Mutual Cooperation Among South Korea, The United States and China to Deal with North Korean Crises

( Bruce W. Bennett ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2007 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.12 No.1

The Future Direction of U.S. -ROK Defense Policy Cooperation: Managing the North Korean Nuclear Weapon Threat

( Bruce W. Bennett ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2008 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.13 No.1

The Prospects for Conventional Conflict on the Korean Reninsula

( Bruce W Bennett ) 한국국방연구원 1995 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.7 No.1

This paper considers the prospects for both limited and major conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula. The cases considered involve North Korea as the aggressor against the Combined Forces Command (CFC) of South Korea and the United States. With any conflict started by North Korea, a key issue would be the North Korean objectives. These cannot be determined with precision, given the character of the North Korean regime. But the likely objectives provide a framework for postulating North Korean strategy and operational concepts, and the North Korean assessment of whether these approaches could achieve its objectives. A major North Korean conventional attack is examined using both theater-level modeling and other forms of military assessment. Because of both CFC preparation and South Korean and US commitment, a North Korean major conventional attack appears very likely to fail: It does not appear capable of penetrating the forward CFC ground defenses, and even if it could, CFC air forces could stop a North Korean advance well short of its objectives. Overcoming these CFC strengths would require the use of weapons of far more lethality, such as chemical and perhaps biological weapons (in addition to conventional weapons), though their use raises other problems for North Korea. The prospects for success of even this alternative are uncertain and the risk so great that such a conflict is unlikely to develop as a purposeful North Korean effort at expansion, but cannot be ruled out as a North Korean act of desperation. It is also possible that some form of limited conflict could occur either as an isolated event or as a precursor to a major conflict in Korea. Such attacks could occur in various circumstances, such as a North Korean response to some form of sanctions that may yet occur if it becomes recalcitrant on the nuclear weapon issue. The costs of even a limited conflict could be very high. The CFC must carefully evaluate the kinds of limited attacks that North Korea could commit, and determine appropriate responses that avoid: (1) encouraging further North Korean attacks and (2) overreacting to North Korean provocation. Overreacting could lead to an escalation spiral that could plunge the Korean peninsula into a major war.

Making a US-ROK Alliance Military Coordination Center Work after OPCON Transition: A US Perspective

Bruce W. Bennett 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2009 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.14 No.1

Military Implications of North Korea`s Nuclear Weapons

( Bruce W. Bennett ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2005 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.10 No.2

