한미동맹체제와 주한미군 : 역할 변화의 모색

김성한 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.1

Ⅰ. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asian Region, which spelled out the security details for the Clinton Administration's strategy of 'engagement' and 'enlargement' in the East Asian region. The U.S. security strategy for East Asia, enumerated in the EASR, aims at maintaining the leadership role of the U.S. in the region through the four specific measures: 1) revitalizing the alliance with Japan: 2) engaging China: 3) consolidating the alliance with South Korea: and 4) combining bilateralism with multilateralism. The primary means for this strategy is the forward-deployed U.S. forces of about 100,000 in the region. Under the strategic framework, it. is important whether the interests of the U.S. and of Korea converge with each other. One important area where the interests coincide is one in which Korea, for the purpose of survival and the U.S. in order to protect its leadership, need an equilibrium within the region where Korea is located. An hegemonic order in Northeast Asia would threaten the U.S. leadership position as well as the political independence of Korea. Since the equilibrium most conducive to Korea's political autonomy is based on continued U.S. participation in the East Asian security system, Korea will continue to prefer to manage the regional equilibrium in alliance with the U.S. However, the convergence of interests does not always guarantee policy coordination, since Korea and the U.S. can have different policy priorities. This is shown in their North Korea policy. The first priority of the Clinton Administration's North Korea policy lies at the global level where the U.S. deals with North Korea to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to other regions. The second priority is based on the regional level in that the U.S. policy to North Korea is interconnected with its policy of' checking' China. At the level of the Korean peninsula, which is the last priority, the U.S. must reduce the tension between the two Koreas in order to prevent the outbreak of a war on the peninsula and must also seek the ways by which the sudden collapse of North Korea can be successfully managed. On the other hand, Korea's priorities in its North Korea policy are in the reverse order. The Korean government is more concerned with how to harmonize and speed up the progress of improving the relationship of Washington-Pyongyang with that of Seoul-Pyongyang. The problem has been that North Korea has yet to start restoring trust with South Korea, though it has been vigorous in carrying out negotiations with Washington. If the U.S.-North Korea negotiations proceed abreast with the improvement of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, Korea - U.S. relations will remain smooth, but otherwise, their relations will face various complexities. In this respect, the importance of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. is emphasized. The resolution for the priority divergence between Korea and the U.S. can be achieved through redefinition of the alliance that is to be focused on regional priorities. In other words, both countries need to put their first priority on the strategic interests in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. This is the way by which the global interest of the U.S. and the peninsular interest of Korea can be converged at the regional level. Thus, both countries should emphasize that the Korea-U.S. alliance, that was created to deter North Korea's military threat, will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia, and that the alliance will continue even after the threat from North Korea disappears. In addition, Korea and the U.S. should start preparing for crisis management in the case of North Korea's collapse. As a measure of redefining the Korea-U.S. alliance, both countries need to announce the "Joint Security Declaration" as soon as Korea's new administration is inaugurated in February 1998. The Declaration will contain the following ideas: 1) The Korea-U.S. alliance is still valid in tills post-Cold War period; 2) Korea and the U.S. will continue to cooperate to induce North Korea to, conduct a gradual reform; 3) The alliance will develop into the 'regional' alliance that will take the role of promoting regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia after Korea's unification. However, both countries should not miss pointing out that Northeast Asian security structure should advance toward multilateralism, since this kind of a joint action could provoke China. After the joint declaration is made, Korea and the U.S. will have to begin consulting each other concerning the necessary steps to transform the alliance into the regional one. A key issue that is to be put on the table will be the role and force structure of the U.S. forces in unified Korea. Ⅱ. Korea and the U.S. will have three options. They have to decide whether they will actually terminate the alliance by completely withdrawing American troops from Korea or preserve a reconfigurated alliance only with U.S. naval and air presence, or redefine their relationship toward an alliance for stability and interdependence with a token presence of ground forces together with the current level of naval and air forces. The first option of a complete withdrawal of American troops runs the risk of precipitating a power vacuum which is most likely to be filled either by China or Japan, and to trigger Sino-Japanese rivalry and arms race. Should Korea be left alone in the wilderness without an ally, there will arise mounting pressure for developing nuclear weapons in Korea, which could lead to a "balance of terror." The second option of a reconfigurated alliance with naval and air presence can provide deterrence and reassurance to Korea to a certain degree. However, an alliance without U.S. ground forces cannot guarantee automatic American involvement in the emergency situation that could happen in Korea. In this case, the very credibility of American security commitment will be severely questioned politically. The last option of the alliance with a token U.S. ground force and naval/air forces can be a basis for deterring the rise of hegemonism in Northeast Asia and for preventing Korea from seeking a nuclear option. A small size (3000-5000) of U.S. ground forces in the southern part of Korea, far from the Chinese border, can play an effective hedge against the destabilizing forces and the uncertainty they will bring in Korea. However, this option requires a precondition, which is the Korean people's conviction that the D.S. has contributed to Korea's unification. Otherwise, the revitalizing task of the Korea-U.S. alliance will face insurmountable obstacles.

