에 따라 시장에 공개되는 공시정보의 빈도가 달라질 것이다. 본 연구는 이러한 가설을 실증자료를 이용하여 분석하였다. 분석 결과는 다음과 같이 요약된다. 첫째, 지분율 괴리도가 증가할수록 공시수준이 감소하였다. 둘째, 지분율 괴리도를 구성하는 배당권과 의결권을 별도의 변수로 나누어 분석해 본 결과, 배당권은 공시수준과 유의적인 관련성이 없었으나 의결권은 공시수준과 음(-)의 관련성을 가지고 있었다. 즉 지분율 괴리도를 사용한 결과는 의결권 때문에 발생한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 셋째, 공시를 하지 않은 기업과 괴리도 차이가 발생하지 않는 기업들을 제외하고 추가 분석을 실시하여 본 경우, 마찬가지로 지분율 괴리도가 높을수록 공시수준이 감소하였다. 본 연구의 이러한 발견은 우수한 기업지배구조의 확립의 효과와 관련하여 규제기관과 학계, 실무 종사자들과 투자자들에게 유용한 많은 시사점을 제공하고 있다. ownership divergence) and the frequency of information disclosed under fair disclosure system. The ownership wedge implies the difference in the voting right and cash flow right of the controlling shareholders. The ownership wedge is found in many countries, Asian as well as European countries where the legal protections for the minority shareholders are generally weak (Faccio and Lang 2002). Larger the ownership wedge, controlling shareholders have an incentive to pursue their private interests (Claessens et al. 2000, 2002) by transferring wealth from minority shareholders to themselves. Thus, the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed. Prior research in accounting and finance show that these incentives caused by the ownership wedge influence the firm value, operating performance, investors` reaction in a negative way (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2002, 2005; Kim and Yi 2006). However, there has been no study which investigates the effect of ownership wedge on the amount of information disclosure. Prior study of Sonu et al. (2010) documents that the magnitude of the ownership wedge is positively associated with the error in analysts` earnings forecasts. They document that as the wedge increases the error in the forecasts increases. Sonu et al. (2010) interpret the findings that firms with greater wedge may be reluctant to provide useful information to analysts and investors who are afraid of revealing accurate information. It is because the information could reveal controlling shareholders` behavior to pursue private interest. The study of Sonu et al. (2010) provides a foundation for this study. In this study, we directly examine the link between ownership wedge and the amount of information disclosure. If controlling shareholders are reluctant to provide detailed information to the outsiders, the amount of information disclosed by the firm could decrease. However, although it is not popular view among researchers, Wang (2006) predicts that companies with problem in corporate governance may release more information to attract the investors` attention. In such a case, we may find positive association between ownership wedge and the frequency of firm disclosure. To measure the ownership wedge, we use the ownership data released by Korea Fair Trade Commission in each year. For the amount of information disclosed, we use the information released via the fair disclosure regulation of Korean Stock Exchange, which was introduced in November 2002. Prior study of Lee (2008) performs an extensive study on the nature and effect of information disclosed under fair disclosure rule. The study shows that investors strongly respond to the disclosed information. Thus, the information released under fair disclosure system is a good proxy for the amount of information disclosure by each firm. The sample period used in this study starts from 2003 and ends 2008. The fair disclosure data are collected from Korean Investor`s Network for Disclosure system (www.krx.co.kr). The sample size is 557 firm-year observations from 147 large conglomerates in Korea. Among 557 firm-year observations, 137 observations do not have any disclosure, whereas the remaining 420 observations made multiple disclosures. On average, sample firms made 4.59 disclosures per year. We divide full sample to 2 different categories of disclosures, disclosure on future forecasts and disclosure on strategic promotion, and report the statistics on the frequency of the disclosures separately. In addition, average cash flow right is 15 percent, whereas the voting right is 43 percent in our sample. Thus, the average ownership wedge is 28 percent, which is the difference between cash flow right and voting right (43- 15=28). The other financial variables used in the analyses are collected from KIS Value and DataGuide Pro databases. Empirical results reveal that there exists a negative association between the ownership wedge and the frequency of disclosure, after controlling other factors which are known to be correlated with the frequency of disclosures (the firm size, the number of days after the initial listing of the firm, Big 4 auditor choice indicator variable, foreign ownership percentage, leverage ratio, sales growth rate, book-to-market ratio, yearly return variability, and other governance-related variables). When we divide the ownership wedge to cash flow right and voting right, the results reveal that only the voting right is significantly associated with the frequency of information disclosures, whereas the cash flow right is insignificant although the sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction. These findings are consistent with those in Sonu et al. (2010) that only voting right is significantly associated with the error in analysts` earnings forecasts. When we further restrict the samples to observations that made at least 1 disclosure during the year and the ownership wedge is greater than zero (thus there is a difference between cash flow right and voting right of controlling shareholders), the results are also qualitatively the same. In summary, these empirical findings are all consistent with the prediction based on the theory presented in the paper. The findings in this study are expected to provide valuable insights to regulators, academics, practitioners, as well as investors. We expect future research should turn the attention to the quality of disclosure as well as the quantity.

