Is there an alternative way for the Korean pension system?

목차 (Table of Contents)

• List of Figures/ Tables = 4
• 0. Introduction = 5
• 0.1. Aim and nature of the Analysis = 5
• 0.2. Organisation of the Study = 7
• Part I. Old-age Security - Theoretical Analysis = 9
• 1. General Considerations = 9
• 1.1. Market Failure and compulsory Public Pension Systems = 9
• 1.1.1.Types of Market Failures = 9
• 1.1.2. The Cause of Market Failures = 13
• 1.1.3. The Role of Collective Intervention = 18
• 1.1.4. Implications of Intervention = 19
• 1.2. The Costs of a Pension Scheme = 22
• 1.2.1. Ways and Means for Supporting the Retired Population = 22
• 1.2.2. Costs and their Measurement = 24
• 1.2.3. Policies to alter the Costs of Supporting the Retired = 26
• 1.3. The Impact of a Pension Scheme on Saving and Investment = 28
• 1.3.1. How does Pension Security affect Personal Saving? = 28
• 1.3.2. Introducing a national Pension Plan and its Effects on Saving = 30
• 1.3.3. Saving and Economic Growth = 31
• 1.3.4. Relationship between Benefits and Contributions = 34
• 1.3.5. Saving vis-a-vis the Supply of Capital = 35
• 1.3.6. Comparing PAYG and Funded Pension Systems = 39
• 1.4. The Effects of Pension Systems on the Labour Supply = 42
• 1.4.1. Social Security and Labour Supply = 43
• 1.4.2. Retirement Decision = 50
• 1.4.3. Efficiency Analysis of the Labour Market comparing the PAYG and the Funded System = 53
• 1.5. Relationship between the Pension Scheme and international Competitiveness = 56
• 1.5.1. Social Security and international Competitiveness = 56
• 1.5.2. Labour Costs and Social Insurance Contribution Rates = 59
• 1.5.3. Labour Costs and international Trade = 61
• 1.5.4. Labour Costs versus fixed Exchange Rates = 63
• 2. The Overlapping Generations Model = 65
• 2.1. Financial Economic Analysis = 65
• 2.2. Voluntary versus obligatory Schemes = 71
• 2.3. Economic Analysis of relevant Parameters = 74
• 2.3.1. The Influence of Population Development on Economic Growth = 74
• 2.3.2. The "golden rule" of Capital Accumulation = 74
• 2.3.3. Determination of Capital Accumulation in the 2-Generations Model with constant, increasing and decreasing Population = 79
• 2.2.4. Effects of technical Progress = 82
• 2.3.5. Retirement Security in the Context of Economic Theory = 83
• Part II. Old-age Security - Country Studies = 88
• 3. Austria = 88
• 3.1. General Description = 88
• 3.2. The Institutional Set-up = 91
• 3.3. The Financial Situation = 93
• 3.4.1. Revenues and Budget Transfer = 95
• 3.4.2. Pension Expenditures = 96
• 3.4. Institutional Shortcomings = 97
• 3.5. Policy Implication and Options for Reform = 99
• 3.6. The Pension Reform 2000 and Conclusions = 102
• 4. Chile = 104
• 4.1. Overview = 104
• 4.2. The old Regime = 104
• 4.3. Basic Features of the Chilean Social Security Reform = 107
• 4.3.1. Coverage and Contribution Rates = 108
• 4.3.2. Functioning of the system = 110
• 4.3.3. The AFPs = 113
• 4.3.4. Accumulated Funds and its Rates of Return = 114
• 4.3.5. Administration and Costs = 117
• 4.3.6. The role of the Government = 118
• 4.4. Conclusion and Current Shortcomings = 119
• 5. Korea = 122
• 5.1. Demographic Transition = 122
• 5.2. The present care system for the elderly = 124
• 5.2.1. The National Pension Scheme (NPS) = 126
• 5.2.2. Recent reforms of the NPS = 134
• 5.2.3. The implications of the current system for the income of the elderly = 136
• 5.2.4. Social welfare programmes for the elderly = 137
• 5.3. The impact of ageing = 138
• 5.4. Fiscal Sustainability = 139
• 5.5. Conclusion = 140
• Part III. Old-age Security - A Proposal for Korea = 142
• 6. The Framework for a new System = 142
• 6.1. Main Problems of the current Korean System = 142
• 6.2. Basic Principles for Social Security = 143
• 6.3. How a Pension Fund shall be regulated = 144
• 7. The proposed Model = 147
• 7.1. The Presentation of the Modified PAYG System = 147
• 7.2. Discussions of different Pension Systems = 148
• 7.2.1. PAYG versus Funded System = 149
• 7.2.1,1. Inflation = 149
• 7.2.1.2. Income Redistribution = 149
• 7.2.1.3. Capital Accumulation = 150
• 7.2.1.4. Administrative Costs = 152
• 7.2.1.5. Rate of Return = 152
• 7.2.1.6. Asymmetric Information: Risk = 155
• 7.2.2. Modified PAYG versus PAYG = 156
• 7.2.3. Modified PAYG versus Privatised Social Security = 161
• 7.2.3.1. Criticisms of the PSA (Personal Security Accounts) Plan = 163
• 7.2.3.2. The World Bank Report = 165
• 7.2.4. Modified PAYG versus Means-Tested Social Security = 167
• 8. Summary and Conclusions = 169
• 9. Bibliography = 174