북한의 정치-군사관계의 변천과 군내의 정치조직 운영에 관한 연구

유영구 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.3

Historical Changes of Party-Military Relation(1) :from the Army of the Party to the Army of the Great Leader(Suryong) The Korean People's Army had been set up on Feb. 8, 1948 before the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established. The Army o주ed a strong political character from its inception. The Army was, from the beginning, the Army of the Party and the Army of revolution aimed at emancipating the southern half of the Korean peninsula. Especially, the Manchurian partisan group under the direct control of Kim Il-sung was absorbed in quantities into the Army. The control on the Army becomes much stronger through the period of the Korean War. While retreating in the Korean War, the Workers' Party of Korea took such measures as setting up of the Military Commission, the expansion of the cultural department into the political department. establishment of the party organs and the general political bureau in the army. Kim Il-sung at the 4th Plenum of the Party Central Committee on November 1. 1951 denounced that Hoe Ga-yi's line of party organization had weakened the party, thus proposing to increase the party membership. The identifica-tion of the military with the party begins with the increased joining of the party members from the front. After the truce treaty in July 1953. Kim Il-sung pursued the nation construction with the Army as its mainstay. while strengthening his party-centered base of power. He went on to beef up the military despite the severe economic difficulties in the period of reconstruction after the Korean War, thus further promoting the identification of the military with the party. The August Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party held on August 30-31, 1956 saw a heated contest of power Kim Il-sung's partisan group and the Yonan group, where the partisan group came off victorious, making the partisan influences felt by far stronger in the military. Owing to these power shifts in and after the August Plenum, Kim Il-sung argued in the address on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the army on February 8, 1958 that the Korean People's Army has succeeded to the tradition of partisan armed anti-Japanese campaigns. This is how he opened the way to transforming the Army of the Party into the Army of the Great Leader(Suryong) Kim Il-sung. The 4th Party Congress, held on September 11-19, 1961. was a political event to announce inwardly and outwardly the firm establishment of the Kim II-sung system, and acted as a watershed also in terms of the identification of the military with the party. The international political situation in the early 1960s went to precipitate North Korea into more militarization. The military leaders from the partisan group confirmed the four military lines at the 5th Plenum of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party held on December 10-14, 1962. Immediately following the Plenum, the Military Commission was revived as a new organization under the control of the Party Central Committee. Critical Moments in the transformation of the Korean People's Army into the Army of the Great Leader( Suryong) were the 15th Plenum of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party held on May 4-8, 1967 and the 4th Extended Plenum of the 4th Party Committee of the People's Army held on January 6-14, 1969. In the 15th Plenum where there was posed the issue of establishing the sole(yuil) thought system in the Workers' Party of Korea, a political crash was in store for Pak Kum-chol. Li Hyo-sun, Hoe Sok-son who were sorted as the Pan partisan group. In the 4th Extended Plenum where military adventurism was under fire, the strong men of the partisan group such as Kim Chang-bong. Hoe Bong-hak were purged from the political scene. The fall of kapsan group and military hard liners meant the final stage of formation of the Army of the Great Leader. that is. Kim Il-sung. With the 4th Extended Plenum of the 4th Party Committee of the People's Army as a momentum. political commissars were dispatched to the military units at and above the regimental level and the organization-guidance department of the Party Central Committee carne to take charge of the political staff in the military. In 1969 Kim II-sung again administered a measure to dispatch chiefs of organization department to the political departments of the corps and above. In the 5th Party Congress in November 1970, Kim Ii-sung emphasized that the leading role of the party in the army should be strengthened and that all projects should be organized and implemented under the guidance of the Party Committee. This has put the finishing touches on the process of transformation of the Army of the Party into the Army of the Great Leader. Historical Changes of Party-Military Relation(2): from the Army of the Great Leader(Suryong) to the Army of the Heir The 8th Plenum of the 5th Central Committee of the Workers' Party which was held in February 1974 decided on Kim Jong-il as the only heir to Kim Il-sung. thus putting the Army of the Great Leader on the path of bejng transformed into the Army of the Heir. The work for exchange of party certificates since October 1972 and the movement of three revolutionary groups since February 1973 helped foster a mood to this end. After the designation of Kim Jong-il as the heir to power. the sole(yuil) thought system of the party was further strengthened and the sole(yuil) guidance system was also actively pursued. The sole(yuil) thought system of the party was designed to help Kim Jong-il take charge of the organization-guidance department and the propaganda-agitation department of the Party Central Committee and thus to concentrate all the party projects on him for realization of his sole(yuil) guidance system. This was part of an effort to transform the Party into the Party of the Heir prior to transforming the Korean People's Army into the Army of the Heir. It was through the party organization that Kim Jong-il exercised his leadership on the military. The General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army which controls the army in political terms was put under the direct control of the organization-guidance department and the propaganda-agitation department of the Party, and Kim Jong-il was able to form the Army of the Heir through the General Political Bureau. As Kim Jong-il was about to recover from the shock of the Kim Dong-gyu Incident of June 1976, Kim Il-sung took a train of measures designed to establish Kim Jong-il's leadership on the military. For instance, Kim Il-sung summoned the convention of the propaganda activists of the Korean People's Army on November 30, 1977. where he emphasized the necessity of strengthening the political activities in the Army. In 1979, Kim Jong-j] published writings, such as "On Strengthening the Propaganda and Agitation Activities in the Korean People's Army" (Feb. 14), Directions on Carrying out to the Full Indoctrination of the Whole Army with the Kimilsung-ism (May 5), and "On Further Development of Defense Industries" (Sept. 10). The biography of Kim Jong-il writes that his statements in February and May proposed the methods for carrying out the indoctrination of the whole army units with Juche Thought and the tasks for deepening the movements for red flags of three revolution lines. Kim Jong-il also advocated the model learning of Oh Jung and Kim Hyok so as to have his guidance carried out by dint of the party organs and political organizations and the propaganda-agitation system in the army. The 6th Party Congress in October 1980 showed the fact that the Army was to be the Army of the Heir. Kim Jong-il came only behind General Secretary and Supreme Commander Kim Il-sung and Defence Minister Marshal Oh Jin-u in the Central Military Commission oh the Party, thus climbing into a position to guide the Military Commission. The establishment of the military department under the Party Secretariat in the guidance of Kim Jong-il contributed to further strengthening his grip on the Korean People's army. Kim Jong-il was elected as the First Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Committee in May 1990. and was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army in December 1991. