호주회사법상 이사의 의무

천성권(Cheon, Seong-Kwon) 한양법학회 2016 漢陽法學 Vol.27 No.1

Directors govern companies on behalf of the shareholder who elect them. All directors must comply with basic legal requirements under the Corporations Act 2001 which specifies four main duties for directors with a number of other areas of key responsibility. The Corporations Act 2001 requires that a company director or other officer exercise their powers and discharge their duties with care and diligence. This duty is subject to a business judgment rule that requires a director making a business judgment to: - make the judgment in good faith and for a proper purpose; - not to have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; - inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; - rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. In addition, directors and other officers of companies must exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose. They are prohibited from improperly using their position to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or to cause detriment to the corporation and are prohibited from using information obtained as a consequence of their role with the company to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or to cause detriment to the corporation. These last two provisions also apply to employees of the company. All of the provisions give rise to civil obligations. They are also civil penalty provisions. In a case where a court determines that a civil penalty provision has been contravened, it must make a declaration to that effect and may order the person pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty of up to $200,000 and may order the person compensate the company for any loss as a result of the contravention. The court may also disqualify the person from managing corporations for a period the court considers appropriate. The Corporations Act 2001 also sets out criminal offences where a director or other officer acts recklessly or is intentionally dishonestly in their failure to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith and in the best interests of the company or for a proper person. Similarly, criminal offences are created where a person recklessly or intentionally dishonestly misuses their position or information they have gained through their position with the company. Directors have a duty to make full and frank disclosure of information within their knowledge to enable shareholders to make properly informed judgments on any matter.

뉴욕주의 증권규제에 관한 소고

천성권 ( Seong-kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2021 법과 정책연구 Vol.21 No.2

본 논문은 미국에서 1930년대 이후에 전개한 연방증권규제 이전의 증권규제인 주의 증권규제, 즉 부정증권거래금지법(청공법)으로 불려온 규제를 특징짓는 내용규제에 대한 연구이다. 이 규제는 증권발행의 실질적 공정을 확보하기 위해 주의 규제당국이 각각의 증권발행에 대하여 실질심사를 한다는 데에 큰 특징을 갖는다. 미국에서는 광란노도의 20년대라고 일컬어지는 1920년대에 바야흐로 부동산 거품과 주식투기의 시대를 맞이하고 그 후의 증권공황의 시대를 맞이하게 되었지만, 증권거래 초기에는 위험한 증권거래로부터 국민을 보호하는 경찰적인 관점과 행정적 관점에서의 단속이라는 발상으로 문제에 접근하고 있었음을 상상할 수 있다. 유럽에서 역사적으로 주식거래가 일종의 모방 상술처럼 여겨지던 시절이 있었지만, 미국에서도 주식거래에 대한 경계가 강했던 것이 아닐까 생각된다. 그러나 그 후 민주주의라 일컬어지는 미국의 산업발전시대에 주식시장은 경제의 중추를 담당하게 되었고, 특히 뉴욕증권거래소를 중심으로 한 상장기업의 주식발행규모는 비약적으로 확대되었다. 이에 따라 개별 거래의 공정을 행정적으로 심사한다는 규제방법으로는 대응할 수 없게 되며, 특히 뉴욕의 주 증권규제는 전통적인 내용규제에서 이탈을 비롯해 정보공개와 사기금지규제를 강력한 규제당국(법무장관)이 담당하게 되면서 부정증권거래금지법의 변질이 시작된다. 그러나 그런 규제 기법으로는 도저히 대응할 수 없을 정도의 증시 급팽창은 결국 시장의 폭주를 허용했고 증권 공황에서 세계 공황으로 가는 길을 열었다. 이와 관련하여 주 차원의 증권규제가 중요한 의미를 갖기 시작했는데, 특히 뉴욕의 마틴법의 구체적인 내용이나 특성 등에 대한 연구는 별로 이루어지지 않고 있다. 이에 따라 마틴법의 입법 경위 및 제 규정의 성격 등을 고찰하면서, 마틴법의 특성 및 의의를 명확히 하고, 미국의 연방증권규제 내지는 우리나라의 증권규제에 대한 시사점을 얻고자 한다. This paper is a study of content regulations characterizing state securities regulations, or regulations called anti-corruption securities transaction laws, that are pre-federal securities regulations developed in the United States. This regulation is characterized by the fact that state regulators conduct a substantive review of each securities issue to ensure a substantial process of securities issuance. In the 1920s, referred to as the 20s of frenzied labor in the United States, the era of property bubbles and stock speculation followed by the stock market panic, but in the early days of stock trading, we can imagine approaching the problem with the idea of a police and administrative crackdown. There was a time in Europe when stock trading was considered a kind of imitation trade, but I think there was also a strong guard against stock trading in the United States. However, in the later era of industrial development in the United States, referred to as democracy, the stock market became the backbone of the economy, and the issuance of shares by listed companies, especially on the New York Stock Exchange, increased dramatically. As a result, it will not be possible to respond to the administrative review of the process of individual transactions, especially New York’s state securities regulations, with strong regulators taking charge of information disclosure and anti-fraud regulations. However, the rapid expansion of the stock market, which cannot be responded to with such regulatory techniques, eventually allowed the market to surge and paved the way for a global panic from a stock market panic. In this regard, state-level securities regulations have become important, especially little research has been done on the specifics and characteristics of the Martin Act in New York. Accordingly, we would like to clarify the characteristics and significance of Martin’s law, considering the legislative context and nature of the Martin Act, and obtain implications for the regulation of U.S. federal securities or Korean securities.