한국채택국제회계기준 도입 효과: 담배제조기업 사례

심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ),정대길 ( Dae Gil Jung ),이창우 ( Chang Woo Lee ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계저널 Vol.19 No.2

Aminoglycosides의 취효소 분비항진기전에 관한 연구

심호식,김경환,홍사석,Shim, Ho-Shik,Kim, Kyung-Hwan,Hong, Sa-Suk 대한약리학회 1983 대한약리학잡지 Vol.19 No.1

Aminoglycoside antibiotics are reported to enhance the amylase release from isolated slices of pancreas in vitro and the mode of action of aminoglycosides on amylase release is considered different from those of acetylcholine or cholecystokinin(CCK), i.e., electronmicroscopically intact zymogen granules are appeared in the lumen of pancreatic acini by treatment of aminoglycosides. It is known that atropine blocks the secretagogue effect of acetylcholine, and phenoxybenzamine is reported to block the effects of CCK or its analogue caerulein. Present study was undertaken to investigate the mode of action of aminoglycosides on the amylase release using atropine, phenoxybenzamine and propranolol as a membrane stabilizing agent in slices of chicken pancreas. The results are summarized as follows : 1) Streptomycin and kanamycin increased the amylase release significantly from slices of chicken pancreas. 2) The effect of streptomycin was inhibited by atropine but not by phenoxybenzamine or propranolol. 3) The amylase release by acetylcholine was blocked by atropine tut the effect of cholecystokinin octapeptide(CCK-8) was not influenced by atropine, phenoxybenzamine or propranolol. 4) Pretreatment of streptomycin enhanced the secretagogue effect of acetylcholine or CCK-8. From these results it is suggested that amylase releasing effects of aminoglycosides are mediated in part by cholinergic stimulation and in part by membrane alteration and these effects are enhanced by acetylcholine or cholecystokinin.

노동조합이 기업의 공정공시에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구

안태식 ( Tae Sik Ahn ),심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ),박진하 ( Jin Ha Park ) 한국회계학회 2011 회계학연구 Vol.36 No.4

