Ni-Aluminide 금속간 화합물의 확산과 고온산화 특성

이동복,정승부 ( Dong Bok Lee,Seung Boo Jung ) 대한금속재료학회 1997 大韓金屬學會會報 Vol.10 No.1

강 기판위에 이온 플레이팅된 TiCrN 박막의 산화기구

이동복,김기영,Lee, Dong-Bok,Kim, Gi-Young 한국재료학회 2003 한국재료학회지 Vol.13 No.7

Coatings of TiCrN ion-plated on a steel substrate was oxidized at $800^{\circ}C$ in air, and their oxidation mechanism was presented. During oxidation, substrate elements and Ti and Cr in the coating always diffused outwardly to form the oxide scale. Simultaneously, oxygen from the atmosphere diffused inward1y to react with Ti and Cr to form $TiO_2$and $Cr_2$$O_3$, respectively. Also, the counter-diffusion of cations and oxygen resulted in some oxygen dissolution in the unoxidized TiCrN coating, and Fe dissolution in the oxide scale. When the Ti content in the coating was high, the $TiO_2$-forming tendency was strong, while when the Cr content was high, the $Cr_2$$O_3$-forming tendency was strong.

강 기판위에 아크이온 플레이팅된 CrN박막의 산화

이동복,이영찬,Lee, Dong-Bok,Lee, Yeong-Chan 한국재료학회 2001 한국재료학회지 Vol.11 No.4

아크이온 플레이팅 장치를 이용하여 STD61강 기판 위에 이온질화 전처리를 행하거나 하지 않은 후, CrN 박막을 증착하고, 대기중 $700~900^{\circ}C$의 온도에서 40시간동안 이들에 대한 산화거동을 연구하였다. 산화거동은 열중량분석기, X선회절기, EDS, SEM을 이용하여 조사하였다. 증착된 CrN박막은 CrN과 $Cr_2$N의 두 상으로 구성되어 있었다. CrN박막은 보호적 $Cr_2$O$_3$층을 형성하여 기판을 산화로부터 보호하였다. 이온질화처리는 CrN박막의 내산화성에 영향을 주지 않았다. CrN films were deposited onto STD61 steel substrates using an arc-ion plating apparatus, with and without ion-nitriding pretreatment, and their oxidation was studied between 700 and $900^{\circ}C$ for 40hr in air. The oxidation behavior was examined by thermogravimetric analyses, X-ray diffraction. EDS and SEM. The deposited CrN films consisted of CrN and $Cr_2$N phases. The CrN films increased the oxidation resistance of the substrate by forming a protective $Cr_2$$O_3$ layer. The ion-nitriding pretreatment has not affected the oxidation resistance of the CrN film.

자유민주주의의 위기

이동복(李東馥)(LEE Dong Bok) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2013 신아세아 Vol.20 No.3

The Attempted insurgency plot allegedly masterminded by United Progressive Party (UPP) member of the National Assembly Lee Seok Ki and his ragtag group of self-styled left-leaning, pro-North Korean “revolutionary activists” provide us with two sober reminders: First, 65 years after the division of the country, North Korea is still busy engaged in the planting of the seeds of a revolutionary take-over of South Korea as part of its un-ending pursuit of a unification achieved on its own terms. Second, obviously hardly recognized by themselves, the bulk of South Koreans are forget-minded about the reality that the liberal democracy that has led South Korea on its path toward the prosperity and political freedom of today is pregnant with the built-in weakness that can undermine itself internally by means of democracy itself. It is by no means a news that the liberal democracy has such a critical weakness. It was Germans who physically experienced that weakness of a liberal democracy when they saw, in 1932∼1933, Adolf Hitler’s Nazis Party turn the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich first by winning a parliamentary election and then by seizing the legislative power from the Reichstag by ramming through a bill to that effect. It was an attempt by the founders of West Germany, when it came into being in 1949 in the wake of the end of World War II in 1945, to prevent the recurrence of an implosion of democracy when they wrote the concept of die wehrhafte Democratie (the defensive democracy), into their Basic Law, West German version of a constitution. In addition to equipping itself with such constitutional apparatuses as the Supreme Federal Constitutional Court (SFCC) armed with the right to dissolve unconstitutional political parties, the constitutional protection agencies, both federal and local, authorized to monitor, even allowing wire-tappings, activities of suspected unconstitutional activities and authorization of both federal and local governments to dissolve social associations suspected of unconstitutional activities, West Germany’s measures to defend its liberal democracy also included an executive order, entitled Extremistenbeschluss, issued by none other than Chancellor Willy Brandt, champion of the ‘ Ostpolitik’ as the leader of the SPD government, that made it mandatory for any would-be public employee to “publicly pledge in writing his/her loyalty to the liberal democratic values as embodied in the Basic Law.” The executive order was challenged by a broad range of progressively oriented West German public on charges of being unconstitutional, to which West Germany’s SFCC ruled it “constitutional” in May 1975. As a result, two West German radical political parties were dissolved by SFCC ruling, in addition to 371 social organizations dissolved by both federal and local governments on suspicion of unconstitutionality in the absence of court rulings to that effect, while, altogether, 3,5 million West Germans pledged their loyalties to the liberal democratic values in accordance with Willy Brandt’s executive order that still remains in effect in unified Germany, with 2,250 men/women having failed to be appointed as public employees because of their failure to have their loyalty pledges authenticated. While West Germany’s success not only in raising itself to its phenomenal economic recovery dubbed as the “Miracle on the Rhine” that accompanied its growth as a leading democracy in West Europe eventually leading to unification of Germany achieved through West’s absorption of East in 1990 owed a great deal to West Germany’s success in developing a “defensive democracy,” it looks loudly clear that the case of Lee Seok Ki is a testimonial to the fact that, although she boasts of her economic success called the “Miracle on the Han River,” the Republic of Korea has developed a fatal weakness in defending its democracy against threats from within.

