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조약법상 준비문서(Travaux Préparatoires)의 지위
황준식(HWANG, Junshik) 국제법평론회 2022 국제법평론 Vol.- No.61
This study aims to examine the substantial status of the Vienna rules of treaty interpretation (Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) as a norm of international law and reflect upon the value and role of preparatory work, or travaux préparatoires, within the said Vienna rules. It begins with inquiry into the genesis of rules of treaty interpretation from the era of classicism up to the early modern academic discourse of Europe, followed by an overview of different theoretical approaches advocated by Western academics in the early 20th century. The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Law (PCIJ) and certain early decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are also analyzed in order to understand the status of rules of treaty interpretation in international law prior to the International Law Commission (ILC)’s intervention. The ILC proposed systematic rules of treaty interpretation building on the mainstream academic views as well as the approaches taken by the International Courts. The ILC-drafted rules were finally adopted by the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties (1968-1969). It is understood that the Vienna rules are the product of compromise and fusion of existing schools of thought, that is textualism, intentionalism, and teleological view. The ICJ began to accept the Vienna rules in its jurisprudence two decades after adoption of the Vienna Convention: Articles 31 and 32 were gradually recognized by the Court to be the authoritative guide to treaty interpretation in the 1990s, culminating in recognition of Article 31 as reflection of customary international law in 1994, followed by the declaration several years later that Article 32 was also reflective of customary international law. The customary status of the Vienna rules have been repeatedly confirmed by the ICJ’s subsequent judgments and opinions with cumulative reference to its own precedents, starting from the 1994 decision. Looking back on the trajectory of how the Vienna rules emerged and gained its current status, certain narrative could be identified: that is, customary rules of treaty interpretation have been formed through seamlessly continuous, linear development of law from the jurisprudence of the PCIJ to early decisions of the ICJ, integrated by the work of the ILC, leading to final confirmation and recognition by modern practice of the ICJ. A closer examination of each linkage, however, reveals inconsistency, discontinuity or gaps between what was declared to be and what really was: the internal inconsistency of the jurisprudence of the PCIJ; incorrect reference to the PCIJ cases by the early ICJ decisions; lack of any argument or evidence in the identification of customary international law in the ICJ cases, to name a few. In particular, the rise of the Vienna rules to the level of the rules of customary international law could be seen as a typical example of how the ICJ resorted to the technique of assertion, rather than induction or deduction, to identify customary international law in existing treaties, in an inevitable normative attempt to perform its essential judicial functions. There still remains uncertainty as to the basis of assertion of customary character of the Vienna rules as well as its inevitability. In this context, a fundamental question is raised of the genuine status of the Vienna rules: are they obligatory legal rules, or do they exist as a guide for treaty interpretation that is a normative act of fundamentally discretionary character? A critical analysis of the existing discourse on treaty interpretation shows that the Vienna rules function and exist as a guide, rather than strictly binding legal rules, for treaty interpretation. In other words, the Vienna rules are the flexible and practical guide based on the essentially binding legal principle of good faith. This view is consistent with how the rules actually work.
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황준식(Hwang, JunShik) 한양법학회 2011 漢陽法學 Vol.35 No.-
As human rights have evolved into a comprehensive world view which dominates the current global legal and political discourse, the inevitable conceptual ambiguity came along. To try to clarify this ambiguity, one needs to look into the history of human rights. The concept of human rights is said to be deeply rooted in the Western philosophy. The development of the natural rights thinking of 16th-18th centuries combined with the Revolutions of America and France established the modern basis for human rights of today. It is also known that the United Nations led the global efforts related to modern international human rights law. Samuel Moyn, the author of ?The Last Utopia-Human Rights in History, however, disagrees with such conventional understanding. What we call human rights today is a revolutionary, transnational concept created and advocated outside the national sovereignty. This is fundamentally different from, and irreconcilable with, the rights originating from the natural law ideas and the French Revolution which were closely bound up with the creation of the sovereign space. Moreover, the concept of human rights remained at the margin of the intellectual, political world after the end of the Second World War, and the mainstream of international law scholarship paid little attention to human rights for considerable period of time up to the late 1970s. What actually happened was a series of accidental events such as the adoption of the Helsinki accords, the activities of the dissidents from the Communist bloc, and particularly the success of Amnesty International and the inauguration of the Carter Administration in the United States in the late 1970s. These seemingly unrelated events resulted in the explosion of the modern human rights movement. This critical re-evaluation of human rights history helps us see the two different approaches to the concept of human rights. One is to understand human rights as the universal list of rights connected to the natural rights theory; the other is to understand human rights as the universal movement of revolutionary character undermining the concept of the sovereignty, based on the massive awakening that took place in the late 1970s. For the sake of convenience, one is labeled the “human rights as domestic rights”, and the other “the human rights as transnational movement”. These two categories of human rights concept are distinguished from each other in terms of: the space in which to exercise rights; the direction of rights; and the fundamental relationship to the concept of sovereignty. This distinction of human rights concept is useful in understanding specific contexts of the human rights language, which, in turn, would help understand and analyze the usage of human rights more objectively. In particular, one may find it necessary to apply this distinction to understand more thoroughly the human rights issues within the Korean legal discourse, including the North Korean human rights problems.
