북한 3대 세습과 군부의 진로

하정열(Ha Jung-yul) 한국전략문제연구소 2011 전략연구 Vol.52 No.-

북한은 근현대사에서 유례를 찾기 힘든 ‘3대 세습’을 추진하고 있다. 27세에 불과한 김정은이 조선인민군 대장이라는 군사 칭호를 부여받고, 당 중앙군사위원회 부위원장 자리에 올라 3대 세습을 기정사실화 하고 있다. 김정일에서 김정은으로의 권력승계는 확실해보인다. 북한의 후견인 역할을 하고 있는 중국도 북한의 세습체계를 인정하고 있는 것으로 알려져 있다. 권력이양이 얼마의 기간 동안에 어떠한 절차를 거쳐 이루어 질것인지에 대한 전망은 쉽지 않다. 북한의 권력구조가 복잡하고, 보호자인 김정일의 수명을 예측하기 어려우며, 북한 군부의 동향과 주민들의 움직임도 예단할 수 없기 때문이다. ‘김정은 체제’가 정착되기 전 김정일의 갑작스러운 유고시에는 북한의 권력층은 이해관계에 따라 분열되고, 이합 집산될 가능성이 높다. 즉 북한체제의 불안정사태가 발생할 가능성이 높아질 것이다. 그러나 중국이 한반도의 북쪽에 친미정권 또는 중국에 순응하지 않는 정부가 들어서는 것을 방관하고 있지는 않을 것이며, 유사시 직접적인 개입을 시도할 것이다. 북한 군부는 3대세습의 기간에도 ‘선군정치’의 주역으로서 충성을 다하며, 지도부 보위역할을 수행할 것으로 판단된다. 이 과정에서 권력의 중추는 ‘국방위원회’에서 ‘당중앙군사위원회’로 이동할 가능성이 높다. 즉 북한은 당-국가체제 복원을 통해 당의 권위를 회복하면서 군에 대한 당적지도 강화를 시도할 것이다. 김정일이 생존하고 있는 한 김정은을 포함한 새로운 세습지도부가 대내외 정책에서 지금과 다른 큰 변화를 추구할 가능성은 크지 않는 것으로 보인다. 그러나 경제난과 국제적 고립이라는 어려운 여건 하에서 권력을 세습한 ‘김정은 정권’이 개혁개방으로의 변화를 시도하지 않는 한 대내외적으로 정통성을 인정받기는 쉽지 않을 것이다. 앞으로도 북한정권은 핵 등 비대칭전력을 앞세워 우리 내부를 교란하고, 비대칭적 도발을 계속할 것이다. 북한의 체제불안정 요인이 지속되는 한 한반도에서 군사적 긴장은 불가피하다. 김정은으로의 후계체제가 가시화됨에 따라 북한당국의 정책방향을 예의 주시해야 하는 이유이다. North Korea is attempting hereditary succession for the third consecutive generation, a phenomenon that is difficult to find precedent in modern history. Kim Jung Eun, a mere 27 years old, has been granted the military title of General in the North Korean People’s Army and risen to the position of Vice Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission. These events seem to indicate that the third generation hereditary succession is an established fact; indeed, the transition of power from Kim Jung Il to Kim Jung Eun seems destined to occur. It has also been known that the People’s Republic of China, long thought to be a guardian of North Korea, has acknowledged North Korea’s succession. It is not easy to forecast the exact duration and processes that will be involved in the transition of power given that the power structure of North Korea is complex, the continued health of its current leader Kim Jung Il by no means a certainty and the sentiments harbored by the North Korean military and general population difficult to predict. If Kim Jung Il were to suddenly pass away prior to the stable establishment of a power structure centered around Kim Jung Eun, there is a high possibility of dissolution within the North Korean senior leadership in accordance with its respective interests, followed by factional realignment. This points to the likelihood of an instability situation occurring within North Korea. However, China will not stand idly by while a regime favorable towards the United States or one that does not show compliance towards China takes power. It is highly likely that China will intervene directly in the case of such an event. The current assessment regarding the North Korean military is that it will continue to loyally perform its leading role in “Military-First Politics” and defend the senior leadership. In this process, there is a possibility that the center of power will move from the National Defense Commission to the Party’s Central Military Commission. What this indicates is that North Korea may try to restore the Party-Nation system, allowing the Party to recover its authority and strengthen the level of control over the military. While Kim Jung Il still lives, it does not seem likely that the new leadership, including Kim Jung Eun, would try to implement large-scale changes to the current domestic and foreign policy. However, unless the Kim Jung Eun regime attempts to overcome the difficult situation it has inherited - economic strife and international isolation - by reforms and opening its doors, it will be difficult for the regime’s legitimacy to be recognized domestically or internationally. In the future, the North Korean regime will attempt to sow internal confusion within the Republic of Korea through its asymmetrical forces, including its nuclear capabilities. It will also continue its asymmetrical provocations. As long as the potential factors for instability exist within the North Korean regime, military tensions upon the Korean peninsula is inevitable. As Kim Jung Eun’s succession becomes more of a possibility, this is why we must pay even closer attention to the policy direction taken by North Korea.

