미국법상 경영판단의 원칙에 관한 비판적 소고 -주주와 회사 이익 보호의 관점에서-

손창일 ( Chang Il Son ) 한국상사판례학회 2009 상사판례연구 Vol.22 No.4

암모니아수 기반 연소 후 이산화탄소 흡수 및 활용: 포집과정에 영향을 미치는 요인 탐색

손창인 ( Changin Son ),송영한 ( Younghan Song ),이상우 ( Xiangyu Li ),나춘기 ( Choonki Na ) 한국폐기물자원순환학회 2022 한국폐기물자원순환학회 추계학술발표논문집 Vol.2022 No.0

기관투자자의 올바른 역할

손창일 ( Son Chang-il ) 안암법학회 2017 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.52

기관투자자의 시장참여는 주가의 상승과 주가변동성의 축소에 기여하는 경우가 많으며, 적극적인 기관투자자의 주식시장 참여는 은행 등의 간접금융 중심에서 직접금융 중심으로 유도하여 바람직한 변화를 야기한다. 또한, 기관투자자가 주식시장에 투자를 늘리면 이는 실물경제의 성장으로 이어지게 되고, 자본시장의 가격이 높은 수준으로 형성되고 유동성이 풍부해지며, 보수적 투자성향을 띄며 투자위험을 낮추려 하는 경향이 강하므로, 불필요한 변동성이 줄어드는 효과가 나타나게 되어 자본시장의 성숙에 기여한다. 즉, 기관투자자의 활발한 의결권 행사는 기업지배구조 개선과 기업가치 제고에 기여할 수 있다. 국민연금을 비롯한 우리나라 기관투자자의 적극적인 시장참여와 주주행동주의도 이와 같은 바람직한 결과를 야기할 것으로 기대된다. 그러나 이번 삼성물산-제일모직 합병 건에서 보듯, 기관투자자는 적절한 규제가 없다면 고객의 손해를 야기하는 의결권 행사를 할 수도 있다. 미국은 개별 법률을 통하여 견고한 충실의무와 주의의무를 확립하였으나, 우리나라는 기관투자자의 의결권 행사 관련하여 삼성물산과 제일모직의 합병과 같은 새로운 전기를 맞이하는 시점에 있다. 한국형 스튜어드십 코드의 제정논의가 진행되는 이 시점에서 미국식의 견고한 신인의무의 확립과 영국식의 자율적인 코드의 정립이 병행되어야 할 것으로 보인다. In many cases, the expansion of institutional investors` invests contributes to the rise in stock prices and the reduction of stock price volatility, and the institutional investors` active participation in the stock market brings about desirable changes from bank-centered indirect financing to direct financing. Also, if institutional investors increase the investments in the stock market, then the real economy grows, the stock market value is formed at a high level, liquidity becomes abundant, and the trends of conservative investment propensity and lowering investment risk become strong, leading to the reduction of unnecessary volatility and contributing to the growth of the capital market. In other words, institutional investors` active investment in stocks can contribute to the improvement of corporate governance and the enhancement of enterprise value. The active market participation of our country`s institutional investors such as National Pension Service and the shareholder activism are also expected to bring about such desirable results. However, as shown in the merger of Samsung C&T and Cheil Industries, institutional investors sometimes behave irrationally if there are no legitimate regulations. The United States has established strong duty of loyalty and duty care through individual laws and our country is now at the time of new changes, shown in the merger of Samsung C&T and Cheil Industries, with regard to the institutional investors` exercise of voting rights. At this time when the enactment of Korean Stewardship Code is being discussed, it is considered that the establishment of both American style strong fiduciary duty and English style autonomous stewardship code should be attained.

미국 회사법 시장 체계에 관한 연구 -주(州) 회사법 시장의 독점적 경쟁시장화와 자유주의적 회사법 형성의 관점에서-

손창일 ( Chang Il Son ) 안암법학회 2010 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.31

Contrary to popular belief, all the corporations of a country are not competitive when the country has a competitive corporate law. In this paper, however, I try to highlight the advantages of a competitive U.S. corporate law market system because I believe that it helps U.S. corporations conduct business. We study the corporate laws of the so-called developed countries even though its corporate laws are not always competitive, and investigate how its provisions can benefit Korean corporations. Each of the 50 states in the United States has different corporate laws. In addition, every corporation can select incorporating states regardless of where the business is based. Traditionally, many scholars have regarded the characteristics of the U.S. corporate law competition system among states as "the corporate law market." Scholarly opinions on this topic can be categorized into "race to the top" and "race to the bottom." In my opinion, first, the U.S. corporate law market has been maintained as "a monopolistic competitive market that aims to create a perfectly competitive market." Second, "liberal" corporate laws have been consistently implemented in the United States. These characteristics may have implications for a future model of Korean Commercial Law. Several rules of the U.S. corporate law have been incorporated into the Korean Commercial Law. However, further research needs to be conducted to identify ways to reduce the limitations of the U.S. corporate law and magnify its advantages to suit the Korean context.

