기업요청 중립투표와 이익의 질

송길성 ( Kil Sung Song ),윤성수 ( Sung Soo Yoon ),이광숙 ( Kwang Sook Lee ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계저널 Vol.23 No.4

본 연구는 기업요청에 의한 중립투표 이용여부와 재량발생액 크기, 이익지속성, 그리고 보수주의 관점에서 보고이익의 질적 차이를 실증분석한다. 중립투표는 정족수에 미달될 경우 주주총회에 참석하지 않은 주주를 대신해 기업요청에 의해 예탁된 주식을 참석주식의 찬반비율에 따라 임의로 배분하는 것이다. 그러나 기업들이 중립투표를 악용하는 사례가 빈번히 발생하고 동 제도가 주주감시 기능을 현저히 낮출 수 있는 취약한 기업지배구조라는 점이 국내외에서 제기되면서 2015년까지 폐지될 예정이다. 본 연구는 기업지배구조의 중요한 요소인데도 그동안 간과되었던 의결제도 측면에서 중립투표와 보고이익의 질 사이의 관계를 분석한다. 실증분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 중립투표 이용여부와 재량발생액 크기 간에는 유의한 양의 상관관계가 관측되었다. 중립투표 이용기업은 대주주지분율 전 구간에서 미이용기업에 비해 높은 수준의 재량발생액이 발견되었으며, 대주주지분율과 재량발생액 크기 간에 U자형 2차 곡선 관계가 관찰되었다. 대주주지분율이 증가함에 따라 재량발생액이 감소하다가 증가하는 변곡점은 이용기업과 미이용기업이 각각 43.54%, 53.52%로 추정된다. 재량발생액이 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 수단으로 사용된다면 이 결과는 중립투표가 소액주주에게 상대적으로 불리한 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 것을 시사한다. 두 번째 이익지속성 검증결과, 중립투표 이용기업의 이익지속성이 미이용기업의 그것보다 낮은 것으로 조사되었다. 미이용기업은 차기이익에 대한 당기이익의 설명력이 약 40.6%인데 반해, 이용기업은 약 29.1%에 그치는 것으로 분석되었다. 차기이익에 대한 당기발생액의 설명력도 미이용기업은 약 32.7%인 반면, 이용기업은 약 13.9%로 현저히 낮은 수준으로 조사되었다. 끝으로 보수주의 수준을 검증한 결과, 이용기업은 미이용기업에 비해 손실의 약 78.8% 정도를 반영하는 데 그친 반면, 이익에 대해서는 오히려 상향인식의 경향도 있는 것으로 분석되었다. 종합하면, 중립투표가 전체 주주의 감시기능을 낮추는 수단으로 이용되어 이익조정의 개연성을 높이고 이익의 질을 낮추는 부정적 효과가 있을 수 있음을 시사한다. 본 연구결과는 기존의 기업지배구조 요소와 회계이익의 질 간의 실증분석을 확장하여 의결제도와 회계이익 간의 관련성을 제시하였다는 데 의의가 있다. 향후 의결제도 환경의 변화에 따른 기업의 회계의사결정 대응에 대한 추가 연구의 필요성이 제기된다. This study investigates the relation between firms` shadow voting and earnings quality measured by discretionary accruals, earnings persistence, and conservatism. When a firm does not meet a quorum requirement, shadow voting allows the company to exercise the voting rights of deposited stocks based on the actual voting result by the shareholders present at a general shareholders meeting. Concerns, however, have been raised that opportunistic managers might exploit shadow voting by using it as a tool to weaken corporate governance. Frequent users of the system were either delisted or suspended in Korean stock markets, and shadow voting system is scheduled to be abolished by 2015. Although voting system is conceived as an important governance factor, there has been few research on the relation between voting system and financial reporting. This study attempts to fill the void by examining the relation between shadow voting and earnings quality. We find significant positive association between the magnitude of discretionary accruals and shadow voting. Discretionary accruals of firms using shadow voting are larger than those of non-using firms at all levels of large shareholders` ownership. A U-shape curve is observed between discretionary accruals and large shareholders` ownership level. The inflection points where discretionary accruals are at their lowest are 43.54% and 53.52% for using and non-using firms, respectively. Secondly, earnings persistence of using firms is lower than that of non-using firms. Explanatory power of current earnings for next period earnings is 40.6% for non-users while that of users is only 29.1%. Current accruals` explanatory power of non-users is 13.9%, but that of users is 32.7%. Finally, firms using shadow voting appear to be less conservative in financial reporting than non-users. Users are estimated to recognize about 78.8% of losses that may be reported by non-users. In sum, our results suggest that shadow voting can weaken shareholders` monitoring and compromise earnings quality. Our study contributes to the literature on earnings quality by incorporating the impact of shadow voting as a corporate governance factor. It might be interesting to investigate whether and how the abolishment of shadow voting influences corporate reporting behavior.

