‘양심적 병역거부’라는 용어의 적절성 여부 검토와 대체 용어의 모색에 관한 소고

신운환(Shin, Oun-Hwan) 행정법이론실무학회 2016 행정법연구 Vol.- No.46

우리 사회에는 국방(병무)행정과 관련되는 ‘양심적 병역거부’라는 용어가 일반적으로 널리 사용되고 있다. 또한 지금 헌법재판소에는 양심적 병역거부자에 대한 병역법 처벌조항의 합헌성(合憲性) 여부에 대하여 세 번째로 위헌법률심판이 진행되고 있다. 이 논문에서는, 소수자 인권의 보호라는 헌법학적 관점이 아니라, 행정법학의 차원에서 국방인력의 확보문제에 미칠 영향을 고려하여, ‘양심적 병역거부’라는 용어가 과연 타당한지? 여부에 관하여 우선 검토해 보고, 적절한 대체용어를 모색하여 보았다. ‘양심적 병역거부’라는 용어는 연혁적으로 미국 판례에서 시작된 ‘conscientious objection to military service’를 수입한 것이다. 과거 미국 사회에서는 ‘종교적 신념에 따른 병역 거부(objection to military service by religious belief)’라는 용어를 주로 사용하였다. 그러나 1965년 미국 연방대법원의 시거(Seeger) 사건 판결에서, 병역거부가 그 신념 소유자의 삶에 자리 잡은 진지하고 의미 있는 신념에 의하여 이루어진 경우에는, 설령 종교적 신념에 따른 병역 거부가 아니더라도, 양심의 진지한 여과과정을 거쳐서 형성된, 다른 이유의 개인적인 신념에 따른 병역거부도 함께 보호하기로 결정하면서부터 이 용어가 사용되기 시작하였다. 그러나 ‘양심적(良心的)’이라는 단어는 가치중립적인 단어가 아니라 가치평가적인 단어이다. 이미 단어 자체 속에 ‘올바른, 타당한, 도덕적인, 윤리적인’이라는 긍정적인 의미의 가치평가를 담고 있다. 병역은 국민으로서 나라를 지키기 위하여 이행하여야 할 신성한 의무이므로, 사회 일반인들은 병역의무이행을 사회적으로 칭찬받을 행위로 알고 있고, 반대로 병역거부는 당연히 사회적으로 비난받을 행위로 생각한다. 그런데 ‘양심적’과 ‘병역거부’라는 두 단어를 조합하여 ‘양심적 병역거부’라는 용어를 사용하면, 사회 일반인들은 “군대에 가지 않겠다는 병역거부가 어떻게 양심적일 수 있는가?” 또는 “만약 병역거부가 양심적이라면, 반대로 병역의무의 이행은 비양심적이란 말인가?”라는 의문과 혼란을 가질 수 있다. 더구나 병역을 거부하지 않고 정상적으로 선량하게 병역을 이행하는 사람들도 역시 양심의 진지한 여과과정을 거쳐서, 즉 양심에 따라 병역의무의 이행을 결정한다는 점을 고려할 때, 이 용어는 결과적으로 “양심적 병역거부자”들의 병역거부행위만을 미화(美化)한다는 비판을 받고 있다. ‘양심(良心)’이란 사물의 옳고 그름을 바르게 판단하여 도덕적으로 올바른 행위를 하도록 하는 잠재적 의식을 말하는데, 우리는 다양한 지식과 정보와 경험들을 양심을 토대로 진지한 고뇌와 여과과정을 거쳐서 어떤 구체적인 ‘신념(信念)’을 형성하게 되고, 그 구체적인 신념에 따라 어떤 구체적인 ‘행위(行爲)’를 하게 된다. 그러므로 우리가 어떤 구체적인 행위를 할 때의 직접적인 근거는, 잠재의식인 ‘양심’ 자체가 아니라, 그 여과과정을 거쳐 형성된 구체적 ‘신념’이다. 또한 신념은 사회일반인이 공유하는 보편적(普遍的) 신념과 특정 개인이 고유하게 가지고 있는 개인적(個人的) 신념으로 나눌 수 있다. 따라서 사회 일반의 보편적 신념이 아니라, 특정 개인이 가지는 고유하고 독특한 신념에 따라 병역을 거부하는 행위는, “양심적 병역거부”가 아니라, “개인적 신념에 따른 병역거부”라고 표현하는 것이 가장 적절하다. 결론적으로, 기존의 ‘양심적 병역거부(conscientious objection)’라는 용어는 앞으로 더 이상 사용하지 말고, ‘개인적 신념에 따른 병역거부(objection to military service by individual belief)’라는 용어로 대체할 것을 제안한다. In South Korea, “conscientious objection to military service” is a term generally used regarding national defence administration. In addition, the constitutional litigation about constitutionality of the penalty regulation applying to conscientious objectors on the Military Service Act is now being conducted for the third time at the Constitutional Court of Korea. In this paper, I will discuss whether the term “conscientious objection” is appropriate, not in the perspective of protection of minority rights, but in the viewpoint of administrative law, considering its impact on securing military manpower for the national defence. The term “conscientious objection to military service” is a term imported from the U.S. precedent. In the past, the American Society mainly used the term “objection to military service by religious belief”. But in the Seeger case of the Supreme Court in 1965, the court decided that, if the objection is based on a sincere and meaningful belief in their lives, which has been formed through the serious filtering process of conscience, it has to be protected as well even though it is not by religious belief, and the term began to be used widely. However, the word “conscientious” is a word of valuation, not a value-neutral word. In the word itself, it already contains the positive valuation of meaning such as “proper, reasonable, moral and ethical.” Military service is a sacred obligation to fulfill as citizens in order to keep the country. Consequently, fulfilling one"s military service is socially regarded to be complimentable conduct by the general public and, conversely, refusing to fulfill it is socially considered to be reprehensible (blameable) conduct. But if we combine the two words “conscientious” and “objection” together and so use the term “conscientious objection to military service”, the general public will have a question and feel confusion that “how can objection to military service be conscientious?” or “if objection to military service is conscientious, is fulfilling military service is unconscientious?” Furthermore those who choose to fulfill their military obligations, instead of objection, they also make their decision through serious filtering process of conscience. This true fact, the U. S. Supreme Court did not see in the Seeger case in 1965. So the term “conscientious objection to military service” is now leading such misunderstanding and confusion to the public. Conscience is subconsciousness which judges the moral values and behave between right and wrong. We all put a variety of information, knowledge and experience into the filtering process of conscience, then form a specific belief, and finally behave according to the belief. In other words, when we behave, it is based on the specific belief formed through conscience filtering, not on conscience itself. Furthermore, beliefs can be classified into “common beliefs” of the general public and “individual beliefs” of each individual. Therefore, when we refer to an action which object to military service according to his own unique belief, it will be more appropriate to name it “objection by individual belief”. In conclusion, I propose that we should not use the existing term “conscientious objection to military service” any longer, and replace it with the term “objection to military service by individual belief (including religious belief)”.

