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초기 고려-명 관계에서 사행로 문제: 요동 경유 사행로의 개통 과정
구범진,정동훈 서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 2021 한국문화 Vol.- No.96
It is widely known that envoys going to Beijing during the Joseon dynasty traveled along the land route via Liaodong: They crossed the Yalu River to reach Liaoyang, and then went through the Shanhai Pass to arrive in the capital of Ming and Qing empires. Then what kind of travel route did the envoys take during the period when the capital of Ming was Nanjing, not Beijing? In the early years of Goryeo-Ming relations, envoys who visited the other country’s capital had no choice but to take the Yellow Sea route crossing the open sea at the risk of shipwreck. In the mid-1370s when the Ming troops were advancing into the Liaodong region, however, Goryeo envoys were granted permission, after many twists and turns, to take the alternative Liaodong-Shandong route, which was far more safer than the Yellow Sea route: They were allowed to cross the Yalu River to reach Liaoyang by land, set sail from the Liaodong peninsula to the Shandong peninsula, and then traveled to Nanjing by land. In this paper, we analyze the relevant sources in great detail to track how and why the change in the travel route of envoys occurred. It was Ming Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang’s ‘speech of denunciation’ that first triggered the twists and turns that, in the end, led to the change in travel routes. In this speech the emperor, suspecting that Goryeo was attempting military espionage activities in the Liaodong region, forbade Goryeo envoys from traveling along the Liaodong-Shandong route, and demanded that Goryeo greatly reduce the frequency and scale of the dispatch of envoys. However, ambiguous and even contradictory words in the emperor’s speech led the Goryeo court to misinterpret his intentions when the speech was actually delivered in the summer of 1373. The Goryeo court mistakenly thought that the emperor demanded envoys be sent to Liaodong by land, not by sea. This misunderstanding led Goryeo envoys to undergo many troubles including a fatal shipwreck as they tried to alternately take the Liaodong-Shandong and the Yellow Sea routes. In June 1374, when Goryeo envoys managed to arrive in Nanjing via the Yellow Sea route in their fourth attempt of travel to the Ming capital, the emperor finally accepted Goryeo’s request and designated the Liaodong-Shandong route as the official travel route for envoys. Goryeo preferred taking the Liaodong-Sandong route as it was far safer than the Yellow Sea route. While permitting Goryeo to use this route, the Ming emperor ensured that Ming could closely control and monitor Goryeo envoys all the way from Liaodong to Nanjing. He could deny their entry into Liaodong whenever deemed necessary. Therefore, the change of travel routes for envoys from the Yellow Sea to the Liaodong-Shandong required that Goryeo envoys be under strict control and surveillance by the Ming authority although it ensured their travel safety and on-time arrival. .
丘凡眞 명청사학회 2004 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.21
It was tremendously difficult to run a salt business in Yongping Prefecture 永平府, located in the northeastern part of Zhili Province 直隸省, because of its vulnerability to the illegal trade of salt. Until 1902, the Qing government had been abandoned Yongping in terms of salt administration. In 1903, Yuan Shikai 袁世凱, Governor-general of Zhili, seeking to increase the salt revenue in order to meet the new financial demands, through the intensification of government activities in the salt administration, introduced a reform program and established a government-managed institution(永平??務總局). Yuan had the new institution run by Zhang Zhenfang 張鎭芳, his protege, who succeeded in this enterprise, at least, with respect to revenue increase. Zhang could supply Zhili provincial government with a fair amount of money, estimated at about 200, 000 teals a year, while this reform inevitably caused a steep rise of the local salt price, which in turn gave rise to peasants revolts in 1909. After Yuan's fall from power and the 1909 popular revolts, the central government, pursuing the centralization of public finance system, began to regain the control over the management of salt business in Yongping and reorganized the agencies there. In contrast with the preference for merchant-operated system in the past, state power in the first decade of the 20th century, both provincial and central, preferred strengthening official control over the salt administration, as they expected stronger official control would bring more money to the treasury, provincial or central. This expectation was exemplified in Yongping Prefecture. The experience and accomplishment in Yongping, I think, encouraged the government to expend government-managed salt business in Changlu Salt District 長蘆監區. For example, when some of Changlu merchants turned out to be incapable of paying off huge debt to the foreign banks in Tianjin, the government decided to place under direct official management almost a third of the Changlu District.
구범진 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 역사문화연구소 2010 역사문화연구 Vol.35 No.-
이 논문은 北洋常備軍의 창설에서 北洋六鎭의 성립까지 北洋陸軍 각 鎭의 전후 계승 관계와 北洋陸軍의 군비 조달 상황을 자세히 고찰함으로써 北洋陸軍의 성격을 재평가하려는 試論이다. 北洋陸軍은 直隸總督 袁世凱의 주도로 편성되었으며, 光緖 28년부터 32년까지 袁世凱가 조성한 재원이 北洋陸軍의 재원 전체에서 차지하는 비중은, 어떤 기준을 적용하느냐에 따라 달라지긴 하지만, 많게는 약 63%, 적게는 약 40%에 달하였다. 따라서, 北洋陸軍 5개 鎭(第2鎭~第6鎭)에 대한 直隸總督의 ‘지분’은 최소 40%에 달하였다고 평가할 수 있다. 흥미롭게도, 光緖 33년부터 陸軍部가 北洋陸軍에 대한 군권을 장악하였지만, 第2鎭 이하 5개 鎭의 40%에 해당하는 第2鎭과 第4鎭의 군권은 여전히 直隸總督이 유지하였다. 直隸總督이 第2鎭과 第4鎭의 군권을 유지할 수 있었던 것은 兩鎭의 소속 병력 전체가 直隸 경내에 주둔하였다는 점 외에 또 다른 ‘연고’가 있었기 때문이다. 第2鎭과 第4鎭은 각각 北洋常備軍 第1鎭과 第2鎭의 後身이었고, 北洋常備軍 第1鎭과 第2鎭은 光緖 29년 말 이래 練兵處 주도의 군제 개혁 이전에 袁世凱가 直隸의 新軍으로 편련한 北洋常備軍 左鎭과 右鎭의 後身이었다. 다시 말해서, 陸軍 第2鎭과 第4鎭은 그 기원을 따져 볼 때 어디까지나 直隸의 ‘地方軍’이었던 것이다.