경영자지분율과 재량발생액간의 관계, 그리고 시장경쟁효과

송길성(Kil Sung Song) 한국경영학회 2013 經營學硏究 Vol.42 No.6

In terms of earnings management, this study investigates two effects of managerial ownership - interest alignment effect and management entrenchment effect- and examines how market competition affects the association between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals relating to earnings management. The results are following; Firstly, I show the U-shaped curve depicting a quadratic relationship between managerial ownership and the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and find that the inflection point is 31.08%. The interest alignment effect dominates on the range of managerial ownership below the inflection point and management entrenchment effect dominates on the range above the point. Secondly, I find that market competition have negative and positive effects on the relationship. As the negative side, market competition lowers up to 21.08% of the inflection point that the alignment effect turns to entrenchment effect. The range above 41.06% of managerial ownership sharply aggravates entrenchment effect. These negative effects of market competition are regarded that managers with considerable ownership neglect both shareholders` interests and market surveillance. As positive effects, although the inflection point is low, the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the range from 21.08% to 41.06% still stays low level. Managerial ownership on the lower range strengthens the interest alignment effect. It is understandable that the monitoring effects of both shareholders and market exist in the certain range of ownership. According to the level of managerial ownership, market competition as external pressure on manager affects earnings management negatively or positively. Therefore, these results imply that the legalization or introduction of tools that managers would be easy to protect management right are needed to be considered the status quo such as ownership structure and market surveillance.

기업수명주기, 시장경쟁과 투자효율성 간 관계에 관한 실증연구

두서영 ( Seo Young Doo ),윤성수 ( Sung-soo Yoon ),송길성 ( Kil Sung Song ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계저널 Vol.25 No.4

