탈냉전기 북한의 안전보장 정책에 관한 연구 : 안보관의 확대와 핵·미사일 문제 = (A) study on security policy of North Korea in the Post-Cold War ear : enlargement of security concept and nuclear missile of North Korea

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this study is to examine the structure of security policy of North Korea in the Post-Cold War era. As the Cold War and bipolar structures of the post-war international system began to unravel during the late 1980s, notion of security bound to the military security become inadequate. Because other types of threat, that is, non-military issues such as economic threat, political threat and social threat are emerging critically. In other words, broad agenda for security, which means to each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages, are emerging critically.
Under this perception, this paper focuses on studying the changing priorities, trade-offs, and troubles among military and economic security elements of North Korea in the Post-Cold War era. With this framework, this paper covers two case studies: freezing the program of developing nuclear weapons and relinquishing long-range milssiles for the economic support from the U.S.
This paper will examine two questions. One is how economic crisis is redefining and broadening North Korea's national security sectors. Another is how economic issues help to define North Korea's foreign relations.
This study concludes as follows. First, North Korea's security concept was expanded in the Post-Cold War. North Korea reassessed the national defence policy due to its economic crisis after the Post-Cold War. Today North Korea is representing a new kind of state image : Gangsungdaeguk, through securitization of economic issues and linkage between military security and economic security. Thus, as military security context become enlargement to economic security elements, attemting to elevate economic issues onto the national security agenda North Korea's economic security policy showed that the program of developing nuclear weapons were replaced two LWRs plan, with a total generating capacity of 2000MW. Thanks to stopping missile test, North Korea had the easy of economic sanction in part and economic support from the U.S. Thus, shift of emphasis occured, through negotiation of nuclear missile between North Korea and U.S. In short, enlargement of security concept actualized at the expense of military issues.
Secondly, the economic security policy of North Korea followed to redefine its foreign relation. One of its national goals in negotiation relating to nuclear and missile was to receive economic support and official recognition from the U.S., Japan and South Korea. As the program of developing nuclear weapon was freezed and long-range missile was stopped to receive economic support, North Korea was able to redefine foreign relation.
Considering the above point, Today North Korea's security policy is the result of economic security, which probably be to redefine cocept of security and foreign relation. Goverment officials and expert in North Korea should be find economic security.
Still, given North Korea's security to project power far beyond its borders, North Korea will be assert and maintain : Gangsungdaeguk

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목차
• 제Ⅰ장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 연구목적 = 1
• 제2절 기존연구 검토 = 4
• 제3절 연구의 범위 및 방법 = 8
• 제Ⅱ장 탈냉전기 북한의 안전보장 개념 = 10
• 제1절 안전보장 개념의 확대 = 10
• 제2절 북한의 안보개념 확대 = 14
• 1. 경제 문제의 안보화 = 14
• 2. 군사안보와 경제안보의 상호작용 = 18
• 제Ⅲ장 북한의 안보정책 변화 : 위협구조와 국가 취약성의 동학 = 22
• 제1절 역사적 차원 = 22
• 제2절 지역적 구도 = 24
• 제3절 국내적 요인 = 27
• 제Ⅳ장 북한의 핵·미사일과 안전보장 = 31
• 제1절 핵개발과 안전보장 = 31
• 1. 핵개발의 의미 = 31
• 2. 북·미 핵협상의 전개 = 33
• (1) 「한반도 비핵지대화」 구상 = 33
• (2) NPT탈퇴 = 35
• (3) 핵개발 동결과 경수로 = 37
• (4) 북미기본합의문의 체결 = 40
• 3. 경제안보적 고려와 핵개발의 동결 = 41
• 제2절 미사일 개발과 안전보장 = 43
• 1. 미사일 개발의 의미 = 44
• 2. 미사일 협상의 전개 = 49
• (1) 미사일 주권과 경제적 보상 = 49
• (2) 페리 구상과 북한의 반응 = 51
• (3) 미국의 대북한 경제제재 해제와 북미관계정상화 = 56
• 3. 경제안보적 고려와 북·미관계의 정상화 모색 = 57
• 제Ⅴ장 결론 : 탈냉전기 북한의 안전보장 체계 = 59
• 참고문헌 = 62
• 〈ABSTRACT〉 = 71