인문산책 : 중앙아시아의 문화 ① 투르크 문학 -알리셰르 나보이(Alisher Navoi) 투르크어 문학의 아버지

성동기 포스코경영연구소 2015 CHINDIA Plus Vol.108 No.-

유라시아 다자협력기구의 한계: SCO와 CSTO를 중심으로

성동기 중앙대학교 외국학연구소 2013 외국학연구 Vol.- No.25

SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization), which consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, was established to resolve boundary issues after the collapse of the Soviet Union. CSTO(Collective Security Treaty Organization), which consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan was established to prevent a security vacuum in the CIS after the USSR collapsed. The former is of great importance in the context of a new world order, particularly in which China is emerging as one of the G2. The latter is highly estimated by the international community as a threatening organization. In particular, the CSTO has an RRF(Rapid Reaction Forces) and peacekeeping role. Overall, SCO and CSTO have been underestimated by international society in contrast to these expectations. We are able to infer the cause of these evaluations from two incomprehensible cases. First, According to the charter and treaty of CSTO, when a nonmember state attacks a member state of CSTO, it is obliged to take quick action against the nonmember state. But when Georgia attacked Russia in 2008, CSTO didn’t intervene in this conflict. Second, when an ethnic dispute between a Kirghiz and an Uzbek faction occured in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, interim president Roza Otunbayeva called for intervention of CSTO. But Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, turned down her request. The SCO rejected involvement in Kyrgyzstan too. Actually SCO and CSTO have had no experiences in a disputed area until now. The purpose of this research is to analyze the reasons why SCO and CSTO didn’t intervene in the two situations outlined above.

우즈베키스탄에 거주하는 타타르인의 민족정체성 분석과 전망

성동기 한국러시아문학회 2017 러시아어문학 연구논집 Vol.56 No.-

Tatar built states in Siberia and the Crimea in the past. However, Most of them migrated to the Central Asian, in particular Uzbekistan of today under the rule of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Most of the inhabitants of this place were Turkic people who speak Turkic languages like Tatar and they believed in the same Islam. Thus, when Tatar settled in the present Uzbekistan region, there were no linguistic and cultural barriers. However, under the Soviet Union, Tatar could not hold fast to his own tradition and culture because of the national policy of the Soviet government. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatar who is still living in Uzbekistan has been faced with a problem of the ethnic identity. At present, Uzbek-Tatar must have some recognition and policy personally and collectively to maintain his ethnic identity and the number of population. If Uzbek-Tatar does not make such preparations, it`s highly likely that he will disappear in Uzbekistan. The characteristic and future of Uzbek-Tatar`s ethnic identity will be analyzed in this article as it follows. First, the history of migration and settlement of Crimean Tatar and Tatar groups who have lived in Uzbekistan will be summarized. Secondly, the questionnaires and interviews will be analyzed to understand Uzbek-Tatar`s ethnic identity realistically. Third, through the above analyses, the real condition of Uzbek-Tatar`s ethnic identity will be introduced and his future will be predicted.

Putin’s Strategy on the Trans-Korean Gas Pipeline:In the Context of Pragmatic Realism

성동기 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2013 Pacific Focus Vol.28 No.1

This study is to analyze why Russia continuously tries to construct the trans-Korean gas pipeline, despite the possibility of the “North Korean risk”and the limited economic benefit it offers compared to China’s pipeline. As the world’s number-one gas producer, Russia exports gas abroad through gas pipelines. As a result, Russia holds a wealth of expertise and experience related to gas pipelines. In particular, the crucial cases of gas pipeline disputes related to Russia since the collapse of the former Soviet Union mainly occurred during the Putin regime; the current President of Russia,Vladimir Putin, is trying to complete the trans-Korean gas pipeline. The content of the study is based on the above common ground. First, as Russia exports gas to various states through the gas pipelines, a great influence from its foreign policy standpoint is inevitable. Thus, this study will explore Putin’s foreign policy of pragmatic realism. Second, the cause and effect of gas pipeline disputes concerning Russia during Putin’s presidential term will be scrutinized with focus on Putin’s pragmatic realism. Third, this paper will review the correlation between the results of cases of the gas pipeline dispute in relation to Russia and the gas market expansion in Russia’s Northeast Asia. Lastly, this study will conceptualize the reasons for why Russia wishes to complete the trans-Korean gas pipeline based on these analyses.