미국의 회사지배구조와 정치활동지출

천성권 ( Seong Kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2016 법과 정책연구 Vol.16 No.3

회사의 정치관련 지출에 대한 문제에 있어서는 원래 회사에 표현의 자유가 인정되는가 하는 인권향유주체성의 문제나 권리능력의 문제에 더하여, 정치활동을 위하여 지출을 하는 경우 그 결정권은 누구에게 있고, 어느 정도까지 허용되는가 하는 회사재산의 용도에 관한 지배구조의 문제까지, 여러 영역에 걸쳐 논의되어 온 것이 사실이다. 본고에서는 현실문제로서 회사가 행하고 있는 정치관련 지출에 미국의 회사법이 어떻게 대응하여 왔는지에 초점을 맞추어, 이사회의 권한 범위 내로 포섭된 사항에 대한 지배구조 구축의 과정을 탐색하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위하여 연방선거운동자금법상의 규제를 개설한 다음, 2010년에 있었던 Citizens United 판결을 회사법에 대한 영향이라는 시점에서 소개한다. 그리고 당해 판결이 있은 후 여러 입법제안, 회사의 대응, 주주의 반응을 바탕으로 회사의 정치관련 지출의 규제를 둘러싼 움직임을 정리한다. Citizens United 판결에서는 자신의 의사에 반하는 정치적 표현에 회사재산을 통하여 지출이 강제된다는 점에서 주주를 보호할 필요가 있다는 주장에 대해서도 이는 지배구조상의 절차를 통하여 달성할 수 있다고 보고, 지출규제에 의하지 않고 개시규제를 적극적으로 지지하는 자세를 보여주고 있는 바, 이를 계기로 이루어진 여러 입법적인 움직임은 우리에게 많은 시사를 주리라 생각한다. Following the U.S. Supreme Court`s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been facing mounting pressure from certain members of Congress, interest groups and investors to require companies to disclose their political spending. Last year, for example, 44 Democratic Senators wrote a letter to SEC, urging the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring issuers to disclose how they use corporate resources for political activities. As part of its Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, the SEC is currently soliciting public comment on whether to require disclosure of public policy issues, including political spending, though it has previously declined to require such disclosure, concluding that, absent a congressional mandate, “it generally is not authorized to consider the promotion of goals unrelated to the objectives of the federal securities laws when promulgating disclosure requirements.” Given comments made by Chair White during her tenure, suggesting that disclosure of political contributions does not appear to be in furtherance of the SEC`s mission, and in light of the fact that Congress recently prohibited the SEC from promulgating a rule requiring political spending disclosure for the rest of the fiscal year, it is unlikely the SEC will issue such a rule in the near future. In the absence of an SEC rule, investors seeking disclosure of issuers` political contributions and/or lobbying payments and policies have continued to try to affect change through private ordering, submitting shareholder proposals on the issue. There is a real possibility of lasting damage to numerous companies reputations and bottom lines. That damage could spring from three primary sources: new approaches to corporate political expenditures, lack of control over political spending made by trade associations and other groups on behalf of member companies, and a lack of transparency around political contributions. Until recently, most companies engaged in political giving through direct contributions to candidates via the political action committee (PACs). Nearly every PAC is governed by a team of the company`s executives who follow guidelines approved by the board of directors or legal counsel. Under federal law, these contributions are limited to $5,000 per candidate, per election. In other words, most corporate political giving was defined in scope and followed a clear set of policies. A company`s ability to exercise clear governance over its political giving began to lessen in 2010 following the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. As a result of Citizens United, corporations and labor unions are able to make unlimited independent expenditures in support of or opposition to political candidates. Thus, as corporate leaders look back on the 2012 election cycle with an eye to future political activity, they will be well served to closely assess the level of control they have over how their company`s money is being spent - and how those expenditures are communicated internally and externally. Companies that exert direct control over corporate giving and embrace transparency are much more likely to ensure that strategic political contributions achieve the intended positive impact.