집권 2기 클린턴 행정부와 의회의 동아시아 안보정책

김성한 한국전략문제연구소 1997 전략연구 Vol.4 No.1

[특별보고서] 북한의 미래 - 전문가 설문조사 보고서

김성한 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 2014 국제관계연구 Vol.19 No.2

The Ilmin International Relations Institute (Director: Kim Sung-han, Professor at Korea University) conducted an expert survey on the "Future of North Korea" from April 14 to May 8, 2014. A total of 135 experts including scholars and former government officials from 7 countries/regions (South Korea 35, US 25, China 12, Japan 17, Russia 13, Europe 13, Others 6) specializing in North Korea and security studies participated in this survey. By analyzing their responses, IIRI has come to obtain various strategic implications. 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원(원장: 김성한 고려대 교수)에서는 2014년 4월 14일부터 5월 8일까지 한국을 포함한 전 세계 북한 및 안보전문가(학자 및 전직 관료) 135명(국내 49명, 미국 25명, 중국 12명, 일본 17명, 러시아 13명, 유럽 13명, 기타 6명)을 대상으로 "북한의 미래"에 관한 설문조사를 실시하였습니다. 설문조사 결과를 통해, 북한의 미래에 대한 의미 있는 결과와 한국과 국제사회의 대북정책에 있어 전략적 시사점을 도출하였으며, 이를 기반으로 국/영문 보고서를 출간하였습니다.