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Army establishment which fell on April 23. 1992. Kim Jong-il carried out a massive train of promotions among 622 general level officers together with conferment of military titles on them. Two days later on April 25. Kim received a direct military parade report from Defence Minister Marshal Oh Jin-u. This made it patently evident inward and outward that the supreme military leader is Kim Jong-il and the Army was the Army of the Heir. In April 1993. Kim Jong-il was elected as the Chairman of the National Defense Committee and thus took charge of the prerogative of military supreme command. Command Lines of the Military Apparatus The military apparatus of North Korea has a complicated system. The main characteristic lies in that the military units have the military line(the staff department). the political line(the party organ and the political department) and the security line(the security department). The highest military apparatus comprises the National Defense Committee in the state field. the Central Military Commission in the party field, and the Supreme Headquarters in the military field. Under the umbrella of the Supreme Headquarters come the military line(Ministry of People's Armed Forces. that is. Defence Ministry and General Staff. General Logistics Bureau). the political line(General Political Bureau) and the security line(Political Security Bureau). The Ministry of People's Army is not in a competent position to control the whole forces but takes charge of military administration. military diplomacy and military judicial affairs. The Minister of People's Armed Forces has under its direct umbrella the Foreign Affairs Bureau. the Military Police Bureau. the Logistical Support Bureau, the Military Court and the Military Prosecution Bureau. The General Staff of the People's Army directly manages the headquarters of different armed forces and army branches, and heads many directly subordinate bureaus. such as operations. military training. military mobiliza-tion, arms. reconnaissance. engineering. communications direction. chemistry. geology. secret service. officers. personnel. inspection. military history pub-lications. Especially the operations bureau of the General Staff Bureau is the core military in charge of operations. military movements, daily plans and activities of the commanders of various levels. On the other hand. the General Political Bureau can be characterized as the executive organ of the party committee of the People's Army. thus organizing and implementing the party political activities in the People's Army. The General Political Bureau directly subordinates the organization department and the propaganda departments and other departments such as officers, statistics. intelligence, inspection, special political affairs. cul-tural liaison. counter-propaganda. guidance of Youth League. and education departments. Especially the organization department charged with party life and personnel matters of the servicemen is exercising a strong range of competencies under the guidance of the organization guidance department of the Party Central Committee. Under the direction of the General Political Bureau come the corps political department. the. division political department. the regimental political department and the battalion political department. and these political departments of various levels have relations with the party committees of corresponding levels. The heads of the corps. division. regimental departments are political commissars(the level of the chief of Secretariat of the corresponding party committees) dispatched direct from the Party Central Committee. and the chief of political section is responsible for the battalion political matters. Responsible for the organization life of the party members at and above the regimentals level are the chief of organizing section(at the level of organization secretary of the corresponding party committees). The company level unit has a political officer under the direction of the battalion political department instead of setting up a separate political organization. Management of Political Organizations in the Military At the military units of each level exist the staff department along the military line. the political department along the political line and the secret department along the secret line. In the military formations above the regimental level. the commanding officer and the chief of staff take charge of the staff department. and the political commissar and the chief of organizing section take charge of the political department. The battalion commander and the battalion chief of the political section. and the company commanding officer and the company political officer are responsible respectively for the military and political lines at the battalion and company levels. Of course. the security lines are managed separately. In the political department at and above the regimental level exist the organizing section. the propaganda section. the executive section, the youth section, the third. broadcasting section. and the family support section among which the largest and core section is the organizing section and next comes the propaganda section. The political department at the battalion level is not divided into sections but positions a political officer to each function in a functionally miniaturized structure of the higher level. Among the political activists the political commissars at and above the regimental level and the political officers down at the battalion level are important positions in terms of actual affairs. Political commissars carry on functions such as thought system. the strengthening of the party prevention of military leaders' disobedience the establishment of the sole(yuil) committees' group leadership, the to the party politics and the strengthening of party discipline among the military commanders. The duties of the company military officer include l)the strengthening of political thought and indoctrination among the servicemen, 2)the promotion of harmony between officers and soldiers, between the military and the civilians, and between party members and Youth League members, 3}the efforts at strengthening company military training. 4)the strengthening of company discipline. 5)the guarantee of the company men's living. The necessity is emphasized for cooperation between the military and political lines coexisting in the units at various levels in the People's Army, but there are said to be not a few conflicts and quarrels between them. These conflicts seem to be inevitable considering the command lines based on mutual checking. The analysis above indicates a slim chance that there may arise a military coup in North Korea. Chairman of the National Defense Committee and Supreme Commander of the People's Army Kim Jong-il is monopolizing military, political and security lines. putting the Defence Minister or the chief of General Staff in no position to make any important decision independently. In the military structure where the political and military lines are cleary separated and pitted against each other, the military commanders and political activists find it nearly impossible to cooperate for a military coup. It can also be understood in this vein that not only the military top level but also the regimental level were purged of Anti-Kim Jong-il disposed personnel in the process of transforming the military into that of the heir to power.