한국 신정부의 안보정책과 동맹 발전 방안

하정열 ( Ha Jung-yul ) 한국군사학회 2017 군사논단 Vol.90 No.-

Security policy led by the Moon Jae-in administration takes a making process. The objective is to pursue a responsible power leading democracy and peace. The Moon administration selected responsible national defense, national interest first cooperative diplomacy and peaceful unification as core areas of emphasis in oder to achieve the objective. First, for the purpose of carrying out a responsible national defense, the administration will implement the six tasks as follows: ① early modernization of core warfighting assets including Korean Air Missile Defense(KAMD) and Kill-Chain; ② transition of wartime operational control within the Moon administration based on the solid ROK-U.S. alliance; ③ Firm implementation of defense reform and civilian supremacy; ④ cultivation of defense industry leading 4th industrial revolution; ⑤ improvement of soldiers` service environment and military human right; and ⑥ reward to the dedicated personnel to the country. To actualize national interest first cooperative diplomacy is to achieve the five areas of emphasis as follows: ① achieve national interest through people`s diplomacy; ② reinforce cooperative diplomacy with neighboring countries and create a responsible community in Northeast Asia plus; ③ substantially strengthen trade diplomacy capability toward an emerging macro economic zone; ④strategically reinforce public diplomacy in order to implement universal value of human-being and to enhance trust; ⑤ protect Koreans` lives and property staying in oversea countries and pro-actively support oversea Koreans. To create an environment of peaceful unification is to implement the six tasks as follows: ① build war-threat free on the Korean peninsula by resolving North Korea`s issue with determination; ② provide a neo-growth momentum by implementing new economic map on the Korean peninsula, ③ pursue a gradual unification by synchronizing two Koreas` market; ④build relations between two Koreas by signing the basic agreement between North-South Korea; ⑤ improve North Korea`s human right and resolve separate families, ROK prisoners of war, and kidnap of the North; ⑥ actualize social, cultural and sport exchanges between two Koreas and develop in the vicinity of DMZ. During the Moon Jae-in administration, its first priority is given to the ROK`s national interest, the administration will retain the tenet by further solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance. That is why the ROK-U.S. bilateral alliance is the most effective in terms of the existing security environment and long-term security environment, along with multilateral security regime supported by the bilateral alliance. In the context, cooperative areas of alliance should be expanded in strategical solidarity based on the military alliance, KORUS FTA and global perspective. Superb ROK-U.S. alliance including reinforcement of extended deterrence will become a momentum for resolving North Korea`s nuclear issue. Institutionalization of annual strategic 2+2 talks consisting of foreign affairs and defense ministers and enhancement of alliance reciprocity helps two allies resolve their pending issues. Integrity, flexibility and elasticity are essential for the Moon Jae-in administration to effectively carry out the security policy.