Modeling of rheological behavior for polymer nanocomposites via Brownian dynamic simulation

성동기,윤재륜,송영석 한국유변학회 2016 Korea-Australia rheology journal Vol.28 No.4

Reptation dynamics of the coarse-grained polymer molecular chain is investigated to predict rheological behavior of polymeric nanocomposites by applying Brownian dynamics simulation to the proposed full chain reptation model. Extensibility of polymer chain and constraint release from chain stretch or retraction are of main concern in describing the nanocomposite systems. Rheological results are well predicted by applying the improved simulation algorithm using stepwise Wiener processes. Strong shear thinning and elongational strain hardening are predicted and compared with the experimental results of polyamide 6/ organoclay nanocomposites. The full chain reptation model enables us to predict dynamic motion of the polymer chain segments and understand mechanisms for characteristic rheological behaviors.

우즈베키스탄 지역공동체 “마할라” 거지가 없는 나라로 만들다

성동기 포스코경영연구원 2013 CHINDIA Plus Vol.85 No.-

카자흐스탄 언어정책의 특징과 전망- ‘언어정책’ 관련 이론들과 카자흐어의 현실적 언어지위를 중심으로 -

성동기,박성용 중앙대학교 외국학연구소 2022 외국학연구 Vol.- No.60

Kazakhstan was more influenced by Russia and the Russian language than any other country in Central Asia. In particular, Kazakhs were nomadic people, so they had no choice but to rely on the Soviet government to transliterate their national language, Kazakh. And in the last census of the Soviet Union in 1989, Kazakhs did not make up half of the total population. Therefore, the language policy promoted by the Kazakh government after independence was dynamically changed under the influence of the Kazakh population and Russian language. This study aims to analyze the contents of the language policy promoted by the Kazakhstan government from 1987 to 2021 in detail, and to find and forecast its characteristics. The research contents are as follows. First, previous studies related to Kazakh language will be introduced. Understanding the topic of previous studies related to Kazakh and the research methods and analysis of each researcher will be the basis for presenting the continuity and differentiation of the topic of this study from previous studies. Second, various laws and programs that the Kazakh government tried to develop Kazakh as the national language of Kazakhstan will be analyzed. In this part, various ‘Language Policy’ and ‘Language Planning’ theories will be applied to laws and programs related to language policy promoted by the Kazakhstan government. Through this, the problems and characteristics of Kazakhstan's language policy will be derived. Third, the realistic linguistic status of Kazakh language will be analyzed. In this part, studies and cases related to the realistic status of the Kazakh language in the language policy of the Kazakh government will be introduced. Through this, the characteristics of the language policy of the Kazakhstan government can be understood. Fourth, the realistic purpose and prospect of the language policy promoted by the Kazakhstan government will be analyzed. In this part, it will be suggested whether the Kazakh government simply develops a language policy to develop Kazakh as the national language or pursues it for other purposes. Through this, the language policy of Kazakhstan will be prospected.

