학술논문 4 : 전쟁지도(戰爭指導) 개념의 몇 가지 문제 논고(論考)

서상문 ( Sangmun Suh ) 한국군사학회 2016 군사논단 Vol.85 No.-

The study has found the following four factors. First, it can hardly tell that the Korean translation of the ``conduct of war,`` ``Jeon Jaeng Ji Do`` (戰爭指導), is not one of the best examples of translations of terms as it does not convey the original meaning ; the Korean translation can have various meanings including the direction of war, executing the war, strategy of war etc. The reason of the mistranslation is not only because of linguistic misunderstanding but also different cultural and perceptional background of the East Asian region. Second, the concept of ``conduct of war`` is used in various circumstances. The Korea National Defense University(KNDU) defined the term ``conduct of war`` as a guideline, control methods and skills for using national power in war periods such as the establishment of guideline for executing war, prerogative of supreme command regarding the exercise of forces, integration of national and military strategies, coordinative and effective military control for concentration of national efforts on the total victory in order to achieve the ultimate objective of war. Third, rules or theories of war such as experiences of conduct of war and operation principles cannot be one-size-fits-all model even if it is a golden rule. However it does not mean that we should deny the ``conduct of war``. Consequently, it used uplifting strategical capacity and historical reference for military leaders and commanders. They should recognize that they need to have new thinking processes, strategic imagination and logical review in every war case. Fourth, there are three levels of ``conduct of war`` ① conduct of war as the national strategy, ② conduct of war as the military and defense policy, ③ conduct of war as the military strategy. The first level has national leaders as the key players, while military commanders are the main actors on second and third levels. The ideal type of ``conduct of war`` is a political·military joint commander system that needs in-depth, organic and general discussion and national level responses between national leaders and military commanders.

서안(西安)사변과 주은래(周恩來)

서상문 ( Suh Sangmun ) 한국군사학회 2016 군사논단 Vol.88 No.-

This study focused on the role of Zhou Enlai in resolution process of Xian shibian which broke out 80 years ago and came up with the conclusion following below : Zhou Enlai believed that if Chinese Communist Party(CCP) negotiates with Jiang Jieshi`s faction, taking Jiang Jieshi as a hostage, CCP could realize their political goals such as interruption the suppression on Chinese communists and policy of Resisting Foreign Aggression after Stabilizing the Country" from Jiang Jieshi`s faction. He suggested to his leadership that he would induce internal conflict of Nanjing(Nationalist Party of China, NPC) and it ultimately cause the leaders of CCP to convert their hard-line stance which was execution of Jiang Jieshi and turn it into a peaceful solution. To sum up, Zhou Enlai can be regarded as having made three major contributions to the peaceful settlement and the release of Jiang Jieshi by persuading leaders of CCP. First, Zhou Enlai coordinated different viewpoints and conflicts between Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng regarding relations with Nanjing, dealing with Jiang Jieshi and solution method. Eventually, he convinced Yang Hucheng who insists the military response due to concerning personal safety to take peaceful resolution. Second, Zhou Enlai successfully persuaded Yang Hucheng`s subordinates and radical commissioned officers who oppose to release of Jiang Jieshi in Northeastern Army(Dongbei Jun). Even if the Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang agreed to negotiate the issue over the treatment of Jiang Jieshi, his proposal was likely to return to the blast without consent of the radical commissioned officers. In fact, Zhou Enlai`s persuasion meant not just prior settlement of preconditions for negotiations. Actually, it blocked the bloodshed which is likely to be caused by radical officers. Third, Zhou Enlai has reached a satisfactory agreement at the end of a long and controversial discussion with Yang Hucheng, Zhang Xueliang and representatives of Jiang Jieshi`s faction who wanted to release Jiang Jieshi. The compromise with Song Meiling, one of the most influential characters who could impact Jiang Jieshi who refused any interview, led to the change of mind of Jiang Jieshi. This compromise ultimately became the trigger that encouraged Jiang Jieshi to accept the terms of the six-clause proposed by the CCP. Under this situation, Zhou Enlai`s proposal which secures personal safety of Jiang Jieshi including six-clause such as the immediate cease-fire of civil war, the withdrawal of Xian from the Central Army, the joint anti-Japanese movement, political democratization and the reconstruction of the Nanjing government to Zhang Xueliang who has not concrete solution was wholly his(Zhou Enlai) achievement. Although Zhou Enlai was guaranteed desired political concession from Jiang Jieshi, he failed leaving written records of it. His failure caused conflicts among the commissioned officers of Xian regarding Zhang Xueliang`s release methods. Therefore the best he could have done was to reconcile disputes till the end.