「IMF 시대」대미 외교의 방향

김성한 한국전략문제연구소 1998 전략연구 Vol.5 No.3

Ⅰ Korea's economic crisis has begun to force potentially important changes in the peace-building process on the Korean peninsula. The inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung under the financial crisis has led to a more conciliatory South Korean policy toward North Korea, thereby broadening public support in South Korea for the 'engagement' policy to North Korea while dampening desires for near-term Korean reunification. Recent developments on the Korean peninsula will require closer policy coordination between the United States and Korea on a broad range of issues including the KEDO process. Tactical coordination on such issues as food aid. progress in the pace of North-South relations, how to apply or relieve political and economic sanctions on North Korea, and how to respond to sudden economic and political changes in North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but critical. In order to make the Korea-U.S. policy coordination more effective, first of all, the Korean government needs to convince the U.S. government that the U.S. remain South Korea's ally rather than playing the role of a mediator between the two Koreas. The Clinton Administration could attempt to mediate between the two Koreas in the four-party peace process. Thus, Korea needs to. emphasize to the U.S. for instance, that the past data on North Korea's nuclear program be preserved and that the issue of North Korean missiles be dealt with not only in terms of their export problem but also of their development and deployment on the peninsula. Second. Korea and the U.S. should make all efforts to make their alliance enter a consolidation stage in which they frequently consult each other on bilateral as well as regional issues and seek agenda-building on the basis of shared democratic values between the two countries. In order to make it possible. Korea needs to well manage. through the political leadership. its relationship with China and the increasing cynicism of the conservative middle class to the U.S. Finally. on the basis of the mutual security alliance between Korea and the U.S.. a collective security system for the Northeast Asian region needs to be created. While bilateral security arrangements will remain the backbone of Northeast Asian security for a considerable period of time. the emerging new order raises the need for such a multilateral setting as the NEASED that was proposed by the Korean government in 1994. Korea should try to make it feasible and also actively participate in the multilateral activities at the track-II level. Ⅱ One important area where the interests coincide between the U.S. and Korea is one in which Korea. for the purpose of survival. and the U.S.. in order to protect its leadership, need an equilibrium within the region where Korea is located. An hegemonic order in Northeast Asia would threaten the U.S. leadership position as well as the political independence of Korea. However. the convergence of interests does not always guarantee policy coordination, since Korea and the U.S. can have different policy priorities. The resolution for the priority divergence between Korea and the U.S. can be achieved through redefinition of the alliance that is to be focused on regional priorities. In other words, both countries need to put their first priority on the strategic interests in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. This is the way by which the global interest of the U.S. and the peninsular interest of Korea can be converged at the regional level. Thus, both countries should emphasize that the Korea-U.S. alliance. that was created to deter North Korea's military threat, will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia. and that the alliance will continue even after the threat from North Korea disappears. In addition. Korea and the C.S. should start preparing for crisis management in the case of North Korea's sudden collapse. Ⅲ Korea and the U.S. will have to begin consulting each other concerning the necessary steps to transform the alliance into the regional one. A key issue that is to be put on the table will be the role and force structure of the U.S. forces in unified Korea. Korea and the U.S. will have three options. They have to decide whether they will actually terminate the alliance by completely withdrawing American troops from Korea or preserve a reconfigurated alliance only with U.S. naval and air presence. or redefine their relationship toward an alliance for stability and interdependence with a token presence of ground forces together with the current level of naval and air forces. The first option of a complete withdrawal of American troops runs the risk of precipitating a power vacuum which is most likely to be filled either by China or Japan. and to trigger Sino-Japanese rivalry and arms race. Should Korea be left alone in the wilderness without an ally, there will arise mounting pressure for developing nuclear weapons in Korea. which could lead to a ''balance of terror." The second option of a reconfigurated alliance with naval and air presence can provide deterrence and reassurance to Korea to a certain degree. However. an alliance without U.S. ground forces cannot guarantee automatic American involvement in the emergency situation that could happen in Korea. In this case. the very credibility of American security commitment will be severely questioned politically. The last option of the alliance with a token U.S. ground force and naval/air forces can be a basis for deterring the rise of hegemonism in Northeast Asia and for preventing Korea from seeking a nuclear option. A small size (3000-5000) of U.S. ground forces in the southern part of Korea. far from the Chinese border. can play an effective hedge against the destabilizing forces and the uncertainty they will bring in Korea. However. this option requires a precondition, which is the Korean people's conviction that the U.S. has contributed to Korea's unification. Otherwise. the revitalizing task of the Korea-U.S. alliance will face insurmountable obstacles.

「페리 보고서」와 한·미·북 관계

김성한 새얼문화재단 1999 황해문화 Vol.23 No.-

알루미늄 허니컴(HC) 구조재 적용 주조형 복합화약

김성한,이근득,박하늘,한민구 한국군사과학기술학회 2024 한국군사과학기술학회지 Vol.27 No.2

As the operating condition for the penetrating missile has been more advanced, the survivability of main chargehas been strongly required when the warhead impacts the target. Lots of efforts to desensitize explosives such asthe development of insensitive molecular explosives or optimizing plastic-bonded explosives(PBX) systems has beenmade to enhance the survivability of main charge. However, these efforts face their limits as the weapon systemrequire higher performance. Herein, we suggest a new strategy to secure the survivability of main charge. Weapplied structurally supportable aluminum honeycomb(HC) structure to cast PBX. The aluminum HC structurereinforces the mechanical strength of cast PBX and helps it to withstand external pressure without the reaction likedetonation. In this study, impact resistance character, shock sensitivity and internal blast performance of PBXsreinforced with HC structure were investigated according to the application of aluminum HC structure. The newlysuggested aluminum HC structure applied to cast PBX was proved to be a promising manufacturing methodavailable for high-tech weapon systems.

