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러시아의 대외 군사·안보정책 결정과정 : 대한반도 정책에 미치는 영향 Its Effects on Policy toward Korea
김병기 한국전략문제연구소 1998 전략연구 Vol.5 No.3
When Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation in 1990. the former Soviet republic lacked those crucial political institutions necessary for consolidating his power and authority. These organs-which existed in other republics. which thereby enhanced the political consolidation of former Communist Party members who came into power-constituted the republican Committee on State Security (or the KGB). the Ministry of International Affairs. and even Academy of Sciences and radio/television channels. Lacking the institutional bases for effective rule, Yeltsin on the other hand, inherited Soviet power ministries with whom he had to struggle to "Russianize" it. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Liberal Democratic Party which inhetrited the balk of the organizational and ideological remanants of the powerful Soviet Communist Party apparatus. moreover, generated major barriers towards institutionalization of Yeltsin's presidency. Such difficult situation, on the whole. helped generate the bloody suppression of the Parliament on October of 1993, the consolidation of the anti-center oriented Siberian Agreement of 1994, and even the Chechen crisis from the same year. Andrei Kozyrev followed a policy of full and complete Westernization in 1992, agreeing on all major issues which NATO and the United States positively thought. including the joining of the military coalition against Irag--a former ally of the Soviet Union. Such policy, however, brought not full economic, political and military integration with the West, but isolation and new ideological division along the shrunken border of the Russian Federation with the Baltic countries, and the CIS. Contrary to expectations, former members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact Organization began to join NATO, while even members of the former Soviet Union begin to seek membership. Kozyrev, all in all, ignored not only Russia's strategic interests vis-a-vis the West, but also, its immediate concerns in the Near Abroad where millions of ethnic Russians resided, who were facing daily economic, social and even political threats to their security. These problems were seriously politicized; the Communists and the Liberal Democrats along with the scattered Russian armed forces began to call for a turn towards "within" and the much ignored "Near Abroad." Between the years 1992 and the beginning of 1996, Kozyrev was forced to follow the lines of the domestic conservatives, thereby weakening the institution of the Presidency, and generating the popular image of a weak-willed administration. At the beginning of 1996 Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov--then the Director of Counter- Foreign Intelligence Agency--as Foreign Minister. A Middle Eastern expert by training and a long-time bureaucrat in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee he began to reorient Russian foreign policy away from US/West Europe to the Near Abroad. In the national security concept developed in 1998, for example, the predominant emphasis is placed on domestic dimension, namely, stablized economic transition towards market economy, and parellel social conditions. In the field of external policy, Primakov proved instrumental in preempting a formation of second military coalition against Iraq--with the help of France and China. In fact, Primakov is reportedly supplying Iraq with nuclear technology for energy purposes. Primakov also actively opposed the expansion of NATO, pressuring the Baltic countries not to join the military bloc. Parenthetically, such show of pressure against the West meant that within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) no outside forces can interfere: moreover by exporting missiles to Northern Cyprus, an area controlled by Greece. which has a confrontation with Southern Cyprus. an area controlled by Turkey. Primakov intends to weaken NATO internally. by accelarating tension among the two members. The contraction of the border in the Western frontier. and threat of NATO toward it has forced Russia to seek compensation in the Southern frontier. In the Caucasus. Moscow was successful in forcing Georgia to join the CIS by supporting the Abkhazian seperatists as was also with Azerbaijan whose enemies Armenia and its seperatists in contentious Nargono-Karaback it also supported. Moscow felt threatened by the ethnic-disturbances in the Caucasus and the geopolitical encroachements being made by Turkey. a strong ally of the United States. Primakov is reinforcing Russia's relations with Iran for three reasons: (1) to offset Turkey. China and the US' influence in the Middle East and Central Asia: (2) to deny US rapproachment with Tehran with whom Washington desires closer trade and political relations: and (3) to export, like towards irag. nuclear related technology for energy purposes. In Kosovo. moreover. Primakov has intervened on behalf of the Serbs against the Albanians. whose forces are supported by the Western diplomatic community. These policies have earned Primakov not only the support of the Communists and the Liberal Democrats who form the majority in the Duma, but also, have strengthened Yeltsin's. domestic position through essential conservatization of Russia's foreign policy. It is support for these feats that Yeltsin awarded the highest medal of public service to Primakov as well as personally visiting him at the Foreign Ministry this year. Primakov has also recently engineered the breakthrough in the reestablishment of talks with Tokyo for normalizing its relations. a moved aimed at weakening the US grip on Japan. Moscow knows and appreciates the markedly grown influence of China in both Koreas: it also worries the recent improvement of US-Sino relations. Only by improving its relations with Pyongyang can Moscow redress its imbalnce on the Korean peninsula; but given the five years of freeze in its relationship. Moscow had no means of approaching Pyongyang other than by way of kicking out the South Korean diplomat as a way of showing Pyongyang that it is ready to deal more equally with North Korea. Given the current freeze in North Korean-US. North Korean-Japanese and inter-Korean talks. Seoul must be ready to exercise more independent initiative in its foreign policy.
