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The existing power arrangement in Northeast Asia can be characterized as one of confrontation between a new United States-Japanese alliance and China in the context of a strategic triangular relationship among the three countries, involving mutual conflict and cooperation. It is expected that, in the 21st century, there will emerge a pattern of confrontation between the United States and China, on the world level, and one between Japan and China, on the regional level. If a conflict between the United States and Japan should grow or if the former's armed forces stationed in East Asia should be cut down, there would reemerge the strategic triangular arrangement among the three major powers. In this case, each of the three countries would seek to gain Russia, which became relatively weekened, over to its side. Such an effort is already being made. Recently, China declares that it will proceed with a strategic partnership with Russia against the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Japan also tries to establish a new cooperative relationship with Russia in spite of a dispute over its four northern islands. In addition, the United States seeks to strengthen its relationship with Russia. This paper examines triangular relationships among the United States, Japan, and China, and then North-South Korean relationships, as will be developed as the result of a reshuffle of power in East Asia. In the Cold War era, persistent confrontation existed between the three southern powers, including the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and the three northern powers, such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. However, such a confrontation pattern has been attenuated by the following events: the end of the Cold War, the normalization of South Korean diplomatic relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s, and a U.S.- North Korean agreement on the nuclear issue in Geneva in October 1994. On the other hand, there has been some continuity in military relations. The U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances have been maintained. After Russia abrogated its military alliance relationship with North Korea, it has pursued a balanced policy toward two Koreas. This paper provides four scenarios of power arrangements which will develop in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. First is the case in which South Korea will maintain its alliance with the United States and its friendly relationships with China, Japan, and Russia. and in which it will continue its current confrontation with North Korea. This scenario is the best one from the South Korean perspective. In this case, Pyungyang will be isolated, and Seoul will seek to induce it to open and reform its system by means of pressure from the four neighboring major powers. As the second best one, another scenario is the case in which confrontation between the U.S.-South Korean alliance and North Korea will reemerge, and in which China, Japan, and Russia will take a neutral position. In this scenario, if South Korea, through its diplomatic efforts, reinforces its economic cooperation with China, and builds political and military confidence with the Baijing regime, it is highly likely .that the alliance relationship between North Korea and China will be abrogated as in the North Korean-Russian case. The third scenario is the worst one in which confrontation will develop between South Korea and the North Korean-Chinese alliance, but in which the United States, Russia, and Japan will adopt a neutralist or pro-North Korea policy. It is difficult to expect that this case will work. Nevertheless, it might happen if the U.S. forces in Korea should be withdrawn and if China should become a hegemonic power, while maintaining its alliance with North Korea. The last scenario is the case of direct confrontation between South and North Koreas. This case will take place when the four major powers make cross-recognition of two Koreas after North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan. As a theory of the North Korean regime's breakup has been recently raised, analysts assume that there would be a five-major power arrangement in which a unified Korea would function as a balancer in maintaining the balance of power in Northeast Asia. If Pyungyang successively soft-lands through the recovery of its economy and its diplomatic normalization with Washington and Tokyo, however, it is expected that there will emerge a six-power competitive arrangement. In this case, interactions between the United States, Japan, and China, on one hand, and two Koreas, on the other hand, will actively take place, while Russian influences will diminish. This research provides several predictions about power relationships among the four major powers and in the Korean peninsular from short-, middle-, and long-term perspectives. From a short-term perspective, there exists a confrontation relationship between the U.S.-Japanese alliance and China on the regional level. It is predicted, on the level of the peninsular, that the U.S.-South Korean alliance and the South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship will be maintained, along with the Chinese-North Korean alliance. From a middle-term perspective, the cross-recognition of two Koreas will weaken the U.S.-South Korean and Chinese-North Korean alliances. In this situation, the major powers as well as two Koreas will compete diplomatically with one another in order to establish a balance of power in Northeast Asia to their own advantage. From a long-term perspective, it can be assumed that change in the East Asia policy of the United States will lead to the weakening of its influence and, thus, the strengthening of the South Korean-Chinese relationship. At the same time, multilateral security cooperation would be institutionalized. In this case, South and North Koreas will vie not only with each other but also with the four major powers without regard to their existing alliance relationships. After the normalization of the North Korean-U.S. diplomatic relationship, China will not remain indifferent to the situation in which the peninsular will fall under the exclusive influence of the United States. Nevertheless, Washington will seek to induce the two Koreas to pursue pro-American policies, After the cross-recognition of two Koreas, Japan will actively make such an effort to gain economic access to North Korea that it will have economic influence on the peninsular, unlike United States and Chinese efforts to exercise security influence. If the relationships among the three major powers and, especially those between the United States and China, should develop in the form of strategic cooperation, progress would be made in North-South Korean relations and, therefore, peace would be established in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, when