미군유해송환으로 변화될 북한-미국관계

유영구 북한연구소 1990 北韓 Vol.- No.223

제 9 차 대한골절학회 학술대회 연제초록 (주연제) : 5. 거골 경부골절

유영구 대한골절학회 1989 대한골절학회 학술대회 및 초록집 Vol.- No.-

한일 북일관계의 고정화과정 소고 : '55년체제'에서 1965년 한일 국교정상화까지

유영구 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 1997 중소연구 Vol.21 No.4

북한의 화폐와 금융

유영구 사회발전연구소 1991 한국인 Vol.10 No.9

Polyparabanic Acid 의 합성과 물성

유영구,김동국,노시태 한국고분자학회 1990 한국고분자학회 학술대회 연구논문 초록집 Vol.1990 No.10

북한의 책.독서.출판풍경 스케치

유영구,Yu, Yeong-Gu 대한출판문화협회 1998 출판저널 Vol.245 No.-

북한의 책값은 2원 이하인데 이는 공장노동자 월급 70-80원 수준에 보면 비싼 편이다. 정책적으로 대량발간하는 김일성.김정일 서적이 중심이 되므로 책은 다양하지 못하다. 대중적인 인기가 높은 책은 역시 문예물이다. 오락수단이 적은 탓인지 평양시내나 산책로 등지에서 독서에 열중하거나 지하철.전차에서 책 읽는 주민들도 많은 편이다.