개요: 본 연구에서는 노동조합이 기업에서 공정공시를 통해 발표하는 정보의 빈도에 미치는 영향을 조사하였다. 연구 분석 결과 평균적으로 유노조기업은 무노조기업에 비해 공정공시의 빈도가 낮으며, 유노조기업만을 대상으로 볼 때는 노동조합가입률이 높을수록 공정공시의 빈도가 높은 것으로 나타났다. 상기의 결과는 (1) 유노조기업의 경영진은 노동조합과의 단체교 섭에서 유리한 위치를 점유하기 위하여 무노조기업에 비해 공정공시를 덜 하려는 유인이 있으며, 노동조합의 존재만으로는 기업의 투명경영을 제고하고 공정공시대상정보의 생산 및 유통을 촉구하는 역할을 수행하는데 한계가 있으나, (2) 노동조합의 협상력이 강해지면, 투명경영에 대한 요구 및 공정공시대상정보의 대내외적 증가를 통해 공정공시 빈도가 증가하게 되는 것으로 해석될 수 있다. 본 연구를 통해 노동조합이, 전통적인 노사관계론의 영역을 넘어, 기업의 공시전략에 미치는 영향에 대한 이해를 보다 풍부하게 할 수 있다. 또한 국내의 노동조합 연구는 미국의 산업별자료가 아닌 기업별 자료를 기반으로 수행되므로 노동조합의 존재유무와 관련된 내생성 문제를 직접적으로 통제하여 발생 가능한 측정오류를 줄일 수 있다. 마지막으로, 실무에서는 노동조합이 기업의 정보제공수준에 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 점을 인지하여 투자결정을 해야 함을 시사한다. This study examines the relationship between labor union and the frequency of information disclosed under fair disclosure system. Specifically, we investigate whether the presence of union (bargaining power of unions) is related to the frequency of disclosure. There exist two different perspectives on the role of unions in a union-management relationship: a partner for goal alignment or a residual claimant. The former view emphasizes that management can achieve effective labor-management cooperation and goal alignment with unions by sharing information (Palmer 1977; Foley and Maunders 1977). However, the latter perspective stresses that unions, through collective bargaining, redistribute a larger portion of profits to their members and consequently decrease firm profitability. In other words, in a situation where the firm and the union share the profits, the union would attempt to maximize the utility of its members by increasing its share of the firm`s surplus. Therefore, firms with a unionized workforce should have an incentive to hide or misrepresent their true position to take advantage of the negotiation (Reynolds et al. 1998). In this regard, studies have suggested that unionized firms carry out a lower level of investments (Bronars and Deere 1993; Fallick and Hassett 1999), use accounting choice to influence labor negotiations (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991; D`Souza et al. 2001; Yoon and Ko 2006), increase debt (Bronars and Deere 1991; Matsa 2010), or hold smaller cash reserves (Klasa et al. 2009). However, there is little evidence concerning whether a firm conceals information to its union except Hilary (2006) which finds empirical evidence of a positive relationship between strong organized labor forces and information asymmetry. Thus, the purpose of our study is to enhance understanding on this issue by examining the relationship between labor union and the frequency of disclosure. We investigate corporate disclosures following the adoption of regulation fair disclosure of the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) in November 2002. Disclosures under this rule are voluntary in terms of that the firm has discretion over whether to release the information or not (Shim et al. 2010). Therefore, this provides a good environment to investigate a firm`s strategy on disclosure when they have an organized labor force. We develop our hypotheses based on two competing effects of union. On the one hand, managers of a firm may have an incentive to reduce information when the uncertainty concerning managerial objectives is higher. Strong labor provides this environment because managers act differently in the presence of different parties that have potentially conflicting goals. For example, while managers would manipulate earnings upward in general, those facing strong union would manipulate earnings downward, and thereby misrepresent their true position to be better off both in the market and in labor negotiation. From this perspective, unionized firms may have an incentive to minimize disclosure and increase uncertainty in order to increase their bargaining power in collective bargaining. On the other hand, unions argue that not only they are residual claimant but also they enhance the information environment by discipline firms to report the firm`s financial condition faithfully and to disclose that information to the market. In addition, information required by union is overlapped with the regulation fair disclosure, and KSE`s guideline propose firm to disclose information that is internally distributed if it is a subject of regulation fair disclosure. The more strong the union is, the bigger this effect will be. Therefore, from the second perspective, it is expected that the frequency of disclosure is higher in the presence of strong union. We do not predict whether the relationship between labor union and the frequency of disclosure is positive or negative because there are competing arguments. On the one hand, as we discussed above, a strong union could reduce the frequency of disclosure because firms have an incentive to minimize information flow both to them and to the market. On the other hand, a strong union could demand for more information disclosure both to them and to the market resulting in a higher frequency of the disclosure. Following these two competing arguments, we posit our hypotheses in null form that the presence of union (bargaining power of unions) is not related to the frequency of disclosure. Our sample consists of 1,681 firm-year observations in the manufacturing industry for the period 2003-2008. All firms are listed on the KSE. Using this sample, we find that unionized firms have lower frequency of fair disclosure compared to nonunionized firms. Second, we find that union`s bargaining power is positively related to the frequency of fair disclosure. In sum, this result implies that the existence of a union reduces the firm`s level of fair disclosure, but in a unionized firm, the stronger the union, the higher frequency of fair disclosure because union can play a monitoring role. This study has implications to practitioners and academics on labor negotiations and disclosure. In addition, we try to eliminate the endogeneity problem that arises from the characteristic differences between unionized firms and non-unionized firms using Heckman`s two-step regression (1979). Finally, the paper utilizes firmlevel union data uniquely available in Korea.

