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      • KCI등재

        "Urfi marriage, an Egyptian Version of Cohabitation?

        IkRan Eum(엄익란) 한국중동학회 2005 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.25 No.2

          글자 그대로 풀이하면 우르피 결혼은 “관습 혼”, 혹은 “사실혼”을 지칭한다. “관습 혼”이 암시하듯 이집트에서 행해지는 우르피 결혼의 전통은 길다. 그러나 우르피 결혼은 부부가 결혼 계약서를 법원에 등록하지 않는다는 점과 결혼 후 그들만의 보금자리를 따로 꾸미지도 않는다는 점에서 일반적인 결혼과는 구별된다.<BR>  결혼 후 한 지붕 아래에서 살지 않는 이들을 부부로서 묶어주는 끈은 임의로 작성한, 정부에 등록되지 않은, 결혼 계약서와 성 관계뿐이다. 비록 정부에 등록되지 않는 우르피 결혼의 특성으로 인하여 그 정확한 숫자를 집계하기는 어렵지만 오늘날 이집트 일부 젊은이들 간에 우르피 결혼이 성행하고 있다고 알려져 있다. 이를 반영하듯 최근 이집트의 텔레비전 프로그램이나 영화는 일부 젊은이들 간에 행해지고 있는 우르피 결혼에 대한 주제를 종종 다루고 있다.<BR>  오늘날 일부 젊은이들 간에 행해지고 있는 우르피 결혼을 분석한 본 논문에서는 합법적인 이슬람식 결혼의 충족 요건과 우르피 결혼의 비교를 통해 우르피 결혼의 적법성 여부를 이슬람법 틀에서 토론하였다. 또 우르피 결혼과 비슷한 결혼 형태인 이란의 무타 혼과 사우디아라비아의 미스야르혼을 소개하고, 이에 대한 남녀의 의식차이와 그 원인을 분석하였다. 마지막으로 본 논문에서는 오늘날 이집트 일부 젊은이들이 왜 우르피 결혼을 선택하고 있는지 그 이유를 분석하고, 다음과 같은 잠정적인 결론에 도달하였다.<BR>  우르피 결혼은 - 현재 이집트 사회가 직면한 경제적 악재 속에서 - 한편으로는 외부, 특히 서구의 개방 문화를 수용하고, 다른 한편으로는 보수적인 이슬람의 규범들을 준수하려는 젊은이들의 변명 섞인 선택으로 해석되어 질 수 있다. 우르피 결혼을 통해 젊은이들은 이슬람에서 금지된 혼전성관계를 맺고, 이를 통해 보수적인 이슬람 사회에서 나름대로 이성에 대한 애정과 성 의식을 표현한다. 하지만 젊은이들은 이슬람식 결혼의 필수요소인 - 비록 상징적이긴 하지만 - 마흐르와 두 증인의 존재를 내세워 자신들의 결혼에 정통성과 정당성을 부여하고, 이를 통해 죄책감에서 해방되려 한다. 이집트의 우르피 결혼은 비록 서구의 동거 패턴과는 다르지만 경제 상황을 고려한 젊은이들의 애정과 성 욕구 해결이라는 맥락에서 이집트 판 동거로 간주되어 질 수 있겠다.

      • Discussions on Gulf Women’s Subordinate Status from Triangular Structure and Future Perspectives

        ( Eum Ikran ) 단국대학교 GCC국가연구소 2019 걸프지역연구 Vol.4 No.1

        The Gulf region has been known as the most conservative region regarding women’s status. Women have been treated as invisible in public spaces, and segregated and marginalized in the political, economic, and legal arenas. However, all Gulf governments declared their own Future Vision in order to prepare for the post-oil era, and using women, described as a great asset for the nations’ future, in the labor force is the prime concern. In order to introduce women into the labor force, governments are promoting policies for the nationalization of labor force, expecting women to replace the expat workers who currently compose more than 62% of the regional labor market. Even though women’s activities have expanded from the private realm to public spaces due to nationalization of the labor policies in the Gulf region, obstacles for women to work remain. To understand the context of the restrictions on women’s work, this article explores the roots and origins of Gulf women’s subordinate status through the lens of a triangular structure with religious/cultural, economic, and social dimensions.

