Free-riding or bargaining? : the case of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study addresses the question of how the relevant model of the economic theory of alliances accounts for South Korea's defense burden-sharing in the alliance for three decades. To answer this question, this study first, in the broad and theoretical context, attempts to critically explore the two existing models (the free-riding and bargaining models) of the economic theory of alliances, and then to suggest that the relaxed bargaining model may provide a better tool for understanding the defense burdensharing relationship between allies. In the narrow and empirical context, this study attempts to apply the relaxed bargaining model to the U.S-South Korean alliance to account for South Korea's defense burden-sharing pattern over a period of nearly thirty years (1961-1988). Empirical examinations of four cases are conducted based on the thick concept of "win-sets" which is the core of two-level games, and on four (five for the last case) sets of contextual factors at both the state and domestic levels such as threat, economic conditions, interests, political and public support, and bureaucratic politics.
The major arguments are: (1) South Korea's pattern on defense burden (disproportionately less contribution) during 1961-1968 is characterized as latent bargaining rather than free-riding because South Korea did not commit defection or exploitation which is the key attribute of free-riding; (2) The Nixon Doctrine is characterized as tacit bargaining since it was a process that relied on actions intended (partly) to influence South Korea's policy changes on defense burden but whose goal was not to reach an agreement; (3) The agreement reached in 1979, which set South Korea's defense burden at 6% of the GNP, and the agreement reached in 1988, which requested that South Korea share costs for stationing U.S. forces in South Korea, are characterized as explicit bargaining because they were made through formal and diplomatic negotiation. They were affected by South Korea's critical security interest and improved economic capability, and by U.S. domestic constraints such as the high level of budget deficit, public opposition, and congressional activities; (4) As a whole, the relaxed bargaining model which includes three types of bargaining (latent, tacit, and explicit bargaining) is a better one for understanding South Korea's defense burden-sharing over thirty years. This study also notes that the nature of bargaining has changed as the context has changed.
Although this study is not meant to offer an overarching generalization on the defense burden-sharing issue, it has theoretical and empirical implications. The obvious implication of this study is to suggest that the logic of free-riding does not have enough explanatory power for the defense burden-sharing in alliances, nor enough persuasive power to impact on the intra-alliance bargaining processes. Instead, policy-makers or negotiators must understand the nature of bargaining concerning this issue and utilize the thick concept of win-sets which are structured by facilitating factors and constraining factors.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• TABLE OF CONTENTS = viii
• CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION = 1
• The Evolution of the United States-South Korean Alliance = 2
• The Defense Burden-Sharing Debate in Practice and the Measurement of Defense Burden = 8
• The Defense Burden-Sharing Debate in Theory: The Economic Theory of Alliances = 13
• "Free-Riding" in Alliances = 14
• "Bargaining" in Alliances = 15
• Discussions and Research Questions = 17
• Some Thoughts on Existing Models = 17
• Analytical Framework and Variables = 23
• Organization of the Study = 26
• CHAPTER 2 ALLIANCE AS COLLECTIVE ACTION = 29
• Pure Public Good Model and Joint-Product Model = 30
• Pure Public good Model = 30
• The Nature of National Defense and the Joint-Product Model = 32
• Two Aspects of Cooperation in Alliances = 40
• Coercive cooperation = 41
• Voluntary cooperation = 42
• Typology of Incentives = 45
• Entanglements of Domestic and State Level Factors = 49
• Undermining the Concept of "Free-Riding" = 53
• Relaxing the Bargaining Model = 61
• CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK = 69
• Two-Level Games: Win-Sets = 69
• Variables and Contextual Factors = 75
• Dependent and Intervening Variables: Defense Burden = 75
• Contextual Factors = 76
• Threat = 77
• Economic Conditions = 82
• Political and Public Support (U.S.) = 86
• Interests = 90
• Bureaucratic Politics (South Korea) = 97
• Empirical Cases = 102
• CHAPTER 4 LATENT AND TACIT BARGAINING = 105
• Latent Bargaining (Easy-Riding): 1961-1968 = 106
• General Background = 106
• Analysis of Contextual Factors = 108
• Threat = 108
• Economic Conditions = 115
• Political and Public Support (U.S.) = 116
• Interests = 125
• Overall Evaluation = 131
• Tacit Bargaining (Nixon Doctrine): 1969 = 134
• General Background = 134
• Analysis of Contextual Factors = 139
• Threat = 139
• Economic Conditions = 139
• Political and Public Support (U.S.) = 140
• Interests = 143
• Overall Evaluation = 147
• CHAPTER 5 EXPLICIT BARGAINING = 151
• Bargaining on 6% of the GNP: 1979 = 151
• General Background = 151
• Analysis of Contextual Factors = 154
• Threat = 154
• Economic Conditions = 161
• Political and Public Support (U.S.) = 162
• Interests = 166
• Overall Evaluation = 170
• Bargaining on Stationing Cost-Sharing in 1988 SCM = 173
• General Background = 173
• Analysis of Contextual Factors = 176
• Threat = 176
• Economic Conditions = 186
• Political and Public Support (U.S.) = 188
• Interests = 192
• Bureaucratic Politics (South Korea) = 196
• Overall Evaluation = 199
• CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS = 204
• Theoretical Arguments = 205
• Empirical Findings = 211
• Case I: Latent Bargaining---Easy-Riding (1961-1968) = 211
• Case II: Tacit Bargaining---Nixon Doctrine (1969) = 214
• Case III: Explicit Bargaining---6% of the GNP (1979) = 216
• Case IV: Explicit Bargaining---Cost-Sharing (1988 SCM) = 217
• Implications = 220
• REFERENCES = 225
• APPENDICES
• Appendix A: Abstracts of Congressional Legislative Activities on Defense Burden-Sharing: 1960s-1987 = 250
• Appendix B: The GNP, per capita GNP, and Budget Deficit for the U.S. and South Korea (current dollars): 1961-1988 = 256
• VITA = 258