http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
Comparison of the Optimal Policies on International Product R&D under Price and Quantity Competition
양일석 한국무역연구원 2023 무역연구 Vol.19 No.6
Purpose – The first objective is to analyze and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a model wherein two governments compete with regard to research and development (R&D) subsidies, and two firms compete in a third-country market through product R&D investment and substitute goods. The second purpose is to compare the results derived in the presence of government intervention in international trade with those obtained in the case of no-trade and non-intervention. Design/Methodology/Approach – For this analysis, we extend Symeonidis’s (2003) work and develop an international R&D subsidy game consisting of three stages. Findings – First, the equilibrium levels of R&D expenditure, product quality, subsidies, prices, and firm profits are higher under quantity competition compared to price competition in the presence of government intervention in international trade, as in Symeonidis’s (2003) no-trade and non-intervention model. Second, the rankings of output and consumer surplus in the third country under the two competitions differ from those derived by Symeonidis (2003), who finds that they depend on the degree of horizontal differentiation and R&D spillovers. Third, the ranking of social welfare under the two regimes differs from the results of Symeonidis (2003), who establishes that the ranking of social welfare depends on the degree of horizontal differentiation and R&D spillovers. Research Implications – If a country is involved in international trade with substitute goods and its government faces R&D subsidy competition in the presence of product R&D spillovers, it is better for the government to provide R&D subsidies to domestic firms under quantity competition rather than those under price competition to ensure greater social welfare.
Lobbying for Trade Protection in Contests
양일석 한국무역학회 2010 Journal of Korea trade Vol.14 No.1
This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of a tariff which is endogenously determined in a two-stage lobbying game. Unlike the results from similar models, we can explain the diversified relation between industry and the policy effectiveness of an industry even with non-cooperation and homogeneity between domestic and foreign firms. We also find in the model that free trade policies can be derived as an optimal trade policy only when the domestic government cares for the revenue from lobbying to some extent, and the total lobbying expenditure is greater when a domestic consumer group is allowed to lobby the domestic government than when only domestic firms and foreign firms lobby non-cooperatively.
양일석 한국국제통상학회 2008 국제통상연구 Vol.13 No.2
This paper analyzes the voting equilibrium in the small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. Since the preferences of voters satisfy the single-crossing property, the policy preferred by the median-voter is the unique equilibrium under pure majority rule in the simple electoral competition. When we introduce the different ideologies by the candidates, the trade policy level in the voting equilibrium is greater or lower than the normative utilitarian benchmark according to the different groups’ relative densities.
LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING OVER TRADE POLICY
양일석 한국경제학회 2010 The Korean Economic Review Vol.26 No.1
This paper analyzes trade policy formation in which three politicians with different preferences bargain over trade policy in a small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. I examine three cases which depend on the share of the factor of production and exogenous parameters in closedrule one-round bargaining. Unlike the previous models in the public choice literature, this model illustrates that the preferences of the centrist party may not be strategically important. As a result, this party may not be a part of the coalition and it is possible that the extreme parties form a coalition.
International Process R&D Competition in the Presence or Absence of Government Intervention
양일석 한국무역연구원 2019 무역연구 Vol.15 No.2
This paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium levels of R&D, output, price, firm profit, social welfare, and consumer surplus in a third country in the presence and absence of government intervention. Moreover, it compares some results in the case that governments intervene in the market with R&D subsidies or taxes to those in a case in which governments intervene in the market with export subsidies or taxes. We show that the optimal R&D subsidy is positive regardless of the efficiency of R&D and the nature of goods, except independent goods. This result is similar to the case of an export subsidy. We also show that the results from the comparison of the equilibrium levels of output, price, firm profit, and social welfare with and without government intervention are similar to those from a case where governments intervene in the market with export subsidies or taxes.