대규모기업집단 소속기업의 이사회 특성과 공시 빈도 사이의 관계

이문영 ( Moony Lee ),심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ),최종학 ( Jong Hag Choi ) 한국회계학회 2012 회계학연구 Vol.37 No.2

본 연구는 대규모기업집단 소속기업들을 대상으로 여러 이사회의 특징들로 측정한 기업의 지배구조 수준과 공정공시제도를 통해 제공되는 정보의 빈도 사이의 관련성을 조사하였다. 우수한 이사회를 갖추고 있지 못한 기업들의 경우 이사회가 지배주주에 대한 효율적인 감독기능을 수행하지 못할 가능성이 높다. 그 결과 지배주주가 소액주주의 권리를 침해하여 자신의 사적 이익을 추구할 가능성이 증가하게 된다. 따라서 기업은 이러한 사실을 외부 이해관계자들로부터 숨기기 위하여 정보를 덜 공개할 수 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 가설을 실증자료를 이용하여 분석하였다. 분석 결과는 다음과 같이 요약된다. 첫째, 이사회 중 사외이사의 비율이 높을수록, 그리고 회색이사의 비율이 낮을수록 공시 빈도가 높았다. 둘째, 이사회 위원 중 다른 회사의 사외이사를 현재 겸임하고 있거나 과거 역임한 경험이 있는 이사가 증가할 경우와 회계/세무 전문가가 독립적인 사외이사로 포함되어 있을수록 (즉, 이사회의 전문성이 증가할수록) 공시 빈도가 높았다. 셋째, 이사회 내 감사위원회가 설치된 기업일수록 공시 빈도가 높았다. 넷째, 소액주주 보호를 위한 집중투표제나 서면투표제를 도입하고 있는 경우 공시 빈도가 높았다. 다른 다양한 이사회 특성 변수들은 공시 빈도와 유의적인 관련성을 발견할 수 없었다. 본 연구의 이러한 발견은 우수한 기업지배구조의 확립의 효과와 관련하여 규제기관과 학계, 실무 종사자들과 투자자들에게 유용한 많은 시사점을 제공하고 있다. This study investigates the association between the superiority of the corporate governance mechanism measured by board characteristics and the frequency of information disclosed through the fair disclosure system. Among various ways to measure the superiority of the corporate governance mechanism, this study specifically focuses on the characteristics of the corporate board, because the board is the highest and most important mechanism to influence corporate behaviors. Corporate insiders and controlling shareholders have incentives to pursue their private interests (Claessens et al. 2000) by transferring wealth from minority shareholders to themselves. In such a case, the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed. Because minority shareholders are aware of this kind of risk, they are reluctant to make an investment in firms dominated by corporate insiders and majority shareholders. To persuade those minority shareholders that the firm is protecting the interests of minority shareholders and thus attract them to invest in the firm, insiders and majority shareholders need to establish a good corporate governance mechanism (Kwon et al. 2011), especially a board of directors. As a result, if the board functions effectively and efficiently to monitor the behavior of corporate insiders and majority shareholders, it is expected that the firm release various information to outsiders to guide their decision making. As a result, it is expected that there exists a positive association between a superior governance mechanism (i.e., an effective board) and the frequency of information disclosure (Lee and Sohn 2005). With 1,023 firm-year observations collected from Korean listed firms belonging to large business groups over the period from 2003 to 2008, this study empirically examines this prediction. Specifically, this study classifies the characteristics of the board into the following five broad categories. The first characteristic is the independence of the board, which is measured by (1) the ratio of independent board members (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Eng and Mak 2003), (2) the ratio of gray directors who are former employees of the firm or other related firms (Choi et