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Security Analysis of the Khudra Lightweight Cryptosystem in the Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
( Wei Li ),( Chenyu Ge ),( Dawu Gu ),( Linfeng Liao ),( Zhiyong Gao ),( Xiujin Shi ),( Ting Lu ),( Ya Liu ),( Zhiqiang Liu ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2018 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.12 No.7
With the enlargement of wireless technology, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are rising as a hopeful way to realize smart cities and address a lot of vital transportation problems such as road security, convenience, and efficiency. To achieve data confidentiality, integrity and authentication applying lightweight cryptosystems is widely recognized as a rather efficient approach for the VANETs. The Khudra cipher is such a lightweight cryptosystem with a typical Generalized Feistel Network, and supports 80-bit secret key. Up to now, little research of fault analysis has been devoted to attacking Khudra. On the basis of the single nibble-oriented fault model, we propose a differential fault analysis on Khudra. The attack can recover its 80-bit secret key by introducing only 2 faults. The results in this study will provides vital references for the security evaluations of other lightweight ciphers in the VANETs.
Security Analysis of the Whirlpool Hash Function in the Cloud of Things
( Wei Li ),( Zhiyong Gao ),( Dawu Gu ),( Chenyu Ge ),( Linfeng Liao ),( Zhihong Zhou ),( Ya Liu ),( Zhiqiang Liu ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2017 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.11 No.1
With the advancement and deployment of leading-edge telecommunication technologies for sensing and collecting, computing related information, Cloud of Things (CoTs) has emerged as a typical application platform that is envisioned to revolutionize the daily activities of human society, such as intelligent transportation, modern logistics, food safety, environmental monitoring, etc. To avoid any possible malicious attack and resource abuse, employing hash functions is widely recognized as one of the most effective approaches for CoTs to achieve message integrity and data authentication. The Whirlpool hash function has served as part of the joint ISO/IEC 10118-3 International Standard by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). In this paper, we propose an effective differential fault analysis on Whirlpool in the byte-oriented random fault model. The mathematical analysis and experimental results show that 8 random faults on average are required to obtain the current 512-bit message input of whirlpool and the secret key of HMAC-Whirlpool. Our work demonstrates that Whirlpool and HMAC-Whirlpool are both vulnerable to the single byte differential fault analysis. It provides a new reference for the security analysis of the same structure of the hash functions in the CoTs.
Security Analysis of the PHOTON Lightweight Cryptosystem in the Wireless Body Area Network
( Wei Li ),( Linfeng Liao ),( Dawu Gu ),( Chenyu Ge ),( Zhiyong Gao ),( Zhihong Zhou ),( Zheng Guo ),( Ya Liu ),( Zhiqiang Liu ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2018 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.12 No.1
With the advancement and deployment of wireless communication techniques, wireless body area network (WBAN) has emerged as a promising approach for e-healthcare that collects the data of vital body parameters and movements for sensing and communicating wearable or implantable healthful related information. In order to avoid any possible rancorous attacks and resource abuse, employing lightweight ciphers is most effective to implement encryption, decryption, message authentication and digital signature for security of WBAN. As a typical lightweight cryptosystem with an extended sponge function framework, the PHOTON family is flexible to provide security for the RFID and other highly-constrained devices. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis to break three flavors of the PHOTON family successfully. The mathematical analysis and simulating experimental results show that 33, 69 and 86 random faults in average are required to recover each message input for PHOTON-80 /20/16, PHOTON-160/36/36 and PHOTON-224/32/32, respectively. It is the first result of breaking PHOTON with the differential fault analysis. It provides a new reference for the security analysis of the same structure of the lightweight hash functions in the WBAN.
Security Analysis of the Lightweight Cryptosystem TWINE in the Internet of Things
( Wei Li ),( Wenwen Zhang ),( Dawu Gu ),( Zhi Tao ),( Zhihong Zhou ),( Ya Liu ),( Zhiqiang Liu ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2015 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.9 No.2
The TWINE is a new Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS) lightweight cryptosystem in the Internet of Things. It has 36 rounds and the key lengths support 80 bits and 128 bits, which are flexible to provide security for the RFID, smart cards and other highly-constrained devices. Due to the strong attacking ability, fast speed, simple implementation and other characteristics, the differential fault analysis has become an important method to evaluate the security of lightweight cryptosystems. On the basis of the 4-bit fault model and the differential analysis, we propose an effective differential fault attack on the TWINE cryptosystem. Mathematical analysis and simulating experiments show that the attack could recover its 80-bit and 128-bit secret keys by introducing 8 faulty ciphertexts and 18 faulty ciphertexts on average, respectively. The result in this study describes that the TWINE is vulnerable to differential fault analysis. It will be beneficial to the analysis of the same type of other iterated lightweight cryptosystems in the Internet of Things.
New Analysis of Reduced-Version of Piccolo in the Single-Key Scenario
( Ya Liu ),( Liang Cheng ),( Fengyu Zhao ),( Chunhua Su ),( Zhiqiang Liu ),( Wei Li ),( Dawu Gu ) 한국인터넷정보학회 2019 KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Syst Vol.13 No.9
The lightweight block cipher Piccolo adopts Generalized Feistel Network structure with 64 bits of block size. Its key supports 80 bits or 128 bits, expressed by Piccolo-80 or Piccolo-128, respectively. In this paper, we exploit the security of reduced version of Piccolo from the first round with the pre-whitening layer, which shows the vulnerability of original Piccolo. As a matter of fact, we first study some linear relations among the round subkeys and the properties of linear layer. Based on them, we evaluate the security of Piccolo-80/128 against the meet-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we attack 13 rounds of Piccolo-80 by applying a 5-round distinguisher, which requires 2<sup>44</sup> chosen plaintexts, 2<sup>67.39</sup> encryptions and 2<sup>64.91</sup> blocks, respectively. Moreover, we also attack 17 rounds of Piccolo-128 by using a 7-round distinguisher, which requires 2<sup>44</sup> chosen plaintexts, 2<sup>126</sup> encryptions and 2<sup>125.49</sup> blocks, respectively. Compared with the previous cryptanalytic results, our results are the currently best ones if considering Piccolo from the first round with the pre-whitening layer.