the relationships between the United States and China become worsened or when those between Japan and China develop into hegemonic competition, both of two Koreas will adopt a policy of maintaining the status quo in the peninsular, while trying to create a balance of power to their advantage in the region. In the meantime, each of the major powers will pursue a policy of unifying the peninsular on the basis of its own superior power position. The purposes of this paper is to predict the possible rearrangement of power relationships in the context of increasing insecurity in Northeast Asia and to examine South Korea's security measures. For these purposes, first of all, it describes the aspects of conflict and cooperation in the triangular relationships of the United States, Japan, and China, which resulted not only from the collapse of the Soviet Union but also from the subsequent weakening of Russian influence. It is predicted from a short-term perspective that those relationships will tend to be cooperative in their economic and security aspects. From a long-term perspective, however, they will show increasing conflict as the result of hegemonic competition, including emerging confrontation between the United States and China, around the year of 2020 when the latter's level of GNP becomes highest in the world. Secondly, the research examines the trend of changes in power relationship and possible new arrangements in Northeast Asia. By doing so, it intends to provide South Korea's security measures. Since the existing arrangement of confrontation between the United States-Japanese alliance and China is expected to change into one of military and hegemonic competition between Japan and China, along with the diminution of American influence, South Korea and other Asian countries need to prepare for it. Thirdly, the paper presents several models of power arrangements likely to develop around the Korean peninsular. In particular, it is predicted that, in the process of competition among the countries concerned after the cross-recognition of two Koreas, they and the four major powers will contend diplomatically with one another in order to gain more influence and security. Despite existing confrontation between the United States-South Korean alliance and Japanese-South Korean cooperative relationship, on one hand, and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, on the other hand, there is a likelihood that a new cooperative military relationship between South Korea and China will result from the reinforcement of their economic cooperation as well as from North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan. Finally, this research provides South Korea's security measures to meet the rearrangement of power relationship in Northeast Asia and its effects on the peninsular. (1) Seoul should proceed with active security diplomacy designed to produce a balance of power in the region. In the 21st century, by attaining its goal of becoming an advanced nation, South Korea has to enter into a five-major power system. In this system, it should play the role of a balancer in maintaining peace and the balance of power by carrying out an active strategy of engagement. In addition, it not only should contain the North Korean threat through a Bismarck-policy of forming various alliances, but it also should build strong mechanisms for its security. (2) Bilateral alliance relationships should be strengthened. Although the U.S.-South Korean alliance has recently loosened, it will be of greater strategic value in checking a Chinese threat in the case of deepening Sino-American confrontation in the 21st century. The South Korean-Japanese cooperative relationship has to be more extended in political. military, and cultural areas. The friendly relationship between Seoul and Baijing also should be extended on the basis of their economic cooperation so as to pave the way for the unification of the peninsular. (3) A system of multilateral security cooperation should be created in the Northeast Asia. Although there has been no tradition of security dialogues and confidence among the major powers, the South Korean government has to play a leading role in establishing such a system as an institutional mechanism for the peace and security of the peninsular. Because South Korea, in comparision with the major powers, has limited military capabilities to guarantee its security, it should depend upon preventive diplomacy through multilateral security cooperation in the case of a crisis in the peninsular or territorial and maritime disputes in the region. (4) Certain measures should be taken to reinforce South Korean armed forces in the direction of attaining self-reliant national defense. Based on a self-sufficient defense strategy, the armed forces have to be capable of defending against any probable external invasions. In preparation for the existing North Korean threat as well as for any expansionist moves resulting from Sino-American hegemonic competion and the military buildups of China and Japan, South Korea should strengthen its naval forces and accelerate the modernization of military equipments and weapons. The above-mentioned measures are necessary for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia and the peninsular. Moreover. they will provide a basis for Korean unification.
In this study, middle school students' misconceptions about frictions acting on objects were examined. 66 students of the first school year and 79 students of the second and the third school year in chonju city were selected. Test forms were newly developed for this study. The students' responding styles were classified and the frequencies of the respoase were analyzed. The results of this study are following: The students thought that given force was smaller than the force of friction in the situation that the object was rested. On the other hand, in the uniform motion they thought that given force was bigger than friction force. The friction of an uniform motion object makes a balance of force as acting in the opposite direction that the object is moving. But they were not aware that uniform motion must be considered as the same situation as rest. Basically friction force acts in the opposite direction of the movement So the students tried to find not the direction of movement but that of force. They misconceived the object was moving in the direction of given force. They thought that the friction force between solids was in proportion to the scale of contact area. The friction force between solids is concerned with just the weight, if the surfaces of friction have the same condition, but they seem to be preferred the surfaces of contact. They tend to think of friction intuitively according to the experience and sense that they got from daily life. As a result we need to instruct the clear concept about the friction force.