현 상황에서의 대북협상 방향

유영구 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략논총 Vol.- No.11

Ⅰ. 김대중 정부의 대북정책은 '햇볕정책'과 '정경분리원칙', '상호주의' 등으로 집약된다. 북한은 김대중 정부 출범 초기에 다소 신중한 자세를 보였으나 북경 차관급협상 결렬 이후 점차 선회하여 최근에는 정부의 대북정책을 전면적으로 비판하고 있다. 북한의 이런 반응에도 불구하고 정부는 당국간 회담을 열어야 하는 부담을 안고 있다. 미국의 대북협상 과정은 '북한 포용을 통한 한반도관리' 정책으로 전환하고 있음을 보여주고 있다. 정부의 햇볕정책도 미국의 '북한 포용을 통한 한반도관리' 정책과 공동보조를 취하는 포용정책에서 출발한 것으로 볼수 있다. 북한의 현 상황을 보면 우선 정치상황은 안정국면에 들어섰다. 최근 흐름은 '조기붕괴' 가능성이 무대 뒤로 물러났음을 보여준다. 북한은 국제통화기금(IMF)의 경제관리체제에 들어간 남한을 보면서 체제·정권 유지에 대한 자신감을 회복하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 둘째 북한은 수년간 식량난·에너지난·외화난 속에서 마이너스 성장의 악화일로를 걸어왔으며, 아직 탈출구가 보이지 않는다. 북한은 '개혁·개방'이 자칫 체제 붕괴로 이어질 것이라고 우려하고, 모기장을 튼튼히 치면서 자신의 경제관리시스템을 점차 '개선'해 간다는 방어적 대책으로 일관하고 있다. 그러나 북한이 만성적인 식량난·에너지난·외화난이 계속되는 상황에서 자력갱생만을 고집할 것이라고 단정하는 것은 곤란하다. 노후화된 시설과 부족한 원자재문제를 풀기 위해서라도 부분적인 대외개방에 나설 것으로 예상된다. 셋째, 민수분야의 심각한 경제난에도 불구하고 북한의 군수산업은 고수되고 있는 것으로 보인다. 북한이 핵무기를 보유하고자 하는지는 알 수 없지만, 분명한 것은 장거리 미사일 및 가공할 화학무기가 앞으로 주변국가들을 계속 긴장시킬 것이다. 북한 사회는 지난 수년간 '군사화' 경향이 더욱 촉진되어 민간부문에 대한 군부의 입김이 과거 어느 때 보다 거세다. 제3세계 국가들에서 나타나는 비상시기인 '군사평의회'같은 모습을 띤 국방위원회가 정권수호의 중요한 버팀목이 될 것이다. 그리고 북한이 대남정책에서 통일전선 전술에 집착하고 있음은 여러 측면에서 확인할 수 있다. 통일전선 전술의 핵심은 남한정부와 민간의 '분리'노력으로 표현된다. 북한은 차관급협상이 결렬된 뒤 통일전선 차원에서의 대남공세를 더욱 강화하고 있다. 정부의 햇볕정책은 대북 포용정책을 취하겠다는 의미에서 긍정적 측면이 있다. 그러나 북한은 햇볕정책이 자신을 개혁·개방으로 유도해 궁극적으로는 체제 와해를 도모하려는 것이라고 보고 경계한다. 정부의 대북정책이 '연북'이나 '북한붕괴'를 추구하는 것이 아니라면 대북 '화해공존' 정책으로 요약할 수 있다. 그 내용에는 정치적 화해, 다양한 남북교류협력, 평화공존 세 측면이 담길 수 있을 것이다. 정부가 남북한 '화해공존'시대의 개막을 선언하고 이에 상응하는 조치들을 취해간다면 결국 북한당국도 협상테이블에 앉게 될 것이다. 정부의 정경분리 원칙은 경제분야를 비롯한 남북 민간교류를 적극 장려하고 당국간 관계와 연계시키지 않겠다는 것으로 당국관계가 교착에 빠져 있는 상황에서 불가피한 선택이라 할 수 있다. Ⅱ. 정부는 남북사이의 화해와 불가침 및 교류협력에 관한 합의서 및 부속합의서의 이행을 대북정책의 근간으로 삼고 있다. 현 상황에서 남북관계를 개선하자면 당국간 회담을 조속히 열어 합의서 실천을 위한 후속논의를 갖는 것이 바람직하다. 합의서 이행을 위한 후속 논의를 갖기 위해서는 고위급회담이 선행되어야 한다. 다음과 같은 절차를 예상할 수 있다. 첫째, 남북한 총리급(혹은 주무장관급)을 책임자로 하는 고위급회담을 열어 합의서를 이행하겠다는 의지를 재확인해야 한다. 둘째, 고의급회담에서는 화해·불가침·교류협력을 논의하기 위한 남북공동위원회의 운영에 관해 합의해야 한다. 셋째, 남북한 당국은 '양해각서'나 '남북헌장'을 의회(국회/최고인민회의)에 상정, 비준을 받음으로써 법적 효력을 갖도록 해야 한다. 의회 비준을 받은 뒤에 최고위급 당국자 명의로 실천의지를 밝히는 담화를 발표함으로써 연락사무소 및 공동위원회 운영에 들어갈 수 있을 것이다. 넷째, 화해·군사·교류협력 공동위원회를 운영하면서 쌍방이 수용하기 쉬운 사안부터 시작해 점진적으로 합의서의 전면 이행으로 나아가야 한다. 그런데 문제는 합의서 이행을 위한 후속 논의를 위해서라도 고위급회담을 열어야 하는데 북한이 당국간 회담을 피하는 상황에서 어떻게 이를 실현시키는가 하는 것이다. 정부는 북한에 식량지원을 다시 제의해 협상을 재개할 수 있을 것이다. 차관급협상의 실패가 반복되어서는 안되기 때문에 '탄력적 상호주의', '순차적 상호주의'를 적용하게 될 것이다. 문제는 '탄력'의 범위와 '순차'의 시기 설정을 어떻게 하느냐 하는 것이다. 대북 식량·비료지원 카드가 남북대화를 이끄는 유리한 환경을 만들수는 있지만 당국대화로 바로 이어지게 할 수 있을지는 미지수이다. 특사교환이든, 남북당국자회담이든 북측이 응하도록 하자면 구체적인 '실익'을 제공해야 할 것이다. 북한으로 하여금 '실익'이 있다는 믿음을 갖게 하려면 경협의 패턴을 바꿀 필요가 있다. 경협 활성화를 위해 다음과 같은 조치를 생각해볼 수 있다. 첫째, 북한의 농업구조 개선 방향에서 지원과 협력을 제공하는 것이다. 둘째, 남한의 사양산업 설비들을 과감하게 북한에 제공하는 것이다. 셋째, 심각한 북한의 전력사정을 감안하여 지금 진행중인 경수로 지원사업을 화력발전지원으로 대체하는 것을 고려할 필요가 있다. 넷째, 북한의 교통·통신망을 확충하는 사회간접자본 투자에 적극 나서는 것이다. 다섯째, 북한의 특정지역(남포, 원산, 신의주, 해주 등지)에 마산수출자유지역과 같은 '보세가공무역지대' 성격의 남한 중소기업 전용공단을 설치하도록 제안하는 것이다. 여섯째, 북한 지역의 관광개발에 적극 참여하는 것이다. 정경분리원칙 아래 경협 활성화 정책을 적극 추진하다 보면 결국은 당국대화를 유도할 수 있는 길이 열릴 것이다. 민간부문의 교류협력이 활발해지면 당국간에 처리할 문제도 그만큼 늘어날 것이기 때문이다. 정부가 당국간 회담을 통한 이산가족 면회소 설치나 노무모 고향방문단 교환을 추진하는 것을 포기해서는 안될 것이다. 문화예술행사와 고향방문단 교환을 묶은 1985년 방식을 재개할 수 있을 것이다. 그리고 당국간 회담이 순조롭게 진행되지 않을 때는 이산가족 상황 문제를 해결하기 위한 특사파견도 고려해야 한다. 