al. 2008), and (3) the existence of a chairman of the board who is one of the independent outside board members. The second characteristic is the competency or expertise of the board, which is measured by (1) the existence of board members who also serve on other companies` boards (Carcello and Neal 2003) and (2) the existence of independent board members who are experts in accounting / taxation (Srinivasan 2005). The third characteristic is the diligence of the board, which is measured by the ratio of outside directors` attendance at board meetings (Choi and Lim 2009; Moon et al. 2006). The fourth characteristic is the establishment of an audit committee. It is well documented that an audit committee plays an important role in promoting the quality of financial reporting (Kwon et al. 2011). Finally, this study measures the other characteristics of the board by (1) the size of the board (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003), (2) the frequency of board meetings, and (3) the introduction of a cumulative voting or written ballot system (LaPorta et al. 1999). We perform multiple regression analyses with the test variables mentioned above and other various control variables that are likely to affect the frequency of information disclosures. Especially, we control for another important governance-related characteristic: the ownership structure. We include foreign and management shareholdings as well as ownership divergence (ownership wedge) measured by the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights of the majority shareholder (Kwon et al. 2011; Lee and Sohn 2005). Thus, this study specifically focuses on the characteristics of the board after controlling for ownership structure. The empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, we find that the ratio of independent (gray) directors is positively (negatively) associated with the frequency. Second, the governance expertise (i.e., the proportion of directors who held director positions on other firms` boards and the existence of outside board members who are experts in accounting or tax) is positively associated with the frequency. Third, firms with an established audit committee tend to release more information. Finally, the firms with cumulative voting or written ballot systems are likely to disclose more information. These results generally support the prediction that firms with a superior governance mechanism tend to release more information to protect minority shareholders. Using exploratory principal component analysis, we confirm our results. We employ this method to summarize several governance characteristics into reduced dimensions. In addition, the results of various sensitivity analyses are also consistent in general. The findings of this study are expected to provide valuable insights to regulators, academics, practitioners, and investors. We expect future research should turn its attention to the quality of disclosure as well as the quantity.

사례논문 : 우회상장과 관련된 이익조작: 네오세미테크 사례

백복현 ( Bok Baik ),김범준 ( Bum Joon Kim ),김영준 ( Young Jun Kim ),심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ) 한국회계학회 2011 회계저널 Vol.20 No.5