미국의 시각에서 바라 본 한미동맹

Bennett, Bruce W. 한국전략문제연구소 2001 전략연구 Vol.8 No.3

한미동맹은 미국이 맺고 있는 동맹관계 가운데 가장 긴밀한 것의 하나이다. 현재 한국에는 독일과 일본 다음으로 많은 수의 미군 병력이 주둔하고 있으며,(주일미군은 주한미군보다 약간 더 많을 뿐이다) 미군전력은 한국군과 함께 북한의 침략을 억지하고 있다. 북한이 공격을 감행하는 사태가 발생 한다면 60만 명의 미국인이 한국과 함께 싸울 것이다. 하지만, 한국이 북한과 화해를 향하야 나아가고 있음에 따 라 한미동맹의 미래에 대한 궁금증이 생겨나고 있다. 한국의 김대중 대통령은 통일 이후에도 미군이 계속 주둔해야 한다고 항상 강조하야 왔지만, 미군 주둔의 필요성 또는 미군의 지속 적인 주둔이 미국에게 주는 이익 등을 명확히 설명하지는 않았다. 반면, 어떤 이들은 북한과의 화해가 이루어짐에 따라 북 한의 위협은 사라졌으며, 따라서 한반도에 미군은 더 이상 펼 요하지 않고 속히 철수되어야 하며 한미동맹은 종결되어야 한다고 말한다. 2000년 남북정상회담 이후로 한국어 N 는 민족주의와 자주성을 지향하는 분위기가 고조되고 있으며, 몇몇 한국인들이 미국 중심주의적인 동맹을 탈피하기를 바라고 있다. 본 보고서는 한미동맹의 미래에 대한 중요한 질 문틀 몇 가지를 답하고자 한다. 한반도에서 화해의 과정이 진행된다면 한미동맹은 어떠한 형태를 가지고 얼마나 지속되어야 하는 것인가? 동맹이 더 이상 필요없다는 주장은 옳은가? 만약 필요하다면 왜 그런가? 화해가 진전되는 과정에서 한미동맹이 지속 되어야 한다는 근거(reason)는 어떻게 변해갈 것인가? 이러한 근거는 한국에 전방전개된 마군전력의 규모와 종류에 대해 어떠한 의미를 지니는가? 이러한 질문에 답함에 있어서 저자는 미국정부가 아닌 개인적인 견해를 밝히는 것이다. The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the closest U.S. alliances. But the ROK appears to be on a path toward reconciliation with North Korea, leading many to wonder about the future of the alliance. ROK President Kim Dae-Jung has consistently argued that U.S. forces should remain in Korea even after Korean unification, but has not clearly identified the needs he sees for U.S. forces or why the United States should be interested in such a continued deployment. This paper will address some of the key questions about the future of the ROK/U.S. alliance. I. The ROK-U.S. Alliance, Past and Present The ROK-U.S. relationship began after World War II. The North Korean invasion of the ROK in 1950 solidified the alliance. Total U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea are about 36,000 today. The Bush Administration is still in the process of formulating its military strategy, and issues such as the U.S. desires for the ROK/U.S. alliance will emerge from the chosen military strategy. II. ROK and U.S. Interests in an Alliance The ROK/U.S. alliance reflects shared interests of the ROK and the United States for regional stability in Northeast Asia and security for the Republic of Korea. While the ROK is clearly most concerned about its own security, the United States focuses as much on regional stability and also values the ability to project military power from Korean bases. To achieve these interests, both the ROK and the United States pay certain prices. Clearly, both Koreans and Americans need a better vision for the purposes of the alliance and the benefits it provides to each side. III. Options for the ROK Military Post-Unification The character of Korea in the future and of the ROK military in particular will fundamentally affect Korean interest in and need for a future alliance with the United States. The current U.S.-dominated, counter-North Korean alliance would change to one with significant ROK control and a regional orientation. Post-unification, there is a wide range of force structures that could be adopted by Korea. It is important to compare these structures in terms of military functions and risks, and in terms of potential costs. Post-unification, the ROK will not want to identify one or more of its neighbors as an adversary against which to do military planning. Instead, Korea will likely want to size its forces in the future to achieve a regional military balance. In the broad aggregate, Korea would want sufficient force to balance its neighbor's forces near its borders while avoiding military forces that threaten its neighbors. We postulate, for example, that Korea should have about one-third of Chinese capabilities, one-quarter of Russian capabilities, and somewhat greater capabilities than the Japanese. IV. The Alliance in the Interim Regardless of Korea's potential long-term interest in a U.S. alliance, does Korea need to continue the alliance through the current reconciliation period? The answer to this question rests on one's assessment of the North Korean military threat and how it may change over time. The bottom-line is that regardless of the intentions of Kim long-Il, a failure to reduce North Korean military power will leave the ROK vulnerable to catastrophe in any of several forms, a condition that should be unacceptable to the ROK. While Korean unification by ROK absorption of the North makes great sense in the ROK, it must be viewed as totally unacceptable to those with power in North Korea. Kim long-II must be pursuing a different kind of unification. Clearly, the long-stated North Korean goal has been unification of the peninsula on North Korean terms, likely via North Korean conquest of the ROK, though perhaps through a sequence of coercions. To reach it, he would require a short-term objective to "muddle through" the current economic difficulties, and several medium-term objectives: 1) Break the ROK/U.S. alliance (leading to removal of U.S. forces from Korea and perhaps from the entire region), 2) Rebuild North Korean economic capabilities, 3) Build North Korean international recognition and support. If these are truly North Korea's objectives, then the implications for the ROK/U.S. alliance are clear. First, North Korea still poses a military threat to the ROK from both a capabilities and an intent perspective, and therefore a strong ROK/U.S. alliance is absolutely necessary to deter a North Korean attack or to defend against it should it occur. While it may eventually be possible to reduce U.S. forces in Korea to some extent, any major U.S. force reduction before unification could undermine deterrence. Second, in the short-term, North Korea would likely treat even a modest reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea or any other "reduction" of the alliance as proof that its current policies are working, and that it need not pursue arms control or military tension reductions to continue toward its objectives. Until North Korea agrees to and implements military tension reductions and then arms control, U.S. forces in Korea should not be reduced by even modest amounts. Finally, any reduction of U.S. forces in Korea is probably not reversible in the next several years. Therefore, the ROK and the United States need to determine roughly what U.S. forces would be required in the ROK post-unification and move toward such force levels through the reconciliation period. V. Alternative Unifications The actual character of the ROK military, and therefore the military assistance the ROK will need from its alliance with the United States, will be a function of the type and course of unification. We have assumed above a baseline future in which the ROK absorbs the North. But other paths to unification could also occur. Interestingly, most of these appear more plausible than a highly peaceful unification by ROK absorption of the North. But the political outcomes in several of the cases lead to a situation where the ROK/U.S. alliance may be dropped for at least some period of time, and as argued earlier it may never recover thereafter. VI. The Future of the Alliance In many ways, the future of the ROK/U.S. alliance is currently dominated by momentum. But it seems far more logical to plan the future based upon the anticipated interests, threats, plans, and needs of each side. After unification, the alliance will be essential in sustaining the security of the ROK and achieving a military balance in Northeast Asia. How large and what kind of U.S. force might be considered for Korea post-unification? This should be determined based upon potential Korean needs and circumstances. Other issues to be addressed would include the transition of the current forces to these proposed forces, the location of U.S. forces, the nature of the U.S./ROK command relationship, and the connection between U.S. forces in Korea and Japan. The transition to this future force structure should likely be completed well before unification, as neither country will likely be prepared to pay large costs for changes after unification(including the costs of displacing or inconveniencing Koreans).

North Korea`s WMD Capability and The Regional Military Balance: AU.S. Perspective

Bruce W. Bennett 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2009 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.14 No.2