미국 회사법상의 주주대표소송과 특별소송위원회에 관한 연구

손창일 ( Son Chang-il ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2011 외법논집 Vol.35 No.4

A shareholders’ derivative suit permits one or more shareholders to bring a suit against wrongdoers on behalf of the corporation. This forces the wrongdoers to compensate the corporation for the injury caused by them. This kind of action usually concerns directors, officers, and majority shareholders failing to exercise their fiduciary duties to the corporation. The shareholders’ derivative suit is distinct even in common law system. Most corporate lawsuits are filed by the corporation itself rather than its shareholders. Usually, the board of directors decide whether a corporation will pursue a claim through litigation. This presents problems when the possible lawsuit is against the directors or officers. A board of directors may act as a whole in reviewing shareholders’ demand, or it can choose to organize a special litigation committee to investigate the facts underlying a demand and draft a report and recommendation regarding the suit. The shareholders’ derivative suit was devised in order to permit shareholders to seek compensation in cases where the board of directors decides not to pursue the possible claim. For over a hundred years, the shareholders’ derivative suit and the special litigation committee in U.S. corporate law have played a significant role in keeping a check on and maintaining a balance between the power of major and minor shareholders. However, they face some problems with regard to the features of modern U.S. corporations. The U.S. shareholders’ derivative suit has three main shortcomings. First, it is illogical for a corporation to have the preferential right to enforce a claim. Second, the concept of direct and indirect harm is misunderstood. Third, it is illogical that the shareholders’ derivative suit is always complex when brought by shareholders. The special litigation committee system also has three issues. First, it has a problem of self-audit. Second, it has problems with regard to public policy. Third, it does not reflect the reality of today’s U.S. corporations. The shareholders’ derivative suit is meant to protect the interests of shareholders. However, it does not fully measure up in this respect. Today, the power of a shareholder in the United States is increasingly diminishing. In this situation, it is desirable for U.S. courts not to enforce the legal entity concept of a corporation and to gradually transfer the power of bringing a suit to shareholders.

기업집단 내 계열사 간 지원시 경영판단원칙의 새 기준 -대법원 2017.11.9. 선고 2015도12633 판결에 대한 평석을 중심으로-

손창일 ( Son Chang-il ) 한국상사판례학회 2018 상사판례연구 Vol.31 No.3

이번 대법원의 판결은, “과연 재벌 오너의, 사적 이익추구가 없는 의사결정에 의한 계열사 지원행위를 불법으로 보아야 하는가?”라는 근원적 질문에 대한 고민으로 볼 수 있다. 대법원은 “경쟁력이 충분한 회사들이지만, 대내외의 불운한 여건 속에 그룹 내의 거의 모든 계열사가 동반부실에 빠진 상황이라면 그룹 오너는 모든 합법적 방법을 동원해서 그룹과 계열사를 살리기 위하여 노력해도 면책된다. 설사 충분한 절차나 담보를 설정하지 못하였고 지원하는 계열사와 지원받는 계열사들이 모두 자금사정이 어려운 상황이더라도, 사적 이익을 얻기 위한 목적이 아니라 계열사를 살리기 위한 순수한 목적이라면, 배임의 고의가 없다고 보아야 할 것이다.” 정도로 요약될 수 있겠다. 오너가 계열사 주식의 상당수를 소유하여 대부분의 회사에서 단일주주이거나 최소한 과반수를 넘는 주식을 소유한 주요주주라면 이러한 논리는 경영판단원칙의 적용에 있어서 그 토대가 마련된 것으로 볼 수 있다. 주식을 대부분 소유했기 때문에 (미국의 경영판단원칙(business judgment rule)의 존재기반이 되는) 주주와의 이익충돌의 문제가 발생할 여지가 적고, 이사회도 완전 장악되어 있을 것이 확실하기 때문에 이사회의 의결을 거치지 않은 문제에 대해서도 용인할 수 있는 부분이 있기 때문이다. 그러나 소수주주의 입장에서는 1개의 계열사에 주식투자를 함에 있어서 타 계열사의 리스크도 져야한다는 큰 문제점이 존재하여 소수주주의 권리를 부당하게 침해하게 된다. 따라서 본 판결은 항구적인 판례로 지속되기는 어렵고, 대내외적 경제상황이 심각한 현 상황에 부응한 판결이라고 본다. 필자도 이번 대법원의 판결에 찬동할 수밖에 없다. 대내외적 환경이 악화일로에 있고, 종업원의 일자리 확보가 사회적 관심사가 되고 있으며, 재벌 간 부익부 빈익빈이 심해지는 요즘 상황에서 대법원의 이러한 결정은 경영상 어려움을 겪는 몇몇 기업집단의 부실 계열사 지원에 있어서 숨통을 틔워주는 판결이 될 것이다. The recent ruling by the Supreme Court boils down to the answer of the fundamental question, “Should the support be provided to a financially troubled subsidiary by the decision of a Chaebol owner who is not pursuing personal gain?” All in all, according to the Supreme Court, “while those subsidiaries have sufficient competitiveness, if almost all subsidiaries in the group are in a collective financial hardship due to a series of unlucky events in and out of the companies, the owner of the group has no other choice but to do anything necessary to revive such subsidiaries within the boundary of legality. Even though they failed to go through the necessary steps or set a sufficient amount of securities, while both the subsidiaries that provide such supports and those that received them were collectively in a financial hardship, if the purpose of such action was for revising those subsidiaries without pursuing personal gains, it should be considered that there was no deliberate intent of malpractice.” If the owner owns a good portion of the stocks of the subsidiaries and therefore has the status of single shareholder or at least the majority shareholder for many of such corporations, such a notion may be able to stand its ground. As the owner owns most of the stocks, it is less likely to cause the issue of conflict of interest with other shareholders (which is the basis for the very existence of the business judgment rules of the United States), while the boards are likely to be under their control, as well, the failure to go through a voting process might be excusable. However, for small shareholder, they are unfairly forced to bear the risks of other subsidiaries in their investment into a certain subsidiary, which can be a violation of the interest of these small shareholders. Therefore, these five criteria are difficult to be applied as a permanently standing basis. The ruling of the court, therefore, appear to be appropriate in consideration of the current situation. The author has no other choice but to agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court, as well. The fluctuation of the economic cycles, the ownership structures of Chaebols, and the public’s legal sentiment, all require that the business judgment rules need to have some flexibility in them. As the external business environments are worsening every day and preserving jobs of the employees become a social concern, while even Chaebols are now having widening gaps in terms of wealth among themselves, such a ruling by the Supreme Court will give a precious chance of revival for some groups of companies helping out their subsidiaries in poor financial conditions.