이산가족 재회사업을 경협 활성화와 연계시키는 것으로는 '실향민의 고향투자 유도 방안'과 '관광사업과 이산가족 재회 연계 방안'을 생각해 볼 수 있다. 나진·선봉 및 금강산 관광지구에서 이산가족을 상봉하게 하는 방법도 가능하다. Ⅲ. 남북한 당국간 관계를 전격적으로 풀어가기 위해 '고위급 정치군사회담'을 제의해 볼 만하다. 기본합의서에 입각한 군사공동위원회가 즉각 열리기 어려운 실정에서 고위급 정치군사회담을 새로 제의함으로써 대화의 계기를 찾을 수 있을 것이다. 대화의 장이 열리면 장기적으로는 기본합의서에 의거해 각 분야의 공동위원회 체제로 전환할 수 있다. '군사강국', '군사화'로 치닫고 있는 북한과의 평화적 환경 조성을 위한 논의는 뒤로 미룰수록 손해라고 생각된다. 더욱이 IMF수렁에 빠진 남한 경제의 사정을 보더라도 과도한 군사비 지출의 부담을 줄여나가야 하고, 북한 역시 경제회생의 길을 걷자면 그나마 산업 명맥을 유지하고 있는 군수산업의 민수화에 본격적으로 나서야 한다. 남북한은 지금이야말로 군사적 대결상태를 완화시킴으로써 국력의 심각한 남비현상을 극복하는 쪽으로 방향을 전환해야 한다. 정부가 경협 활성화를 위한 대북 경제지원 프로그램과 평화적 환경 조성을 위한 조치를 마련하는 과정에서 중요한 것은 화해공존에 입각해 장기공존의 길을 걷는 것이다. 다만 IMF 관리체제 놓인 상황에서 대북 경제지원 프로그램이 여의치 않고 평화적 환경 조성을 위한 조치도 대미 군사관계의 조정이 따라주어야 하는 만큼 손쉬운 일은 절대 아니다. 그러나 새로운 사고로의 전환이 없이는 당국간 대화를 이끌어내기 어려울뿐 아니라, 한반도문제가 더욱 국제화하고 남한 정부의 발언권은 점차 약화될 가능성마저 있다. 현재의 교착국면을 타개하기 위해 남북정상회담도 생각해볼 수 있다. 서울 및 제3국에서 정상회담이 열리면 김영남이 나올 가능성이 크고, 평양에서 열리면 김대중-김영남 공식회담, 김대중-김정일 비공식회담 형식으로 진행될 가능성이 있다. 다만 북한의 최근 동향으로 보아 남북정상회담의 조기 개최는 어려울 것같다. 일방적인 대북선언에서부터 대북식량지원 및 경협 활성화 조치 발표, 고위급 정치군사회담 제의, 남북고위급회담 재개 혹은 남북정상회담 개최를 위한 특사교환 제의 등 여러 방식을 동시에 검토하고 배합해 나가는 것이 바람직하다. 대북제의는 다단계 다차원으로 전개하되 전체 방향은 '화해공존정책'의 일관성이 있어야 한다. 정부의 일관성 있는 화해공존 정책만이 북한을 협상테이블에 앉힐 수 있는 지름길이다. Ⅰ. President Kim Dae-jung administration's North Korean policies can be defined as "sunshine policy," "separation of politics and economy" and "mutualism." In contrary to North Korea's somewhat sincere attitude towards to South at the advent of the Kim Dae-jung government, the North Korean government has returned to all-out criticizing South Korea's North Korean policies after the inter-Korea vice-ministerial talks recently broke down in Beijing. Despite such North Korea's disposition, South Korean government is pressured to hold inter-Korean dialogue. U.S. government's negotiations with North Korea show that the U.S. policy is changing to focus on "controlling Korean Peninsula through embracing North Korea." It can be said that South Korea's sunshine policy agrees with U.S. soft-landing policy, that is to "control Korean Peninsula through embracing North Korea." The present political situation in North Korea has reached stability. Current flow shows that the possibility of North Korea's early collapse is no longer hotly debated. North Korea seems to regain confidence in its regime and maintain power by watching South Korea fall under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial bailout program. Second, North Korea has shown negative economic growth over the last years in the midst of food shortage, energy crisis and foreign currency crisis, and there yet seems to be no way out. North Korea has consistently defended itself through a safety net in which the North would gradually "improve" its economic system, worrying that "reform" and "open door policy" will lead to collapse of the North Korean Communist regime. However, it is too early to assume that North Korea will insist on self-reliance amid lingering food shortage, energy crisis and foreign currency crisis. North Korea is expected to partially take on open door policy in order to solve problems caused by its outdated infrastructure and natural resource shortages. Third, North Korea seems to persist on investing in its defense industry despite the severe economic difficulties in civilian