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Solving and Resolving the East China Sea Dispute: Beijing`s Options
( Kien Hong Yu ) 한국국방연구원 2005 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.17 No.3
In early 2005, the East China Sea (ECS) became a hotly-disputed area. mainly between the People`s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan. especially in view of the fact that in August 2005, for the first time in history, the price of light, sweet crude oil futures for October 2005 delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) crossed the US$70 per barrel mark. This paper explores what Beijing would likely do to solve or resolve its dispute with Tokyo, if not Taipei as well. It suggests, as a first step, the creation of a series of either international or bicoastal regimes, including between mainland China and Taiwan, which should be able to reduce tension between all the parties. By examining the PRC`s past words and deeds, the author has inductively pointed out options that mainland China can choose from to handle the dispute, such as dragging on as well as making compromises or adopting a fifty-fifty formula. Arguably, the PRC will try to solve or resolve the dispute in a peaceful way. In other words, it may first provoke, but not by firing the first shot. The Chinese Communist leaders are still adhering to their "paramount leader," Deng Xiaoping`s strategy of peace and development. In short, Beijing may have to make some concessions to Japan and/or Taipei for the sake of all concerned.
Sino-Japanese Contention Over the Diaoyu Islands/Senkakus: A Hypothetical Analysis
Peter Kien-hong Yu 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2005 Pacific Focus Vol.20 No.1
There are still some hot, sticky issues in Northeast Asia, including one which involves the Diaoyu Islands/Senkakus (Senkaku Retto/Gunto)/Pinnacle Islands, which are rich in fish, oil reserves, and other valuable natural resources. Many recent developments deserve closer observation, as they have some bearings on the Diaoyu Islands dispute. The article provides various scenarios, detailing the circumstances in which Japan will fire the first shot in the Diaoyu Islands (Senkakus) waters and those in which it will not. Of course, there could be ambivalent circumstances. The author argues that before 2010, Tokyo will probably not fire the first shot. It is easier to find reasons to support the argument that the JSDF would not fire the first shot in the Diaoyu Islands. The hotline set up since October 10, 2000 between Tokyo and Beijing supports such an argument. Given that we are mainly talking about possibilities/situations, is this intellectual exercise of determining who fires the first shot worth doing? The answer has to be yes, because by examining the issues and analyzing the facts, one gets a deeper understanding of the whole situation. Such an exercise on the Diaoyu Islands perhaps can also be applied to the even more complicated situation in the South China Sea (SCS), if not elsewhere.
Drafting the Basic Provisions for a Bicoastal Chinese Peace Agreement: A Preliminary Proposal
( Chia Hung Su ),( Peter Kien Hong Yu ) 한국국방연구원 2000 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.12 No.1
The relationship between Taiwan and mainland China is "intranational interstate relations or transpolital relations," and signing a peace agreement seems necessary. There is a strong desire among the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan to maintain peace and tranquillity in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese people also find that policies fostering the beliefs that "Chinese people won`t attack Chinese people" and "national reconciliation" match their basic interests in sharing Chinese sovereignty and gradually moving towards integration with the mainland people. After describing the peace agreement process between Taipei and Beijing, this research affirms that the core of a peace agreement should be arms control. In this paper an attempt is made to draft a bicoastal Chinese peace agreement from Taipei`s perspective. The draft agreement consists of a preamble and eleven provisions. Provision II, for example, states the following: "Under the principle of sharing sovereignty, both sides of the Taiwan Strait would not invade the other`s land (as opposed to territory) under jurisdiction nor interfere in each other`s internal affairs." As another example, Provision III stipulates, "To avoid military confrontation, a buffer zone will be designated by both sides of the Taiwan Strait." The final section discusses how the United States would regard bicoastal Chinese arms control. Taipei must make sure that the outcomes of any arms control agreement with the mainland not threaten Taiwan`s sovereign existence.