보수계획의 승인과 이사의 의무 - 골드만삭스 관련 판례를 중심으로 -

천성권 ( Seong-kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2021 법과 정책연구 Vol.21 No.4

주식회사의 지배구조와 관련하여 임원의 보수에 대한 규제는 중요한 의미를 갖는다. 종래 임원의 보수에 대한 결정은 이사회가 담당하는 것이 일반적이었고, 이와 관련해서는 미국 등에서 활용되는 이사회내의 보수위원회 제도가 우리에게 시사하는 바가 크다. 미국의 경우에는 이 제도와 관련된 풍부한 입법례와 판례 이론이 있는데, 특히 골드만삭스 그룹과 관련된 판례(The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation., 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch.))에서는 종래의 다양한 해석기준에 관하여 언급하고 있어서 보수계획에 대하여 이사가 부담하는 의무를 이해하는 데 유용한 자료를 제공하고 있다. 이하에서는 판례에서 다루어진 논의를 검토하면서 보수계획의 승인에 있어서 이사는 어떠한 내용의 의무를 부담하는지, 그리고 보수계획과 관련된 종래의 여러 심사기준이 어떠한 변천을 격었는지를 검토하고자 한다. 이러한 몇 가지 쟁점에 대한 분석을 시도함으로써 향후 보수위원회 또는 보수계획에 관한 입법 및 해석에 유용한 논리를 제공하고자 한다. 향후 경영판단의 원칙 및 정관의 면책규정을 매개로 하는 이사의 책임의 본연의 자세를 고찰할 때에는 성실성 기준이 적용된 판례나 그에 대한 학설의 평가 등을 통해서 델라웨어주 판례법이 어떠한 가치판단 하에서 성실성 기준을 적용하고 있는지를 주시할 필요가 있으며, 이 판결은 이를 위한 하나의 소재를 제공한 것으로 해석할 수 있으며, 우리나라의 보수위원회 관련 입법이나 규정의 해석에 있어서 보수위원의 독립성 판단에 관한 의미 있는 시사를 줄 것으로 기대한다. Although a procedural rule, the demand requirement in derivative litigation is one of the most consequential doctrines in corporate law. Its touchstone, for Delaware law, is the decision in Aronson v. Lewis, in which the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether shareholder demand is futile and therefore unnecessary. This Article contends that the Aronson test is flawed. Its test for demand futility, in certain circumstances, overly restricts board authority. Furthermore, it encourages rational boards to delegate more corporate decision-making to management and board committees than they would otherwise. The Aronson test, venerable as it is, ought to be refashioned. Because of the demand requirement, shareholders may not independently pursue legal action on behalf of a corporation and must instead “demand” that the corporation’s board of directors initiate litigation. The demand requirement is a natural outgrowth of the authority that corporate law vests in the board to make corporate decisions, including litigation decisions. Boards are then free, within the boundaries of their fiduciary duties, to determine whether to accept or refuse the demand. Demand is not required, though, if it would be futile to ask a board to initiate the relevant lawsuit. This futility exception allows board authority to be overridden under certain circumstances in order that fiduciary duties remain enforceable. Aronson held that demand is futile when there is reasonable doubt that, inter alia, the underlying board decision was the product of a valid business judgment. Throughout this Article, that underlying board decision is referred to as the “Original Decision,” while a board’s decision to accept or reject the demand (assuming it is made by plaintiffs) is referred to as the “Demand Decision.” Although Aronson examines the Original Decision, it does so not because all bad Original Decisions are necessarily appropriate subjects for legal action by the corporation. Rather, Aronson looks to the merits of the Original Decision when there is reason to doubt directors’ ability to make an impartial Demand Decision if the Original Decision was bad, i.e., if they might face personal liability because of the Original Decision.

