US-DPRK nuclear/missile negotiations, 1991-2002 : diplomacy and domestic politics

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study investigates the three asymmetric nuclear/missile negotiations that took place between the United States and North Korea: the Yongbyon crisis (1993-4), the Kumchang-ri crisis (1998-9) and the Taepo-dong crisis (1999). By analyzing the varying degrees of cooperation adopted by all parties during these negotiations, it argues that the outcomes of the negotiations can only be fully explained by the interrelationship of domestic and international variables. The dissertation raises the question as to 'when' and 'how' the US-DPRK asymmetric nuclear/missile negotiations succeeded politically.
In order to answer the above question, chapter two introduces contending theories of cooperation among nations and then discusses the shortcomings of existing theoretical approaches to international cooperation. Chapter three then presents the two-level game approach as an alternative framework for explaining variations in international cooperation. The next two chapters provide a historical background. Chapter four presents a contextual overview of US-DPRK nuclear/missile negotiations, discussing the preferences and coalitions among various domestic actors in the US and DPRK, as well as the motivating factors which explain how the two governments because entangled in negotiations. Chapter five explains the processes and profiles of the US-DPRK Yougbyon nuclear crisis between 1993 and the 1994 signing of the Geneva Agreed framework. Based on this, chapter six analyzes the outcomes of the Agreed framework and KEDO negotiations. In particular, this chapter examines those domestic variables and international factors which heavily influenced the size of the 'win-set' and, consequently, affected the process and outcome of the Yongbyon negotiations. chapter seven addresses the occurrence of two other crises on the Korean Peninsula, the Kumchagn-ri crisis and the Taepo-dong crisis, and explains why these negotiations concluded unfavourably for the United States. The concluding chapter provides a closer examination of these variables in the US-DPRK nuclear/missile negotiations. The major findings of this study are then summarized.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Table of Contents = ii
• Chapter One. Introduction = 1
• Chapter Two. Literature Review and Current Theory: Cooperation Among Nations = 16
• 1. Neorealism and Cooperation: The Hegemonic Stability Theory = 17
• 2. Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Game Theory and the Neoliberal Institutionalist's Approach = 23
• Chapter Three. Frameworks of Analysis: The Two-Level Game Theory = 33
• 1. The Theoretical Basis of the Two-Level Game Model = 34
• 2. Determinants of the Size of a State's 'Win-Set' = 43
• Chapter Four. The Context of US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations, 1991-1992 = 52
• 1. Achievement of Cooperation: The Beginning of the US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations = 55
• 2. The United States: Nuclear Proliferation and US Domestic Variables = 64
• 3. North Korea: Domestic Variables and Dilemmas = 81
• 4. An Explanation of the Achievements of US-DPRK Cooperation = 103
• Chapter Five. The Processes and Profiles of the Yougbyon Nuclear Negotiations, 1993-1994 = 121
• 1. The First Crisis: North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT, March - July 1993 = 122
• 2. The Second Crisis: The Push for Special Inspections and Super Tuesday, September 1993 - February 1994 = 143
• 3. The Third Crisis: The Patriot Missile Deployment Plan, March - May 1994 = 153
• 4. The Fourth Crisis: Removing the Spent Fuel Rods and New Korean War, May - June 1994 = 158
• Chapter Six. The Agreed Framework and KEDO Negotiations, 1995-1997 = 172
• 1. The Outcomes of the 1994 US-DPRK Geneva Agreed Framework and KEDO = 174
• 2. The US's Domestic and International Constraints and Its Soft-landing Policy = 190
• 3. North Korea's Domestic Politics and External Situation = 206
• 4. Obstacles to the Agreed Framework = 216
• Chapter Seven. Kumchang-ri and Taepo-dong Nuclear/Missile Crises Negotiations, 1998-1999 = 229
• 1. The Outcomes of the Kumchang-ri and Taepo-dong Nuclear/Missile Crises = 231
• 2. United States: The Domestic Factors in Changing Foreign Policy = 245
• 3. North Korea: Dilemmas and Intentions Concerning Proliferation = 265
• 4. Explanation and Conclusion of the Processes and Outcomes = 279
• Chapter Eight. Conclusion and Implications of this Study = 290
• 1. North Korea's Objectives and Achievements in the Negotiations Processes = 292
• 2. The Key Variables Affecting the Processes and Outcomes of the US-DPRK Nuclear/Missile Negotiations = 296
• 3. The Merits and Demerits of the Two-Level Game Theory and US-DPRK Nuclear/Missile Negotiations = 301
• References = 312