팁페이파 기공도가 담배 연기희석에 미치는 영향

김성한,이영택,이근회,양광규 한국연초학회 1984 한국연초학회지 Vol.6 No.1

This study was carried out to investigate the effect of porous plug wrapping and perforated tipping paper on tip ventilation rate of cigarettes. The wider perforated width of tipping paper was and the more rows Perforation were given, the more increased the effort on the tip ventilation rate, and the high porous plug wrap also had a influence on the tip ventilation rate. Tip ventilation rate purposed would be obtained by adjusting the permeability of tipping papers with high porous plug wrap. To keep the cigarette quality uniform, the high porous plug wrapping paper and the tipping paper of small pore and many rows of perforation must be combined.

상수도시설관리 성과지표로서의 유수율(%) 검토

김성한,최효연 한국수자원공사 2018 저널 물 정책·경제 Vol.30 No.-

매년 반복되고 있는 가뭄에 따른 물 부족현상은 수돗물 공급과정에서 손실되는 물을 절약하고자 하는 정책으로 이어지고 있다. 유수율(%)은 우리나라에서 개별 지자체의 물 손실 수준과 수도시설 운영관리 효율성을 나타내는 주요 성과지표로 인식되고 있으며, 물 손실저감을 위한 사업의 성과지표로 활용되고 있다. 물 손실저감을 위한 성과지표는 해당 사업의 서비스 수준 측정과 품질평가를 통해 효율성을 제고함은 물론 국제 경쟁력을 강화할 수 있어야 하나, 백분율(%)로 표시되는 유수율은 성능추적과 기술성능 비교 기능을 수행하는데 부적절한 지표라는 지적이 꾸준히 제기되고 있다. 본 고에서는 국내외의 물 손실관리 지표 정의와 활용에 대한 차이점을 논하였다. 유수율 지표가 수도시설 관리 외적요인인 물 소비수준, 즉 물 사용량 변화에 따라 달라질 수 있고, 유수율 수준에 따라 물 손실저감 목표량이 달라지는 한계점을 제시하였다. 향후 물 손실 성과관리 지표는 유수율 사용을 지양하고 단위당 손실량, 즉 급수전 밀도에 따라 급수전당 손실량(ℓ/connection/day) 또는 급수관 길이당 손실량(㎥/㎞/day)을 사용하고, 최종적으로는 데이터 표준화를 통해 개별시스템 성과 추적과 시스템 간 상호비교가 가능한 기반시설 손실지수(nI frastructure Leakage Index, ILI) 사용을 권고하였다.

RESOLVING THE KOREAN QUESTION: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH OR MUDDLING THROUGH?

김성한 통일연구원 1999 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.8 No.-

The comprehensive approach toward the North, suggested in the Perry report, aims at gradually reaching the positive-sum solution of the triangular relationship among the US, the South and the North: the United States lifts economic sanctions and normalizes its relationship with North Korea; North Korea ceases to engage in the WMD program by being assured of its regime survival; South Korea willingly accepts peaceful coexistence with the North. However, North Korea would prefer to adopt a "muddling-through" strategy rather than accepting the comprehensive proposal. In negotiations, North Korea would take "maximum strategy," which would slice the range of its concession as many as possible, while varying its negotiation lists. In order to avoid the situatin in which North Korea will muddle through, the United States, Japan, and South Korea need to devise a strategy that can increase their bargaining power. While maintaining the two-path strategy, those three countries need to think seriously about the tasks ahead, and what they should do to make the comprehensive approach successful.

동아시아 다자간 군비통제 추진방안:ARF를 중심으로

김성한 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2002 전략연구 Vol.- No.25