미국 회사법상 적대적 M&A 상황에서의 강화된 경영판단의 원칙 -델라웨어州회사법을 중심으로-

손창일 ( Chang Il Son ) 한국상사판례학회 2012 상사판례연구 Vol.25 No.3

The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. In the past, the board of directors at target merger and acquision (M&A) corporations have been recognized as being able to exercise the maximum M&A defense under the protection of the business judgment rule. However, since the mid 1980s, new rules began to be formulated under U.S. corporate law for directors in hostile M&A situations, particularly in Delaware. The enhanced business judgment rule was established over the general business judgment rule. Starting in 1985, notable precedents began to emerge from the State of Delaware and the Unocal, the Moran, and the Revlon cases, all of which were settled by 1986, accelerated the imposition of the revised rule. However, according to the author, the revised business judgment rule cannot be considered a business judgment rule for the following reasons: First, the enhanced business judgment rule changes the foundation of the business judgment rule because of the absence of presumption rule and the transition of the burden of proof. Second, the two rules are fundamentally different in that the business judgment rule considers the motive of the behavior while the enhanced business judgment rule also takes into account the extent of the behavior. Third, the enhanced business judgment rule is a strengthened version of the director`s fiduciary duty. In addition, the author believes that the enhanced business judgment rule is not really enhanced because of the following reasons: First, the burden of proof has been transferred to the board of directors through the transition of burden of proof, but the problem lies in the fact that it is actually easy to prove. Second, once the proof is easily obtained, the next step should be the implementation of the business judgment rule. Therefore, in practice, the enhanced business judgment rule does not really enhance the business judgment rule. As such, the enhanced business judgment rule cannot even be considered a business judgment rule, much less an enhanced one. The enhanced business judgment rule, however, can be an appropriate prototype for an ideal business judgment rule for the following reasons: First, it has the potential to be developed further as it places the burden of proof on the directors. Second, it is possible to increase the responsibility of the directors by assessing their behavior. Third, it may be possible to strengthen duty of loyalty, which has often been overlooked in the existing business judgment rule due to reasonableness factor and the imposition of duty as an auctioneer.

경영학 강의-고전의 제왕학과 현대경영의 조화

손창일,Son, Chang-Il 한국지역냉난방협회 2007 집단에너지 Vol.5 No.-

성견치은열구내 치아표면의 치태형성에 대한 주사전자현미경적 연구

손창인,채중규,김종관,Son, Chang-Ihn,Chai, Jung-Kiu,Kim, Chong-Kwan 대한치주과학회 1986 Journal of Periodontal & Implant Science Vol.16 No.1

생체신호 데이터의 압축코드 알고리즘에 관한 연구

홍승홍,손창일,민홍기,Hong, Seung-Hong,Son, Chang-Il,Min, Hong-Gi 대한의용생체공학회 1984 의공학회지 Vol.5 No.1

In this paper, the real-time compressed code generation method for the biological signal data, especially for the Electrocardiogram, is studied. For this purpose, variable length code is introduced. And from this code, we get a exactly the same reconstructed signal data as the original. Experimental results show that this program reduces the data rate by a factor of about 8, and codes the result in a form convenient for analysis.