본 연구는 기업의 현금흐름을 기준으로 구분한 기업수명주기(firm life cycle)에 따라 투자효율성이 차별적으로 나타나는지를 살펴보고, 기업이 속한 산업의 경쟁 정도가 투자효율성에 영향을 미치는지, 그리고 이러한 경쟁의 효과가 기업수명주기에 따라 차별적으로 나타나는지 분석한다. 2006년부터 2013년까지 유가증권시장 및 코스닥시장에 상장된 12월 결산 비금융업 기업을 대상으로 실증분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 기업수명주기의 단계별로 기업의 투자효율성이 상이한 것으로 나타났다. 구체적으로, 성숙기 기업의 경우 과잉투자가 완화됨에따라 다른 단계에 비해 투자효율성이 개선되는 것으로 관찰되었다. 둘째, 산업 내 경쟁이 치열할수록 기업의 과잉투자 및 과소투자 성향이 완화되어 투자효율성이 향상되며, 특히 도입기 기업의 과잉투자와 성숙기 기업의 과소투자가 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 시장경쟁이 기업의 경영을 규율하는 메커니즘의 역할을 하며, 이때 기업의 현재 발달단계에 따라 경쟁이 투자효율성을 향상시키는 방식이 차별적일 수 있음을 의미한다. 본 연구는 현금흐름 양상을 기준으로 구분한 기업수명주기에 따라 기업의 투자효율성이 달라지고, 시장경쟁이 이 관계에 영향을 미친다는 실증결과를 제시함으로써 선행연구를 확장하였다. 산업 내 경쟁이 기업의 투자효율성을 높일 수 있다는 연구결과는 기업의 투자효율성 증진을 위한 정책 마련에 시사점을 제공할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. This study investigates (1) whether firms`` current economic status, named firm life cycle, influences their investment efficiency and (2) whether and how market competition alters the relation between firm life cycle stages and investment efficiency. Corporate investment decisions are affected by both firm-level and industry-level factors. Prior literature on firm life cycle suggests that firms are likely to experience distinct stages of development, and that management decisions are influenced by firms`` economic characteristics reflected in these stages. Applying the concept of firm life cycle to investing activities, we examine whether investment efficiency is systematically related to firm life cycle stages. Another line of research finds that product market competition is an important driver of managerial decisions. We provide empirical evidence on the relation between the intensity of product market competition and corporate investment efficiency, and extend prior literature by examining the differential role of market competition across life cycle stages. Following Dickinson(2011), we use the combinations of the signs of firms`` operating, investing, and financing cash flows to classify individual firm-years into one of the following five life cycle stages: an introduction stage, a growth stage, a mature stage, a shake-out stage, and a decline stage. An introduction stage is where both operating and investing cash flows are negative while financing cash flows are positive. In a growth stage, operating cash flows turn positive while investing (financing) cash flows remain negative (positive). Firms in a mature stage have positive cash flows only in operating activities. A shake-out stage encompasses diverse patterns of cash flows: all positive, all negative, or negative only in financing activities. Finally, a decline stage is where operating (investing) cash flows are negative (positive) as firms exit the market. We use Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a proxy for the degree of product market competition. Regarding investment efficiency, we adopt the model of McNichols and Stubben(2008) to estimate the extent of over- or under-investment. Our sample consists of 7,920 firm-year observations for the period from 2006 to 2013. Of these, 1,426 firm-years fall into the introduction stage while 2,333 firm-years have cash flow patterns of the growth stage. Mature and shake-out firm-years are 2,575 and 905, respectively. Finally, 681 firm-years belong to the decline stage. Empirical results confirm that corporate investment efficiency differs across life cycle stages. On average, our sample firms appear to under-invest. When we partition the entire sample into individual life cycle stages, we find that the firms in both the introduction stage and the growth stage over-invest while those in the mature and subsequent stages under-invest. The absolute value of inefficient investment decreases significantly in the mature stage, and such improvement appears to stem from the reduction of over-investment in earlier stages. We also find that market competition generally improves investment efficiency by lessening over- and under-investments. Intense market competition reduces the over-investment of firms in the introduction stage and the under-investment of firms in the mature stage. These results support the governance role of product market competition: market competition works as a disciplinary mechanism by decreasing managerial overconfidence in the introduction stage and managerial entrenchment in the mature stage. We also conduct several sensitivity analyses and find that our results hold. For example, when we use average cash flows in two years (current and the past year) to classify firm-years into one of the five life cycle stages, we get qualitatively the same results as those in the main test. The primary results are generally robust when we use alternative proxies for investment efficiency and market competition and when we consider alternative model specifications. This study contributes to the extant literature in multiple ways. First, we extend the literature on firm life cycle and investment efficiency by analyzing the systematic relation between the two factors. Prior research on corporate investment decisions paid little attention to the impact of firms`` economic status captured by life cycle on investment efficiency. Investors might gain insights on corporate investment efficiency by focusing on the pattern of cash flows. Second, this study provides policy implications to regulators by demonstrating that market competition has a positive impact on corporate investment efficiency. Our results suggest that policy makers need to consider the role of competition and firms’ development stages when preparing for investment stimulus packages.