industrial sectors. It is not clear whether North Korea wishes to possess nuclear weapons, but there is no doubt that North Korea's long-range ballistic missiles and chemical weapons will continue to be a threat to the neighboring countries. North Korea has continued to "militarize" its society over the last years and thus the influence of the North Korean military has grown stronger than ever before. North Korea's National Defense Commission, similar to an emergency military council (junta) found in a third country, is expected to play a pivotal role in protecting the North Korean regime. There are many ways to confirm that North Korea's South Korean policy persists on the United Front tactics. The gist of the North's United Front tactics can be defined as "separation" of South Korean government from its civilian sector. Since the vice-ministerial talks broke down, North Korea has increased and strengthened criticisms against the South Korean government. The South Korean government's sunshine policy bears a positive meaning in that it has decided to embrace North Korea. However, North Korea cautions that this South's policy ultimately pursues the collapse of the North Korean regime by leading it to adopt reform and open door policy. If South Korea's North Korean policy is not pursuing the "collapse of the North Korean regime," it can be defined as "reconciliation & peaceful coexistence" policy. This includes political reconciliation, various inter- Korea exchanges, cooperations and peaceful coexistence. If the South Korean government declares an era of "reconciliation & peaceful coexistence" and adopts relevant measures, the North Korean government will at the end come to the negotiating table. The principle of South Korea's policy to separate politics from economy means to actively promote inter- Korean civilian exchanges, including economic exchanges, and not to link them to the relations between both governments. This policy is an inevitable choice under the current deadlocked inter-Korea relations. Ⅱ. South Korean government's North Korean policies are based on the agreement and sub-pacts on reconciliation, nonagreession and inter-Korea exchanges. A desirable way to improve inter-Korea relations under current circumstances is to open South - North dialogue and hold following negotiations to implement the inter- Korea basic agreement. In order to hold further inter-Korea negotiations, the following procedures should precede. First, South Korea needs to confirm that the North will hold high-level talks of prime ministerial-level ( or chief ministerial-level) in order to implement inter-Korea agreement. Second, South and North must agree on operating South-North joint commission to discuss reconciliation, nonagreesion and inter-Korea exchanges. Third, South and North government should introduce "memorandum of understanding" or "South-North Korea treaty" at the National Assembly/Supreme People's Assembly and ratify the bills to make them legally effective. After the bills are ratified, both governments can start operating liaison offices and joint commission by having top government authorities announce an official statement to implement the bills. Fourth, South and North Korea should operate a joint committee on settlement, military