      • SSCISCOPUSKCI등재

        “New Women for a New Saudi Arabia?” Gendered Analysis of Saudi Vision 2030 and Women’s Reform Policies

        Ikran Eum 숙명여자대학교 아시아여성연구원 2019 Asian Women Vol.35 No.3

        Saudi society has undergone tremendous changes since the Crown Prince’s declaration of Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016. In the process of realizing Saudi Vision 2030, “moderate Islam” and “Saudi First” nationalism have appeared as a new state ideology, replacing ultra conservative Wahhabism-based religious nationalism. Within this paradigm shift, Saudi women, previously restricted to the private realm and therefore “invisible,” have emerged as “visible” participants in the public arena. However, the limitations of women’s reform policy are revealed by, inter alia, by the government’s crackdown of several women’s rights activists in early 2018 and the ensuing Saudi–Canada diplomatic dispute. This paper examines the characteristics and limitations of Saudi Vision 2030 and related reform policies from a gender perspective by elucidating state and women’s relations within the context of existing literature. This article highlights that the new policies are not intended to expand women’s rights per se, but contribute to the expansion of the Saudi economy and reinforce the Crown Prince’s leadership. Saudi Arabia thus follows the suit with other patriarchal Arab countries’ modernization and reform processes in which women’s role and images are constructed by state policy and ideology.

      • KCI등재
      • SSCISCOPUSKCI등재

        Discourses on (Un)Veiling in Egypt

        EUM, Ikran Asian Center Women's Studies Korean Women's Instit 2000 Asian Journal of Women's Studies(AJWS) Vol.6 No.4

        Clothing is usually accepted as an aspect of the symbolic language of people and a form of an unspoken communication system (Lurie, 1986: 1). In other words, through clothes it is possible to express oneself using a "silent language" communicated through the use of visual, non-verbal symbols because these can sometimes implicitly tell us what people are thinking (Horn, 1975: 179).An item of clothing that has ignites one of the most controversial debates in the world is the veil of Muslim women. In this era. where the freedom of individuals in considered important, many people view the veil as oppressive. The origin of the controversy over Muslim women's veiling and unveiling can be traced back to the colonial era, when the Middle East was ruled by western powers. Interpretations about the veil have undergone many changes through history and both positive and negative view points about it are to be found. On the one hand, many westerners who support the unveiling movement, see veiling as a marker of inequality, sexual oppression and subjugation (Mikhail, 1979: 22-3; Mince, 1980/1982; 49-50). On the other hand, supporters of the veiling movement, who are largely drawn from the indigenous Arab point of viw, perceive the veil as a marker of autonomy, individuality, and identity.

      • KCI등재

        걸프국가 소프트파워 구축전략과 한계 연구 : 사우디아라비아, 아랍에미리트, 카타르 문화산업을 중심으로

        엄익란(Eum, IkRan) 한국중동학회 2020 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.41 No.1

        미국의 정치학자 조셉 나이(Joseph Nye)는 “문화의 시대”라 일컬어지는 21세기, 한 국가의 외교전략 패러다임은 “하드파워”에서 “소프트파워”로 전환된다고 주장하였다. 걸프국가는 포스트오일 시대를 대비하여 자원자본을 활용한 기존의 국가발전 전략을 대체할 새로운 패러다임을 문화산업과 소프트파워 구축에서 찾고 있다. 이들 국가는 문화를 새로운 부의 원천으로 간주하고 있으며, 문화산업을 통한 산업다변화를 목표하고 있기 때문이다. 본 연구에서는 걸프국가 중 사우디아라비아, 아랍에미리트, 카타르를 중심으로 국가별 소프트파워 구축전략을 분석하고 그 한계를 연구하는 것을 목표로 한다. 이를 위해 본문에서는 소프트파워의 개념을 우선적으로 리뷰하고, 국가별 소프트파워 구축전략의 특징을 분석했으며, 그 한계를 첫째, 모방과 경쟁적인 소프트파워 강화전략과 보여주기 식의 “박제화”된 전통문화; 둘째, 국민의 호응이 부족한 통치가문의 제2세대가 추진하는 “펫 프로젝트(Pet Project)”, 셋째, 정치개혁 없이 경제발전만 강조한 결과 나타난 소프트파워 영향력 와해 현상 차원에서 분석하였다. Joseph Nye argued that national diplomatic paradigms shifted from ‘hard power’ to ‘soft power’ in the 21st century of ‘age of culture.’ In preparation for the post-oil era, the Gulf states are looking for a paradigm shift from a hard power building strategy to soft power through the development of cultural industry. These countries regard culture as a new source of wealth, and aim for economic diversification by enhancing tourism and sports events. This study analyzes the soft power construction strategies of Gulf countries with a focus on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and its limitations. To this end, this study reviews the concept of soft power and analyzes the characteristics of the soft power construction strategies in each of these countries. The paper discuss the soft power construction strategies from three perspectives: overheated competition among the three countries to enhance soft power, the lack of public consensus on the ‘pet project’ promoted by the second generation of the ruling family, and the ‘soft power disempowerment’ phenomenon emerged as a result of stressing economic achievement without political reform.