An Overview: Inter-Korean Relations 2009

LEE Dong-Bok (이동복, 李東馥) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2009 신아세아 Vol.16 No.2

북한의 세 번째 장거리 미사일 발사(2009. 4. 5)와 두 번째 핵실험(2009. 5. 25)으로 한반도의 긴장상태는 새로운 비등점을 향해 치닫고 있다. 북한은 한편으로는 군부의 입을 빌어 남북간의 준 전시상태를 선포하면서 서해의 북방한계선에서의 무력 충돌을 위협하고 다른 한편으로는 남북간의 기존 합의 일체의 무효화를 일방적으로 선언하면서 개성공단 관리 운영 조건을 일방적으로 변경하는 등의 방법으로 남북관계의 파탄을 선동하면서 이와 함께 6자회담의 일방적 거부와 북핵 관련 모든 기존합의의 파기를 선언하는 등의 방법으로 국제사회와의 대치 수위를 끝없이 끌어 올리고 있다. 이에 대하여 국제사회는 종전과 달리 중국과 소련이 적극 동참하는 가운데 대북 금융제재와 북한선박에 강제수색 등의 강경 조치를 포함하는 새로운 유엔안보이사회 결의의 채택 등 고강도의 제재조치로 북한의 핵 및 미사일 개발 포기를 강요하는 외교적 압박의 수위를 높이고 있다. 이명박 대통령이 이끄는 한국정부는 6월16일 워싱턴에서 개최되는 이 대통령과 미국의 오바마 대통령 사이의 두 번째 정상회담에서 유사시 미국이 한국에 대한 ‘핵우산’과 함께 재래식 무기 등 ‘확장된 억지력’ 제공 약속을 재확인하는 내용을 담은 <한-미 동맹의 공동 구상>(Joint Vision for ROK-U.S. Alliance)에 합의하는 등 한-미 동맹의 강화로 북한의 위협에 대처하겠다는 의지를 굳히고 있다. 북한의 이 같은 과격한 행동은 금년 초 출범한 미국 오바마 행정부의 대북정책에 대한 기대가 빗나간 데 대한 반발일 수 있고 김정일(金㊣㈰)의 건강 때문에 진행되고 있는 3대 째의 권력세습 과정과 관련이 있을 수 있다는 견해도 있다. 결국 예측하기 어려운 북한의 행동으로 긴장이 고조되고 있는 한반도의 문제는 6자회담 등 대화가 아니라 1980년대 구 소련의 붕괴를 초래했던 레이건 미국 대통령의 ‘신 봉쇄전략’을 한반도에서 다시 꺼내 드는 방법만이 그 유일한 해결방안일 가능성이 있다.

