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국가적 통일인가, 서방측으로의 통합인가? : 독일연방공화국(구 서독)의 정부수립과 아데나워 정부의 독일정책결정에 관한 문제
權五中(Kwon O-Joong) 역사교육연구회 2004 歷史敎育 Vol.91 No.-
The Unification of Germany (1990) has lead to a question in the research of German history; "was Adenauer"s intent on German policy unification of nation or westintegration (adsorption to the west)?" because German unification has been realized as Adenauer"s theory (Politik der Starke) predicted. Adenauer"s policy on Germany is still being debated. What he and his government really intended to achieve by their policy has been an interesting topic in the research of politics and history. Previous research studies have not focused on the situation of West Germany in the context of the international law, which was obliged to follow rules from Potsdam conference (1945), but by Adenauer"s intent on German unification. West Germany"s effort to regain national sovereignty in international affairs must be understood with the background in which West Germany could not join to determine their own issues. The current study puts emphasis on the unique situation of West Germany as a defeated country and analyzes the prevailing policy integrating West Germany into the West in view of the situation in the years of 1949-1951. And I argue, that Adenauer and his government were obliged to choose Westintegration concerning the conflicting situation of West Germany at that time.
서독의 NATO 가입과 SEATO의 창설 그리고 한국내 핵무기 배치를 통한 미국의 봉쇄적 안보정책 1949-1958
권오중(Kwon, O-Joong) 한국독일사학회 2009 독일연구 Vol.- No.17
Die Welt zerfiel nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg plötzlich in die Einfulssbereiche zweier antagonistischer Supermächte. Die ursprüngliche Konzeption der USA, eine neue Weltordnung durch die UN zu schaffen, konnte man anlässlich der kommunistischen Expansionspolitik in Europa sowie in Asien, wo sich die Kolonialreiche auflösten, nicht in die Tat umsetzen. Man brauchte eine andere Organisation, die die Rolle, die zunächst der UN zugedacht gewesen war, spielen konnte. Als Folge des Versuches der USA, zuerst in Europa einen Limes gegen die kommunistischen Expansion zu schaffen, entstand 1949 die NATO. Durch den NATO-Beitritt der BRD im Jahre 1955 waren die USA erst in der Lage, die militärische Hegemonie in der westen Lagern wieder ergreifen zu können. Durch die Gründung der ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO in den ersten 50er Jahren hatten die USA auch den Ring gegen die Expansion des Kommunismus geschaffen. Das kollektive Bündnissystem, das die finanzielle Belastung der USA verringern konnte, stand im Milltelpunkt der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik. In Ostasien, wo die Gründung des kollektiven Bündnissystems unmöglich war, war es für die USA zwangläufig, Atomwaffen in Korea zu stationieren, umdie schwierige Situation Südkoreas zu meistern. Damit wurde die westliche Verteidigungslinie durch die Atomwaffenlieferung nach Südkorea abgeschlossen. Diese Atomwaffen erleichterten tatsächlich die amerikanische Last in Ostasien und diente bis jetzt dazu, das von den USA versuchte militärische Gleichgewicht in Korea sowie in Ostasien zu halten. Damit konnten die USA ihr militärisches “Comtainment” von der Atlantik bis zum Pazifik abschließen und Status Quo in Europa sowie in Ostasien durch die Teilung halten.
독일연방공화국과 대한민국의 외교관계 복원과정과 상호간의 입장차이 (1954~1956) : 독일연방공화국의 외무성 미공개 사료에 근거하여
權五中(Kwon O-Joong) 역사교육연구회 2005 역사교육 Vol.95 No.-
The Process of re-establishing the Relationship between two politically divided Nations, Germany and Korea, was very complicated because both parties had very different points of view. The assumption that both parties have been intimate with each other, since sharing the same political fate, is not correct. Korea intent, emphasizing the political identity of the two countries was not accepted by German government, because Korean dictatorial regime was an obstacle to them. Both nations agreed upon mutual cooperation in economical policy. This basically meant that the "Korean Reconstruction Program" was profitable to both parties. Korean government tried to demand Germany to provide a loan. Germany tried to export their products and technology to Korea. Nevertheless representing of diplomatic posts from both countries was not established immediately because their opinion on the level of diplomatic representation was quite different from each other. Their views were complicated : Korean government wanted to exchange diplomatic representation while German government wanted to send commerce representation. Although the problem had been finally solved in August 1956, the difference of the opinion had not been solved and still remained. The current study introduces the process of re-establishing the Relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Korea and analyzes the problems that occurred during the period of 1954-1956. It is based on unpublished records in "Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes"(PA/AA). These records may be help us objectively understand the diplomatic problems between the two nations.
초기 관계발전과정에서 나타난 독일연방공화국과 대한민국의 외교적 갈등과 그 해결과정(1956~1961) : 독일연방공화국의 외무부 미공개 사료에 근거하여
權五中(Kwon O-Joong) 역사교육연구회 2006 역사교육 Vol.99 No.-
Since re-establishing the Relationship (1956), the intention of the two countries were very different. German government was only interested in the promotion of private trade, whereas Korean government had tried to get a financial aid from Germany through political and diplomatic cooperation. Legation (september 1957) and embassy (august 1958) meant to improve the status of the bilateral diplomatic representation was enacted according to interest of the two countries but, was originated from the economic target of Germany. The ture establishment of bilateral relationship began after the overthrow of Rhee’s government. The new democratic government which was launched post Rhee could not realize their own reform- program for rebuilding political-economical structure. German government became confident in the new Korean military government, which came into power through a military coup d’etat on May 16, 1961 because it had made clear its own strong anti-communism and intention to reform (reform-program). Around that time German government had also finally recognized Korea as a political alliance through the Berlin-crises (august 1961). In December 1961, both parties had made a contract on financial aid and german companies could participate in “Korean five year plan” for economic development. The genuine cooperation of both parties had now begun.