      • KCI등재

        아랍 걸프지역 여성 인플루언서의 소셜미디어 활동사례로 본 온라인 참여문화와 사회문화적 함의 연구

        엄익란(Eum, IkRan) 한국중동학회 2021 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.42 No.2

        This study analyzes the online participatory culture in the Arab Gulf region and its socio-cultural implications through a case study on the social media activity of female influencers and predicts the direction of social change. Due to the popularity of social media among young people, several individual endorsers, called “influencers,” have emerged from this region who influence audiences in the online space. Influencers are socio-cultural beings, and the online space is not value-neutral, but rather reflects societal values. Therefore, research on influencers is useful in capturing an aspect of social change. Social media has created a “virtual public feminized space” in the conservative Arab Gulf society, laying down an appropriate environment for female influencers to grow. The results show three socio-cultural implications of female influencers’ activities in the Arab Gulf society: first, women’s online activities are becoming more visible, and the influencers’ influence over their followers is growing. Second, socio-cultural taboos are loosening as the boundaries between the public and private spheres blur. Finally, social media has provided a new platform for female influencers to exercise their power in support of the women’s movement. For this study, a qualitative research method was employed to analyze the content of mega-influencers from the Arab Gulf region with more than 1 million followers.

      • KCI등재

        걸프지역 COVID-19 사례로 본 수니 무슬림의 반시아 종파주의 담론 분석

        엄익란(Eum, IkRan) 한국중동학회 2021 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.41 No.3

        This study analyzes Sunni Muslims’ anti-Shia hatred sentiment under COVID-19 conditions. COVID-19 has emerged as a new fomenting element of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia in the Middle East. Since the WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic in March 2020, the virus has spread indiscriminately worldwide regardless of class, gender, age, and religion. Exploiting the ‘infodemic’ phenomenon, COVID-19 surpasses unfound fears toward other groups and amplifies hatred toward otherness. In the Middle Eastern region, the COVID-19 pandemic has restructured Sunni Muslim’s anti-Shia prejudice and hatred to a new level. Sectarianism, before COVID-19 was shaped by actual conflicts and violence that occurred on the front lines between Saudi supported Sunni groups and Iran supported Shia groups. The current sectarianism occurs in the online space, reinforcing ‘civilization and science’ vs. ‘barbarism and superstition’ discourse and ‘Islamic’ and ‘non-Islamic’ theological dimensions, regarding COVID-19 as God’s punishment. In addition, COVID-19 further deepened sectarianism at the grassroots level. This study is distinguished from previous studies as it highlights sectarianism in the Middle East from the perspective of the pandemic that threatens the security and stability of the region.

      • KCI등재

        동아시아 국가 미래비전과 할랄정책 비교연구

        엄익란(Eum, Ikran) 한국이슬람학회 2018 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.28 No.2

        China, Japan, and Taiwan began to pursue policies related to halal industry from the early of 2010s onwards. These countries are similar in their recognition of the necessity for nurturing halal industries within their countries for economic diversification despite less than 1~2% of their population being Muslim. Therefore, the motivation for entering the halal market did not spontaneously emerge by market necessity but was artificially introduced by top-down governmental policies. This situation is very similar to Korea. However, halal policy is differently developed in each country as their history of acceptance for Islam also differs. In this context, this study aims to elucidate the implications for Korea’s halal market advancement strategy through a comparative study of China, Japan, and Taiwan’s halal industry policies.

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