2019년은 대한민국 ‘건국 100주년’이 아니라 ‘독립 71주년’이 맞다

이동복(李東馥)(Dong-bok Lee) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2018 신아세아 Vol.25 No.3

A political storm is brewing over fixing the birth year of the Republic of Korea. President Moon Jae-in is committed to moving it from 1948 to 1919, while conservative opponents are no less determined to defend 1948. A coalition of rightwing forces spearheaded by the Korea Liberty Party (KLP) is bracing for a showdown during parliamentary deliberations over the Fiscal Year 2019 national budget with the aim of derailing Moon’s efforts. Fixing the republic’s birth year is a challenge. The Republic of Korea marked Aug. 15, 1945 as the “Day of Kwangbok,” but “kwangbok” means “restoration of the lost land and sovereignty,” and Aug. 15, 1945 was merely the day of “liberation” from Japanese colonial occupation. The Korean Peninsula was “liberated” from Japan but it was divided into two halves along the 38th Parallel and subject to military occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union. On Aug. 15, 1948, “restoration of the land and sovereignty” became a reality for Koreans in the southern half of the peninsula, as the Republic of Korea gained independence and was recognized by the UN as the “only lawful government” on the peninsula, established through a free general election mandated and supervised by the world body, even though control and jurisdiction was confined to the southern half of the peninsula. Having gained “independence,” the republic could mark Aug. 15, 1945, as its “Day of the Founding of the Nation (건국절),” making it possible for the people of South Korea also to remember it as the “Day of Kwangbok.” Complete “kwangbok” remained unfulfilled pending reunification of the peninsula. Moon’s attempt to designate April 11, 1919, the day the “Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea” was proclaimed in Shanghai, as the “Day of National Founding” is not justifiable for two reasons. First, the Provisional Government did not satisfy any of the requirements of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, having neither territory, population, sovereignty nor international recognition. Second if the Republic of Korea became fully independent on April 11, 1919, it is impossible to explain “independence struggles” waged until 1945 when the peninsula was liberated from Japan. The Republic of Korea gained independence on Aug. 15, 1945, with the UN playing the role of a mid-wife. Therefore, it is wise to remember Aug. 15, 1945, as the “Independence Day” of the republic, and to celebrate the 71th Anniversary of Independence Day on Aug. 15, 2019. August 15 2019 will also be the 74th Anniversary of “Liberation Day,” and be remembered by the people of South Korea as the 71st Anniversary of the “Day of Kwangbok.”

싱가포르 회담의 Post-Mortem : ‘흥정꾼’과 ‘사기꾼’의 한판 대결인가

이동복(Dong bok Lee)(李東馥) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2018 신아세아 Vol.25 No.2

The decades-long confrontation between North Korea and the international community over North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM program is shrouded in uncertainty after summit talks between US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, North Korea s third-generation tyrant. Gone is Washington’s long-avowed commitment to CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) of North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM programs. The US and North Korea are, instead, on the threshold of a new commitment to “working toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Trump declared upon landing in Washington after the summit that he had all but resolved “America’s biggest and most dangerous problem,” alleging that there was “no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” Trump was instead the reincarnation of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who claimed that he had delivered “peace in our time” after reaching agreement with Adolf Hitler. Less than a year later, Hitler began World War II by invading Poland. The Singapore agreement looks set to share as similar fate as Kim Jong Un is busy mending fences with China and suing for additional concessions from both the US and South Korea, after securing such spoils as suspended ROK-US joint exercises and rapid expansion of inter-Korean interactions even before entering into talks with the US on ways for a “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” There appears to be a consensus among observers that Washington and Pyongyang will find themselves wide apart on how to handle the “inspection” issue, among others. As uncertainties mount, there is mystification over why Trump made this about-face in talks with Kim, backpedaling not only from his commitment to CVID and his readiness to suspend ROK-US joint military exercises, but also his switch from harsh rhetoric against Kim to lavish adulation. Suzanne Scholte, a North Korea human rights activist, argues that the summit diplomacy was a confrontation between Trump’s “Art of the Deal” and Kim’s “Art of Deceit.” Since Kim can no longer resort to anti-American propaganda that helped the regime stay in power and keep subjects loyal, Trump’s “Art of the Deal” has forced Kim to choose between “following through on his promises” or “end his regime.”

金正恩의 권력세습은 아직 未完成이다

이동복(李東馥)(LEE Dong Bok) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2012 신아세아 Vol.19 No.3