미국연방위임장규칙의 개정 동향과 시사점

천성권 ( Seong-kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2017 법과 정책연구 Vol.17 No.3

미국에서 proxy access는 2012년 주주총회 시즌 당초에 상정된 proxy access의 모습과는 다른 형태이지만, 상당히 빠르게 보급되고 있다. 이처럼 급속하게 확대된 이유로서는 SEC 규칙의 개정을 우선적으로 들 수 있겠지만, proxy access를 주주의 기본적 권리의 하나로 위치시키는 기관투자가·기관투자가단체·의결권행사조언회사 등의 영향력도 커다란 원인이라 할 수 있다. proxy access 규정을 정관에 규정하는 회사가 많아졌다고는 해도, 이 규정에 근거하여 주주가 지명한 이사후보자가 주주총회소집통지 등에 기재된 사례는 확인할 수 없으며, proxy access가 실제 어떠한 모습으로 이용되는지는 상당히 흥미 깊다. 이 글에서는 이미 논의의 대상이 되었던 맹아를 확인한 다음, 커다란 파도에 이른 원동력으로서의 추진력 등에 관하여 살펴보고, 미국에서의 proxy access에 대하여 고찰하기로 한다. Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders to include proposals in the company’s proxy statement. This Rule contains a number of substantive grounds for exclusion, including proposals relating to the election of directors. The election exclusion has evolved to allow for the omission of proposals that specifically affect an upcoming election. Until 2010, the exclusion applied to proposals that would have allowed shareholders to include nominees in company proxy materials. This article argues the SEC has impeded shareholder franchise through the election exclusion under Rule 14a-8. Especially, Part Ⅱ and Ⅲ traces the admin-istrative history of the exclusion and analyzes the SEC staff’s (the staff) interpretation. Part Ⅳ discusses more recent developments regarding the exclusion including changes to shareholder access to the nomination process. Part Ⅴ considers the problems presented by the exclusion and pro-poses a narrower staff interpretation. Election to the board of directors represents perhaps the most important function for shareholders. Directors -not shareholders- manage the company. Accordingly, as a means of holding elected representatives accountable and providing incentives for directors to focus on shareholder interests, “the powers of corporate democracy are at (the shareholders’) disposal to turn the board out.” SEC Rule 14a-8, however, restricts shareholders’ ability to influence board composition. From the outset, the Commission prohibited the use of the Rule to nominate directors. The Rule likewise prohibited shareholders from including proposals in the proxy statement that would have provided access to the proxy materials for their nominees. While the 2010 revisions provided shareholders with greater flexibility, staff interpretation continues to restrict shareholder efforts to influence the composition of the board.

