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      • KCI등재후보

        다수결원칙의 근거와 가중다수결 근거규정에 대한 축소헌법해석의 당위성

        박찬주 헌법재판소 2019 헌법논총 Vol.30 No.-

        The social contract theories provide the clues about the decision-making forms such as unanimity, bare majority and qualified majority. The main discussion of this essay is about the unavoidability of constitutional restrictive interpretation of the ground provision on qualified majority i.e., the Article 49 of the Constitution. Without such restrictive interpretation, the qualified majority system inevitably collides with the proposition of 「Parliament cannot bind its successors」. The National Assembly constituted through the general election enjoys the full and intact powers conferred by the Constitution. Such powers cannot be violated even by the prior Assembly. The Article 49 is the ground provision on the qualified majority. Korea is an almost unique country admitting the introduction of qualified majority through the statute laws. Furthermore, the bills scheduled for voting are not confined to the statute bills. A lot of non-statute bills are submitted making use of the said Article. The effect of the predecessor Assembly’s resolution on the non-statute bills has presumably indirect force on the successor Assemblies. If the successor Assemblies do not wish to accommodate the force of the predecessor Assembly’s resolution, they can neglect the force even without adopting opposing resolutions. In this meaning, the force of any resolution reaches only to the end of the Assembly of the day. With the statute bills unrelated to qualified majority, no reference is necessary to the binding force, as the successor Assemblies can amend or repeal the qualified-majority-related bills in accordance with the majority rule. Nevertheless, the binding force of the statute laws concerning qualified majority influences on the successor Assemblies, if we cannot root out the unconstitutionality through restrictive interpretation. Such problem does not arise in the countries the constitutions of which do not admit the introduction of qualified majority. With this construction, even where qualified majority is prescribed by the prior Assembly as necessary for repealing the qualified majority provision, successor Assemblies can repeal by the bare majority. And such repeal should not be the subject of presidential veto. 사회계약이론은 만장일치제, 과반수다수결원칙 및 가중다수결제도에 대한 논의의 단초를 제공하고 있다. 이 글에서의 주된 논의는 가중다수결제도에 대한 축소헌법해석의 당위성이다. 축소해석헌법을 하지 아니하는 경우에는 가중다수결제도는 의회는 자신의 계승자를 구속하지 못한다 라는 명제와 충돌할 수밖에 없다. 총선거를 통하여 새로 구성되는 국회는 임기 내에는 헌법상의 온전한 권한을 가지며 선임국회가 침해할 수 없다. 제정법을 통한 가중다수결제도의 도입을 허용하는 국가는 사실상 우리나라가 유일하다. 가중다수결 근거규정인 헌법 제49조 전문에서는 의결의 대상인 의안을 「법률안」에 국한하지 아니하고 각종 「결의안」을 포함하고 있다. 「법률안」을 제외한 결의안들은 결의의 효력이 결의국회의 계승자인 후임국회에게 미치는 효력은 간접적이다. 후임국회가 결의의 효력을 받아들이고 싶지 아니하는 경우에는 이를 무시하면 되며 반드시 반대결의를 할 필요도 없다. 결의의 효력은 결의를 한 국회에만 미친다. 「법률안」이라고 하더라도 가중다수결과 무관한 경우에는 후임국회에서 통상적인 입법절차에 따라 폐지하면 되기 때문에 구속력을 논할 필요가 없다. 그러나 가중다수결과 관련된 「법률」의 경우에는 「축소헌법해석」을 하여 위헌성을 제거하지 아니하는 한 구속력이 후임국회에도 미친다. 헌법에서 제정법을 통한 가중다수결제도의 도입을 규정하지 아니하는 나라에서는 이런 문제가 발생하지 아니한다. 제정법상의 가중다수결규정의 폐지에 가중다수결을 필요로 한다고 규정하든 아니하든 후임국희는 과반수다수결로 가중다수결규정을 폐지할 수 있고, 대통령의 거부권행사의 대상이 되어서도 아니 된다.

      • KCI등재후보

        위헌결정과 소급효

        박찬주 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2011 서울법학 Vol.19 No.1

        The main points the writer asserts in this essay are as following. First, the extent of retroactivity conferred by the Supreme Court is considerably broader than that conferred by the Constitutional Court, and such disparity brings about the necessity of admitting the binding force of decision on constitutionality and its indispensable reasonings. Second, the writer points the disparity between the degree of unconstitutionality and the extent of retroactivity. The degree of unconstitutionality of decision on simple unconstitutionality is much powerful compared to that of decision on unconformity to constitution. The main sentence of §47 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act only admits ex-nunc effect (prospective effect) to a decision on simple unconstitutionality, so ex-tunc effect (retroactive effect) is only admitted by the precedents of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme court. But majority scholars and the large part of the precedents assert the newly enacted laws be applied under the name of betterment laws. This approach confers much powerful ex-tunc effect on the decision of unconformity to constitution. For this disparity, the writer asserts that the courts should apply the former laws adjudicated as unconformable instead of newly enacted laws unless adjudicated to apply newly enacted laws in the decision on unconformity to constitution. Third, the Constitutional Court should decide whether the retroactivity is conferred or its extent when conferring retroactivity in the light of the sovereign entity of making Constitution. The main points the writer asserts in this essay are as following. First, the extent of retroactivity conferred by the Supreme Court is considerably broader than that conferred by the Constitutional Court, and such disparity brings about the necessity of admitting the binding force of decision on constitutionality and its indispensable reasonings. Second, the writer points the disparity between the degree of unconstitutionality and the extent of retroactivity. The degree of unconstitutionality of decision on simple unconstitutionality is much powerful compared to that of decision on unconformity to constitution. The main sentence of §47 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act only admits ex-nunc effect (prospective effect) to a decision on simple unconstitutionality, so ex-tunc effect (retroactive effect) is only admitted by the precedents of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme court. But majority scholars and the large part of the precedents assert the newly enacted laws be applied under the name of betterment laws. This approach confers much powerful ex-tunc effect on the decision of unconformity to constitution. For this disparity, the writer asserts that the courts should apply the former laws adjudicated as unconformable instead of newly enacted laws unless adjudicated to apply newly enacted laws in the decision on unconformity to constitution. Third, the Constitutional Court should decide whether the retroactivity is conferred or its extent when conferring retroactivity in the light of the sovereign entity of making Constitution.

      • KCI등재

        기동특성에 따른 ARS 자세 성능향상 기법

        박찬주,이상정,Park, Chan-Ju,Lee, Sang-Jeong 한국군사과학기술학회 2008 한국군사과학기술학회지 Vol.11 No.6

        The ARS(Attitude Reference System) calculates an attitude of a vehicle using inertial angular rate sensors and acceleration sensors. The attitude error of ARS increases due to the integration of angular rate sensor output. To reduce the attitude error an acceleration of sensor is used similar to leveling method of INS(Inertial Navigation System). When an acceleration of vehicle is increased, it is difficult to calculate the attitude error using acceleration sensor output. In this paper the estimation method of acceleration due to the attitude error only is proposed. Two methods of the attitude calculation depending on vehicle dynamics and the integration method of these two methods are proposed. To verify its performance the monte carlo simulation is performed and shows that it bounds attitude error of ARS to reasonable level.

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