우즈벡어에 존재하는 러시아어 영향의 사회언어학적 분석

성동기 한국러시아문학회 2007 러시아어문학 연구논집 Vol.24 No.-

After Independence five Central Asian states have promoted a language policy to establish ethnic and nation identity. But it is being changed by russian and Russian language. Now in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Russian is official language with main ethnic language. This means that two states depend on russian and Russian language. But in Uzbekistan uzbek occupies 80% in total population and only official language is Uzbek. Language policy to eliminate Russian seems considerably successful. In former Soviet period Russian was high code and Uzbek was low code. Especially, the latter had the function of spoken language. But now this situation keeps in scope of language function to some degree. It means that Uzbek has some problems in language function because of unprepared language policy. Above of all, uzbek government hasn't prepared to develope Uzbek language. So, It is just symbolic official language. Uzbek borrow Russian vocabularies and grammar in scope of language expression to overcome it's weaknesses. It means that Russian language keeps it's influence in Uzbekistan.So, language policy of uzbek government has a formal characteristic according to political ideology. Although uzbek has negative feeling to Russia and russian, they use Russian language and words borrowed from Russian habitually everyday. In conclusion the language policy of uzbek government must be reviewed in this situation.

우즈베키스탄 독재체제의 지속가능성 원인 분석: ‘정치문화’(Political Culture) 이론을 중심으로

성동기 한국슬라브․유라시아학회 2023 슬라브학보 Vol.38 No.2

우즈베키스탄은 1991년 독립 이후 32년 동안 두 명의 대통령에 의해서 안정적인 독재체제가 유지되고 있다. 카리모프는 1991년부터 2016년까지 25년 동안 집권했고, 2016년에 평화롭게 그의 뒤를 이은 미르지요예프는 최근 국민투표를 통해 2040년까지 권력을 연장했다. 위 대통령들의 장기독재와 관련된 이러한 비민주적이고 위헌적인 정치행위는 정상적인 민주주의 국가라면 국민의 강력한 저항에 직면했을 것이다. 본 연구는 우즈베키스탄 독재체제의 지속가능성을 씨족과 관련된 지역 파벌의 관점이 아닌 역사 속에서 형성된 ‘정치문화’의 관점에서 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다.

우즈베키스탄 미르지요예프 정권의 권력 강화 방식 분석: 권위주의 권력 공유(Power-Sharing) 이론을 중심으로

성동기 서울대학교 아시아연구소 2019 아시아리뷰 Vol.9 No.1

2016년 9월 2일에 25년 동안 우즈베키스탄을 통치했던 독재자 이슬람 카리모프(Islam Karimov) 대통령이 사망한 후 차기대권 후보로 당시의 샤브카트 미르지요예프(Shavkat Mirziyoyev) 총리, 루스탐 아지모프(Rustam Asimov) 재무 담당 수석부총리, 루스탐 이노야토프(Rustam Inoyatov) 민족 안전국 의장이 거론되었다. 그런데 외형적으로 강자의 위치에 있던 아지모프와 이노야토프는 약자였던 미르지요예프를 지지하고 대선 출마를 포기했다. 그리고 미르지요예프는 집권 이후 이들을 큰 문제 없이 제거하고 개인 독재 체제를 구축할 수 있는 기반을 만들었다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 현상을 이해하기 위해서 스볼릭(Milan Svolik)의 권위주의 권력 공유(Power-Sharing) 이론을 중심으로 이를 분석했다. Islamic Karimov ruled Uzbekistan for 25 years. After Karimov’s death on September 2, 2016, Mirziyoyev, Azimov and Inoyatov were mentioned as candidates for the next presidential election. At that time, Azimov and Inoyatov were more likely to be elected to the presidency than Mirziyoyev. However, Azimov and Inoyatov endorsed Mirziyoyev and gave up running. Mirziyoyev, who was elected president, eventually removed Azimov and Inoyatov without any problems. Basically, this case rarely occurs in an authoritarian regime. In order to understand the above case, this study focuses on power-sharing theory of authoritarianism, which was proposed by Milan Svolik. This study analyzes this case through the following research questions. Why did Azimov and Inoyatov endorse Mirziyoyev? When did Mirziyoyev fire Azimov and Inoyatov? Why did Azimov and Inoyatov accept Mirziyoyev’s decision without resistance? What were the ways and characteristics that Mirziyoyev used to strengthen his power?