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국제사법재판소(ICJ)의 권고적 의견과 동의(consent)의 원칙
황준식(Hwang Junshik) 대한국제법학회 2018 國際法學會論叢 Vol.63 No.4
국제사법재판소(ICJ)는 권고적 의견을 요청받는 경우, 그 요청된 법적 문제에 대한 의견을 제공할 권한(관할권)이 있는지를 우선 확인하고, 만일 관할권이 존재한다고 결론내리면 그러한 관할권의 존재에도 불구하고 이 관할권 행사를 재량적으로 거부해야할 사유가 있는지를 살펴본다. ICJ는 총회나 안보리 등이 요청한 권고적 의견을 반드시 제공해야할 의무가 있는 것은 아니며 ICJ의 재량권이 인정되기 때문이다. ICJ는 유엔의 주요 사법기관으로서 본연의 역할에 비추어 적절하지 않은 권고적 의견 부여는 재량적으로 거부해야 한다는 입장을 정립해왔다. 단, ICJ는 오직 “강력한(긴요한) 사유”가 있는 경우에만 권고적 의견을 거부할 수 있다고 보고 있다. ICJ는 아직 재량권에 근거하여 권고적 의견요청을 거부한 적이 없으나, 국가들은 그간 여러 권고적 의견 사건의 심리과정에서 다양한 종류의 강력한 사유를 제시해왔다. 그중 특히 분쟁의 사법적 해결에 대한 동의의 원칙을 회피하고자 하는 경우에 권고적 의견 부여가 부적절하다는 점이 지속제기되어왔다. 현재 ICJ는 현재 유엔총회의 요청에 따라 차고스(Chagos) 군도를 둘러싼 영국과 모리셔스 간 영토분쟁을 배경으로 1965년에 차고스 군도를 모리셔스로부터 분리한 것의 법적 결과에 대한 권고적 의견을 심리하고 있다. 차고스 군도 권고적 의견 요청에서 가장 문제가 되는 선결적 쟁점도 바로 이 동의 원칙의 문제라고 할 수 있다. ICJ는 권고적 의견 부여가 분쟁을 사법적으로 해결하는 실질적 결과를 가져오는 경우에는 이를 거부해야 함을 인정하면서, 권고적 의견 부여가 동의관할권 원칙을 회피해서는 아니 된다고 판시해왔다. 다만, ICJ는 이 원칙의 실제 적용에 있어서는 극히 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 해당 사안이 유엔에 있어서 직접적이고 첨예한 관심사라면 단지 이 문제가 양자간 분쟁 사안이라는 사유만으로 권고적 의견 부여를 거부할 수 없다고 보기 때문이다. 차고스 군도 권고적 의견 심리과정에서 영국은 차고스 군도를 둘러싼 영국과 모리셔스간 영토주권 분쟁이 존재하며 영국이 이 분쟁의 재판회부에 동의하지 않고 있다는 점이 권고적 의견 요청을 거부해야할 강력한 사유가 된다고 주장한다. 이에 반해 모리셔스는 유엔총회의 직접적 관심사인 탈식민 문제를 다루는 데 필요한 법적 지침 제공이 목적이며, 단지 양국간 분쟁 사안이라는 이유만으로 권고적 의견 요청을 거부할 수는 없다고 지적하면서 동의 원칙이 우회되었다고 볼 수 없다는 논리를 제시한다. 한국 정부가 제출한 서면의견은 동의 원칙과 관련하여 권고적 의견 요청을 거부해야할 강력한 사유가 존재한다고 볼 수 있는 세 가지의 예시적 기준을 제안하고 있다. 첫째는 권고적 의견의 목적(object), 둘째는 핵심쟁점 또는 핵심사안(subject matter), 셋째는 배타적 권리 문제에 대한 법원 고유의 사법적 기능(inherent judicial function)에 대한 것이다. 한국서면의견이 제시한 예시적 기준은 유엔 활동에 대한 법적 자문 제공이라는 권고적 의견제도의 본래 목적과 사법기관으로서 ICJ의 고유 기능 간에 적절한 균형을 찾기 위한 현실적 고려에 근거하여, 국제사법체제의 신뢰 제고에 도움을 줄 수 있는 실용적 가이드로서 제시되었다. 이 서면 의견은 한국 정부가 ICJ의 절차에 참여하여 제출한 사상 최초의 법적 의견서라는 점에서 의미가 있다. 향후 ICJ가 차고스 군도 권고적 의견 요청에 대해 어떤 식으로든 최종적 결론을 내리게 된다면 이는 현대 국제법의 발전에 다양한 함의를 갖게 될 것으로 예상되는바, 이 사건에 계속 관심을 갖고 다양한 후속 연구를 통해 토의해 보아야할 것으로 생각된다. When seised of a request for an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any reason why it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction. The ICJ is not obligated to give a reply to a request from the General Assembly or the Security Council: it possesses certain degree of discretion to render advisory opinions. The ICJ has made it clear that it should decline to give an advisory opinion which would be inappropriate in light of its role as a principal judicial organ of the United Nations, on considerations of judicial propriety. However, the ICJ is of the view that only compelling reasons should lead it to refuse to exercise advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ has never refused to give opinions based on this discretionary power in its history, but the states have made various arguments in past proceedings on what could constitute such compelling reasons. In particular, it has been constantly submitted that a request circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement should be declined. Recently, the ICJ has begun its deliberation on the request from the General Assembly for the advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, against the backdrop of the territorial dispute between Mauritius and the United Kingdom concerning the Archipelago. The important preliminary issue here is whether the principle of consent to judicial settlement would prevent the Court from exercising its advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ has repeatedly stated that rendering of an advisory opinion should not circumvent the principle of consent, admitting that it should stay away from substantially deciding a dispute through an advisory opinion. The ICJ, however, seems quite reluctant to apply this principle to actual cases. If the subject matter of the request for an advisory opinion is of an acute and direct interest to the United Nations, the ICJ thinks it not acceptable to refuse the request only because there is a bilateral dispute involved. During the written and oral proceedings on the Chagos Archipelago, the UK argued that, there being a long-standing territorial dispute between it and Mauritius, the lack of consent by the UK to judicial settlement constitutes a compelling reason for the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. On the other hand, Mauritius submitted that the principle of consent is not circumvented because the main purpose of the request is to obtain legal guidance necessary for the General Assembly to address the issue of decolonization which is of its direct interest. Mauritius also pointed out that a mere fact that there is some bilateral dispute does not deprives the Court of its legitimate and appropriate power to give an advisory opinion. The written statement of the Republic of Korea proposes three examples that could serve as criteria by which to determine whether there is a compelling reason to refuse to give an advisory opinion in terms of the principle of consent to judicial settlement: The first is about the object of the request; the second about the subject matter of the request; and the third about the inherent judicial function of a Court of law over certain exclusive rights. These three types of compelling reasons are presented as a practical guide to help preserve the integrity of the international judicial system, based on realistic considerations for striking a proper balance between the need to provide necessary legal advice in support of the activities of the United Nations and the judicial function of the Court as an adjudicative body subject to consensual jurisdiction. This written statement is the first legal document ever submitted by the Government of the Republic of Korea to the ICJ. It is believed that the final conclusion to be reached by the ICJ on this advisory reque
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