VLSM기반 IP 서브넷 주소 계산법 및 관리기법

천성권 ( Seong Kwon Cheon ),김동학 ( Dong Xue Jin ),김영락 ( Young Rag Kim ),김종근 ( Chong Gun Kim ) 한국정보처리학회 2005 정보처리학회논문지 C : 정보통신,정보보안 Vol.12 No.1

One of problems of the currently used IPv4 addressing-structure is the fact that there is a shortage of IP addresses and mant addresses are being wasted, especially on sub-netting design. The variable subnet masking is a resolution to reduce IP address wasting. We propose an effective subnet IP address calculation and management method on VLSM. Also with proposed subnet IP address management method, a web based subnet allocation and management system is introduced.

이사의 감시의무와 위험관리

천성권 ( Seong-kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2017 법과 정책연구 Vol.17 No.1

21세기에 들어와 엔론, 월드콤 등 유명한 회사의 붕괴 또는 서브프라임 문제 등에 의한 세계적인 금융위기가 발생하고 있는데, 이러한 위기는 델라웨어주의 Caremark 판결에서 제시된 이사의 느슨한 감시책임기준에 일부 기인한다는 지적이 있다. 이처럼 금융위기는 이사회에 의한 감시의 중요성에 대한 강조를 환기시켰고, 이사의 회사에 대한 책임을 추궁하는 소송의 증가를 초래하였다. 그리하여 이사회의 감시에 있어서 적극적인 자세, 특히 위기관리프로그램은 위기에 대응하는 유익한 수단의 하나로서 고려되고 있다. 그런 까닭에 근년에 델라웨어 법원은 임원이 문제 있는 큰 위험을 취하는 행위를 이사회가 받아들이지 말 것을 장려하고 있다. 또한 현재의 상황에 대해서는 이사의 권한과 주주에 대한 책임의 균형이 왜곡되고 있다는 비판이 있다. 그러나 이러한 이사회의 경영상 결정에 관한 책임문제와 마찬가지로 감시의 책임도 엄격한 제한에 따라야 한다는 이념에는 많은 저항이 있는 것으로 보인다. 이 글에서는 경영판단의 원칙의 적용과 위험을 취하는 것의 관련 및 위험관리와 이사의 감시의무의 관련성에 대하여 고찰하기로 한다. This Article uses recent events and litigation involving Citigroup to ask whether corporate law as created and enforced by state legislatures and courts such as the legislature and courts of the State of Delaware is capable of reducing the possibility of a replay of the recent financial crisis. Specifically, after presenting the events at Citigroup as a case study demonstrating the excessive risk-taking activities of financial institutions, this Article outlines generally the tools available to the law to limit the sort of excessive risk-taking that occurred at Citigroup and elsewhere. These tools include regulation of business activities, capital requirements, rules for executive compensation, imposing liability on directors and officers for unreasonable risks, and rules governing the selection of directors and officers. This Article then divides these tools into those addressed by banking law (regulation of business activities and capital requirements), and those for which state corporate law plays a role (compensation limits, personal liability for unreasonable risks, and director and officer selection). This Article then uses the results from the recent Citigroup litigation as a case study in the limited willingness of state legislatures and courts to use the important tools allocated, at least in part, to corporate law to curb excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. Specifically, the article contrasts the weaker standards and application for finding directors and officers liable for their inattention to risk in Citigroup with the probable analysis under a banking law or other regulatory regime. This Article also explains why this result is inherent in a regime in which directors and shareholders select which state`s corporate law will govern. The article concludes with a discussion of normative implications. This essay analyzes the potential benefits of improved risk management practices, commonly called enterprise risk management (ERM), and the potential barriers to implementing meaningful ERM at U.S. firms. ERM is an integrated risk management framework that seeks to improve knowledge of and communication about potential risks throughout the firm, starting with the board and senior management team. Indeed, the board and senior management team are vital to creating a risk culture. The essay considers the impact of boardroom dynamics and U.S. corporate culture on risk management practices. The essay further considers whether regulation or a different approach is needed to encourage U.S. corporations to invest the necessary human capital in meaningful ERM.