‘중화민국’의 한국전쟁 참전활동 論考

서상문(Suh, Sangmun) 중국근현대사학회 2021 중국근현대사연구 Vol.91 No.-

As a result of this study, it was discovered for the first time in academia that the ‘Republic of China’(Taiwan) also participated in the Korean War. The background, process, period, and activities of the Republic of China"s participation in the Korean War are summarized into four main facts. First, The United States rejected JiangJieshi"s offer to dispatch the Kuomintang(Chinese Nationalist Party) army, but the situation changed when the Chinese communist prisoners of war who had participated in the Korean War was captured in late october 1950. The United Nations Command in Japan and the US 8th army in Korea, recognized the necessity and importance of psychological warfare operations against the Chinese forces. So they requested the Republic of China government to dispatch Taiwanese psychological warfare agents several times through the ambassador of the Republic of China to Korea ShaoYulin(邵毓麟). Second, after discussion with the Chief Executive of the Republic of China, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Staff, and Director of the Ministry of National Defense, JiangJingguo, finally, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China selected special agents(the members of the Counter Intelligence Corps) several times according to JiangJieshi"s ratification and instruction. Although they are non-combat units of the Kuomintang army, they secretly participated in the Korean War in early February 1951 as regular troops made up of psychological warfare soldiers and civilians. Third, the Republic of China special agents(the members of the Counter Intelligence Corps) who entered Korea conducted intelligence gathering and psychological warfare, some belonging to the US military, and some independently performing tasks. They were respectively affiliated with branches of the Republic of China Government Investigation Bureau, the Second office of the Ministry of National Defense, the International Intelligence Bureau, and the Army Intelligence Bureau. It was the ambassador of the Republic of China to the South Korea who commanded them. Fourth, in order to realize JiangJieshi"s will that anti-communist and retrieving China mainland, the Kuomintang dispatched ChenJianzhong(陳建中), vice-chairman of the Nationalist Party Central Committee 6th group, to South Korea. He commanded and operated special agent(the members of the Counter Intelligence Corps) and “Seoul Chinese squad(支隊)”, a civilian military organization made up of anti-communist overseas chinese living in South Korea. The activity expenses of the special agents and the SC squad were supported by the Kuomintang and managed by the embassy of the Republic of China in Korea.

미국-타이완-중국 관계의 질적 변화: ‘타이완관계법’에서 ‘타이완동맹보호법’으로

서상문 ( Suh Sangmun ) 한국군사학회 2023 군사논단 Vol.113 No.-

Xi Jinping, who became the leader of the Chinese Communist Party in the 2010s, stepped up his diplomatic isolation against Taiwan as he challenged the U.S. hegemony. At the same time, President Donald Trump changed his policy toward China from cooperation with China to containment and suppression. In response to this change, the U.S. created a new Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act of 2019’(Taiwan Alliance Protection Act) in addition to the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in 1979 when the U.S. formally established diplomatic ties with China to help Taiwan escape diplomatic isolation or join international organizations in China's policy response. This law has begun to take effect in March 2020. If the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act of 2019’ Sanctions smoothly in the future, the U.S. and Taiwan will have more frequent exchanges and contacts economically, diplomatically, and militarily, and the U.S. diplomatic and economic support for Taiwan will deepen. At the same time, the U.S., which declared a “New Cold War era” targeting the Chinese Communist Party, will use the “Taiwan card” more against China. In addition, Taiwan's deepening diplomatic isolation is expected to ease, and Taiwan's accession to international organizations, activation of official and informal diplomatic activities, and expansion of the survival space. In fact, a bill or resolution supporting Taiwan's membership of international organizations has already been submitted in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 28, 2023. Unless the U.S. changes its strategy topple the Chinese Communist Party, it will deal with Taiwan as an economic partner to check or pressure China, coordinating, or occasionally pressuring its allies to play a role in the international community, and military support and arms sales will be further boosted. Taiwan will take advantage of this opportunity to focus its efforts on increasing exchanges and relations with the United States. China will not be able to invade Taiwan by force immediately, but it will strengthen its military power to occupy Taiwan in case of an emergency, while at the same time using various means and methods to help the Kuomintang take power instead of the Democratic Progressive Party. Republic of Korea needs to closely monitor U.S.-Taiwan-China relations, seek ways to deepen cooperation with Taiwan, and foster Taiwanese experts.