북한 핵문제에 대한 미국의 정책결정요인에 관한 연구 : 1993년 NPT 탈퇴 이후 - 1994년 제네바 합의를 중심으로 = (The) study on the factors on United States foreign policy toward North Korea : focused on North Korea's nuclear issue

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study covers the U.S. foreign policy and its development within the scope of time ranging from North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993 causing the repetition between the negotiation and its impasse to Geneva Framework Agreement signed by both the U.S. and the North in October 21st 1994. This paper is mainly concerned with the policy of the U.S. administration toward North Korea's nuclear issue.
The traditional foreign policy of the U.S. toward North Korea had been "cold war policy of containment" to assure and maintain peace and security for the Korean peninsula and also the Northeast Asian region by controlling the expansion of the Communism power and preventing war.
However, the U.S. foreign policy in the postcold war era was launched under the strategy titled "Engagement and Enlargement" by Clinton's administration, and the North Korea's nuclear issue has been treated, on the basis of this strategy, with the view of removing the main factor threatening national benefit.
In conclusion, it can be said that the U.S. nuclear policy toward North Korea has been determined by both international and domestic political factors and the change of North Korea's policy toward the U.S.
As a international political factors, there were variables of the countries such as China, Japan, Russia, EU, and South Korea, who have interests in North Korea's nuclear issue: China was the main variable in that she was the most significant and the only efficient friendly country concerned to the interest since the North' nuclear weapons under suspicion and Pyongyang's missile test triggered alarm in Japan. Japan could also have exercised their influence as much as China if the economic sanctions against the North had been carried on; Russia, on the other hand, suggested the octonary talk insisting that the problem could not be solved by only unilateralism of the U.S. or mutual relation between the U.S. and the North, but the suggestion was contrary to the U.S. view; South Korea, the country concerned directly, offered an opinion that they worried about the unilateral improvement in relationship process exclusive of the South.
As the domestic political factors, the line of policy determined by the administration was important. It was trouble and confusion that were noticeable in the administration including CLA, the U.S. Department of Defense, the White House, amd State Department, which has the substantial power of influence over the U.S, foreign policy against North Korea. Most of moderated, with the State Department as the central figure, considered the ultimate purpose of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT as reopening the U.S.-North dialog. They also insisted that the goal of North Korea, with serious economic crisis, was to receive financial support from the U.S. using nuclear issue as bargaining chips for th purpose of survival in the international community after the collapse of Russia. On the contrary, the hardliners led by the U.S. Department of Defense sticked to the idea that taking a firm attitude against North Korea was the best, concerning that it U.S. yield to intimidation from the North. Reprimand of Congress and pressure of interest group were continued upon the administration controlling the crisis.
It seemed to be affected by the change of the North's policy toward the U.S. that U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea's nuclear program was finally led to a moderate direction. North Korea's nuclear policy itself came to change from the nuclear weapon development-preferred policy to substitute profit-oriented policy. Nevertheless, North Korea began to launch the "nuclear option maintenance" policy at the same time, which was to delay giving up the nuclear weapon development.
Consequently, North Korea's nuclear policy has been developed bearing the character of both nuclear option maintenance and nuclear weapon subsitute profit-oriented policies, using nuclear weapons as a bait for negotiation, in order to lure the international community into helping Pyongyang to circumvent the financial crisis on the verge of famine and end its isolation with structural uncertainty.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 문제제기 = 1
• 제2절 연구범위와 방법 = 5
• 제2장 미국의 대북정책 목표와 결정요인 = 10
• 제1절 대북정책 목표 = 10
• 제2절 대북정책 결정요인 = 14
• 1. 국내적 배경 = 15
• 2. 대외적 배경 = 18
• 제3장 미국의 대북 핵협상 과정 = 28
• 제1절 미국의 세계적 핵정책 = 28
• 제2절 대북 핵협상 진행 = 31
• 제3절 미·북 제네바협상 = 37
• 제4절 미·북 제네바합의와 KEDO = 47
• 제4장 미국 대북 핵협상의 국내정치적 요인 = 54
• 제1절 정부기관(관료기구) = 57
• 제2절 언론, 이익집단 = 70
• 제5장 미국의 대북한 핵정책 결정의 국제정치적 요인 = 75
• 제1절 한국정부에 의한 영향 = 78
• 제2절 한반도 주변국이 갖는 대북정책의 영향 = 78
• 1. 중국 = 78
• 2. 일본 = 80
• 3. 러시아 = 83
• 4. EU = 85
• 제6장 결론 = 89
• 참고문헌 = 94
• ABSTRACT = 99