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The Obama Administration and Preparations for North Korean Instability
Scott Snyder,See-Won Byun 통일연구원 2009 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.18 No.2
Kim Jong-il’s alleged health problems in the fall of 2008 have had mixed effects on North Korea’s foreign policy and the responses of the United States and South Korea, among others, to the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. This paper explores in detail the implications of Kim Jong-il’s health scare for U.S. policy, including specific aspects of policy implementation that may have implications for U.S. efforts to respond to possible future political instability in North Korea. Second, the paper will identify current challenges and dilemmas facing U.S. policy toward North Korea and analyze how these challenges interact with concrete policy initiatives that might be taken to prepare for possible future instability in North Korea. Finally, the paper will draw some conclusions regarding the Obama administration’s preparations for and assumptions regarding prospects for instability in North Korea and how those assumptions are influencing the formation of U.S. policy toward North Korea. Kim Jong-il’s alleged health problems in the fall of 2008 have had mixed effects on North Korea’s foreign policy and the responses of the United States and South Korea, among others, to the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. This paper explores in detail the implications of Kim Jong-il’s health scare for U.S. policy, including specific aspects of policy implementation that may have implications for U.S. efforts to respond to possible future political instability in North Korea. Second, the paper will identify current challenges and dilemmas facing U.S. policy toward North Korea and analyze how these challenges interact with concrete policy initiatives that might be taken to prepare for possible future instability in North Korea. Finally, the paper will draw some conclusions regarding the Obama administration’s preparations for and assumptions regarding prospects for instability in North Korea and how those assumptions are influencing the formation of U.S. policy toward North Korea.
Scott Snyder 통일연구원 2007 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.16 No.1
The reemergence of a second North Korean nuclear crisis in October of 2002 has underscored the fragility of regional relations and highlighted the continuing proliferation dangers posed by North Korea’s ongoing nuclear development efforts.The regional response to the crisis through the establishment of Six- Party Talks in August of 2003 marked a new phase in efforts to develop regional multilateral dialogue to address regional security issues. This paper will analyze the significance of the Six-Party Talks, the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of Principles, and the February 13, 2007 implementing agreement from two perspectives.First, the author will conduct a detailed examination of the “action for action” principle cited in both the Joint Statement and the implementing agreement, analyze its significance and implementation, and analyze implications for the next steps toward the fulfillment of the objectives identified in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. Second, the Six-Party Talks will be considered as the latest stage in a series of ad hoc multilateral efforts over the past two decades to overcome strategic mistrust in Northeast Asia.
The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies
( Scott Snyder ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2007 Pacific Focus Vol.22 No.1
The experience of U.S.-DPRK negotiations during the first North Korean nuclear crisis has framed American and North Korean strategies and tactics as they have approached the second crisis. The six party talks negotiating format itself has been favored by the Bush administration based on its own perception of lessons learned from the Clinton administration`s experience. For its part, the DPRK leadership has relied on a range of familiar tactics in the initial rounds of talks, including calculated efforts to utilize brinkmanship and crisis escalation to catalyze a direct response to the Bush administration. In the case of both Washington and Pyongyang, the use of these tactics reveal that until North Korea`s nuclear test on October 9th, 2006, neither side had truly committed itself to resolving the nuclear issue through a give-and-take negotiation process. Instead, both sides have attempted to shape the environment to their own ends as a vehicle for reaping benefits through the mechanism of negotiations. The North Korean nuclear test achieved Pyongyang`s tactical goal of drawing the United States into direct talks, but against a strategic context that initially appeared to be relatively unfavorable to North Korea`s longer-term strategic aims. This paper will examine possible lessons learned from the first North Korean nuclear crisis, will review the progress of the six party process, and will analyze the tactics and strategies of the U.S. and DPRK, respectively, as well as the other parties to the talks.
Snyder, Scott The Institute of East and West Studies 1999 Global economic review Vol.28 No.3
In step with the global trend toward regionalism, there has been significant progress in the development of a regional institutional framework in Asia, although perhaps to a lesser degree than other parts of the world. This is evidenced by the establishment over the past decade of APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, and other multilateral attempts to address specific security issues. The attitude of the United States toward the development of such institutions for regional cooperation has been quite ambivalent and its approach might be described as ad hoc, utilitarian or instrumental. This paper examines the rhetoric, politics, and policy of America's seemingly ambiguous and inconsistent approach to Asian regional cooperation in an attempt to illustrate the factors that shape U.S. policy toward such efforts.