Leniency programs have recently proliferated and reved up in many jurisdictions including Korea. However, as competition agencies rely more and more on leniency programs in detecting cartels, they are facing various challenges to leniency systems as follows: leniency policies collide with other enforcement policies, especially with private enforcement and criminal liability; companies use leniency strategically for their own purposes; and competition authorities need to secure full and continuous cooperation of applicants, even after they have been granted immunity. They also have to cooperate with the agencies in other jurisdictions, despite the lack of harmony among their leniency systems. In similar vein the leniency program in Korea is facing more and more of those challenges, as the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act strengthens the remedy against cartels: it already introduced treble damages against cartels; and the legislature is examining several bills to deprive the Korea Fair Trade Commission of the exclusive authority to report cartels to the prosecution. These changes caused fierce debates on the measures to secure the effectiveness of leniency programs. Thus this article examines various challenges to leniency programs described above, and tries to suggest a series of measures to secure the effectiveness of those programs. In addressing controversial issues, this article focuses on the protection of leniency applicants and the enhancement of predictability in its implementation. 리니언시 제도는 최근 들어 국내 뿐 아니라 세계적으로도 급속히 확산되고 활성화되는 추세를 보이고 있다. 그러나 리니언시 제도가 국제적으로 널리 보급되고 경쟁당국들의 이에 대한 의존도가 높아감에 따라 형사제재 등 다른 경쟁법 집행 제도들과의 관계가 문제되는가 하면, 기업들이 동 제도를 전략적으로 활용하는 등의 운용상 문제들이 드러나고 있으며, 특히 국제 카르텔의 경우 각국의 상이한 리니언시 제도가 기업들의 자진신고를 가로막는 장애요소로 등장하고 있다. 또한 우리나라에서도 공정거래법에 부당공동행위에 대한 3배배상제도가 도입되고, 전속고발제도를 (부분)폐지하는 공정거래법 전부개정안이 국무회의를 통과하면서, 리니언시 제도의 실효성을 확보하기 위해 어떠한 조치들이 필요한지 하는 문제가 우리 공정거래법 집행에 관한 초미의 현안으로 떠오르고 있다. 그리하여 본 연구는 리니언시 제도의 운용상 장애요소와 극복방안 및 그 국제적 조화의 문제를 전술한 OECD 경쟁위원회 제3작업부 회의의 성과를 중심으로 살펴본 뒤, 이와 관련한 우리 법상의 리니언시 제도의 문제점들을 검토하고 그 개선 방안을 제시하였다. 본고에서 제시한 방안들은 담합에 대한 강화된 제재로부터 자진신고자를 보호하고 자진신고자의 지위를 불안정하게 하는 요소들을 제거함으로써 리니언시 제도의 실효성을 극대화하는 데 초점을 맞추고 있다. 이는 리니언시 제도를 채택한 이상 그 실효성을 극대화하는 것이 결국은 카르텔의 적발과 제재를 촉진함으로써 더 큰 이익을 가져올 수 있다고 보았기 때문이다. 또한 나날이 증가하는 국제카르텔의 폐해와 리니언시 없이 국제카르텔을 제재하기가 매우 어렵다는 점을 고려하였다.
This study intended to develop the test methods for the purpose of identifying the gifted in science and to develop the instructional programs and educational systems for the gifted in science. The results of this study are as follows; A. Instructional programs 1. This scientific educational program for the gifted is made for the purpose of increasing the thinking ability and creativity. 2. The programs for increasing the thinking ability are searching patterns, analogy, raising the basic thinking ability, and raising the deductive thinking ability. 3. The programs for the creativity are the classification of diagrams, the analogy of diagrams, and visual logic. B. Educational systems 1. grouping students system in general high school 2. grade skipping system in general high school 3. advanced placement system in general high school
From June 1991 to November 1992, biological and physio-chemical environmental factors were investigated 18 times at 5 stations in the upper area of Daechung reservoir. The ranges of heterotrophic bacteria were 2.5×10 exp (2)∼7.3×10 exp (4), proteolytic bacteria were 1∼6.7×10 exp (3), lipolytic bacteria were 0.6×10 exp (2)∼1.9×10 exp (4), spore forming bacteria were 2∼55(CFU/㎖), total coliform bacteria were ND∼1.1×10 exp (3) and fecal coliform bacteria were ND∼2.9×10 exp (2) (MPN/100㎖)during the investigated period. All bacterial distribution of station 1 was affected by the precipitation and the bacterial distribution of stations located on downstream it was affected by the water temperature instead of the precipitation. On the total result, monthly variation of bacterial distribution was stronger than stational variation, therefore the important environmental factor affecting to the distribution of bacteria was analysed as water temperature.