일반연구논문 ; 경쟁사업자의 사업제휴와 반트러스트법

천성권 ( Seong Kwon Cheon ) 한국법정책학회 2014 법과 정책연구 Vol.14 No.3

반트러스트법의 적용과 관련하여 공동행위에 대하여 합리의 원칙 혹은 축약된 합리의 원칙이 적용되는 경우 어떠한 고려를 하여야 하는지에 대해서는 미국에 서도 충분히 확립된 판단이 존재하지 않는다. 특히 공동사업으로 운영하는 것이 불가피한 단체의 행위나 전략적인 사업제휴의 경우 단체나 사업의 성질을 고려할 필요가 있다. 이 경우 어떠한 고려를 하고, 그것이 반경쟁적 효과와의 관계에 서 어떻게 분석되어야 하는 것인가의 문제를 명확하게 정리하는 것은 우리의 공정거래법상 공동행위를 분석하는 데 유익하리라 생각한다. 본고에서는 스포츠단체에 대한 반트러스법 사건을 비교 참조하여 그 문제를 명확히 하고자 한다. 이는 미국에서 최근 프로스포츠인 NFL(National Football League)의 브랜드 관리를 둘러싼 문제에 관하여 연방최고법원의 판단이 있었는데, 사업제휴에서의 사업의 성질을 어떻게 생각하여야 하는지가 새삼 주목을 받고 있기 때문이다. 이에 따라 NCAA(National Collegiate Athletic Association; 미국대학체육협회) 사건을 살펴보고, 이를 바탕으로 최근 사례인 American Needle 사건을 검토하면서 그 배경에 있는 법이론의 흐름을 분석하기로 한다. 축약된 합리의 원칙이라는 판단구조를 제시한 NCAA 사건을 스포츠리그라는 특성을 감안하여 재조명하고, American Needle 사건에 관하여 다른 각도에서의 분석을 시도한 바, 적어도 프로스포츠라는 사업의 특수성에 관한 분석에 있어서 미국에서도 그다지 커다란 진전이 있었다고는 말할 수 없는 것으로 생각할 수 있다. 오히려 American Needle 사건은 NCAA 사건이 제기한 문제의식이 아직 해결되지 않은 문제임을 보여주고 있다고 말할 수 있을 것이다. Section 1 of the Sherman Act proclaims that “[e]very contract, combination … or conspiracy in restraint of trade … is declared to be illegal.” Virtually all “intraleague” player-restraint lawsuits alleging that the NFL and its member clubs have violated this statute are based on one of two theories: that one of the League`s rules constitutes a “contract, combination or conspiracy” that restrains trade by either (1) artificially lowering the compensation that a player would have received absent the rule ?that is, in a free market for player services; or (2) excluding a particular player or class of players from League employment (otherwise known as a “group boycott”). The first theory is perhaps best exemplified by antitrust lawsuits challenging the legality of a league-wide salary cap. The salary cap can be defined as the maximum amount of money that any one club is permitted to spend on player services during a given season. Without the salary cap, players argue, clubs with greater financial means would capitalize on that advantage by spending more than the salary cap limit to acquire the best players in an attempt to increase their chances of winning. Accordingly, the salary cap artificially depresses player salaries and constitutes an illegal “restraint of trade.” The second theory is best illustrated by the NFL`s rule that a player must be three full college football seasons removed from high school graduation before being allowed to play in the NFL. The argument here is that, absent punishment in the form of fines and loss of draft picks, clubs would employ the best players regardless of age. Accordingly, the rule precludes talented young players from earning an NFL salary for all of the years that NFL member clubs legitimately desire their services. American Needle answered a simple question correctly, but failed to address a number of crucial issues about the permissible scope of joint-venture conduct, the nature of a “single entity,” and the application of the rule of reason to sports leagues and comparable ventures. We argue that distinguishing a sports league`s “core” activities from its other kinds of conduct is neither a workable nor a legitimate means of conducting antitrust analysis. If that distinction is unworkable for sports leagues, it is equally unworkable for other joint ventures. We offer some thoughts on how courts and scholars should interpret American Needle, and we formulate a framework within which to assess the antitrust legality of intra- and extra-league restraints. We conclude that, in analyzing the business conduct of joint ventures, courts should appeal to a hypothetical bargain that would occur ex ante between the prospective members of the relevant venture, at the time of the venture`s formation and thus under conditions of economic uncertainty. To the extent that the members would agree to adopt a particular practice to promote the effective functioning of the league, where the league faced efficiency-ensuring competition, that practice should satisfy any antitrust concerns. This approach suggests that the NFL`s exclusive licensing of its members` IP ought to pass muster under the rule of reason.