issues, exchanges and cooperations and gradually proceed to the full implementation of the inter-Korea agreement by starting with the simplest cases. The problem is, however, how to open inter-Korea high-level talks in order to carry out inter-Korea agreement whereas the North insists on refusing to face the South. The South Korean government could bring the North to the negotiating table by suggesting to supply more food aid In this case, South Korea needs to apply "flexible mutualism," "sequential mutualism" not to result in another failure of vice ministerial talks. The issue lies in how to define the scope of "flexibility" and "sequence." It is unknown whether the South's food & fertilizer provision card may directly lead to inter-Korea dialogue although it may help creating a favorable environment for South-North talks. Whether it is an exchange of special envoys or South-North talks, the South Korean government has to provide concrete "real benefits" to bring the North to the negotiating table. South Korea needs to change the pattern of inter-Korea economic cooperation in order to assure the North that there exist "real benefits." The following measures may help activate inter-Korea economic cooperation. First, South Korea provides support and cooperation to improve North Korea's agricultural structure. Second, South Korea fully accommodates North Korea with facilities of its declining industries. Third, South Korea needs to replace the on-going light-water reactor project by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization with electric power-generator project, considering that North Korea is suffering from severe electricity shortage problems. Fourth, South Korea actively participates in investing in North's social overhead capital to expand traffic, communication networks. Fifth, South Korea suggests the North to build a special industrial complex for South Korean small- and medium-sized companies, such as the South's Masan free trade zone especially designated for processing warehouse goods, in North Korea's special economic zones, such as Nampo, Wonsan, Sinuiju and Haeju regions. Sixth, South Korea participates in developing North Korea's tourism industry. If South Korea encourages to boost inter-Korea economic cooperation under the principle of separating politics from economy, the South Korean governments will finally find a road to inter- Korea dialogue because an active inter-Korea exchange among civilian sectors will lead to increasing the size of inter- Korean governmental exchanges. The South Korean government should not give up the task of establishing a liaison office for separated families or providing opportunity for separated families in the South to visit their family members in the North. South Korea may retry to hold an event such was held in 1985, in which South and North exchanged separated families as well as art performance troupes. If the South - North talks do not proceed smoothly, South Korea may consider dispatching special envoys to solve the issue of separated families. South Korea may consider "luring inter- Korea investments by separated families" and "linking tourism industry with family reunions" by linking the issue of separated families reunions with inter- Korea economic