Victor Cha could not be more correct to me when, in his essay entitled “Kim Jong Il Is No Reformer” carried by the September/October issue of the Foreign Policy, a U.S. bimonthly academic journal, he saw absolutely no hope for Kim Jong Un’s North Korea to take the path toward opening and reform. After 8 months from the passing of Kim Jong Il in December last year, Kim Jong Un, the late Kim Jong Il’s own deathbed choice, at the age of 28, for yet another round of hereditary transfer of power in North Korea, does not appear to have consolidated sufficient political foothold enough to allow him to seriously consider major policy changes. Kim Jong Un is found forced, at least for the moment, to satisfy himself with half titles such as ‘First Secretary’ of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and ‘First Chairman’ of the National Defense Council (NDC), while ‘Supreme Commander’ of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the only full title that he has been allowed to acquire. All told, Kim Jong Un’s rise to the top of North Korea’s power structure appears as yet remaining incomplete, if not provisional. It is noteworthy that, when he succeeded his father, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, as North Korea’s ‘Great Leader II’, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un’s father, satisfied both of the requirements of one of the time-old rules of the game applied to most of the hereditary successions of power in Asian dynasties; he was Kim Il Sung’s ‘eldest’ son mothered by Kim Il Sung’s ‘legitimate’ wife, Kim Jong Sook. By contrast, Kim Jong Un meets neither of these requirements as the ‘youngest’ of Kim Jong Il’s three known sons, mothered by one of his father’s numerous mistresses as a dancer from a family of Korean residents in Japan who migrated to North Korea in 1950s. It is interesting to note that, while North Korea spent no time to launch a concerted public relations campaign to idolize Kim Jong Il’s long-deceased natural mother, Kim Jong Sook, as part of his own deification as soon as his father passed away in 1994, Kim Jong Un’s caretakers today are found extremely reluctant, if not hesitant, to unleash a campaign to idolize the junior’s deceased natural mother, Koh Young Hee by name, probably indicating the possibility that they are regarding her questionable backgrounds as harmful to Kim Jong Un’s deification. In addition, Kim Jong Un also lacks in ‘revolutionary credits’ in a country where ‘revolutionary credits,’ whether real, forged or imaginary, count absolutely to qualify a ‘Great Leader’. While Kim Il Sung boasted a record, grossly bloated as it was, of armed anti-Japanese struggles in Manchuria during the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula and Kim Jong Il spent more than twenty years laboriously building up a charisma of his own, Kim Jong Un has no record of past achievements except that he used to play a king pin as a tot. For these and other reasons, we may have the need to revisit some of the cases of failed attempts of hereditary succession of power in past dynasties in Asia if we were to be foresighted enough to be able to do some fortune telling about the fate of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea.

북한 인권 문제 해결의 王道는 북한의 自由化다

이동복(李東馥)(LEE Dong-bok) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2012 신아세아 Vol.19 No.1

The public debate, both within and without the country, over the North Korean human right issue is now entering a new dimension as the controversy is intensifying over a new recent Chinese move to repatriate additional North Korean asylum seekers to North Korea despite the obvious risk of subjecting them to inhuman punishments by the North Korean authorities. While China continues to hold on to her argument that the deportation of the North Korean defectors caught on the Chinese territory is a legitimate exercise of her sovereignty because they are “not refuges qualified for protection under international humanitarian laws” as they are simply “economically motivated illegal immigrants,” there are nevertheless indications that the Chinese argument is giving some signs of cracks due to its incompatibility with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Torture that manifestly prohibits all its signatories from “expelling, returning (“refouler”) or extraditing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” regardless of whether that person is qualified as a ‘refugee’ or not. Considering the fact that China is the only country in alliance with North Korea providing the latter with a shield against the mounting international pressure on the issue of North Korea’s human rights, it looks conceivable that a weakened Chinese position on the issue of deportation of the North Korean asylum seekers caught in China might leave North Korea more susceptible to international pressures on its human rights situations. It needs to be pointed out, however, that China’s deportation of the North Korean asylum seekers caught in China is but a tip of the iceberg as a human rights issue when viewed against the larger context of the North Korean human rights issue, which is essentially one that has to do with the fact that North Korea is a country where its entire population is denied all of the “inalienable basic rights and freedoms” guaranteed under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The fact that North Korea’s constitution does contain provisions on some of the basic rights and freedoms is merely a sham as the country is constitutionally governed by the totalitarian norm of “one for all and all for one” that features a wholesale expropriation of individual rights and freedoms by the state, making it practically difficult, if not impossible, to have the human rights situations improved without a regime change. A ‘sunshine’ approach does not look relevant as an option to cause a meaningful improvement in North Korea’s human rights situations, as North Korea takes advantage of it merely as a means to prolong its repressive regime further at the expense of rights and freedoms of the people. With North Korea now clearly in a state of limbo going through yet another round of hereditary succession of power, the third of its kind, it is perhaps time now to consider revisiting, for its application to North Korea, the ‘crusade’ that U.S. President Ronald Reagan mobilized against Poland in 1980s that led to the liberation of Poland from the yoke of Communist tyranny and set the stage for the collapse of Communism that ensued in East European countries in a chain reaction.

金初 女眞社會의 構成

李東馥(Lee Dong-bok) 역사학회 1985 역사학보 Vol.106 No.-