미국의 중가산세 제도에 관한 고찰

천성권(Cheon, Seong-Kwon) 한양법학회 2014 漢陽法學 Vol.25 No.1

Taxpayers in the United States may face various penalties for failures related to Federal, state, and local tax matters. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is primarily responsible for initiating these penalties at the Federal level. The IRS can assert only those penalties specified imposed under Federal tax law. State and local rules vary widely, are administered by state and local authorities, and are not discussed herein. Penalties may be monetary or may involve forfeiture of property. Criminal penalties may include jail time, but are imposed only by a federal judge after a defendant is tried and conviction. Most monetary penalties are based on the amount of tax not properly paid. Penalties may increase with the period of nonpayment. Some penalties are fixed dollar amounts or fixed percentages of some measure required to be reported. Excise taxes used as penalties are imposed in the Code sections relating to particular kinds of transactions. Some penalties may be waived or abated where the taxpayer shows reasonable cause for the failure. Penalties apply for failures to file income tax or information returns or filing incorrect returns. Some penalties may be very minor. Penalties apply for certain types of errors on tax returns, and may be substantial. Some penalties are imposed as excise taxes on particular transactions. Certain other penalties apply for other types of failures. Certain acts may result in forfeiture of property of the taxpayer. There are over 150 kinds of civil penalties in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, ranging in severity which is reflected in the amount of the applicable fines.

회사매각과 이사의 의무위반

천성권(Cheon, Seong-Kwon) 한양법학회 2015 漢陽法學 Vol.26 No.2

In these difficult economic times, financial sponsors often find themselves holding their investments longer than they initially intended. Liquidity and exit opportunities are not easy to come by and are often fleeting when they present themselves. Nevertheless, a recent Delaware Chancery Court case reminds us that a board of directors must satisfy its fiduciary duties to all stockholders in a change of control transaction, despite pressures from financial sponsors or other major investors to “get the deal done”. In re Answers Corp. Shareholders Litigation, Consolidated. The case involves the merger of Answers Corporation (Answers) with AFCV Holdings, LLC (AFCV), a portfolio company of Summit Partners, L.P. Answers was a publicly traded company, and Redpoint Ventures (Redpoint) was a 30 percent shareholder of Answers. In early 2010, Redpoint decided that it wanted to sell its interest in Answers. Answers “stock was thinly traded, however, and Redpoint allegedly could only exit its investment through a sale of the entire company. As a result of the merger transaction, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the Answers board of directors (the Board) breached its fiduciary duty to its shareholders and that the buyer group aided and abetted the Board in that breach. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss such claims. Vice Chancellor Noble denied the defendants” motion to dismiss the claims of breach of fiduciary duty against the Board and concluded that the facts alleged were sufficient to support a claim that the Board members were interested in the transaction and had acted in bad faith. He also denied the motion to dismiss a claim of aiding and abetting against the buyer group, as discussed below. In re Answers Corporation Shareholders Litigation provides us with timely reminders about the importance of having disinterested directors approve a change of control transaction and with examples of certain factual situations that should trigger scrutiny by a board during a sales process. Vice Chancellor Noble’s opinion also reminds us of the need for the target board in a merger transaction to evaluate critically conflicts of interest in order to limit opportunities for plaintiffs to allege that the board acted in bad faith or that the directors breached their duty of loyalty. Finally, it provides a good reminder that the ultimate duty of a target board is to maximize value for all stockholders in the event of a sale of the company.