우회상장은 비상장기업이 상장기업과 합병 등의 방법을 통해 상장하는 수단으로, 신규상장이 엄격한 심사과정이나 공모절차를 거쳐야 하는데 반해 이러한 요건들이 다소 완화되어 있는 우회상장을 통해 자본시장에 진입하는 기업들이 꾸준히 증가하였다. 그러나 우회상장제도 본래의 취지에서 벗어나 부실한 기업 또는 우회상장제도를 악용하는 기업들이 경영진의 배임, 횡령, 주가조작 등 여러 부작용을 발생시키고 있어 이로 인해 일반 투자자들이 피해를 입는 사례가 생기고 있다. 본 연구에서 소개하고 있는 네오세미테크는 2009년 10월 (주)디엔티와의 흡수합병을 통해 우회상장하였으나, 상장 후 채 1년도 되지 않은 2010년 9월 상장폐지되었다. 본 연구에서는 네오세미테크가 부실한 재무구조와 손실을 상장을 통해 해결하기 위해 우회상장을 결정하였으며, 그 과정에서 허위공시와 자전거래 등을 통해 가공의 매출 및 자산을 계상하는 등의 분식회계를 저질렀고, 결국 이로 인해 상장폐지를 맞게 되었음을 설명하였다. 네오세미테크의 우회상장 및 상장폐지 사례는 회계감사, 상장심사제도, 금융당국의 감리, 공시제도 등 시스템 전반에 걸쳐 개혁이 필요하다는 점을 시사한다. Backdoor listing is a method of listing on a stock exchange in which an unlisted company merges with a listed company. Unlike initial public offerings, in which firms have to pass a rigorous listing eligibility review, backdoor listings are subject to relatively lax listing requirements. Many firms have gained readily access to the capital markets via backdoor listing. However, due to backdoor listing of fraudulent companies, investors have suffered losses from management malpractice, embezzlement, and stock price manipulation. Neosemitech conducted backdoor listing by merging with D&T on October 2009, only to be delisted on September 2010, less than a year since listing. Neosemitech listed on the stock exchange to increase capital and reduce financial distress. The company performed false disclosures and inflated sales and assets on the financial statements. Eventually, accounting fraud led to delisting of the company. This case implies that measures must be taken in auditing, listing eligibility reviews, audit reviews, disclosure regulations, and the overall backdoor listing system.

교육서비스 가격책정 방법론의 개발과 적용

안태식(Tae-Sik Ahn),곽수근(Su-Keun Kwak),이병희(Byung-Hee Lee),심호식(Ho-Shik Shim),최연식(Youn-Sik Choi) 한국관리회계학회 2008 관리회계연구 Vol.8 No.2

본 연구는 최근 국내에 도입된 경영ㆍ의학계열ㆍ법학전문대학원 등의 서구식 교육체제를 갖춘 전문대학원을 대상으로 등록금 책정시 적용가능한 방법론을 개발하고, 이를 전문대학원의 등록금 책정에 이용한 사례를 제시한다. 본 연구는 전문대학원의 등록금 책정시 교육원가기준(cost-based pricing method)과 부가가치창출기준(value-added pricing method) 등을 종합적으로 이용하여 책정할 것을 제시하고 있다. 과거 등록금 책정과 관련한 연구들은 주로 교육원가 모형만을 이용하였으나, 특정 전문분야와 관련된 고도의 실무지식과 이론을 교육하여 학생들의 미래 경제적 가치를 높이는 것을 주요 목적으로 하고 있는 전문대학원의 경우 교육서비스의 품질을 보다 충실히 반영하기 위해서는 과거에 투입된 교육원가뿐만 아니라 그 교육을 통해서 학생들의 미래 경제적 가치를 얼마나 높일 수 있는지를 고려하는 것이 보다 합리적일 것이다. 본 연구는 과거 학부나 일반 대학원의 등록금 책정시 주요 근거로 제시되었던 교육원가 모형의 의의와 한계를 짚어보고, 전문대학원 교육이 창출해내는 부가가치를 반영하는 부가가치창출기준을 전문대학원 등록금 책정방안의 하나로 제시하였다는 점에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. This paper develops alternative pricing mechanisms for educational services of professional schools, including the cost-based pricing method and value-added pricing method, which can be applied to professional tuition estimations. Most prior research has focused on educational costs and activities, and commonly used cost-based approach to compute tuitions for students. However, it is not likely that this practice properly reflects the purpose and function of education services offered by professional schools. These schools provide students with highly advanced expertise and practice-oriented theories as well as enhance graduates' future economic value. In this sense, we need to develop alternative methodologies that are more appropriate to the purposes and functions of educational services provided by professional schools. Therefore, we not only investigate the functions and limitations of the cost-based approach that has been widely used for determining the tuition levels of undergraduate and general graduate schools but also suggest a value-added pricing method that is more reflective of the economic value of the education provided by professional schools.