cooperations. It is possible to hold family reunions in North Korea's Rajin-Sonbong free economic and trade zone or in Mt. Kumgang tourist zone. Ⅲ. The South Korean government can gear up solving inter-Korea relations by suggesting the North "high-level military talks." South Korea may find a chance for dialogue by suggesting the North to hold high-level military talks, considering that it is difficult to instantly bring the military joint commission embedded in the inter- Korea basic agreement into operation. If the curtains rise for inter-Korea dialogue, South and North will be able to operate all the joint subcommittees based on the inter-Korea basic agreement. It is a drawback for the South to postpone discussions with North on how to create a peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea is reaching the pinnacle of becoming a "military haven" and "militarization." Especially, since South Korea's worstever economic situation is supervised by the IMF bailout program, South Korea should decrease its excessive military spending and launch a full-scale plan to sell its government-controlled military industry to civilian sectors. Both the South and North should reduce military tensions and stop seriously wasting their national power. It is important that the South Korean government's economic aid program for North, which is expected to activate inter-Korea economic exchanges, and measures to create peaceful environment be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence in the long-term. However, it is not an easy task for South Korea as it is financially-strapped to provide economic aid to North since it has applied for the IMF financial bailout package, and it needs U.S. military help to create a peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, South Korea needs to adopt to new changes, otherwise inter- Korea dialogue will continue to remain a difficult problem to solve, inter-Korea issues will become a growing international debate and the South Korean government may lose its voice on the international stage. South Korea may consider to hold inter-Korea summit to break the current deadlocked situation. If the summit is held in a third nation, North Korea's Kim Young-nam may probably be the South's counterpart. If the summit is held in Pyongyang, it may be either an official dialogue between South's Kim Dae-jung and North's Kim Young-nam or an unofficial dialogue between South's Kim Dae-jung and North's Kim Jong-il. Current North Korean situations, however, eliminate a great deal of chances for an early inter- Korea summit. South Korea should consider various ways, such as announcing inter-Korea talks, providing food aid for North, activating inter-Korea economic exchanges, suggesting high-level military talks, resuming inter-Korea high-level official talks or exchanging special envoys to hold inter-Korea summit. South Korea's North Korean policies should proceed step by step in line with the principle of "reconciliation and peaceful coexistence." South Korea's consistent reconciliation and peaceful coexistence policy will be the only shortcut to bring the North Korean government to the negotiating table.

때로는 마침표가 필요하다

유영구 민족21 2012 민족21 Vol.- No.-

다양한 패션,개방화를 의미하는 것인가

유영구 북한연구소 1991 北韓 Vol.- No.236