Production of hydroxylated equol derivatives from soy isoflavone using microbial oxidoreductases
김병기 한국공업화학회 2019 한국공업화학회 연구논문 초록집 Vol.2019 No.0
Equol is a promising isoflavone derivative that mitigates diverse sex hormone related disorders. Recently, we developed a recombinant E. coli strain expressing multiple gut microbial isoflavone reductases, then it displayed much higher equol-producing capacity compared to non-productive natural bacteria. Moreover, engineered equol-producing enzymes with improved biocatalytic performance were rationally designed and exploited for efficient and enantioselective production of (S)-equol and (-)-5-hydroxyequol with high titer (ca. > 1g/L). Meanwhile, we also firstly identified functional oxidases for orthohydroxylation of (S)-equol. The oxidases were efficiently utilized in the catalysis of (S)-equol into 6-hydroxy-(S)-equol, 3’-hydroxy-(S)-equol and 6,3’-dihydroxy-(S)-equol. Furthermore, combinatorial use of the equol-producing strain and equol-hydroxylaing strain, enabled efficient and regioselective biosynthesis of ortho-hydroxyequols from soy isoflavone, for the first time.
Biocatalysis and Protein Engineering
김병기 한국공업화학회 2020 한국공업화학회 연구논문 초록집 Vol.2020 No.-
지난 30년 동안 바이오테크놀로지 분야에서 여러 새로운 발견과 개념들이 만들어졌지만 Biocatalysis와 Protein engineering은 아주 전통적인 유기합성의 화학 촉매 분야 연구의 연장선 상에서 새로운 유기 단백질촉매의 개발이라는 측면에서 정밀화학에 많은 기여를 하였으며 향후에는 생체촉매를 이용한 더욱 다양한 응용 분야가 생길 것이라고 예측된다. 본 발표에서는 지난 30년의 효소 및 효소공학의 발전과 이와 괘도를 같이한 효소의 시험관 진화(in vitro EVOLUTION) 및 단백질공학에서 어떤 발전이 진행되어왔는 지에 대한 리뷰를 시도하고자 한다. 효소라는 유기 단백질촉매를 어디에서 어떻게 찾아 만들고, 어떻게 이용하고, 산업적 목적에 맞게 어떻게 변형 내지는 변이시키는데 어떠한 도구와 방법들이 개발되어 왔는지에 대해 살펴보고자한다.
김병기,홍용식 한국회계정보학회 2017 한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집 Vol.2017 No.2
본 연구는 서민에 대한 금융편의를 제공하는 저축은행의 하방경직적 원가행태를 분석하고, 자금조달 및 운영, 경영자 유형, 적자 저축은행 등 여러 측면에서 비대칭적 원가행태가 있음을 확인하였다. 본 연구의 목적을 위해서 2007년부터 2016년까지의 10년간 610개 저축은행-년도를 대상으로 분석하였다. 본 연구를 통한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 저축성예금 비중이 높은 저축은행은 영업비용, 이자비용에서 하방경직적 원가행태가 있음을 확인하였다. 둘째, 저축성예금 비중이 높은 저축은 행 중에서 저축성예금 만기가 길수록, 저축성예금 금리가 높을수록 영업비용, 이자비용에서 원가의 하방경직성이 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 가계대출 비중이 높은 저축은행은 영업비용에서 하방경직적 원가행태를 보였다. 넷째, 전문경영자 저축은행은 이자비용에서 하방탄력적 원가행태를 보였다. 다섯째, 적자 저축은행은 영업비용, 이자비용에서 하방경직적 원가행태를 보였다. 일곱째, 적자 저축은행 중 적자규모가 큰 저축은행은 영업비용, 이자비용에서 원가의 하방경직성이 강화되었다. 마지막으로 글로벌 금융위기이후 저축은행 업계 전체적으로 적자를 기록한 2009년부터 2014년중 적자 저축은행은 영업비용, 이자비용에서 원가의 하방경직성이 강화됨을 확인할 수 있었다. 본 연구결과가 제시하는 시사점은 다음과 같다. 저축성예금 비중이 높은 저축은행일수록 원가의 하방경직성이 강화되는 것을 확인함으로써 저축은행 업계에 내재되어 있는 구조적인 문제점을 실증적으로 검증하였고, 저축은행의 자기자본 확충 등 자금조달 구조를 개선하는 자료로 활용할 수 있을 것이다.