상표의 기능 및 상품의 동일성 여부에 관한 小考

신운환(Shin, oun-hwan) 세창출판사 2011 창작과 권리 Vol.- No.64

In the case numbered 2009Do3929, the Supreme Court has found it not violative of the Trademark Act to sell sets of playing cards altered with special ink so that the set could be used for fraudulent gambling purpose. The Court held; that the set was lawfully purchased from the trademark holder; that each playing card was printed on its back with special pattern and numbers written with special ink that is visible through infrared light filter and is unidentifiable by naked human eyes; and that in conclusion the defendants act of altering and selling the playing cards do not fall within the ambit of either "modification or alteration to a degree of harming the identity of the goods" or "encroachment upon the trademark's function to show origin of goods or to guarantee the quality of the goods concerned." On this background, this essay is purposed to critically review the above decision of the Supreme Court in the following four points. First, playing cards are basically required to have one and the same back side with the same pattern and color, so that the front face of each card is non-recognizable by the players of the playing cards in general. In this case, the playing cards were altered with special pattern and number to be used unfairly advantageously for some players. This means the cards were specially manufactured for an unfair and illegitimate gambling purpose. Once the playing cards were altered with certain tricky methods for unfair gambling purpose, the cards are no more an instrument for a fair game of cards, and the identity of the goods was discontinued. Second, the playing cards were sold with the original trademark attached and recognizable by ordinary purchasers, but with its back altered with special ink that is non-recognizable by the ordinary purchasers. So, the bona fide purchaser and players of the playing cards altered for unfair purpose would erroneously believe that the cards were manufactured in fair style by the trademark holder. Therefore, the function of trademark to show the origin of goods and to guarantee the quality of the goods were impaired by the act of unfair and illegal alteration. Third, the playing cards concerned were altered for unfair and illegal purpose into goods legally different from the original ones, which means the identity of the goods was discontinued. Therefore, the principle of exhaustion of trademark right has no room for application in cases of this nature. Forth and finally, considering that the act of altering the back side of playing cards with special ink for unfair and illegal purpose tantamounts to both an act of breaking the identity of the goods concerned and harming the function to show the origin of goods and to guarantee their quality, as well as an act outside the ambit of principle of exhaustion of the trademark right, such an act of alteration has overtly intruded the right of the trademark holder. In conclusion, the Supreme Court in this case by failing to fully consider the basic purpose and function of the playing cards has reached an erroneous decision that the act of altering the back side of playing cards with special ink that is non-recognizable through naked human eyes did not impair the identity of the cards, did not harm the basic function of the trademark and did not intrude upon the right of the trademark holder.

특허법학교육(特許法學敎育)의 현황(現況)과 발전방향(發展方向) -한남대학교법과대학(韓南大學校法科大學)의 사례(事例)를 중심(中心)으로-

신운환 ( Oun Hwan Shin ) 한남대학교 과학기술법연구원 2006 과학기술법연구 Vol.11 No.2